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521 Fifth Avenue: The Corporate Makeover of Education and Its Limits 
Samuel E. Abrams 
 
Milton Friedman and his disciples contended for decades that private markets could 
deliver better schooling than governments. In the 1990s, this belief was put to the test in 
the United States by Edison Schools Inc. and other for-profit educational management 
organizations (EMOs). Edison grew rapidly, running schools in cities across the country. 
Yet disappointing academic and financial outcomes before long pushed the company and 
its competitors to the margins. This study documents the expectations of EMO advocates 
and chronicles the failure of EMOs to live up to these expectations. The failure is 
explained as the consequence of paradigm encroachment: unbridled confidence in the 
free-market model obscured the difficulty of achieving, one, sufficient trust in a domain 
necessarily defined by incomplete contracting; and, two, political support for outsourcing 
a core civic service. For perspective, this failure is set against the relative success of 
nonprofit charter management organizations (CMOs) across the United States and of for-
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We have to beat the competition. If we don’t, there’s no reason for Edison. 
- JoAnn Cason, Principal, Gilmor Elementary School, Edison Schools, Inc., Baltimore, 
November 30, 2005 
 
Following the dismissal of students at Montebello Elementary School in Northeast 
Baltimore on the final Wednesday of November 2005, a collection of administrators 
gathered in the school library.  Montebello’s principal, the principals of Furman 
Templeton Elementary and Gilmor Elementary, both located in West Baltimore, several 
learning specialists, and two regional supervisors of Edison Schools Inc., the educational 
management organization (EMO) running all three schools, had convened to discuss the 
upcoming Maryland School Assessment (MSA).1  
 The MSA is an annual exam in reading and math given to all students across 
Maryland in grades three through eight in early March.  With No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB), passed by Congress in 2001 and signed into law by President George W. Bush 
in 2002, federal elementary and secondary school funding to states required the 
administration of exams like the MSA.  With the goal of identifying and closing “the 
achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between 
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers,”  NCLB mandated, first, that at 
                                                
1 Visit to Montebello Elementary, November 30, 2005. 
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all schools receiving federal funding, students in grades three through eight and at one 
year at the secondary level be tested in reading and math;2 and, second, that schools 
exhibit Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), meaning annual improvement on these exams 
at each grade level and for each subgroup (defined by race, ethnicity, income bracket, 
disability, and degree of English proficiency).3 
 If schools failed to achieve AYP for two consecutive years, they were identified 
for “school improvement” and had to permit students to transfer to a better school within 
the district; if schools failed to achieve AYP for three consecutive years, local district 
officials had to use a portion of their Title I money, allocated by the federal government 
to assist disadvantaged students, to contract with outside organizations, for-profit or 
nonprofit, to provide “supplementary educational services” (SES) in the form of after-
school and summer tutoring;4 if such failure happened the next year, schools got targeted 
for “corrective action” and could be reorganized and restaffed like any underperforming 
division of a corporation; if such failure ensued for a fifth consecutive year, schools were 
slated for “restructuring” and could be turned over to the state, a for-profit company like 
Edison, or a nonprofit operator of charter schools, alternatives to district schools 
introduced by the Minnesota legislature in 1991 and financed with public money but 
privately managed.5  In addition, NCLB stipulated that states “include sanctions and 
rewards, such as bonuses and recognition, … to hold local educational agencies and 
                                                
2 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110-January 8, 2002, Section 1001 (3) and 
Section 1111(b)(3)(C)(v). 
3 Ibid., Section 1111(b)(2)(C)(v). 
4 Ibid., Section 1116(b) and (e). 




public elementary and secondary schools accountable for student achievement” and, 
moreover, create, or aid local educational agencies in creating, “merit-based performance 
systems.”6 
Operating a projector and taking the small audience through one slide after 
another about the MSA, Kent Luetke-Stahlman, Edison’s community technical services 
manager, explained what students at each grade level would be expected to know.  The 
principals, assistant principals, and several learning specialists from Furman Templeton, 
Gilmor, and Montebello silently took notes; also in attendance was Edison’s regional 
supervisor, a former principal named Sarah Horsey, celebrated by The Baltimore Sun as a 
school turnaround genius.7 The MSA would be administered in early March, more than 
three months away.  The mood in the library was nevertheless grim. 
 In reviewing the math exam for fifth-graders, Luetke-Stahlman said, “The kids 
will have to know how to convert the following fractions into percentages: one-fourth, 
one-third, a half, two-thirds, and three-fourths.  Don’t worry about five-eighths.  That’s 
not on the test.  Focus on what’s on the test.  The kids have to do well on the test.”8 
“That’s right,” chimed in JoAnn Cason, the principal of Gilmor.  “Remember 
what Mr. [John] Chubb [then Edison’s chief education officer] said here last month.  We 
have to beat the competition.  If we don’t, there’s no reason for Edison.”9 
                                                
6 Ibid., Section 1111 (b)(2)(A)(iii) and Section 2113(c)(12). 
7 Howard Libit, “The Power of a Strong Principal Leadership:  Sarah Horsey Pushes Pimlico 
Elementary Teachers and Pupils to Be the Best in Baltimore,” Baltimore Sun, May 29, 2000. 
8 Kent Luetke-Stahlman, November 30, 2005. 
9 JoAnn Cason, November 30, 2005. 
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Luetke-Stahlman’s instructions, no doubt, echoed those of school administrators 
across the country in this era of high-stakes testing.10  Luetke-Stahlman’s counsel, in fact, 
bore an uncanny resemblance to the words of admonition uttered by the assistant 
principal in a Baltimore school in the HBO series The Wire to Roland “Prez” 
Pryzbylewski, a detective-turned-teacher. The administrator repeatedly urged 
Pryzbylewski to focus on preparing his students for the MSA.  “Stay on the curriculum, 
Mr. Pryzbylewski,” she says, for example, upon learning of his intention to integrate 
board games like Parcheesi and Monopoly into his lessons, “or you’ll have an area 
superintendent on our backs.”11  But the pressure on a company like Edison to teach to 
the test stands to be that much greater, and its method more systematic, for precisely the 
reason articulated by Cason:  EMOs must exhibit concrete gains to justify contract 
renewals, never mind earn performance-based payments. 
Since 2005, this pressure has only intensified.  Race to the Top (RTTT), crafted 
by the Obama administration and passed by Congress in 2009 as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, built on NCLB.  Under RTTT, states were awarded 
additional federal funds for tying teacher assessments and pay to student performance on 
                                                
10 See David C. Berliner and Bruce J. Biddle, The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, and the 
Attack on America’s Public Schools (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 1995),194-202; Sharon L. 
Nichols and David C. Berliner, Collateral Damage: How High-Stakes Testing Corrupts 
America’s Schools (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2007), 122-143; Linda Perlstein, 
Tested: One American School Struggles to Make the Grade (New York: Holt, 2007), 119-123, 
189-199. 
11 David Simon, Season Four, Episode Seven, “Unto Others,” The Wire, HBO, 2007.  While 
Pryzbylewski tells his assistant principal he wants to obtain the board games from the school’s 
book room in order to integrate them into his lessons, his intention is to use the dice from the 
board games to teach his students the basics of probability. 
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these exams.12  In addition, several states have since required that school districts publish 
reports documenting the effectiveness of teachers according to the exam results of their 
students, notwithstanding protests from scholars that such value-added assessment is rife 
with methodological problems.13 With the Common Core State Standards (CCSS), 
conceived by the National Governors Association in 2009 and rolled out in 2013 to unify 
expectations across the country, the focus on data, incentives, and consequences promises 
to grow. 
 Once administrators and teachers are held accountable for annually administered 
standardized exams, the obligation to teach to those exams can become oppressive. A 
stadium effect kicks in.  Much as successive rows of spectators at a baseball, football, or 
soccer game must rise to their feet to view a big play on the field, administrators and 
teachers have no choice but to concentrate on test preparation when their colleagues 
across the state are doing so. 
 The pressure is acute even if state exams are not graded on a curve. Proficiency 
levels on criterion-referenced tests, constructed to gauge mastery of material, derive from 
degrees of competence defined by earlier tests. Criterion-referenced tests, as opposed to 
norm-referenced tests, thus have a built-in curve.  And if criterion-referenced tests prove 
too easy one year or the next, with more students achieving proficiency than expected, 
teachers, schools, and districts nevertheless get measured against each other. The 
                                                
12 U.S. Department of Education, Race to the Top Program, Executive Summary, November 
2009, 9: Reform Plan Criteria (D)(2)(ii) and (D)(2)(iv)(b), 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. 
13 Aaron M. Pallas, “The Fuzzy Scarlet Letter,” Educational Leadership 70 (2012): 54-57. 
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proficiency rates of students of one teacher, school, and district are compared to the 
proficiency rates of students of other teachers, schools, and districts. 
 Schools in this environment forfeit vitality. Students in grades three through eight, 
as a result, typically spend part of each day drilling in math and reading in preparation for 
annual exams like the MSA and, to the same end, take monthly benchmark assessments.  
Science, social studies, arts, crafts, physical education, and play get minimized, and even 
critical components of English and math, as this episode in Baltimore illustrates, get 
bypassed.14  Faculty meetings center on test preparation and data analysis, not curriculum 
enrichment.15 Some school administrators have come to feel so embattled that they call 
their offices dedicated to analysis of test data their war rooms.16  Even grimmer, but all 
too predictable, journalists and state investigators found in 2011 that in sum hundreds of 
                                                
14 Center on Education Policy, “NCLB Year 5: Choices, Changes, and Challenges: Curriculum 
and Instruction in the NCLB Era,” July 24, 2007, 5-10, http://www.cep-dc.org/publications/; and 
Basmat Parsad and Maura Spiegelman, Arts Education in Public Elementary and Secondary 
Schools: 1999–2000 and 2009–10, National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of 
Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, DC, 2012, 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012014rev.pdf. 
15 Sharon L. Nichols and David C. Berliner, Collateral Damage: How High-Stakes Testing 
Corrupts America’s Schools (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2007), 149-168; Linda 
Perstein, Tested: One American School Struggles to Make the Grade (New York: Holt, 2007), 
120-123, 189-199; Rafe Esquith, Real Talk for Real Teachers (New York: Viking, 2013), 106-
114; “Why Great Teachers Are Fleeing the Profession,” Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2013. 
16 Ruma Kumar, “Schools Push Rigor, Reach for Stars,” Baltimore Sun, May 13, 2007; Maureen 
Downey, “Are Teachers under Too Much Pressure from ‘War Rooms’ and Constant Scrutiny?,” 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, March 29, 2010; Stephanie McCrummen, “D.C. Principal’s Hands-
On Tack Transforms Sousa Middle but Ruffles Feathers,” Washington Post,  July 6, 2010; 
Francisco Vara-Orta, “Schools Going to War—of Sorts,” San Antonio Express-News, February 5, 
2012; Paul Bambrick-Santoyo, Driven by Data: A Practical Guide to Improve Instruction (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 4.  Also, in visits to schools in Baltimore, New York, and 




administrators and teachers in Atlanta, Washington, DC, Baltimore, and Philadelphia 
changed wrong answers to right on the bubble sheets of their students’ state exams.17 
 As devised by its many advocates, from the founders of Edison to the architects of 
NCLB and RTTT, this makeover of education was supposed to play out much differently.  
Data-driven management, outsourcing school administration, and performance-based 
bonuses were engineered to bring about efficiency, accountability, and, ultimately, 
dramatic gains in academic achievement.  But these strategies did not bring about such 
gains and in the process yielded numerous unintended consequences.  Some business 
practices clearly serve schools well.  Information technology, purchasing protocol, and 
staffing at schools have long been in need of reform.  Public school systems have 
suffered, as many had long argued, from glaring inefficiencies.18  With the assistance of 
the Economic Development Council in New York City in the 1970s, for example, the 
Board of Education made some headway in improving payroll, inventory, storage, 
construction, and auditing protocols, but cumbersome methods and procedures 
persisted.19  Hiring and purchasing also remained convoluted.20 
                                                
17 Barbara Martinez and Tom McGinty, “Students’ Regents Test Scores Bulge at 65,” Wall Street 
Journal, Feb. 2, 2011; Jack Gillum and Marisol Bello, “When Standardized Test Scores Soared in 
D.C., Were the Gains Real?,” USA Today, March 28, 2011; Kim Severson, “Systematic Cheating 
Is Found in Atlanta’s School System,” New York Times, July 5, 2011; Benjamin Herold and Dale 
Mezzacappa, “2009 Report Identified Dozens of PA Schools for Possible Cheating,” The 
Philadelphia Public School Notebook, July 8, 2011.  
18 David Rogers, Can Business Management Save the Cities? The Case of New York (New York: 
Free Press, 1978), 23, 73-92. 
19 Ibid. 
20 David Tyack and Larry Cuban, Tinkering toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 78.  For an analysis of how frustration with 
such inefficiency paved the way for Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s takeover of New York’s school 
system, see David Rogers, Mayoral Control of the New York City Schools (New York: Springer, 
2009), 21-22.   
Introduction 
 8 
 Yet adopting streamlined measures for managing inventory and employing 
outside vendors for transportation, food service, or information technology constitute one 
level of reform. In the case of busing, meal preparation, and software, for example, the 
purchased good or service is subject to straightforward assessment and thus simple 
contract enforcement.  Running schools like businesses with test scores equating profits 
and losses means something far different.  Day-to-day education, after all, lacks the 
transparency necessary for conventional contract enforcement.  Education is an 
archetypal complex service, necessarily defined by incomplete contracting. The 
immediate consumer is a child or adolescent who can know only so much about how 
material should be covered.  The parent, taxpayer, and policymaker can know only so 
much from a distance. And the effect of much pedagogy may regardless take years to 
measure. 
 More fundamentally, educators, like doctors, do not have as much control over 
outcomes as businessmen because, in technical terms, the production function in 
education, as in health care, is by nature more complex. The traditional production 
function for industry comprises capital investment, labor, and technological innovation. 
In education, facilities and supplies constitute capital investment; administrators, 
teachers, and support staff equal labor; and pedagogical strategy takes the form of 
technological innovation. However, in education, the students themselves amount to a 
fourth input.21 
                                                
21 See Jamie Robert Vollmer, “The Blueberry Story,” Education Week, March 6, 2002, 42; and 
Larry Cuban, The Blackboard and the Bottom Line: Why Schools Can’t Be Businesses 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-5. 
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 EMOs like Edison have in large part won contracts to turn around schools in low-
income communities; middle- and upper-income communities have rarely needed such 
intervention.22 As abundant research has made clear, students in low-income communities 
do not come to school as equipped to flourish as their counterparts in middle- and upper-
income communities.23 Accordingly, much as doctors struggle in caring for patients 
raised in communities impaired by lead poisoning, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, poor 
air quality, inadequate recreational opportunities, and substandard grocery stores (lacking 
fresh produce basic to balanced diets), educators struggle in running classrooms in these 
communities.  For educators, the struggle is, in fact, compounded by substantial peer 
group effects, with troubled students causing trouble for classmates.24 With the 
exogenous factors unaddressed and without much if any additional funding per pupil, 
EMOs have thus faced a steep challenge no matter how impressive their building 
                                                
22 This has been true from the start.  BRL’s contract in the early 1970s was to run a school in 
Gary, Indiana, a struggling former industrial city.  EAI’s contracts from 1991 to 1996 were to run 
schools in poor parts of Miami, Baltimore, and Hartford.  Edison’s contracts likewise from its 
beginning in 1995 involved taking over schools or starting charter schools in underserved 
communities. Representative of the company’s work were contracts to turn around clusters of 
schools in such troubled districts as Baltimore; Chester, Pennsylvania; Dallas; Flint and Inkster, 
Michigan; Philadelphia; and San Antonio.  One exception among EMOs is National Heritage 
Academies, which has built charter schools in many suburban communities in response to 
demand from parents for an alternative to district schools. 
23 See Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, Economic, and Educational Reform to 
Close the Black-White Achievement Gap (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2004), 13-
59; and David C. Berliner, “Our Impoverished View of Educational Reform,” Teachers College 
Record 108 (2006): 949-995. 
24 Regarding peer group effects, see Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano, “Competition 
between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic 
Review 88 (March 1998): 33-62; Richard J. Murnane, “The Role of Markets in K-12 Education,” 
in The Limits of Market Organization, ed. Richard R. Nelson, 161-184; and Scott E. Carell and 
Mark L. Hoekstra, “Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed to Domestic Violence 




renovations, how sharp their personnel, how innovative their curricula, and how 
sophisticated their data systems.   
 
The case for for-profit school management may be dated back to 1955, when Friedman 
made his initial case for vouchers to amplify school choice.   Friedman stipulated that 
vouchers be accepted at schools run as businesses as well as at conventional public, 
parochial, and nonsectarian independent schools.  “Governments could require a 
minimum level of schooling financed by giving parents vouchers redeemable for a 
specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’ educational services,” 
Friedman wrote in an essay entitled “The Role of Government in Education.” “Parents 
would then be free to spend this sum and any additional sum they themselves provided on 
purchasing educational services from an ‘approved’ institution of their own choice.  The 
educational services could be rendered by private enterprises operated for profit, or by 
nonprofit institutions.  The role of government would be limited to assuring that the 
schools met certain minimum standards such as the inclusion of minimum common 
content in their programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to assure that they maintain 
minimum sanitary standards.”25 
In Capitalism and Freedom in 1962, Friedman republished his 1955 essay as a 
chapter, with only slight modifications.26  Over the next three decades, Friedman 
elaborated on his case. In 1973, he wrote an essay for The New York Times Magazine 
                                                
25 Milton Friedman,  “The Role of Government in Education,” in Economics and the Public 
Interest, ed. Robert A. Solo (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 123-144. 
26 Ibid., Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 85-107, 178-189 
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entitled “Selling School Like Groceries.”27 In his book Free to Choose, co-written with 
his wife, Rose, and published in 1980, he included a chapter entitled “What’s Wrong with 
Our Schools?” and updated his endorsement of vouchers and for-profit school 
management.28 In a similar vein, he wrote an essay for Newsweek in 1983 entitled 
“Busting the School Monopoly” and another for The Washington Post in 1995 entitled 
“Public Schools: Make Them Private.”29 
Alongside Friedman, other scholars applied the tools of economics to civic affairs 
and arrived at the conception of citizens as consumers voting with their feet.  In an article 
for The Journal of Political Economy in 1956 entitled “A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures,” the economist and geographer Charles Tiebout crystallized this kind of 
analysis, depicting citizens as “consumer-voters” settling in communities that best served 
their needs.30  In endorsing vouchers in Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, the 
political scientists John Chubb and Terry Moe in 1990 placed this formulation of the 
citizen as consumer squarely in the realm of education policy.31 
While Friedman’s proposal for vouchers was slow to gain traction, it repeatedly 
took the diluted form of legislation on Capitol Hill for tuition tax credits for parents of 
                                                
27 Ibid., “Selling School like Groceries: The Voucher Idea,” New York Times Magazine, 
September 23, 1973. 
28 Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement  (New York: Harcourt, 
1980). 
29 Milton Friedman, “Busting the School Monopoly,” Newsweek, December 5, 1983; and “Public 
Schools: Make Them Private,” The Washington Post, February 19, 1995. 
30 Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Science 64  
(October 1956): 416-424. 




children in private elementary and secondary schools.  Such legislation passed in the 
Senate in 1969, 1970, 1971, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, and 1984 yet died each time 
in the House of Representatives.32 On the heels of such failure, a bipartisan commission 
appointed by President Ronald Reagan to study how privatization could lead to “more 
effective government” issued a report in 1988 recommending federal support of a school 
choice system that included private schools, with the exception of religiously affiliated 
schools.33 
Friedman’s endorsement of competition from for-profit institutions was not 
advanced in that report but it was echoed in two books at that time by Myron Lieberman: 
Beyond Public Education, published in 1986, and Privatization and Educational Choice, 
published in 1989.  In the latter, Lieberman wrote: “[T]he only ways to improve 
American education are to (1) foster private schools that compete with public schools and 
among themselves and/or (2) foster for-profit competition among service providers 
within the public school system.... There is no public policy reason why school districts 
that can contract with ServiceMaster for custodial and maintenance services, or ARA for 
food services, or Burns International for security services, or ETS for testing services, or 
for dozens of other non-instructional services should not have the same right to contract 
for instructional services.”34 
                                                
32 Amy Stuart Wells, Time to Choose: America at the Crossroads of School Choice Policy (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 152-153. 
33 President’s Commission on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective Government; 
Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1988), 92-95. 
34 Lieberman, Privatization and Educational Choice, 4, 268. 
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Paul Hill, Lawrence Pierce, and James Guthrie fleshed out this argument in 1997 
in their book Reinventing Public Education: How Contracting Can Transform America’s 
Schools.  Beyond hiring companies like Sylvan Learning Systems for remedial 
intervention or Dialogos International for foreign-language instruction, they wrote, 
municipalities and townships should outsource school management.35  The National 
Center on Education and the Economy echoed this recommendation in 2007 in a widely 
publicized report entitled Tough Choices or Tough Times.36 
In the early 1970s, more than 150 school districts had, in fact, negotiated 
performance contracts with private firms to provide instructional services in math and 
reading.  Lieberman, among other scholars, wrote in detail about this brief chapter in 
American educational history.37 If students exhibited gains on exams, the firms retained 
their contracts and received bonuses; if not, the firms would owe school districts a 
refund.38  Yet discouraging results brought a swift end to performance contracting. In 
Lieberman’s opinion, contractors should have been permitted more latitude and time.39 
                                                
35 Paul T. Hill, Lawrence C. Pierce, and James W. Guthrie, Reinventing Public Education: How 
Contracting Can Transform America’s Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 
51-52. 
36 National Center on Education and the Economy, Tough Choices or Tough Times: The Report of 
the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (San Francisco: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2007), 67-78. 
37 Lieberman, Privatization and Educational Choice, 85-117.  See also Edward M. Gramlich and 
Patricia P. Koshel, Educational Performance Contracting: An Evaluation of an Experiment 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975); Craig E. Richards, Rima Shore, and Max B. Sawicky, 
Risky Business: Private Management of Public Schools (Washington, DC: Economic Policy 
Institute, 1996), 31-37; and Carol Ascher, “Performance Contracting: A Forgotten Experiment in 
School Privatization,” Phi Delta Kappan 77 (May 1996): 615-621. 
38 Ascher, “Performance Contracting,” 615. 
39 Lieberman, Privatization and Educational Choice, 100. 
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The new approach first suffered a black eye in 1970 with news that an Oklahoma-
based company called Dorsett Educational Systems had allowed students in its 
remediation program at a school in Texarkana, Arkansas, to preview exam questions.40 
Dorsett, it was discovered, wasn’t merely teaching to the test.  The company was 
teaching the test itself—on the grounds that it had been assigned, according to a company 
administrator, too many low-functioning students.41 Soon after, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), run at the time by Donald Rumsfeld, concluded that a $5.6 million 
one-year experiment in performance contracting exhibited no benefits. The OEO 
initiative involved six randomly selected companies providing supplementary instruction 
in reading and math to 13,000 disadvantaged children in eighteen school districts across 
the country.42  In a program assessment published in 1972, the OEO found that children 
in schools receiving additional instruction from performance contractors did no better 
than children in ordinary schools.43 
The one company in the country that had a performance contract to run every 
aspect of a school also failed to deliver.  Behavioral Research Laboratories (BRL) of Palo 
Alto, California, saw a three-year contract negotiated in 1970 to manage an elementary 
school in Gary, Indiana, terminated a year early because of low scores in both reading 
                                                
40 Joan Cook, “Business-Run Schools: Companies’ Profits Linked to Students’ Progress,” New 
York Times, November 29, 1970. 
41 David Tyack, “Reinventing Schooling,” in Learning from the Past: What History Teaches Us 
about School Reform, ed. Diane Ravitch and Maris A. Vinovskis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1995), 199-200. 





and math as well as declining attendance.44  The harsh response to BRL from teachers 
and community leaders didn’t help. BRL’s prepackaged curriculum and emphasis on drill 
and practice alienated teachers who valued autonomy.  And BRL’s very management of a 
school angered citizens who prized local involvement in developing educational policy.45   
Despite BRL’s ominous lessons, twenty years later, Educational Alternatives Inc. 
(EAI) ventured into the field of for-profit management of public schools.  EAI, based in 
Minneapolis, provided curriculum guidance and professional development to one school 
in Miami from 1991 to 1995, managed nine schools in Baltimore from 1992 to 1996, and 
ran the central office of the school system of Hartford, Connecticut, along with five of the 
city’s schools from 1994 to 1996.  Disappointing results and persistent conflict with 
teachers and community leaders had again spelled an early end to outsourced school 
management.46  
Much as Lieberman argued that contractors didn’t get the flexibility or time they 
needed in the early 1970s, Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie contended that EAI never obtained 
from Baltimore or Hartford the control over resources and staff necessary to achieve its 
goals.47  In EAI’s wake, another Minnesota company entered the business of school 
district management but soon after exited.  From 1993 to 1997, the Public Strategies 
                                                
44 Andrew H. Malcolm, “Company to Teach Gary, Ind., Pupils,” New York Times, July 26, 1970; 
Associated Press, “Gary, Ind., Ends Pact with Concern Running School,” New York Times, Dec. 
5, 1972; Ascher, “Performance Contracting,” 619. 
45 Tyack, “Reinventing Schooling,” 198-199. For a detailed analysis of how teacher voice may be 
diminished under EMOs, see Katrina Bulkley, “Losing Voice? Educational Management 
Organizations and Charter Schools’ Educational Programs,” Education and Urban Society 37 
(February 2005): 204-234. 
46 Richards, Shore, and Sawicky, Risky Business, 54-72. 
47 Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie, Reinventing Public Education, 5-6. 
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Group Inc., based in St. Paul, served as the superintendent of the Minneapolis Public 
Schools.  Amid news of disappointing results for Minneapolis students on statewide 
exams, the school board terminated its contract with the company.48  
By 2001, however, educational privatization was no longer an academic or 
experimental matter.  The company managing Montebello, Gilmor, and Furman 
Templeton in Baltimore, Edison Schools Inc., headquartered on the fifteenth floor of a 
Manhattan office tower at 521 Fifth Avenue, was running a network of 114 schools with 
74,000 students across twenty-three states; a little over half of these schools were district 
schools while the remainder were charter schools.  When Edison began operations in 
1995, it started with four schools (three district schools and one charter school) with 
2,250 students across four states.49 
 Friedman’s ideas had taken hold.  While Friedman’s endorsement of vouchers had 
not gained wide support,50 his recommendation that for-profit operators run public 
                                                
48 Mark Walsh, “Minneapolis Ends Unique Management Contract,” Education Week, June 4, 
1997. 
49 Alex Molnar et al., Profiles of For-Profit Education Management Companies: Fourth Annual 
Report, 2001-2002 (Tempe, AZ: Commercialism in Education Research Unit, Education Policy 
Studies Laboratory, Arizona State University, 2002), 11,  
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/EMO102.pdf.  
50 As of 2001, only Milwaukee and Cleveland had implemented full-fledged voucher programs. 
Milwaukee began with a pilot program in 1990 with modestly valued vouchers for children from 
low-income homes at secular private schools; in 1999, Wisconsin permitted inclusion of religious 
schools. In 1995, Cleveland followed suit with modestly valued vouchers available to low-income 
students at religious as well as secular private schools (if more vouchers were allocated than 
needed by students from low-income homes, the remainder could be used by students from 
homes of greater means, though the vouchers decreased in value). As of the 1999-2000 academic 
year, about 7,600 students in Milwaukee employed vouchers at ninety-one private schools (the 
maximum value was $5,106); and about 3,400 students in Cleveland used vouchers at fifty-two 
private schools (the maximum value was $2,250 for students from low-income homes and $1,875 
for students from homes of greater means). See U.S. General Accounting Office, School 
Vouchers: Publicly Funded Programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee (GAO-01-914), August 2001. 
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schools had gained significant ground.  Edison was big, growing, and not alone.  Among 
Edison’s competitors at that time were the Leona Group of East Lansing, Michigan, with 
thirty-three schools in two states; Mosaica Education of New York with twenty-two 
schools in eleven states; and National Heritage Academies of Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
with twenty-eight schools in three states.51  As EMOs, these companies were education’s 
answer to health maintenance organizations, or HMOs, likewise dedicated to improving 
service, containing costs, and, in many cases, making a profit. 
 The impress of commerce on education was now clear and ubiquitous. Its 
influence, however, was not new.  Half a century ago, in his book Education and the Cult 
of Efficiency, the historian Raymond Callahan described the impact of commerce on 
American schooling as substantial. Callahan traced the effects back to a convergence in 
the early 1900s of the embrace of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s theory of scientific 
management and the domination of local school boards by businessmen.52 The historian 
Richard Hofstadter at the same time maintained that a mercantile spirit basic to the 
nation’s identity had left its stamp on schools.53 Yet fifty years ago, EMOs and charter 
                                                
51 Molnar et al., Profiles of For-Profit Education Management Companies, 5-6. 
52 Raymond Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that 
Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962), 7, 19-25, 67-94. For additional insight into the development of this ethos, see Merle Curti, 
The Social Ideas of American Educators (1935; Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1959), 203-260; 
and Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform 
and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 131-141, 160-163. For 
insight into contemporary manifestations, see Cuban, The Blackboard and the Bottom Line, 1-14; 
and Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and 
Choice Are Undermining Education (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 69-91. For the impact of 
business on tertiary education, in particular, see David L. Kirp, Shakespeare, Einstein, and the 
Bottom Line: The Marketing of Higher Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003), 6-7, 11-12, 259-263. 




schools did not exist; the nomenclature of business didn’t apply to the titles of school 
district leaders and their staff members; there was little if any talk of tying teacher pay to 
student performance; cities did not outsource school management or launch school 
turnaround efforts; nobody spoke of schools as belonging to regional portfolios of 
academic options to be periodically rebalanced according to exam results; history and 
science did not take a back seat to reading and math in the name of test prep in core 
subjects; and, apart from the OEO experiment in the 1970s, the federal government 
played no role in devising and funding performance-based incentive programs.54 
The rise of nonprofit charter school networks as well as EMOs illustrates the 
corporate influence on education. Significant supplementary funding comes from 
corporate foundations. Captains of industry, commerce, and finance steer the boards of 
these networks, from the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP), Achievement First, 
Uncommon Schools, and Mastery Charter Schools to Success Academy, Rocketship 
Education, and YES Prep. The leaders of these networks bear the same executive titles as 
their counterparts in the corporate world and earn much more than their peers in district 
offices.  Staff typically work without union protection.  And the focus of these networks 
on exam results sets the national standard. 
 With the number of charter schools as a whole—from solo operations to network 
members—growing from two in Minnesota in 1992 to nearly 6,750 in forty-two states 
                                                
54 Regarding portfolio management, see Paul Hill, “Put Learning First: A Portfolio Approach to 
Public Schools,” Progressive Policy Institute, February 2006, 2, 
http://www.crpe.org/publications/put-learning-first-portfolio-approach-public-schools:  “Like 
investors with diversified portfolios of stocks and bonds, school boards would closely manage 
their community’s portfolio of educational service offerings, divesting less productive schools 
and adding more promising ones.”   
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and the District of Columbia by 2014,55 the appeal and force of educational outsourcing 
cannot be questioned.  At the helm of this movement, New Orleans became a 
predominantly charter school district in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,56 the Los Angeles 
Board of Education decided in 2009 to turn over 250 of the city’s 750 schools to outside 
operators,57 and Mayor Michael Bloomberg vowed in 2009 to double the number of New 
York’s charter schools from 100 to 200 during his third term.58 In these three cities and 
many more, the proportion of public school students attending charter schools grew 
significantly. By 2014, 93 percent of public school students in New Orleans attended 
charter schools; 53 percent did so in Detroit; 44 percent in Washington, D.C.; 33 percent 
in Philadelphia; 30 percent in San Antonio; 23 percent in Los Angeles; 14 percent in 
Chicago; and 8 percent in New York.59  
 
Edison’s evolution is one subject of this study, covered in Chapters 1 through 4, as an 
illustration of the forces for and against the corporate makeover of education. The 
                                                
55 Gary Miron and Christopher Nelson, What’s Public about Charter Schools? Lessons Learned 
about Choice and Accountability (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2002), 2; and National 
Center for Education Statistics, Digest 2016, Table 216.20, https://nces.ed.gov. 
56 Before Katrina, nine of the 125 schools in New Orleans (or 7 percent) were charter schools.  In 
2009-2010, 51 of the city’s 88 schools (or 58 percent) were charter schools.  These numbers were 
obtained by phone on February 10, 2009, from Siona LaFrance, Director of Communications, 
Louisiana Recovery School District.  
57 Howard Blume and Jason Song, “Major Shift for L.A. Schools; Board OKs a Plan that Could 
Turn Over 250 Campuses to Charter Groups and Other Outsiders,” Los Angeles Times, August 
26, 2009. 
58 Jennifer Medina, “Mayor Again Calls for Lifting Cap on Charter Schools,” New York Times, 
September 30, 2009. 
59 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, A Growing Movement: America’s Largest 
Charter School Communities (Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 
November 2015), 3-7, http://www.publiccharters.org/publications/enrollment-share-10/. 
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applicability of corporate methods to education is another subject, covered in Chapter 5, 
with special attention to territoriality, information asymmetry, transaction costs, and 
mission alignment as issues central to the struggle of the for-profit model.  A third 
subject, covered in Chapter 6, is the rise of two nonprofit charter networks, KIPP, a 
national organization, and Mastery Charter Schools, confined to Philadelphia and nearby 
Camden, New Jersey.  The stories of KIPP and Mastery serve to illustrate the critical 
differences between outsourcing school management to for-profit and nonprofit 
operators. 
 A fourth subject of this study is the corporate makeover of education in Sweden, 
covered in Chapter 7.  The United States is not alone in applying corporate principles to 
education. In 1981, Chile became a laboratory for Milton Friedman's case for educational 
privatization.  In adopting a full-fledged voucher system, the Chilean government gave 
parents the option to send their children to state schools or for-profit or nonprofit 
independent schools.  By 1990, 18 percent of the nation's 2.7 million schoolchildren used 
vouchers to attend 1,592 schools operated by for-profit entities.  By 2008, 31 percent of 
the nation's 3.5 million schoolchildren used vouchers to attend 3,118 such schools.60 
Meanwhile, thousands of low-fee commercially run primary and secondary schools have 
opened over the past decade without government support across sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia.  Dissatisfied with public options, parents are sending their children to such schools 
in cities as different as Lima, Lagos, and Lahore.61  
                                                
60 Gregory Elacqua, "For-Profit Schooling and the Politics of Education Reform in Chile: When 
Ideology Trumps Evidence," Centro de Políticas Comparadas de Educación, Documento de 
Tragajo CPCE no. 5, July 2009, 36, http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP178.pdf.  
61 James Tooley, The Global Education Industry: Lessons from Private Education in Developing 
Countries (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1999), and The Beautiful Tree: A Personal 
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In Chile’s path, Sweden implemented a voucher system in 1992 that made 
government money available to operators of for-profit as well as nonprofit independent 
schools.  While growth of this sector in Sweden has not matched that of Chile, it has been 
substantial and has defied the image of Sweden as a nation guided by state institutions 
alone.  As of 2013, 13 percent of Sweden's 1.3 million schoolchildren used vouchers to 
attend 942 schools operated by for-profit firms.62  This sector in Sweden moreover 
functions as a telling backdrop to the story of U.S. EMOs. The Swedish firms benefitted 
from more favorable circumstances than their U.S. counterparts: educating under 1 
percent of the nation’s students before vouchers were introduced, the independent sector 
in Sweden was miniscule and thus presented entrepreneurs a ripe opportunity to claim 
ground; per-pupil funding would be the same for independently run schools as municipal 
schools whereas EMOs in the United States typically received less; and a conception of 
                                                                                                                                            
Journey into How the World's Poorest People Are Educating Themselves (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 2009); Joanna Härmä, "Can Choice Promote Education for All? Evidence from Growth 
in Private Primary Schooling in India," Compare 39 (March 2009): 151-165; and Antoni Verger, 
Clara Fontdevila, and Adrián Zancajo, The Privatization of Education: A Political Economy of 
Global Education Reform (Teachers College Press, 2016), 89-103. See also Riddhi Shah, “Class 
Difference: Poor Neighborhoods around the World Embrace a Surprising Idea: Incredibly Low-
Priced Private Schools,” The Boston Globe, May 9, 2010.  
62 In the 2013-2014 academic year, according to Friskolornas riksförbund, the Swedish 
Association of Independent Schools, 73 percent of students in grades one through nine attending 
independent schools went to schools run by aktiebolag (limited companies); of independent 
schools for grades one through nine, 69 percent were run by aktiebolag; at the upper-secondary 
level, 85 percent of students attending independent schools went to schools run by aktiebolag; 
and of independent upper-secondary schools, 86 percent were run by aktiebolag. These figures 
come from Friskolornas riksförbund, Fakta om friskolor, April 2015, 2, 
http://www.friskola.se/fakta-om-friskolor. The raw numbers of students and schools were 
obtained from Skolverket, the Swedish School Agency, http://www.skolverket.se/statistik-och-
utvardering/statistik-i-tabeller. In the 2013-2014 academic year, there were 920,997 students in 
grades one through nine, of whom 125,960 attended 792 independent schools, and 330,196 
students in upper-secondary school, of whom 85,079 attended 460 independent schools. Given 
the percentages reported by Friskolornas riksförbund, 164,268 of 1,251,193 students attended 942 
schools run by aktiebolag.  
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the nation as family or “people’s home” (folkhem) and concomitant sense of trust kept at 
bay the distrust that shadowed EMOs at every turn.  And yet competition between 
schools for students in Sweden would lead to the same compromising concentration on 
test results that dogged the Edison administrators meeting in the library after school at 
Montebello Elementary in Baltimore in 2005 and their peers across the United States.  
Such concentration on test results indicates that some corporate practices do not 
translate well to education. As with the economy in general, so with education in 
particular, Arthur M. Okun’s dictum applies: “[T]he market needs a place, and the market 
needs to be kept in place.”63  The failure to heed the boundaries of the market amounts to 
a form of paradigm encroachment. This study is about such encroachment in the realm of 
education and the pushback against it. 
 
Throughout this study, I employed a mixed-methods approach comprising data analysis, 
interviews, surveys of teachers, classroom observations, archival research, and 
exploration of relevant academic literature in the fields of economics, political science, 
and education policy. 
 For data analysis, I studied school test results in Maryland from 1993 to 2009 and 
Pennsylvania from 2008 to 2012; per-pupil spending in Pennsylvania from 1995 to 2013; 
results on the Program for International Student Assessment in Sweden from 2000 to 
2015; school counts, enrollment, revenue, and earnings for Edison from 1996 to 2003 and 
Kunskapsskolan from 2001 to 2009; philanthropic funding for KIPP from 2010 to 2012; 
                                                
63 Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1975), 119. 
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and teacher attrition at KIPP from 2009 to 2014 and Achievement First from 2012 to 
2014. 
 At Edison, KIPP, Achievement First, Mastery, Kunskapsskolan, and several other 
organizations, I interviewed sixty-six people in total, many of them on several occasions; 
I listed these people and the dates and places of the interviews in the bibliography. I 
conducted surveys of teachers at several campuses of Mastery Charter Schools in 
Philadelphia and did classroom observations in schools managed by Edison in Baltimore, 
New York, Philadelphia, and York (Pennsylvania); by KIPP in Baltimore, New York, 
Los Angeles, and San Diego; by Mastery in Philadelphia; by Achievement First in New 
Haven; and by Kunskapsskolan in Nacka, Stockholm, and Uppsala. 
 For archival research, I searched newspapers, SEC filings, and company reports, 
as documented throughout this study.  In exploring relevant academic literature in the 
fields of economics, political science, and education policy, I read a range of articles, 
books, and reports, as documented, as well, throughout this study. 
   
 




Chapter 1: Making Education a Business 
 
The biggest contribution business can make to education is to make education a business.   
- Chris Whittle, Founder and Chairman, The Edison Project, The Nation, February 17, 
1992 
 
In 1990, Vanity Fair ran a long story about Chris Whittle, his burgeoning media empire 
based in Knoxville, Tennessee, called Whittle Communications, and the launch of 
Channel One TV, the company’s daily twelve-minute cable news program with two 
minutes of commercials beamed to classrooms in middle and high schools across the 
country.  On the first page of the article, Whittle is pictured at the kitchen table in his 
apartment in New York’s fabled Dakota with two books and a pile of papers before him. 
One of the books is a paperback edition of Myron Lieberman’s Privatization and 
Educational Choice, endorsing, as noted in the Introduction, for-profit management of 
schools.1 
When asked in an interview fifteen years later about the influence of Lieberman 
on his conception of the Edison Project, as his company was initially titled, Whittle said 
Lieberman’s thinking was significant and added: “Right after the announcement [of the 
Edison Project], Myron was a big supporter of our separate system of private schools.  
                                                
1 Lynn Hirschberg, “Is Chris Whittle the Devil?” Vanity Fair, March 1990, 196-197. 
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But he would probably say we made a mistake in running public schools without full 
managerial freedom.  That may have been too much of a compromise for him.”2 
Though the Edison Project—which would be renamed Edison Schools in 1999 
and EdisonLearning in 2008—evolved into a subcontractor working with public school 
districts without such autonomy, it was conceived as something quite different. In 
unveiling the Edison Project at a news conference at the National Press Club in 
Washington, D.C., on May 16, 1991, Whittle described an enterprise that appeared to 
comport with the recommendations of Lieberman as well as Milton Friedman: an 
independent for-profit chain of schools that would break the mold of traditional education 
and outperform public schools across the country.   Whittle said tuition would be just 
under the per-pupil expenditure of neighboring public schools.  To contain costs, the 
Edison Project, Whittle said, would “harness student power” by putting students to work 
as tutors, office aides, and cafeteria workers.3 
To be wired with the latest technology and open eight hours a day and eleven 
months a year, Whittle’s schools were slated to serve elementary, middle, and high 
school students as well as children as young as one in daycare programs.4  With this 
model, Whittle forecasted dramatic growth: 200 schools with 150,000 students by 1996 
and 1,000 schools with 2 million students by 2010.5  Whittle said he would need $2.5 
                                                
2 Chris Whittle, interview, New York, November 8, 2005. 
3 Hilary Stout, “Whittle Lays Out Plans to Establish For-Profit Schools,” Wall Street Journal, 
May 17, 1991; Mark Walsh, “Entrepreneur Whittle Unveils Plans to Create Chain of For-Profit 
Schools,” Education Week, May 22, 1991, 1, 13. 
4 Laura Simmons, “Whittle to Build 1,000 Schools: Cost of First 200 to be $2.5 Billion,” The 
Knoxville-News Sentinel, May 15, 1991; Stout, “Whittle Lays Out Plans”; Susan Chira, 
“Whittle’s School Unit Gains Prestige and Pressure,” New York Times, May 27, 1992. 
5 Simmons, “Whittle to Build 1,000 Schools”; Walsh, “Entrepreneur Whittle Unveils Plans.” 
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billion to $3 billion to open the first 200 schools and would raise the money from private 
investors.6 
To justify such bold expectations, Whittle built on the argument made by 
Friedman in 1973 for “highly capitalized chain schools, like supermarkets.”7 Whittle 
would claim repeatedly that much as locally owned restaurants, hardware stores, 
clothiers, groceries, and banks had been replaced by national brands like McDonald’s, the 
Home Depot, Gap, Safeway, and Bank of America, schools, too, could and should be run 
by major corporations.8  “In each case,” Whittle contended, “customers decided to go to 
these new establishments because they liked what was offered there. Such a trade has not 
been made in schools, though, because no options have been offered there.”9 
To Whittle, the community involvement in local affairs that Alexis de Tocqueville 
and many social analysts since had hailed as basic to the vitality of American society 
served an antiquated purpose.10  And yet the concept of chain schools represented a 
brazen challenge to a fundamental aspect of everyday American life.  The concept of an 
                                                
6 Stout, “Whittle Lays Out Plans.” 
7 Milton Friedman, “Selling School like Groceries: The Voucher Idea,” New York Times, 
September 23, 1973. 
8 Mark Walsh, “Brokers Pitch Education as Hot Investment,” Education Week, February 21, 
1996; Walsh, “All Eyes on Edison as Company Goes Public,” Education Week, November 24, 
1999, 17.  See also Chris Whittle, Crash Course: Imagining a Better Future for Public Education 
(New York: Riverhead, 2005), 25-26. 
9 Whittle, Crash Course, 26. 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Bevan (1835; New York: Penguin 
Putnam, 2003), 52, 74-77, 80. See also in this vein Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, 
Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929), Lynd and 
Lynd, Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1937); Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 
1961); and Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1978). 
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outside company running even one school represented such a challenge, as evidenced by 
the aforementioned pushback from community leaders in Gary, Indiana, to Behavioral 
Research Labs in the early 1970s.11  Whittle was nevertheless certain his idea would be 
embraced in view of his dismay at the quality of leadership, instruction, and facilities he 
observed in visiting schools across the country in selling Channel One.12  
Naming his company after the legendary inventor Thomas Alva Edison, Whittle 
maintained that just as Edison did not fiddle with candles to create the light bulb but 
rather devised an utterly different approach to achieve a better and more cost-effective 
form of lighting, American educators had to break with past practices to develop a new 
way to teach children.13  This new way, the implication was clear, would be as superior to 
current methods as a light bulb to a candle.14  “These won’t look like schools you know,” 
Whittle said at the company’s inaugural news conference.15 
 What Whittle left out in introducing the Edison Project was vouchers. Vouchers 
were basic to the recommendations of Friedman and Lieberman.  Whittle’s case about 
options for consumers between local and national brands, the scope of his ambitions, the 
                                                
11 David Tyack, “Reinventing Schooling,” in Learning from the Past: What History Teaches Us 
about School Reform, ed. Diane Ravitch and Maris A. Vinovskis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1995), 198-199. 
12 Brian O’Reilly, “Why Edison Doesn’t Work,” Fortune, December 9, 2002, 148-154. 
13 Chris Whittle, “An Education Edison,” Tennessee Illustrated, Winter 1990, cited by Vance H. 
Trimble, An Empire Undone: The Wild and Hard Fall of Chris Whittle (New York: Birch Lane, 
1995), 262-263.  Whittle wrote: “When Edison invented electric illumination, he didn’t tinker 
with candles to make them burn better. Instead, he created something brilliantly new: the light 
bulb.  In the same fashion, American education needs a fundamental breakthrough, a new 
dynamic that will light the way to a transformed educational system.”   
14 Tyack, “Reinventing Schooling,” 191. 
15 Stout, “Whittle Lays Out Plans.”   
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national stage on which he announced his plans, and the estimated price of tuition falling 
below the per-pupil expenditure of neighboring public schools all suggested that the 
Edison Project was never intended to be an independent chain of schools—or certainly 
not for long.16  The Edison Project, as Whittle depicted it, made sense only as an 
expensive gambit.  If Whittle got the infrastructure in place early and if vouchers won 
political approval, the Edison Project stood to be the front-runner in a booming market. 
 Whittle had good reason to believe vouchers would soon become a reality.  
George H.W. Bush was in the White House. His secretary of education, Whittle’s fellow 
Tennessean Lamar Alexander, was an ardent advocate of vouchers.  And Whittle knew 
Alexander well.  Alexander was both a former stakeholder in Whittle Communications 
and member of Channel One’s advisory board.17 
 
At base, Whittle’s new way called for imposing the rigor of business—its timelines, 
quality standards, costing methods, and accountability measures—on education.  Whittle, 
for instance, routinely argued that if Federal Express can tell customers exactly when a 
package shipped and where it was in transit, schools must be able to pinpoint for parents 
their children’s levels of proficiency in reading and math throughout the year; this 
argument later appeared in a series of full-page advertorials for the company in 
                                                
16 For a similar take on the importance of vouchers to the initial conception of the Edison Project, 
see Jonathan Kozol, “Whittle and the Privateers,” The Nation, September 21, 1992, 273-278; and 
Kenneth J. Saltman, The Edison Schools: Corporate Schooling and the Assault on Public 
Education (New York: Routledge, 2005), 34 and 56-57. 
17 Dinitia Smith, “Reform School: Benno Schmidt, Chris Whittle, and the Edison Project,” New 
York, July 20, 1992, 34-35. 
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Education Week.18  Exhibiting no doubts about whether learning could or should be 
monitored in such a precise manner, Whittle conveyed conviction that schooling differed 
little from package delivery or any commercial enterprise.  “The biggest contribution 
business can make to education,” he said, “is to make education a business.”19   
Whittle was far from alone in calling for a corporate makeover of American 
education.  Others long before Whittle and concurrently saw schools as being in 
desperate need of business solutions.  As early as 1912, education scholar and 
administrator James Phinney Munroe employed the language of scientific management 
made popular by industrial efficiency expert Frederick Winslow Taylor in calling for 
greater accountability.  In opening his book New Demands in Education, Munroe wrote: 
“The fundamental demand in education, as in everything else, is for efficiency—physical 
efficiency, mental efficiency, moral efficiency.”  Munroe continued: “The potential 
economic worth of each school pupil, to say nothing of his moral value as a householder 
and as a citizen, is enormous, provided he be so educated, by his family, by his 
environment, and by his schools, as to become an efficient member of society.” 20 
While Munroe prescribed a genuinely progressive curriculum, with as much 
emphasis on the arts and athletics as on academics,21 and while he specified that the 
authority of school boards be limited to “matters non-educational,”22 his tone was 
                                                
18 Tung Le, vice president for research and accountability, EdisonLearning, interview, New York, 
August 25, 2009.  The advertorials ran on page 2 of Education Week in the following issues:  
September 28 and December 7, 2005; and February 15 and 22 and May 3, 2006.  
19 John S. Friedman, “Big Business Goes to School,” The Nation, February 17, 1992, 190. 
20 James Phinney Munroe, New Demands in Education (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1912), v. 
21 Ibid., 106-107. 
22 Ibid., 23, 63.  
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managerial.  “We need ‘educational engineers’ to study the huge business of preparing 
youth for life,” he contended, “to find out where it is good, where it is wasteful, where it 
is out of touch with modern requirements, where and why its output fails; and to make 
report in such form and with such weight of evidence that the most conventional teacher 
and the most indifferent citizen must pay heed.”23 
 In this same spirit, one month before Whittle rolled out the Edison Project, 
President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the formation of the New American Schools 
Development Corporation (NASDC) as a central component of his America 2000 
education strategy and announced Alcoa CEO Paul O’Neill as the organization’s 
chairman.  Defining the NASDC as “a private-sector research and development fund of at 
least $150 million to generate innovation in education,” Bush pledged to follow up on its 
recommendations by urging Congress to commit “$1 million in start-up funds for each of 
… 535 New American schools—at least one in every congressional district—and have 
them up and running by 1996.”24 
 O’Neill was soon after replaced by Thomas Kean, president of Drew University 
and former Republican governor of New Jersey.  Kean’s fifteen fellow board members 
comprised some of most powerful people in American business, including Louis 
Gerstner, chairman and CEO of RJR Nabisco; Frank Shrontz, chairman of Boeing; Lee 
Raymond, president of Exxon; James R. Jones, chairman and CEO of the American 
Stock Exchange; John Ong, chairman of BF Goodrich; and Paul Tagliabue, 
                                                
23 Ibid., 20. 
24 President George H.W. Bush, Presentation of the National Education Strategy, April 18, 1991, 
as published in America 2000: An Education Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of 
Education, 1991), 10. 
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commissioner of the National Football League.  Their mission was to lead the way in 
breaking the mold of conventional schooling.25  And their language was no less bold or 
ambitious than Whittle’s. 
 “The R&D teams,” stated the NASDC declaration of purpose, “… can be 
expected to set aside all traditional assumptions about schooling and all the constraints 
that conventional schools work under….  Time, space, staffing and other resources in 
these new schools may be used in ways yet to be imagined.  Some schools may make 
extensive use of computers, distance learning, interactive video-discs and other modern 
tools. Some may radically alter the customary modes of teaching and learning and 
redesign the human relationships and organizational structures of the school. Whatever 
their approach, all New American Schools will be expected to produce extraordinary 
gains in student learning.”26  
 This ambition to realize significant improvement in student achievement, echoed 
by Whittle in his vision for the Edison Project, drew, in turn, on the widespread sentiment 
that America’s schools were in decline and accordingly posed a grave threat to national 
prosperity.  No document captured this sense of crisis more than the 1983 report A Nation 
at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. Issued by President Ronald Reagan’s 
National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE), the report alleged, “Our once 
unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation 
is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world.” The authors of the report—an 
array of educators, researchers, and public officials ranging from school principals and 
                                                
25 Karen De Witt, “Bush Sets Up Foundation to Start Model Schools,” New York Times, July 9, 
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university presidents to a former governor of Minnesota—contended that Americans 
could take pride in their schools of the past, but “a rising tide of mediocrity” was 
overtaking today’s schools.27 
 As specific evidence, the NCEE authors made the following claims:  “The 
College Board’s Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) demonstrate a virtually unbroken 
decline from 1963 to 1980.  Average verbal scores fell over 50 points and average 
mathematics scores dropped nearly 40 points. College Board achievement tests also 
reveal consistent declines in recent years in such subjects as physics and English.  Both 
the number and proportion of students demonstrating superior achievement on the SATs 
(i.e., those with scores of 650 or higher) have also dramatically declined.”28 
 In its most ominous words, the report affirmed, “If an unfriendly foreign power 
had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists 
today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.”29  Declaring history unkind to 
idlers,30 the NCEE recommended a longer school day and year; more academic rigor; 
more homework; “a nationwide (but not Federal) system of state and local standardized 
tests”; performance-based pay for teachers; and a new tier of master teachers to develop 
teacher education programs and mentor junior colleagues.31 
                                                
27 National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1983), 9. 
28 Ibid., 11. 
29 Ibid., 9. 
30 Ibid., 10. 
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 With this report, education policy in the United States pivoted from a focus on 
providing supplementary help to poor children—initiated by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965—to a concentration 
on performance and accountability.  Two years after the publication of the report, the 
political scientists Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir concluded in Schooling for All: 
Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal that policymakers had grievously 
erred in subordinating equity to their focus on excellence.32  In his book No Child Left 
Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005, published in 
2006, the political scientist Patrick J. McGuinn termed this change in focus a shift in 
“policy regime.”33   
 
The relationship between knowledge and prosperity was not in dispute.  The economic 
consequences of a skilled workforce were well established.  The economist Robert Solow 
famously gave mathematical expression to the role of knowledge in economic growth 
with his reformulation of the production function in 1956. In adding technological change 
as a variable to be multiplied by capital investment and labor, Solow laid the foundation 
for a new understanding of national output.  Long since called “Solow’s residual,” this 
variable elucidated the extraordinary impact of know-how, explaining, Solow wrote a 
                                                
32 Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the 
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year later in a follow-up article, approximately 88 percent of the increase in U.S. 
productivity from 1909 to 1949.34   
 The evidence cited by the NCEE for a decline in the effectiveness of schools, 
however, was in dispute. In examining College Board test data a decade after the 
publication of A Nation at Risk, several statisticians determined that the NCEE had 
substantially overstated the decline in scores and thus called into question the premise for 
the call to arms.  The statisticians concluded that because year after year more 
disadvantaged students were applying to college and, therefore, taking the required SAT 
and achievement tests, the mean scores necessarily dropped.  Some of the statisticians 
argued that this “composition effect,” whereby the performance of the whole does not 
reflect the performance of its subgroups, meant that there was no real drop in scores and 
that, accordingly, the alleged educational crisis was confined to underfunded schools in 
poor inner-city minority communities. Other statisticians contended the decline was real 
but only half as bad as the NCEE had made it out to be.35 
                                                
34 See Robert M. Solow, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” The Quarterly 
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 To the historian Lawrence Cremin, the case of the NCEE was from the start 
brittle.  Writing in between the publication of A Nation at Risk and the statistical 
reassessments, Cremin argued that the country’s schools were yet again being blamed for 
a loss of U.S. economic competitiveness when competitiveness is “to a considerable 
degree a function of monetary, trade, and industrial policy” decided in Washington, D.C.  
“[T]o contend that problems of international competitiveness can be solved by 
educational reform,” Cremin wrote, “especially educational reform defined solely as 
school reform, is not merely Utopian and millennialist, it is at best foolish and at worst a 
crass effort to direct attention away from those truly responsible for doing something 
about competitiveness and to lay the burden on the schools.”36 
 Amid the sense of urgency, however, Cremin’s critique and the statisticians’ 
qualifications gained little attention. The plight of students in poor districts, rural as well 
as urban, was, after all, conspicuous.37 In addition, the naysayers were battling a 
movement of international scope.  The year before Cremin leveled his refutation, British 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher had won Parliament’s approval of a sweeping overhaul 
of schooling that mandated a variation on nearly each recommendation made in A Nation 
at Risk and went several steps beyond.  Devised to reverse an alleged decline in academic 
achievement, Britain’s Education Reform Act of 1988 created a national curriculum with 
“attainment targets” and a corresponding system of standardized exams to be taken by 
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students aged seven, eleven, and fourteen; facilitated the development of league tables by 
ordering the publication of exam results by school; sanctioned performance-based pay of 
teachers; and originated a market for school competition by authorizing “grant-
maintained schools.”38 
 With overlapping tactics and the same mission, both the NASDC and Whittle 
picked up where the NCEE as well as Britain’s Parliament had left off. With the 
assistance of the RAND Corporation’s Institute on Education and Training along with an 
independent panel of senior educators, the NASDC reviewed 686 proposals in its initial 
year and in July 1992 settled on grants to eleven design teams.  Three designs placed 
technology at the core of curricula and teachers on the periphery.  Two implemented the 
methods of corporate organization: Modern Red Schoolhouse, based in Indianapolis and 
headed by William Bennett, secretary of education under President Ronald Reagan; and 
National Alliance for Restructuring Education (now America’s Choice), run by the 
National Center for Education and the Economy in Rochester and dedicated to the widely 
popular production principles of Total Quality Management.39   Nine more design teams 
were funded in 1993 and another seven in 1995.40  While Congress never followed up 
with the funding Bush had envisioned for 535 New American schools, new models were 
in place in approximately 1,500 schools by 1999.  Yet the “extraordinary gains in student 
learning” expected by the NASDC never materialized.  A study published that year by 
                                                
38 For background, see Will Woodward, “The Legacy of Blue Ken,” The Guardian, March 28, 
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the American Institutes for Research concluded that it was unclear any gains had been 
achieved.41 
 
Like Gerstner, Shrontz, Raymond, Jones, Ong, Tagliabue, and all other members of the 
NASDC board but Kean, Whittle did not have a background in education.  Whittle 
majored in American studies at the University of Tennessee and exhibited a flair and 
passion for both politics and business. He helped run a program called Youth in 
Government devised by Tennessee Republican senator Howard Baker that took top high 
school seniors from across the state to the nation’s capital to learn about legislative, 
judicial, and foreign affairs through visits to Congress, the Supreme Court, and the State 
Department.42 As a senior, he served as a popular president of the university’s Student 
Government Association and co-founded with several friends a small publishing 
company in Knoxville called Collegiate Enterprises.43 
 After earning his bachelor’s degree in 1969, Whittle enrolled at Columbia Law 
School but found the study of law too dry and dropped out after a semester.44 He 
subsequently took a position as a staffer on the campaign of Wally Barnes for the 
Republican nomination for governor of Connecticut and quickly rose to become the 
campaign manager.45 On account of chronic asthma, Whittle had been granted a medical 
                                                
41 Ibid., 2, 4. 
42 Trimble, An Empire Undone, 44. 
43 Ibid., 49, 50-56. 
44 Ibid., 61-63. 
45 Ibid., 73-76.   
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exemption from military service in Vietnam.46  After Barnes lost, Whittle nearly 
embarked on a career in education. He committed to a position as a history teacher at a 
now-defunct alternative private high school in Connecticut called Westledge, whose head 
he had met while working for Barnes, but he backed out at the last minute to rejoin his 
friends from college in running Collegiate Enterprises.  The prospect of making a fortune 
was too good to turn down, Whittle later said.47 
Collegiate Enterprises sold textbook and lecture summaries called Time Savers. 
Whittle came up with the idea as a college senior after hearing about Cliff’s Notes study 
guides, begun in Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1958. Collegiate Enterprises also published free 
ad-filled local consumer guides for college campuses, starting with the University of 
Tennessee in 1969 and spreading to 100 schools across the country within five years.48  
Renamed the 13-30 Corporation in 1971, the company targeted that age group with niche 
magazines sponsored by single advertisers,49 such as Student Traveler, filled with ads 
exclusively for Nissan.50 
As 13-30’s national sales director, Whittle went on to make the fortune he had 
sought.  After selling a 50 percent stake in the company for $3.2 million in 1977 to the 
Bonnier Group, a media conglomerate based in Stockholm intent on establishing an 
American beachhead, Whittle and several partners bought financially troubled Esquire 
                                                
46 Ibid., 58. 
47 Ibid., 77, 84-85. 
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magazine at a steep discount and moved to New York to turn the magazine around. As 
Esquire’s publisher, Whittle steered the magazine back to profitability.  He sold his share 
in Esquire in 1986, took charge of 13-30, and renamed the company Whittle 
Communications.51  With the debut in 1988 of Special Report, Whittle stunned Madison 
Avenue. A quarterly issued in six versions (devoted to either family, health, sports, 
lifestyle, personalities, or fiction), Special Report was aimed at patients sitting in the 
waiting rooms of doctors’ offices and distributed for free.  The magazines were arrayed 
in a dedicated oak display case Whittle Communications provided each medical practice. 
In no time, Whittle set a record for ad revenue in the initial year of a publication, selling 
$41 million of ad space to Procter & Gamble, General Foods, and twelve other major 
corporations; the previous record for ad revenue in the initial year of a publication was $8 
million, set in 1974 by People.52   One month after the appearance of the first issue of 
Special Report, Time Inc. paid $185 million for a 50 percent stake in Whittle 
Communications, $40 million of which went to Whittle himself.53 
By 1990, Whittle Communications had 1,000 employees, $220 million in annual 
revenue,54 and a new red-brick headquarters resembling a New England college campus 
under construction in the center of Knoxville.  Designed by celebrity architect Peter 
Marino, the headquarters would cost $56 million.55  Among senior executives were 
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Hamilton Jordan, White House chief of staff during the Carter administration; William S. 
Rukeyser, former managing editor of Fortune; and Gerry Hogan, former chief operating 
officer of the Turner Broadcasting System.56  In addition to magazines like Student 
Traveler and Special Report, Whittle’s portfolio by 1993 included the Big Picture, a 
monthly series of wall posters mixing educational content with ads and displayed in 
hallways and lunchrooms in 11,000 elementary schools;57 as a complement to Special 
Report, a single-advertiser TV news program by the same name for waiting rooms in 
30,000 doctors’ offices;58 Medical News Network, an interactive news and information 
service sponsored by drug companies and relayed by satellite to 5,000 doctors’ offices;59 
the Larger Agenda, a series of short topical hardcover books by such noted authors as 
James Atlas, John Kenneth Galbraith, William Greider, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and 
Michael Lewis punctuated with ads for Federal Express and sent free every two months 
to 150,000 corporate executives and government officials;60 and, of course, Channel One, 
viewed every morning of the academic year by approximately 8 million students in 
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11,861 middle and high schools across the country within four years of its introduction in 
1989.61 
 
Soon after his announcement of the Edison Project in 1991, Whittle assembled a seven-
member school design team at his new headquarters in Knoxville.62  With the nation’s 
dominant companies in medical care, overnight package delivery, and prison 
management, Tennessee had led the way in challenging the public sector with for-profit 
operations.  The same state that became home to Hospital Corporation of America in 
1968, Federal Express in 1973, and Corrections Corporation of America in 1983 was now 
home to the nation’s boldest effort at educational privatization.  
 Whittle introduced his design team with a group photo  in identical full-page ads 
on the same day in March 1992 in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal; the 
same full-page ad ran two days later in Education Week.  Below the photo and above 
brief biographies of the seven members of the design team ran the following declaration:  
“They’re starting school all over again.”63 
 For two years, this team convened monthly for three or four days of collaboration, 
either in Knoxville, New York, or Washington, D.C. Only one of the seven members, 
Sylvia Peters, had been a K-12 educator.  Peters had earned a national reputation as an 
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elementary school principal who had led parents and community activists to create a safe 
haven for her students amid a crime-ridden neighborhood in Chicago.  The remaining 
members comprised Chester Finn, a professor of educational policy at Vanderbilt 
University in Nashville, a former assistant secretary of education under President Reagan, 
and an architect of President Bush’s America 2000 education strategy; John Chubb, a 
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and coauthor with Terry Moe of a highly 
regarded book advocating vouchers called Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools; 
Dominique Browning, an assistant managing editor at Newsweek and a former editor at 
Esquire; Lee Eisenberg, the editor in chief of Esquire when Whittle was the magazine’s 
publisher; Nancy Hechinger, the founder and head of Hands-On Media, a producer of 
interactive reference material; and Daniel Biederman, president of the Grand Central and 
Thirty-Fourth Street Partnerships and a leader in the field of managing public services 
with private resources.64  This group, in turn, brought aboard another forty researchers to 
help them design the Edison program.65 
The most prominent member of Whittle’s team would be the Edison Project’s 
CEO and president.  In a coup that made the front page of The New York Times on May 
26, 1992, Whittle lured Benno Schmidt from the presidency of Yale University and 
thereby brought the Edison Project national attention and clout overnight.  Two days 
later, identical full-page ads for the Edison Project again appeared in The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal, this time featuring a picture of Schmidt in a 
professorial pose above an announcement of his move, headlined by the following quote:  
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“America’s schools need fundamental, structural change.  Not tinkering around the 
edges.”66 
Though Schmidt was struggling in his sixth year as president of Yale, his 
departure came as a surprise.  Many students criticized him as remote.  Some wore 
“Where’s Benno?” T-shirts to protest his frequent absence from campus.  And many 
professors found him imperious for having bypassed a search committee in naming a 
friend as the dean of the School of Organization and Management and for having urged 
major cuts without much faculty input. Yet Schmidt didn’t appear to be leaving.  And he 
certainly didn’t appear to be someone who would leave to run a school-management 
company with no track record, no less a company founded by someone as controversial 
as Whittle.67 
Moreover, like Whittle, Schmidt had no background in K-12 education.  Though a 
career educator, Schmidt’s experience was confined to the university level and, at that, 
the rarefied realm of Ivy League teaching, scholarship, and administration.  Before 
becoming president of Yale in 1986, Schmidt had been the dean of Columbia Law School 
for two years. Prior to that, he had been a professor of constitutional law at Columbia 
since 1969 and previously a clerk directly out of Yale Law School for Chief Justice Earl 
Warren.  Schmidt nevertheless embraced this unlikely challenge.68  And he brought with 
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him Yale’s chief financial and administrative officer, Michael Finnerty, to become 
Edison’s chief financial officer.69 
Despite this lack of experience in K-12 education, Schmidt along with Whittle 
spoke with conviction about what ailed it and what should be done.  They contended that 
no cause in the United States was as pressing as K-12 education and no remedy as 
promising as for-profit management. In the front-page article in The New York Times 
announcing Schmidt’s decision to leave Yale to lead Edison, Schmidt and Whittle 
forecasted that Edison could have a revolutionary impact.  Whittle placed the company’s 
mission in the context of the Cold War and employed the language of historical 
inevitability: “You have to have a West Berlin for East Berlin to fall, and what we’re 
really doing here is building West Berlin.”  Schmidt added: “The reason this hasn’t been 
done before is that this thing is a matter of D-Day dimensions.  Only someone with a high 
tolerance for risk would even be willing to contemplate it."  Schmidt predicted, “[I]f this 
venture succeeds, there’s nothing, there’s nothing, that could be done, aside from 
changing human nature, that could be more constructive for our society.”70  
Elaborating two weeks later in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Schmidt wrote: “If 
schools need fundamental change, not just tinkering, then an entirely new, profit-based 
alternative such as the Edison Project offers the best hope, perhaps the only hope, for 
providing new models of education. What other approach can overcome the 
fragmentation, inertia, political and bureaucratic constraints and vested interests that 
make it so hard to innovate in our current educational system?” Schmidt continued: “The 
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world has been revolutionized in recent years by the demand for freedom and choice…. 
Competition, freedom of opportunity, and diversity serve the causes of progress and 
human dignity.  These lessons have a profound bearing on American education, if we will 
but heed them.”71 
To Schmidt, a central problem was inefficient spending.  Elaborating on claims 
made by the authors of A Nation at Risk and on arguments made by the education 
economist Eric Hanushek, Schmidt attacked the mismatch of growing expenditures and 
declining results.72 While per-pupil spending had approximately doubled in real dollars 
since 1965, Schmidt wrote, scores in math, science, reading, and writing on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) had not improved since 1970 and scores on 
the SAT had dropped.73 
 As with the NCEE’s claims about College Board scores a decade earlier, 
Schmidt’s charges, too, required qualification.  While per-pupil spending had climbed 
considerably since 1965, much of that spending went to new services.  As Richard 
Rothstein explained a year later in a combative rebuttal in The American Prospect 
entitled “The Myth of Public School Failure,” about 30 percent of the additional funding 
went to programs in special education mandated by the federal government since 1975 to 
help children with cognitive, emotional, and physical handicaps; about 10 percent went to 
free or subsidized breakfasts and lunches for a growing population of children from low-
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income homes; about 5 percent went to expanded busing of students to meet integration 
orders; and about 3 percent went to initiatives focused on keeping students from dropping 
out.74  Moreover, with health-care expenditures in the United States climbing from 5.6 
percent of GDP in 1965 to 13.1 percent of GDP in 1992, a significant portion of the 
additional spending on education went to covering escalating medical insurance costs for 
staff.75    
 This last qualification points to a more fundamental explanation for the rising cost 
of education, whether it be primary, secondary, or tertiary:  the costs for all labor-
intensive sectors—from health care to carpentry, masonry, musical performance, and 
education—climbed considerably over this time period for the simple reason that the 
costs of services that cannot be significantly improved by technological innovation are 
intrinsically inflationary.  Termed “the cost disease” by the economist William J. 
Baumol, this phenomenon plagues labor-intensive sectors indiscriminately. Only sectors 
benefiting substantially from technological innovation—such as automobile, TV, or 
laptop manufacture—have succeeded in cutting costs and thus boosting productivity.76  
And yet no chorus emerged to criticize carpenters, masons, and musicians for 
underperformance.  To counteract what has come to be called Baumol’s Law, customers 
have merely substituted recorded music for the work of live musicians; and prefabricated 
units for the work of carpenters and masons. Doing something similar in education—and 
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advocates of online learning to this end have indeed been hard at work—has proved 
much more difficult because of the importance of personal interaction between teacher 
and student. For similar reasons, barbers, too, have been safe and stand to remain so, a 
point well made by Kurt Vonnegut in Player Piano, his 1952 novel about a futuristic 
society where machines have displaced nearly all workers.77 
 Schmidt was, however, justified in depicting “political and bureaucratic 
constraints and vested interests” as obstacles to better schooling.  Some of the most 
ardent advocates of public education, after all, had conceded that many mandated 
pedagogical policies, hiring practices, and work rules conflicted with effective 
instruction.  This was especially true in big cities like New York. No less established a 
champion of public education than Deborah Meier, founder and leader of the progressive 
Central Park East schools in Harlem and winner of a MacArthur Foundation “genius” 
grant in 1987, recounted in detail her frustration with the city’s educational bureaucracy 
in an essay in The Nation in 1991 advocating school self-governance and choice; Meier 
four years later fleshed out her case in a frequently indignant book, The Power of Their 
Ideas: Lessons for America from a Small School in Harlem.78  Seymour Fliegel, a former 
teacher and principal and Meier’s one-time regional supervisor, conveyed even greater 
frustration in his 1993 book, Miracle in East Harlem: The Fight for Choice in Public 
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Education, telling the transformational story of one school district’s unlikely triumph 
over centralized authority and urban politics.79 
 Whether such school self-governance and choice would improve systems at large 
was another matter.  That was certainly the hope of Fliegel, Meier, and likeminded 
reformers.80 As early as 1968, the economist Henry M. Levin cautioned in an article in 
The Urban Review that school  choice as envisioned by Friedman stood to undermine 
social cohesion and sidestep the challenges handicapping the underprivileged students 
choice—via vouchers—was primarily intended to help.  Levin maintained that 
competition between schools for students could have a splintering rather than catalytic 
effect and urged infrastructural reforms instead to coordinate schools with an array of 
support services, from health care to recreation.81  In his book Rethinking School Choice: 
Limits of the Market Metaphor, published in 1994, the political scientist Jeffrey R. Henig 
echoed Levin, contending that school choice would likely hurt public education through 
further segregation by race, class, and academic achievement.   Henig argued that school 
choice ultimately derived from a failure of collective will to support all schools 
appropriately and thus dodged a pressing challenge rather than tackle it.82  With charter 
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schools taking off in 1992 and multiplying year after year, Henig’s concerns found 
expression in more and more countervailing voices.83 
 There was nevertheless no denying in 1992 that many political and bureaucratic 
forces got in the way of good schooling.  The weight and divisiveness of such forces, in 
turn, testified to the failure of collective will that Henig identified as fundamental to the 
nation’s educational woes.  Nor was this problem new. 
 In his comprehensive study of the New York City Board of Education, 110 
Livingston Street, published in 1968, the sociologist David Rogers described the city’s 
school system as “typical of what social scientists call a ‘sick’ bureaucracy—a term for 
organizations whose traditions, structure, and operations subvert their stated missions and 
prevent any flexible accommodation to changing client demands.”84  In a follow-up study 
fifteen years later, 110 Livingston Street Revisited, Rogers and his co-author, Norman 
Chung, acknowledged some progress since the system was decentralized in 1970, and 
much authority, as a result, deputized to thirty-two community school boards.  However, 
Rogers and Chung observed that decentralization did nothing to address the problem of 
struggling principals and teachers while generating a tangle of new problems: many 
community school boards overstepped bounds in administrative and pedagogical matters; 
resorted to patronage in making hires and furnishing contracts; and failed to coordinate 
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operations effectively with headquarters, and vice versa.85  The dysfunctionality Bel 
Kaufman had satirically depicted in her classic 1965 novel, Up the Down Staircase, was 
not merely grounded in the author’s experience as a veteran New York City teacher but 
also confirmed and reconfirmed by social science.  The novel’s nonsensical memos, 
convoluted procedures, and  dizzying regulations were but one step from reality.86 
 Outside New York, Ted Sizer, a professor of education at Brown University and 
the founder of a consortium of progressive public schools, made arguments similar to  
Meier’s and Fliegel’s in his books Horace’s Compromise, published in 1984, and 
Horace’s School, published in 1992: district officials should confer principals and 
teachers more autonomy to do their jobs and grant students more freedom to choose their 
schools.87  Even Albert Shanker, the longstanding leader of the American Federation of 
Teachers and very personification of teacher unionism, criticized the rigidity of 
educational authorities and advocated giving teachers the right to create and manage their 
own schools as the proper remedy. Issuing this proposal in a 1988 address at the National 
Press Club, Shanker thus helped lay the foundation for charter schools.88    
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In calling for for-profit school management, however, Schmidt along with Whittle was 
taking frustration with educational bureaucracy to a new level.  Choice within the public 
system for schools managed by veteran district educators such as Meier constituted a 
second way of educational organization. Choice outside—or within—the public system 
for schools managed by for-profit operators amounted to a third way.  Friedman and 
Lieberman had endorsed it. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) had given it a 
brief trial and deemed it a failure. The leaders of Educational Alternatives Inc. (EAI) and 
Edison saw no alternative. 
 Whittle’s pick as chief educational officer, John Chubb, never mentioned for-
profit management in the seminal book on school choice he had two years earlier 
coauthored with Terry Moe,  Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools.  The core 
concerns of Chubb and Moe were the freedom of parents and children to choose schools 
and the freedom of school administrators to run their schools without meddling from 
school boards.  This second freedom, Chubb and Moe wrote, was of paramount 
importance.  “Autonomy has the strongest influence on the overall quality of school 
organization of any factor that we examined,” they concluded.89 
 Whittle’s career as an unorthodox entrepreneur, though, led naturally to a 
commercial conception of school management, as did his fondness for Ayn Rand, the 
Soviet émigrée novelist and essayist who famously extolled unfettered capitalism. When 
asked about his reported admiration for Rand, Whittle said, “If you’re an entrepreneur, 
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you see the world through a prism of optimism and freedom.  Rand, to me, was all about 
optimism and freedom.”90 
 Whittle’s methods as a maverick media executive dovetailed with Rand’s laissez-
faire credo that commerce should know no bounds.  One passage in Rand’s 1957 totemic 
novel, Atlas Shrugged, makes Whittle’s sympathy for Rand clear. Driving the story’s 
protagonist, Dagny Taggart, through the rolling Wisconsin countryside, a heroic self-
made Pennsylvania steel magnate named Henry Reardon grumbles that one thing is 
missing:  billboards.91 
 Rand’s lesser-known 1938 novel, Anthem, accomplishes nothing less than 
bringing into sharp focus the very meaning of the Edison Project. Anthem tells the tale of 
an ingenious twenty-one-year-old rebel recalling a young version of Edison.  Living in a 
primitive, gray dystopian state, he stumbles upon light bulbs in an abandoned subway 
tunnel from a bygone era.  This rebel—named Equality 7-2521, who renames himself 
Prometheus—reengineers their magic and bravely proposes before a solemn “World 
Council of Scholars” seated below a portrait of “the twenty illustrious men who had 
invented the candle” that this rediscovered form of illumination become the new 
standard.92 
 The resemblance between Rand’s vision and Whittle’s is uncanny. Rand’s 
opposition of light bulb to candle as a metaphor for the conflict between freedom and 
oppression places Whittle’s rhetoric in context. It is but one step to Whittle’s use of Cold 
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War language of West Berlin and East Berlin to render his educational model as 
innovative and the status quo, stifling. 
 
With the autonomy of a private school system, the Edison Project would be free from 
school board interference and union opposition. With such freedom, Whittle and Schmidt 
promised significant pedagogical reform and envisioned great progress.  The program 
constructed by their design team called for lengthening the school day by two hours and 
the school year by thirty days (to match the Japanese academic calendar of 210 days); 
providing every student with a home computer to facilitate parent-teacher communication 
as well as independent student inquiry; dividing schools into “academies,” in turn 
separated into “houses,” to promote a greater sense of belonging for teachers as well as 
students; appointing master teachers to supervise and inspire junior colleagues; instituting 
a student dress code of collared shirts or blouses in solid colors and khaki slacks or skirts; 
scheduling an hour a day of music or art for all students; starting all students with 
instruction in Spanish in preschool, with the expectation that they be conversant in the 
language upon completion of eighth grade; requiring the study of Latin from sixth grade 
through eighth; and keeping all students on pace in math to complete courses in calculus 
or probability and statistics before graduation from high school.93 
 Edison’s academic curriculum, in particular, was based on standardized outcomes 
and vetted by two former U.S. assistant secretaries of education, the policy analyst Bruno 
Manno and the historian Diane Ravitch, both proponents at the time of market-based 
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reforms and standardization; Ravitch would two decades later become an ardent 
opponent.94 
In sync with the New American Schools Development Corporation (NASDC) and 
its goal of “extraordinary gains in student learning,” the Edison Project set its bar high.  
Schmidt wrote in his introduction to the Edison design team’s 110-page book laying out 
this new educational program that Edison aimed to bring about “quantum gains in 
students’ academic performance and in the quality of their lives,” all at “the same amount 
per student as the average school district now spends.”95  Tuition was accordingly 
projected to be about $5,500.96 
 Atop Whittle’s initial positioning of the company in 1991 as a solution to the 
country’s educational malaise, all these widely publicized claims about spending no more 
than the average school district, “fundamental change,” and “starting school all over 
again” made clear that the Edison Project was never meant to be an independent for-
profit network of schools funded by tuition. Vouchers were implicit.  The business plan 
otherwise did not add up. 
 It was, in fact, reported in The New York Times in connection with Schmidt’s 
announcement to join the Edison Project that the company put “great stock” in Education 
Secretary Lamar Alexander’s plan to implement a national system of vouchers. Whittle 
                                                
94 Chubb, “Lessons in School Reform,” 111. For Diane Ravitch’s subsequent rejection of market-
based reforms and standardization, see Ravitch, The Death and Life and Reign of Error. 
95 Edison Project, The Edison Project, 7.  See also Trimble, An Empire Undone, 295, where 
Schmidt is quoted as saying in an interview, “We will create schools that achieve quantum gains 
in the academic performance of American students, in the quality of their lives, and in the well-
being of our nation.” 
96 David Ellis, “Knowledge for Sale,” Time, June 8, 1992, 69. 
Chapter 1: Making Education a Business 
 55 
was quoted in that Times article as saying: “If vouchers existed, we couldn’t build 
schools fast enough. But we’re assuming no vouchers to start.”97 
With Bill Clinton’s defeat of Bush in November 1992, Whittle’s assumption that 
the Edison Project would succeed with or without vouchers was put to the test in the 
investment community.  Whittle had said in 1991 that he would need $2.5 billion to $3 
billion to open the company’s first 200 schools by 1996 and would raise the money from 
private investors.  His three major partners in Whittle Communications had agreed in 
1992 to commit amounts proportionate to their stakes in the media company.  Time 
Warner, which that year scaled back the 50 percent stake in Whittle Communications it 
had taken in 1988 as Time Inc. to 37.5 percent, invested $22.5 million. Philips 
Electronics of Holland, which bought a 25 percent stake in the company in 1992 for $175 
million, invested $15 million.  Associated Newspapers of Britain, holding a 24 percent 
stake in the company, contributed $14.4 million.  Whittle himself, who along with a small 
group of investors controlled the remaining 13.5 percent of the company, added $8.1 
million.98 
Though Whittle claimed in July 1992 that investors would be lining up to fund the 
launch of the Edison Project,99 he had no more takers.  Whittle approached the Walt 
Disney Company, Apple Computer, Paramount Communications, AT&T, McDonald’s, 
Cox Enterprises, and PepsiCo.  All declined to invest.  As late as September 1993, 
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Whittle had managed to raise no more than $60 million.  His goal of $2.5 billion to $3 
billion was out of sight.100  
Without vouchers to make tuition free or at least more affordable and without the 
capital to build a new network of schools, Whittle shifted course and became, as  
Lieberman had recommended as an alternate path to reforming schools, a for-profit entity 
“within the public school system,” yet not necessarily with the control over staff that 
Lieberman had described as indispensable.101  In running charter schools, Edison would 
have the freedom to hire and fire staff, but not in running conventional district schools.  
In the latter case, Edison would be bound by the union regulations Lieberman had decried 
as ruinous.  
According to Whittle, he had been advised at the winter meeting of the National 
Governors Association in Washington, D.C., in 1993 by Governor Roy Romer of 
Colorado, Governor Bill Weld of Massachusetts, and Governor John Engler of Michigan 
to get out of the brick-and-mortar business and remodel Edison as a subcontractor 
managing public schools.102 From the beginning, Whittle had said he hoped Edison 
would eventually branch out to run public schools as a subcontractor.103  And Chubb later 
wrote that Edison’s design team had concluded by December 1992 that working with 
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public school districts should be part of the company’s business plan.104  While such an 
undertaking was decidedly secondary, circumstances quickly made it primary.  In 
September 1993, Edison officials announced that the company would put on hold its 
plans to build its own schools and enter the business of subcontracting.105  In shifting 
course, Whittle conceded what John Golle had three years earlier.  Golle, the founder and 
CEO of EAI had also initially intended to manage an independent network of private 
schools but found the start-up costs too high and refashioned his company as a 
subcontractor.106 
In its new form, Edison was forced to scale back the curriculum advanced by its 
design team. Although Edison did divide its schools into academies and houses, institute 
a neat student dress code, create cohorts of master teachers, and provide home computers 
for every student, it could only afford to lengthen the school day by one hour, not two, 
and the school year by eighteen days, not thirty.  Nor could Edison provide the resources 
necessary to achieve its art, music, or foreign-language ambitions.107   
With this modified program—anchored by the Success for All reading program 
developed at Johns Hopkins University and by Everyday Mathematics developed at the 
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University of Chicago—Edison took over four elementary schools in 1995 with 2,250 
students: a charter school in Boston; a district school in Mount Clemens, Michigan; 
another district school in Sherman, Texas; and a third district school in Wichita, Kansas. 
From there, the company grew significantly, eclipsing EAI, which in 1996 would see one 
contract for running nine schools in Baltimore terminated after three-and-a-half 
contentious years and another contract for managing all of Hartford’s schools cut to five 
and then nullified after two equally difficult years.108   By  1998, Edison was running 
forty-three schools with 23,900 students across twelve states; by 1999, the company was 
running sixty-one schools with 37,500 students across seventeen states.109   
 
With Edison’s impressive growth, the company gained confidence from investors.  With 
$12 million from Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, $20 million from J.P. Morgan Capital 
Corp., $20 million from a Swedish fund called Investor Growth Capital, and $30 million 
from Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen’s Vulcan Ventures on top of earlier investments by 
Time Warner, Philips Electronics, Associated Newspapers, and other investors, Edison 
had raised $232 million in total by the summer of 1999.110  But the company needed far 
more money even in its reinvented role as a subcontractor:  start-up costs in taking over 
district schools involved renovating buildings as well as purchasing new computers for 
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both the classroom and each student’s home; start-up costs in partnering with charter 
school boards typically involved leasing or buying property, as well.111 
Earlier in the year, Edison had turned to Merrill Lynch to go public. Much as 
managing public schools as a subcontractor was not central to Whittle’s initial strategy, 
going public did not appear to be either.  But here again, Whittle had little choice.  His 
media empire in Knoxville had collapsed in 1994.  Only Channel One was posting a 
profit.  His other properties—in particular, the single-advertiser magazines, Special 
Report TV, Medical News Network, and the Larger Agenda book series—were 
hemorrhaging money.  K-III Communications (renamed Primedia in 1997), a 
conglomerate in New York controlled by the venerable private equity group Kohlberg 
Kravis & Roberts, now known as KKR, paid $240 million for Channel One.112  The rest 
of Whittle Communications, valued as a whole in 1992 at more than $750 million, was 
dissolved.113  Time Warner and Philips Electronics wrote off their respective investments 
in Whittle Communications of $185 million and $175 million and were forced to come 
up with an additional $60 million to meet the company’s payroll. Whittle 
Communications had turned out to be a shimmering house of cards constructed from 
blind ambition and aggressive accounting.114    Reginald K. Brack, Jr., chairman of Time 
Inc., called the six-year partnership with Whittle Communications the company’s 
Vietnam.115 
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The brand-new stately company headquarters would be purchased by the federal 
government for under half its cost and transformed into the Howard H. Baker Jr. U.S. 
Courthouse.116  Whatever plans Whittle may have had to use Whittle Communications to 
subsidize the Edison Project were  buried. 
That Whittle went on to raise the aforementioned money from Donaldson, Lufkin 
& Jenrette, J.P. Morgan, Investor Capital Growth, and Paul Allen testified to his 
legendary skills as a salesman.  That Whittle won over Merrill Lynch and a range of Wall 
Street voices further testified to such prowess.  Typical of bullish analysts and 
commentators were Michael T. Moe, the director of growth equity research at Merrill 
Lynch, and James K. Glassman, a financial columnist for The Washington Post.117 
In a widely circulated 192-page report entitled The Book of Knowledge: Investing 
in the Growing Education and Training Industry, published by Merrill Lynch seven 
months before it took Edison public in November 1999, Moe praised Edison in a one-
page sidebar as the nation’s leading EMO and trumpeted the company’s potential. In 
assessing the market for educational privatization in general, Moe wrote, “It is our 
prediction that 10% of the publicly-funded [sic] K-12 school market will be privately 
managed ten years from now, implying a market of over $30 billion in today’s 
dollars.”118 As striking as this forecast were the jibes at the public sector as inefficient 
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and downright incompetent. These put-downs appeared in the margins throughout the 
report, sometimes as quotes from luminaries, sometimes as the authors’ assertions: 
• “In the first place, God made idiots. That was for practice. Then he made school 
boards.” – Mark Twain 
• “I don’t know jokes; I just watch the government and report the facts.” – Will 
Rodgers 
• “Private schools spend less money per student on average but have significantly 
higher SAT scores.” 
• “Technology can take American schools into the 21st century, but first we need to 
bring our schools into the 20th century.” 
• “We can’t think of another service industry that exists where 50% of the money is 
spent outside of where the service is rendered.” 
• “Public schools too often fail because they are shielded from the very force that 
improves performance and sparks innovation in nearly every other human enterprise 
– competition.” – Robert Lutz, President and COO, Chrysler Corporation 
• “I quit school in the fifth grade because of pneumonia. Not because I had it, but 
because I couldn’t spell it.” – Rocky Graziano 
As much as any critique by Friedman, Lieberman, Chubb and Moe, Whittle, or 
Hill, Guthrie, and Pierce, these jibes collectively captured the frustration on Wall Street 
with the quality of public schooling and the confidence that businessmen could do a 
better job than municipalities in running schools.119 
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In assessing Edison’s future in particular, Moe declared a year later in a 
Businessweek article that by 2005, Edison would be running 423 schools with 260,000 
students and generating $1.8 billion in revenue.  Echoing Moe, Scott Soffen, an analyst at 
Legg Mason, said in the same article, “In the near term, you’re going to see growth not 
unlike the Internet.”120   
While Moe’s report may not be considered a work of disinterested analysis, given 
that Merrill Lynch was Edison’s lead underwriter and stood to make—and did make—
millions of dollars in fees for taking Edison public, Glassman’s assessment requires no 
such qualification.121  As early as 1995, Glassman, in a column entitled “It’s Elementary: 
Buy Education Stocks Now,” cited Edison as a company to watch and suggested that in 
ten years private firms might be running 20 percent of the nation’s K-12 public schools 
and generating $100 billion in revenues.122  Joining Moe, Soffen, and Glassman in 
lauding Edison and forecasting dramatic growth for EMOs in general were Howard M. 
Block of Banc of America Securities, Jeff Silber of Gerard Klauer Mattison, and Greg 
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Cappelli and Brandon Dobell of Credit Suisse First Boston.123  Banc of America 
Securities and Credit Suisse First Boston along with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and 
J.P. Morgan Securities assisted Merrill Lynch in underwriting Edison’s initial public 
offering.124 If Moe, Soffen, Glassman, Block, Cappelli, and Dobell were right, Edison 
would become, as Whittle had envisioned, the Gap, McDonald’s, or Safeway of 
education.  
 
With Edison’s initial public offering in November 1999, the company netted $109 
million from the sale of 6.8 million shares at $18 apiece,125 and in the process 
underscored the permanence of its place in the educational world by changing its name 
from the Edison Project to Edison Schools.126  The company raised more money through 
two secondary offerings: one in August 2000, netting $71 million from the sale of 3.35 
million shares at $22.88 apiece; and another in March 2001, netting $81 million from the 
sale of 3.53 million shares at $24.56 apiece.127  
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 This scale of investment in an education company was new, but not the method 
or, as time would tell, the fate.  White, Weld & Co. of Boston along with Hambrecht & 
Quist of San Francisco among other underwriters took Behavioral Research Laboratories 
(BRL) public in February 1971 at $15 a share and quickly sold 424,000 shares to raise 
more than $6 million for the Palo Alto-based education company.128  BRL at the time was 
managing an elementary school in Gary, Indiana, as well as preschools, foreign-language 
academies, and reading centers across the country; BRL also developed and implemented 
math and reading programs for school districts nationwide.129  BRL peaked at $17 a share 
the following month and then began an inexorable slide on repeated news of 
disappointing earnings.130  By 1974, the company was trading for pennies and soon after 
suffered the shame of delisting.131 
Two investment banks in Minneapolis—John G. Kinnard & Co. and Dain 
Bosworth Inc.—likewise raised $6 million for Educational Alternatives Inc. (EAI) in 
April 1991 by taking the company public at $4 a share.132  Michael T. Moe, who, as 
noted earlier, vigorously endorsed Edison as Merrill Lynch’s director of growth equity 
research, worked at the time as a financial analyst for Dain Bosworth.  Moe claimed that 
EAI was “in the right place, at the right time, with the right service” and forecasted 
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dramatic expansion.133 EAI climbed to $48.75 in November 1993 and then commenced 
its own inexorable slide on repeated news of disappointing earnings as well as accounting 
irregularities and misrepresentations of test data.  By 1996, EAI was trading under its 
initial offering price of $4.  By 2000, EAI, too, was trading for pennies and soon after 
was delisted.134 
Also new was the scale of potential return for the leaders of a school management 
company.  Whittle and Schmidt stood to benefit enormously if Edison became what they 
had envisioned.  With 11.3 million shares (or nearly 25 percent of the company’s total) 
when Edison went public, Whittle held a stake worth $203.4 million at the outset, a stake 
that would be worth much more, of course, if the stock went up, as it would, climbing to 
$38.75 per share in 2001.  Schmidt, in turn, held 929,000 shares when the company went 
public, making his portion worth $16.7 million.  In both form and degree, such 
compensation was unheard of in the world of K-12 education, let alone education in 
general, but for the evolving for-profit postsecondary sector defined by the likes of 
DeVry and the University of Phoenix.135  
 
While taking Edison public may never have been part of Whittle’s original plan, the 
move comported with his pursuit of growth and accountability as well as substantial 
profit.  If Edison was going to be like any other major business, it should have access to 
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capital markets, compete for the favor of investors, and stand up to the scrutiny of Wall 
Street analysts.  What applied to the schools it ran should apply to the company itself. 
 Competition defined Edison, as it defined those who contended that schools 
should be run like businesses.  Louis Gerstner, in amplifying the message he helped 
broadcast as a founding board member of the New American Schools Development 
Corporation (NASDC), made clear in his book Reinventing Education, published in 1994, 
that schools must vie with each other like any service provider in the marketplace: “From 
a business perspective, … the central problem for American public schools is that they 
have not been forced to continuously adapt themselves to the changes in their students 
and the demands of society and the economy.”136 
 For Gerstner, who had recently moved from the helm of RJR Nabisco to that of 
IBM, the crucible of competition among schools would lead to progress:  “Schools must 
meet the test any high-performance organization must meet:  results.  And results are not 
achieved by bureaucratic regulation. They are achieved by meeting customer 
requirements by rewards for success and penalties for failure.  Market discipline is the 
key, the ultimate form of accountability.”137 
To Whittle and his team launching Edison, the reward for results for school 
operators should be no different from the reward rendered the likes of RJR Nabisco and 
IBM.  If the company succeeded in its goal of providing a “world-class education” to 
disadvantaged students at the same cost as public schools, Edison officials maintained, 
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profits should follow.138  While tension certainly existed between reinvesting money in 
its schools and returning it to investors, explained John Chubb soon after the company 
opened its first schools, such tension was healthy:  “[T]he pressure to make profits has 
forced the Edison Project to improve the service it offers communities, not compromise 
it.”139 
 
Whittle and his team exuded the same conviction as Gerstner. Some of this conviction 
seemed rooted in the customary regard businessmen accord competition.  Much of 
Whittle’s conviction, however, derived from the success of Channel One. Despite harsh 
criticism from students, parents, educators, and consumer rights groups alike, Channel 
One profited immensely as a business collaborating closely with school districts.  In 
defending Edison as a for-profit enterprise, Whittle repeatedly cited Channel One’s 
battle. Whittle did so before Edison opened its first school in 1995.  And he made the 
same argument as late as  2005 when Edison was retrenching in the face of public 
opposition rather than growing as he and Wall Street forecasters had predicted.140 
If not Whittle’s most unconventional venue for advertising, Channel One was 
certainly his most controversial. In exchange for wiring schools and equipping them with 
satellite dishes, twenty-five-inch televisions, and videocassette recorders, Channel One 
obtained a commitment from school administrators to show students every morning a 
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twelve-minute news program comprising four thirty-second commercials.141  Among 
advertisers would be Wrigley’s Chewing Gum, Snickers, Fritos, Pepsi, Mountain Dew, 
Nintendo, Xbox, Clearasil, Stridex, Head & Shoulders Shampoo, Nike, Converse, Levi’s 
Jeans, Pizza Hut, McDonald’s, and the U.S. Army.  The cost to Channel One for 
installation was approximately $50,000 per school with a minimum of 5,000 schools to 
start, meaning an initial outlay of $250 million.142  The revenue potential with each thirty-
second commercial costing $150,000 was $600,000 a day or approximately $100 million 
a year.143 
As educational programming, Channel One differed little in principle from 
Schoolhouse Rock!, the widely acclaimed series of brief animated musical segments that 
aired on ABC between Saturday morning cartoons from 1973 to 1985 and was revived in 
the 1990s. Sponsored by General Mills, Kellogg’s, and McDonald’s, among others, 
Schoolhouse Rock! brought to millions of children mini-lessons in math, grammar, civics, 
and science with such episodes as “Three Is a Magic Number,” “Conjunction Junction,” 
“I’m Just a Bill,” and “Interplanet Janet.”144 Yet Schoolhouse Rock! was viewed at home 
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at parental discretion. Channel One was viewed during homeroom as a mandatory part of 
the school day.   
Prior to commencing a five-week pilot of Channel One at six schools across the 
country in March 1989, Whittle published an op-ed in The New York Times to win over 
critics of commercials in the classroom.  Whittle wrote that while students can benefit 
immensely from modern video technology and specifically from a daily news program, 
only 3 percent of the country’s schools had satellite dishes and only 10 percent of 
classrooms had televisions.  “Were this a perfect world,” Whittle argued, “we would 
agree that Government, not commercials, should provide this technology and 
programming.... But in today’s world of $20 textbook budgets and tough fiscal 
constraints, two minutes of appropriate advertising is not a bad solution.”145 
To buttress his case, Whittle ran seven full-page ads in March in The New York 
Times during the launch of the pilot and another seven in June to report the results of 
studies of the program’s popularity and its academic impact.146  In the first of the fourteen 
ads, appearing the same day as his op-ed and on the final page of the paper’s business 
section, a simple exclamation in white ran across a black background:  “Dinner’s ready!”  
Occupying the bottom quarter of the page was commentary, with the following heading:  
“For too many students, this is the 6:00 news.”  The ad continued:  “Teenagers have more 
on their minds than world news.  And it shows.  In a recent television special, high school 
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students reported that Chernobyl was Cher’s full name.  That the Ayatollah Khomeini 
was a Russian gymnast.  And that the District of Columbia was a country in Latin 
America.  It’s not fair to ask the overburdened teachers in our underfunded schools to 
solve this problem alone.  Obviously a news program that teenagers will watch would 
help.”147 
The next day, Whittle ran another attention-grabbing ad, this one appearing on the 
back page of the paper’s front section.  Taking up the top three-quarters of the page were 
three columns of blank spaces, numbered from one to fifty-seven.  Commentary again ran 
below, this time with the following heading:  “Here’s a list of everyone willing to donate 
$250,000,000 to schools.”  The ad continued:  “No one can afford it.  Including us.  And 
it’s becoming apparent that government can no longer equip schools on its own.... It 
seems obvious to us that it’s time to explore new, innovative approaches to the funding of 
education. And that’s what we believe we’ve done with Channel One.”148  The five 
remaining ads of this initial blitz appeared over the ensuing two weeks, carried similar 
messages, and generated enough buzz to warrant an article in The New York Times about 
the advertising firm behind the campaign.149  Of the seven follow-up ads in June, three 
appeared with a picture of fireworks and claimed underneath that “an overwhelming 
majority” of polled viewers wanted Channel One in their schools, that the same held for 
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polled parents of school-age children, and that students who had watched Channel One 
did significantly better on current events assessments than those who had not.150 
Whittle’s efforts paid off.  A year after the pilot, Channel One was in 3,600 
schools across thirty-eight states.151 In its second year, Channel One was in 8,216 schools 
and every state but Alaska, Hawaii, and Nevada.152 Though public schools in California, 
New York, and Rhode Island were barred by state education authorities from contracting 
with Channel One, private schools in those states were, of course, free to make their own 
decisions.  Catholic schools had signed up in disproportionate numbers. Of the country’s 
Catholic high schools, 65 percent (or 844) were wired with Channel One.153  In 1992, 
educational authorities in Rhode Island and California backed down.154 In 1995, 
educational authorities in New York did the same.155  Channel One appeared to be on its 
way to fulfilling Whittle’s prediction in 1989 that the program would someday be viewed 
in 20,000 of the country’s schools.156 By 1999, Channel One had a daily audience of 8 
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million students in more than 12,000 schools, and the cost of the network’s thirty-second 
commercial spots had climbed to $200,000.157  
Whittle’s full-court press to disarm his opponents didn’t end with his fourteen 
full-page ads in The New York Times.  He also spent a significant sum on lobbying 
legislators in Albany, Sacramento, and other state capitals to get Channel One into 
schools.158  In addition, much as he and his successors would in leading Edison, Whittle 
worked hard to bring aboard prominent people from many corners.  With the 
inauguration of Channel One, Whittle succeeded in appointing to the program’s advisory 
board none other than Albert Shanker.159  Whittle moreover created a noncommercial 
program for teachers about best pedagogical practices.  Called the Educators Channel, it 
was moderated by Judy Woodruff, Washington correspondent for The MacNeil/Lehrer 
Newshour on PBS and beamed for free by Whittle Communications to any school with a 
satellite dish. Though Shanker stepped down from the Channel One advisory board a year 
later, saying that he feared his association as president of the American Federation of 
Teachers was being used as an endorsement of the program, he agreed to sit on the 
advisory board of the Educators Channel. The chair of this latter board was the 
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progressive scholar Linda Darling-Hammond, at the time the codirector of the Center for 
School Reform at Teachers College, Columbia University.160   
 
While Whittle was right in claiming many years later that Channel One overcame 
resistance from opponents to commercials in the classroom to become a profitable 
operation, he was wrong, according to academic studies, that Channel One would 
accomplish its purpose of significantly improving student awareness of current events, 
and he was wrong that Channel One would continue to keep its critics at bay and grow. 
Whether or not these studies proved to be decisive in determining the future of Channel 
One, the opponents of commercials in the classroom ultimately prevailed, and advertisers 
drifted away.  
In a review of Channel One during its pilot stage, Wall Street Journal media critic 
Robert Goldberg described the program as “MTV meets CNN,” with smart graphics, 
seductive music, breathless movement from one story to the next, and seamless 
integration of commercials. “By the end of the first three shows,” Goldberg wrote, “I was 
exhausted.  And what sank in?  Not much—that Eastern [Airlines] was on strike, and that 
there are teens in the U.S.S.R. and they’re just like us, except different.”  Moreover, 
Goldberg wrote, “[a]t a certain point in this slick, fast-paced show, I had a strange 
feeling—a feeling that the news and the ads were actually starting to merge.  Chatty, 
upbeat, full of flash and pizzazz, they became impossible to tell apart.”161  
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Goldberg’s concern that Channel One lacked depth was soon confirmed by a 
series of studies building on the preliminary studies conducted after the pilot in 1989.  
Much as the Ford Foundation concluded in the 1960s after spending $20 million on 
classroom televisions and educational programs—transmitted to schools in six 
midwestern states in that pre-satellite era by circling aircraft—that television fared poorly 
as an instructional device,162 the researchers studying Channel One found little if any 
pedagogical value to the daily news program. 
The first study was carried out by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan and commissioned by Whittle himself. In administering multiple-
choice current events tests from 1990 to 1992 to students at forty-six schools, half of 
which showed Channel One and half of which did not, the University of Michigan 
researchers found that students at Channel One schools exhibited only a 3 percent 
advantage.  While the same researchers documented advantages of 5 percent for high 
school students and 8 percent for middle school students in a third year of their study, 
these gains applied only to five schools where teachers actively integrated stories from 
the Channel One broadcasts into their curricula.163  Sowing further doubt among skeptics 
were subsequent studies by other researchers that concluded that Channel One was found 
disproportionately in high-poverty schools, delivered only teaspoons of substance amid a 
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banquet of rich images and sounds, and conveyed ad content with considerably more 
effectiveness than news.164   
This last determination—reported in a peer-reviewed article in 2006 in the 
medical journal Pediatrics detailing how much better middle school students recalled 
commercials from Channel One than news stories—got to the heart of the program’s 
problem.  Much as Goldberg worried after watching three episodes of the pilot in 1989 
that Channel One was, in essence, a subtle vehicle for advertisers to nurture brand loyalty 
among young consumers, critics from across the political spectrum described Channel 
One as guilty of trespassing. Bill Honig, California’s superintendent of public instruction, 
piped up in opposition just as the pilot wrapped up. “We are given these kids in trust,” 
Honig said.  “We can’t sell access to them.”165  Thomas Sobol, New York’s 
commissioner of education, echoed Honig, decrying Channel One as an “intrusion of 
materialism and commercialism.”166 When Whittle tried in 1993 to add a fifth 
commercial to the twelve-minute broadcast, he added fuel to the fire.  “Right from the 
beginning, we have described this as a classic example of a slippery slope,” responded 
William L. Rukeyser, special adviser to Honig (and, ironically, a third cousin of Whittle 
Communications senior executive William S. Rukeyser). “This is akin to allowing a 
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multinational company to strip mine in a national park. Naturally, the company is going 
to try to get a few extra tons of coal a day.”167 
Though Whittle failed to get his fifth commercial, opposition to Channel One 
nevertheless continued.  Groups as different as Action for Children’s Television, 
Consumers Union, Ralph Nader’s Commercial Alert, the Christian parents’ organization 
Citizens for Excellence in Education, and Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum relentlessly 
beat the same drum.168  Nader and Schlafly, in fact, appeared before the same Senate 
committee on May 20, 1999, to testify against Channel One. The hearing had been 
convened at the urging of Alabama Republican Richard C. Shelby, yet another Channel 
One critic.  Schlafly called the program “a devious device to enable advertisers to 
circumvent parents.”  Nader called it “the most brazen marketing ploy in the history of 
the United States.”169 
Reflecting two decades later on his battle with Channel One, William L. Rukeyser 
said that had Whittle forgone California and New York, he may well never have 
generated such wide-ranging criticism.  “Whittle’s mistake may have been his 
impatience,” the retired California official said.  “He went where he wasn’t wanted and 
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pushed and pushed, and though he won permission for his program, he in the process 
engendered so much negative publicity he would have otherwise been spared.”170 
By the time Pediatrics published its clinically dry assessment in 2006, Channel 
One was a hobbled giant.  Though still viewed in approximately 12,000 schools across 
the country, Channel One was losing advertisers and failing to attract new ones.  Kraft 
Foods and Kellogg’s, for example, had stopped running commercials on Channel One 
because of growing criticism of such companies as being partially responsible for the 
rising incidence of childhood and adolescent obesity.  From 2002 to 2005, ad revenue 
dropped 31 percent, from $99 million to $68 million.171  From 2005 to 2006, ad revenue 
fell another 31 percent, plummeting to $49 million.172 
In April 2007, Primedia, which had paid Whittle Communications $240 million in 
October 1994 for Channel One, sold the cable program to Alloy Inc., a publicly traded 
New York-based media and marketing firm best known for developing such TV series as 
Gossip Girl, The Vampire Diaries, and Pretty Little Liars.  The price represented nothing 
more than assumption of liabilities.173  Given that the purpose of sophisticated private 
equity groups like Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts, the majority owner of Primedia, is to beat 
the market, the irony of such a loss is profound.  While KKR may have retained sizable 
earnings during its early ownership of Channel One, the private equity group had nothing 
                                                
170 William L. Rukeyser, telephone interview, May 26, 2011. 
171 Rhea R. Borja, “Channel One Struggling in Shifting Market,” Education Week, July 27, 2005, 
3, 14. 
172 Rhea R. Borja, “Media Conglomerate to Drop Channel One,” Education Week, December 22, 
2006,. 
173 Business Wire, “Alloy Broadens Media Offerings; Acquires Channel One,” April 23, 2007, 
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to show for its investment over the long term. Had KKR instead placed $240 million in a 
simple S&P 500 index fund in September 1994, it would have seen that investment grow 
by April 2007 to more than $840 million.174   
Under Alloy Inc., Channel One saw its audience dwindle and ad revenue slide. By 
March 2010, Channel One was down to 8,000 schools,175 and many of its commercials 
were merely program promotions for TV shows on CBS, with whose news division 
Channel One had partnered to produce stories.176 Though reports by Alloy Inc. to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission do not break out revenue according to specific 
subsidiaries, it is clear from its annual filings that Channel One was generating no more 
than $29 million a year and probably much less.177  In June 2010, Alloy Inc. was itself 
purchased by the private equity firm ZelnickMedia.178 
                                                
174 Had KKR played the tortoise instead of the hare, it could have invested that $240 million in an 
S&P 500 index fund such as State Street Global Advisors’ SPY.  On September 30, 1994, when 
KKR was finalizing its purchase of Channel One, SPY closed at $46.17 a share.  On April 23, 
2007, when KKR sold Channel One to Alloy Inc. for nothing more than assumption of liabilities, 
SPY closed at $148.06.  With annual dividends of 2 percent reinvested and taxed at the qualified 
dividend rate of 15 percent conferred corporations, that $240 million would have grown by April 
2007 to approximately $844 million. 
175 Alloy Media and Marketing, investor presentation, March 15, 2010, 9, 
http://www.alloymarketing.com/. 
176 GlobalNewswire, “Channel One Network and CBS News to Co-Produce Award-Winning 
Newscast for Teens,” July 21, 2009, http://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2009/07/21/401096/169374/en/Channel-One-Network-and-CBS-News-to-Co-Produce-
Award-Winning-Weekday-Newscast-for-Teens-Beginning-This-Fall.html. 
177 The 10-K filed by Alloy Inc. for fiscal 2007 reports combined revenue for Channel One and 
FrontLine Marketing (a company selling in-store display board advertising), both properties 
purchased that year, as $20.5 million (revised downward from the $24.3 million reported in the 
company’s initial 10-K for fiscal 2007).  According to the company’s 10-K for fiscal 2008, 
Channel One posted an increase in revenue of $7 million, and FrontLine an increase of $6 
million, for their first full years as Alloy subsidiaries.  According to the company’s 10-K for 
fiscal 2009, Channel One posted an increase in revenue of $1.6 million, and FrontLine, an 
increase of $2.6 million.  The implied combined revenue for these two properties for fiscal 2009 
was thus $37.7 million.  Even if Channel One accounted for all the revenue reported for both 
properties in fiscal 2007, it could not account for more than $29.1 million of the combined 
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If public opposition scuttled Channel One within fifteen years, it stood to do the same in 
much less time to an educational management organization (EMO) set on the 
controversial course of making a profit running public schools.  Once Channel One had 
taken care of the fixed costs of wiring schools and purchasing and installing satellite 
dishes, televisions, and videocassette recorders, it had only the variable costs of 
production to worry about.  With more client schools and thus more ad revenue, those 
variable costs of producing the program dropped in relative terms and brought down 
average total costs.  Channel One could achieve economies of scale and did.  More 
schools meant a lot more money. 
 For an EMO, more schools necessitate more personnel.  There is a linear 
relationship between expansion and more teachers, education’s units of production. All 
labor-intensive sectors are, in this regard, as previously noted, constrained by Baumol’s 
Law.179  Yet Baumol’s Law hits education especially hard.  In such labor-intensive 
sectors as law, consulting, and insurance, competition indeed forces firms to contain 
budgets but not to the degree of taxpayer and school board vigilance. Because of the 
collective nature and purpose of public education, pay for top school officials, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 8, pales in comparison to that of leaders of law firms, consultancies, 
and insurance companies. The same holds for military officers, police chiefs, judges, civil 
                                                                                                                                            
revenue in fiscal 2009.  See Alloy Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal years ended January 31, 2009 and 
January 31, 2010, www.sec.gov. 
178 Matt Jarzemsky, “ZelnickMedia to Pay $126.5 Million for Alloy,” Wall Street Journal, June 
24, 2010. 
179 William J. Baumol, The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 20-24. 
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servants, and legislators. Moreover, because children and adolescents are the immediate 
consumers in schools and, as such, not in much of a position to judge the quality of 
service rendered, any and all apparent incentives for providers to cut corners must be 
curbed.  This makes the EMO business particularly tough.  Making it tougher still is that 
teachers and staff in traditional district schools are usually protected by strict union 
contracts; and while teachers and staff in charter schools are rarely unionized, managing 
charter schools often calls for considerable funding to lease or buy property. 
 Salaries and benefits for teachers in school districts across the country, according 
to the National Center for Education Statistics, have been year after year stubbornly 
consistent: in 1990-1991, they amounted to 56 percent of annual spending; in 1995-1996, 
57 percent; in 2000-2001, 56 percent again; and in 2005-2006, 55 percent. If salaries and 
benefits for support staff—from guidance counselors and attendance secretaries to 
librarians and speech pathologists—are included, the percentages jump to 63, 64, 63, and 
63 again, respectively.  If salaries and benefits for custodians, bus drivers, and cafeteria 
workers are added, the percentages climb to 73, 74, 72, and 72 again, respectively.  What 
remains are salaries and benefits for school and central administrators, ranging over these 
four sample years from 5 to 6 percent; the cost of supplies and purchased services, 
ranging from 15 to 18 percent; and tuition and other costs, consistently amounting to 2 
percent (see Table 1.1).180 
 Under these circumstances, an EMO is hard pressed to achieve economies of 
scale.  While supplies and services might be more efficiently bought through bulk 
                                                
180 National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2009, Table 180: Total 
Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education, by Function and Subfunction: 
Selected Years, 1990-91 through 2006-07, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_180.asp. 
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purchasing and while school and central administration might be rationalized through 
careful regional coordination, the potential for significant savings is limited, and the 
pressure to cut corners is accordingly substantial. Such pressure on for-profit educators 
was trenchantly noted a century ago by Abraham Flexner in his assessment of 
commercially operated medical schools in his landmark 1910 study of medical training in 
the United States and Canada. “In these schools,” wrote Flexner, “an annual balance to 
the good is obtained for distribution by slighting general equipment, by overworking 
laboratory teachers, by wholly omitting certain branches, by leaving certain departments 
relatively undeveloped, or by resisting any decided elevation of standards.”181  What held 
true for Flexner continued to stoke suspicion and foment resistance, making for-profit 
educational management an especially hard and expensive sell.   
 Expansion in education can moreover result in diseconomies of scale, researchers 
have found, because of additional administrative layers necessary for larger operations. 
“Cost function results indicate potentially sizeable cost savings up to district enrollment 
levels between 2,000 and 4,000 students,” concluded three scholars in a 2002 study, “and 
that sizeable diseconomies of size may begin to emerge for districts above 15,000 
students.”182  This stood to be all the more true for an EMO with schools spread across 
the country rather than concentrated in one region.  
 
                                                
181 Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (New York: Carnegie Foundation, 1910; 
reproduced, 1972), p. 126. 
182 Matthew Andrews, William Duncombe, and John Yinger,  “Revisiting Economies of Size in 
American Education: Are We Any Closer to a Consensus?” Economics of Education Review 21 
(June 2002): 245-262. See also Henry M. Levin, “Why Is This So Difficult?,” in Educational 
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Budget item 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 
Teacher salaries 44.9 44.9 44.4 41.6 
Teacher benefits 11.1 11.9 11.4 13.1 
Support staff salaries 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.4 
Support staff benefits 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 
Maintenance salaries 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.6 
Maintenance benefits 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 
Transportation salaries 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Transportation benefits 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Cafeteria salaries NA 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Cafeteria benefits NA 0.4 0.4 0.5 
School admin salaries 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1 
School admin benefits 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 
District support salaries 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 
District support benefits 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
District admin salaries 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 
District admin benefits 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Purchased services 8.1 8.5 9.1 9.6 
Supplies 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 
Tuition  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 
Other 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Table 1.1  Total expenditures by percentage for U.S. public elementary and secondary schools by 
function and subfunction.  Data source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2009, Table 180, 1990-1991 through 2006-2007, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_180.asp. 
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students.”183  This stood to be all the more true for an EMO with schools spread across 
the country rather than concentrated in one region.  
 As with nearly all commercial enterprises, marketing costs constituted another 
burden. To make its case, Edison invested heavily in marketing.  In addition to running 
full-page ads at the outset in Education Week, The New York Times, and The Wall Street 
Journal, Edison ran 121 full-page ads in Education Week from 2004 through 2007, of 
which more than half appeared as advertorials on the second page of the magazine.184  
Edison also sponsored several annual two-day retreats for prospective clients at the 
luxurious Broadmoor Hotel and Resort in Colorado Springs and paid substantial salaries 
to marketing executives to pitch the company.185   As many as twelve company vice 
presidents, called developers, crisscrossed the country studying the needs of school 
districts, cold-calling superintendents, meeting with school officials, and negotiating 
contracts. These developers, according to Richard O’Neill, senior vice president and 
                                                
183 Matthew Andrews, William Duncombe, and John Yinger,  “Revisiting Economies of Size in 
American Education: Are We Any Closer to a Consensus?” Economics of Education Review 21 
(June 2002): 245-262. See also Henry M. Levin, “Why Is This So Difficult?,” in Educational 
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184 Edison began this sustained advertising campaign in Education Week on March 3, 2004.  Ads 
appeared in nearly every issue through July 18, 2007.  From August 31, 2005, onward, Edison 
advertised on page 2 of every issue. For detailed analysis of how school privatization leads to 
heavy investment in marketing, see Christopher Lubienski, “Public Schools in Marketized 
Environments: Shifting Incentives and Unintended Consequences of Competition-Based 
Educational Reforms,” American Journal of Education 3 (August 2005): 464-485. 
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School Support Division from 1997 to 2002, said in a telephone interview on October 30, 2006, 
“There was a huge number of people at high salaries selling Edison.  Nobody at Edison was 
considering the scale of marketing and sales costs when assessing the company’s budget.” 
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general manager of Edison’s Partnership Division from 1997 to 2005, earned $150,000 to 
$175,000 a year and incurred approximately $75,000 a year in expenses.186  
Developers, O’Neill said, on average pitched Edison to at least fifty school 
districts for every contract they won.  Moreover, on account of pressure from 
headquarters to add schools and increase gross revenue, many developers closed deals 
that were not financially viable. This was the heaviest marketing cost, O’Neill said.  It 
was not the retreats at the Broadmoor or the salaries and expenses of developers that cost 
Edison so much, he said, but the losses deliberately absorbed to boost market share. 
“Every school in California was and remains under water,” O’Neill said in 2006.  “The 
contracts for the two schools in Macon, Georgia, were under water.  And the deal to run 
nine schools in Chester, Pennsylvania, was so poorly structured, it cost Edison maybe 
$34 million over four years.”187   
More fundamentally, Edison’s marketing problem was the lack of evidence that 
the company was putting theory into practice in fulfilling its purpose of bringing about 
academic gains.  While Edison’s schools may have struck observers as orderly, modern, 
and vibrant, there was no independent confirmation as of 2000 that their students were 
learning more than students in neighboring schools in the same districts.  In a 300-page 
study of achievement at ten schools managed by Edison in Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Florida, Kansas, Texas, and Colorado, Gary Miron and Brooks Applegate of Western 
Michigan University concluded in 2000 that Edison students did not do as well as Edison 
had claimed but rather made average progress.  Miron and Applegate argued that Edison 
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looked solely at criterion-referenced tests (measuring gains in knowledge over time) 
when it should have also examined norm-referenced tests (assessing progress relative to 
comparison groups).  The latter approach showed Edison’s schools to be in the middle of 
the pack, not out front.188  Likewise, longitudinal studies commissioned by Edison of 
reading scores at Edison’s first four schools done from 1995 to 1998 by Robert Mislevy, 
a statistician at the Educational Testing Service, exhibited mixed results.189 
 Edison nevertheless maintained in its annual reports that its schools achieved 
significant academic gains.190  And Whittle and Schmidt maintained that on account of 
streamlined operations, top managerial talent, and high-quality professional development, 
Edison would with growth achieve the economies of scale necessary for the company to 
earn a profit.  Edison had indeed hired top managerial talent.  It had centralized 
purchasing and professional development. It had adopted state-of-the-art data 
management systems and trained school administrators to make proficient use of them.  
All Edison schools, for example, were equipped with SASI, arguably the best software at 
the time for maintaining student records and scheduling classes, and all Edison 
programmers responsible for running SASI received a week of hands-on training; by 
contrast, programmers in such school systems as New York City’s got little, if any, 
                                                
188 Gary Miron and Brooks Applegate, “An Evaluation of Student Achievement in Edison Schools 
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189 Steven F. Wilson, Learning on the Job: When Business Takes on Public Schools (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 297-299.  
190 Edison Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File #000-27817 (Form 10-K),” 
September 28, 2000, 16; September 26, 2001, 16; September 30, 2002, 15; and September 30, 
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training.191  Edison’s well-appointed headquarters at 521 Fifth Avenue in New York 
likewise gave every impression of order and efficiency, standing in sharp contrast to the 
typical central office of a large school department.  The switchboard was open from 8 
a.m. to 6:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.  Telephone calls were promptly returned.  The 
staff treated visitors with exceptional courtesy; even company executives, from Whittle 
and Schmidt to Chubb, greeted visitors at the front desk and escorted them out.192   
With this professionalism and operational efficiency, economies of scale did 
grow, but not to the point of generating profits. Whittle and Schmidt repeatedly pushed 
back target dates as they approached.  For example, in December 1996, when Edison was 
running twelve schools, they predicted the company would become profitable once it had 
twenty-five schools.193  By 1998, Edison was running twenty-five schools and posted 
losses of $11.4 million on revenue of $38.5 million.194  In June 1997, Whittle and 
Schmidt told The New York Times that Edison would be profitable with fifty to seventy 
                                                
191 Marge Hendricks, director of operations, Harriet Tubman Charter School, interview, New 
York, December 7, 2005. SASI, a product of Pearson School Systems, is a truncated acronym for 
School Administration Student Information System.  Hendricks’s observation about minimal 
training provided by the NYC Department of Education to school programmers conforms with  
my experience as the programmer of a New York City high school from 2001 to 2008 and as the 
leader of programming workshops for New Visions for Public Schools, June 2005, and the NYC 
Department of Education, July 2005. 
192 Based on interviews on November 30, 2005, with Camille Bell, principal of Montebello 
Elementary; Sarah Horsey, former principal of Montebello; Kent Luetke-Stahlman, Baltimore 
Edison Partnership Schools Community technical services manager; and Tanya Lipscomb, 
Montebello’s special education instructional coordinator; on December 7, 2005, with Gwen 
Stephens, principal of Harriet Tubman Charter School, and Marge Hendricks, Tubman’s director 
of operations; and on numerous calls to Edison’s headquarters as well as visits there on October 6 
and 18, 2005; November 8, 2005; March 16, 2006; January 3, 2007; March 16, 2009; August 25, 
2009; April 7, 2010; May 5, 2010; and February 25, 2011. 
193 “Edison’s Elusive Profits,” Rethinking Schools, Spring 2002, 17. 
194 Edison Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File # 000-27817 (Form 10-K),” 
September 28, 2000. 
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schools, which they said they expected to have under management in two years.195  By 
1999, Edison was running fifty-one schools and posted losses of $21.9 million on 
revenue of $69.4 million; by 2000, Edison was running seventy-nine schools and posted 
losses of $49.4 million on revenue of $125 million.196  In July 2001, Whittle told 
Businessweek that Edison would be profitable by 2005 with 250,000 students in its 
schools.197 
 
To remain in business, Edison executives concluded the company had to change its 
business.  While the company could achieve volume in running public schools across the 
country as a subcontractor, the margins were at best slim. In fact, the margins were so 
slim in some states that Edison accepted philanthropic funding from privatization 
advocates to subsidize the operation of many schools.198 
The family foundation of Donald Fisher, the founder of Gap Inc., donated $1.8 
million in 1998 to fund the start-up of an Edison charter school in San Francisco and 
pledged $25 million more to California school districts that signed on with Edison.199  
Business groups and foundations in Denver the same year contributed more than $4 
                                                
195 Peter Applebome, “For-Profit Education Venture to Expand,” New York Times, June 2, 1997. 
196 Edison Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File # 000-27817 (Form 10-K),” 
September 28, 2000. 
197 William C. Symonds, “Edison: Pass, Not Fail,” Businessweek, July 9, 2001, 70. 
198 For criticism of Edison in this regard, see Kenneth J. Saltman, The Edison Schools: Corporate 
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million to transform an old school building into a new home for an Edison school.200 In 
Peoria, Illinois, an heir to the Caterpillar Company fortune provided $1 million in 1999 to 
help finance the opening of two Edison schools.201 In suburban Indianapolis, the Lilly 
Endowment gave a school district $3.3 million in 2001 to subsidize a five-year contract 
with Edison to run two schools.202 That same year, the Fisher Foundation combined with 
the Thompson Family Foundation of Knoxville, Tennessee, in providing $2.8 million to 
the school district of Clark County, Nevada, to subsidize a five-year contract with Edison 
to run seven schools.203  In sum, according to Edison’s filings with the SEC, 
philanthropies supported nineteen of the 113 schools under company management in 
2000-2001.204 
To reorient the company, executives made use of its brand and its intellectual 
property to develop higher-margin divisions.  In 1999, Edison introduced a summer 
school component with non-union staff.  By 2001, the company had 12,000 students 
enrolled in its summer programs. In 2002, summer enrollment climbed to 35,000.  That 
same year Edison rolled out Edison Extra, combining after-school and summer programs, 
as well as Edison Affiliates, offering school districts a light version of its whole-school 
management model in providing  professional development, curriculum guidance, and 
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computer software for assessing student progress.205   
 To what degree these higher-margin divisions drove down costs cannot be 
discerned from the company’s filings with the SEC, as the company did not break out 
revenues and costs by division.  But it is clear that they played a role.  Jim Howland, the 
CEO of Edison’s Educational Services Group and a former McKinsey consultant, said in 
a 2005 interview that the company’s supplementary divisions had quickly evolved into 
the company’s strongest.206 
 In adhering to its core mission, Edison continued to pursue more management 
contracts but concentrated its efforts on signing multiple schools within a district to 
reduce oversight costs and improve academic supervision.207  To that end, Edison in 1999 
was already running four schools in each of six cities: Flint and Mount Clemens, 
Michigan; Peoria, Illinois; Wichita, Kansas; San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C. 
The following year, Edison had three schools in Baltimore, seven schools in Dallas, and 
all three schools in Inkster, Michigan, making it the company’s first wholly run district 
and the nation’s first district run by a private company.208 
But it was Baltimore that presented Edison with its best opportunity yet to prove 
its promise.  In Flint, Mount Clemens, Peoria, Wichita, San Antonio, Dallas, and Inkster, 
Edison was managing traditional district schools, which meant working within the 
constraints of teacher union contracts.  In Washington, D.C., Edison was running four 
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206 Ibid. 
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208 For information on Inkster in particular, see Darcia Harris Bowman, “Michigan District Hires 
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charter schools launched by Friendship House, a local social services agency.  Working 
for a charter board under Friendship House freed Edison from such staffing constraints 
yet placed the company one remove from the city’s department of education and thus 
necessarily limited its influence on municipal policy and its capacity to grow. 
In Baltimore, Edison likewise had no such staffing constraints.  In an effort to 
catalyze change throughout the Baltimore system with an injection of competition, the 
Maryland State Department of Education in February 2000 took the nationally 
unprecedented step of taking over three struggling schools and hiring a commercial 
operator to manage them.  Six other states to date had taken over failing school districts. 
Most prominently, New Jersey had assumed control of the school systems of Jersey City 
in 1989, Paterson in 1991, and Newark in 1995.  But no state so far had assigned 
management of any schools to a commercial operator.209  As state takeover schools, the 
three schools Maryland assigned to Edison—Gilmor Elementary, Furman Templeton 
Elementary, and Montebello Elementary—were off limits to the Baltimore Teachers 
Union.  Edison had the same freedom of a private or non-union charter school to hire and 
fire staff and to fully implement its program.  In contrast to typical arrangements in 
running charter schools, Edison did not have to lease or buy property.  Moreover, as 
Edison’s contract was with the state school board, the company was well positioned to 
influence state as well as municipal policy and thereby take on more schools.210 
Granted significant administrative liberty and placed squarely within a public 
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school system, Edison now had the opportunity to manage a miniature district in the 
manner Myron Lieberman had long ago prescribed.211 
 
                                                
211 Myron Lieberman, Privatization and Educational Choice (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989), 4, 
268. 




Chapter 2: Back to Baltimore 
 
It has to look like what we call the Edison brand.  It’s going to be clean.  It’s going to be 
well lit.  It’s going to be organized in a certain way…. We leave nothing to chance. 
- Dwight D. Jones, Regional Vice President, Edison Schools, The Baltimore Sun, July 30, 
2000 
 
Upon entering Edison’s Montebello Elementary School in Northeast Baltimore in 2005 
and again in 2009, I left behind a quiet working-class neighborhood for an orderly, 
vibrant school governed by a charismatic principal, Camille Bell, who collected hugs 
from students everywhere she went. “Give me some sugar, pumpkin,” Bell said to one 
student after another upon inviting them into a warm embrace.  “Are you feeling fine,” 
she followed up, “or fabulous?”1 
 At each turn, Montebello fulfilled Edison’s promise of immaculate, bright schools 
with dedicated teachers leading well-behaved students through focused lessons. The 
hallways and classrooms were sparkling clean and decorated with colorful bulletin 
boards.  All students were neatly attired in navy polo shirts and khaki pants.  They sat 
politely attentive in class and marched quietly in single file between periods.  Reflecting 
Bell, the teachers and staff were universally upbeat.  
                                                
1 Visits to Montebello Elementary, November 30, 2005, and March 23, 2009. 
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 Four miles across town in West Baltimore sat the two other schools turned over to 
Edison by the Maryland State Department of Education in 2000: Furman Templeton 
Elementary and Gilmor Elementary.  West Baltimore, rendered iconic by the acclaimed 
HBO series The Wire, is a neighborhood of boarded-up row houses, empty storefronts, 
and frequent police sirens. One block from Furman Templeton Elementary is McCulloh 
Homes, a sprawling maze of two- and three-story red-brick public housing anchored by 
two high-rises and checkered by courtyards, some of patchy grass, others of concrete 
laced by clotheslines.  In The Wire, this is home turf to Avon Barksdale and his crew of 
drug dealers.  Across the street from nearby Gilmor Elementary is Gilmor Homes, a 
smaller but equally impersonal assemblage of three-story red-brick public housing where 
twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray would be arrested in April 2015 and soon after slip 
into a coma while in police custody and die, setting off a night of violent protest and 
several days of marches and rallies.2 
 When Jeff Wahl, who became CEO of Edison in 2008, recalled his first trip from 
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport to this neighborhood, he 
shook his head in disbelief and said he had never seen such a sudden and sustained shift 
in urban landscape.3 
 
While Baltimore paid homage to Maryland’s most famous jurist, Thurgood Marshall, 
with an airport on the city’s edge and a prominent statue downtown outside the Garmatz 
                                                
2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Baltimore Enlists National Guard and a Curfew to Fight Riots and 
Looting,” New York Times, April 27, 2015; Stolberg, “After Thousands Rally in Baltimore, 
Police Make Some Arrests as Curfew Takes Hold,” New York Times, May 2, 2015. 
3 Jeff Wahl, interview, New York, February 25, 2011. 
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Federal Courthouse, its most infamous, Roger Taney, cast a larger shadow.  Though 
unmentioned in city guidebooks and unknown to countless lifelong residents, Taney, 
chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1836 to 1864 and author of the 1857 decision 
Dred Scott v. Sandford that denied blacks citizenship and fueled the sectionalism basic to 
the Civil War, sat squarely in bronze in a park several blocks from Marshall’s stately 
image until protests against memorials to Confederate heroes led to its removal in 2017.4 
 The world Marshall fought and appeared to defeat in 1954 as lead counsel for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka implicitly persists here as in cities across the country. Furman 
Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello are each 99 percent black.  Though Baltimore’s 
schools are not technically segregated, they reflect a metropolitan area rigidly divided by 
race. Because of white flight in the 1960s and 1970s, the city’s schools fifty years after 
Brown were 89 percent black, up from 51 percent in 1960. Because of divisions within 
the city, the neighborhoods of Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello are even 
more segregated.5  Moreover, the students at these three schools are poor: 91 percent of 
Furman Templeton’s 448 students qualified for free or reduced-price lunch when Edison 
took over in September 2000, as did 89 percent of Montebello’s 699 students and 96 
percent of Gilmor’s 486; and these figures changed little in the ensuing decade.6 
                                                
4 Colin Campbell and Luke Broadwater, “Citing ‘Safety and Security,’ Pugh Has Baltimore 
Confederate Monuments Taken Down,” Baltimore Sun, August 16, 2017. 
5 See Howell S. Baum, Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010, 208-210, 225, in particular. 
6 National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey,” 1998-2009, www.nces.gov.  For the 2008-2009 
school year, 92 percent of Furman Templeton’s 556 students qualified for free or reduced-price 
lunch, as did 93 percent of Gilmor’s 469 students and 71 percent of Montebello’s 799 students. 
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 A midday walk through the neighborhood surrounding Furman Templeton in 
2009 with the school’s principal, Ken Cherry, revealed a playing field littered with 
broken glass, buckled sidewalks dotted with discarded crack vials, a bloated dead white 
cat by a curb, three prostitutes on a corner smiling at passersby, and a black Baltimore 
Police helicopter locked in the sky some 500 feet above. 
 “Every job candidate gets this tour,” Cherry said.  “They have to know the school 
beyond the classroom and the parking lot.  Quite a few afterward withdraw from 
consideration.”7 
 Though Cherry and Gilmor’s principal, Ledonnis Hernandez, exhibited the same 
focus and determination as their crosstown colleague Bell, their schools by comparison 
lacked the vibrancy and warmth of Montebello.  And their students’ scores on the state’s 
standardized exams year after year lagged far behind.  Along with recycled claims that 
Edison received more money per pupil than other Baltimore schools, the low test scores 
at Furman Templeton and Gilmor repeatedly subjected Edison to scrutiny and put the 
company’s contract in jeopardy. 
 
The story of Maryland’s takeover of Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello goes 
back to 1993, when the state school board introduced an accountability system based on 
annual tests given to third-, fifth-, and eighth-graders in the following subjects:  reading, 
writing, language usage, math, science, and social studies.  Student scores were 
categorized as excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.  Schools with low rates of 
proficiency were labeled “reconstitution eligible.”  With passage in 1997 of a bill in the 
                                                
7 Visit to Furman Templeton Elementary, March 27, 2009. 
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Maryland legislature giving Baltimore schools $254 million in additional funding over 
the ensuing five years in exchange for joint control of the Baltimore School Board by the 
governor and the mayor, the state gained authority to take over persistently 
underperforming schools.8  By 1999, eighty-three of Baltimore’s 180 elementary, middle, 
and high schools were labeled “reconstitution eligible,” though Maryland superintendent 
of schools Nancy Grasmick said that only schools on this list since 1994 would be 
considered for state takeover.9  
 For Grasmick, the time for intervention was overdue.    “Any accountability 
system has to have a bottom line,” she said at a meeting of the state school board in 
September 1999 where members voted unanimously to identify persistently 
underperforming schools for management by outside operators. “We have an obligation 
to the children in those schools.  We can’t wait.”  Grasmick conceded that Baltimore’s 
experiment in outsourcing the management of nine schools to Minneapolis-based 
Educational Alternatives Inc. (EAI) from 1992 to 1996 was a disappointment but 
contended that the state’s application of privatization would be different.  EAI had neither 
been granted the freedom to hire and fire staff, she said, nor introduced a distinct, 
comprehensive curriculum.  Any contractor working with the state would have such 
freedom and would be expected to introduce a genuinely new academic program.10   
 In an editorial following Grasmick’s announcement, The Baltimore Sun backed 
her up: 
                                                
8 Jessica Portner, “Plan Tying Increased Aid, State Control of Baltimore Schools Backed,” 
Education Week, April 16, 1997. 
9 Liz Bowie, “Board Votes to Consider Outside Help,” Baltimore Sun, September 22, 1999. 
10 Ibid. 
Chapter 2: Back to Baltimore 
 97 
Several things make this an entirely different proposal than the EAI mess, but the 
most important is that this privatization venture would be part of the existing plan 
to improve the lowest-performing schools…. A third-party manager would step 
into that process, acting as an agent of the state in the takeover.  If the state does its 
job, that contractor would comply with the same meticulous documentation 
demanded of the schools….  EAI didn’t face those kind of strictures in Baltimore.  
Nor did it operate as part of a well-functioning structure.  The company’s academic 
improvement plans were sketchy, and its efforts were not well-supervised. Then-
Superintendent Walter G. Amprey acted more as EAI’s cheerleader than as the 
school system’s guardian….  If the state proceeds cautiously with this plan, and 
ensures that safeguards are in place to prevent abuses, this plan might just work. 
EAI’s crash and burn in Baltimore soured a lot of people on privatization, and the 
state has an opportunity to show that it’s not a taboo.11 
 Following several months of study, Grasmick announced at a meeting of the state 
school board in February 2000 that Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello would 
be taken over and that interested school management firms should submit detailed 
proposals. Two board members dissented, one of whom, Reginald Dunn, a marketing 
executive appointed to the board in August, asked, “What have we done in the previous 
years to help these three schools to achieve before we got to the point of a takeover?”  
Dunn’s question went unanswered.12  The reaction after the meeting from Baltimore 
                                                
11 “Second Chance for Privatization,” Baltimore Sun, September 29, 1999. 
12 Darcia Harris Bowman, “Private Firms Tapped to Fix Md. Schools,” Education Week, February 
9, 2000, 1, 22; Howard Libit, “Maryland Assumes Control of Three Baltimore Schools,” 
Baltimore Sun, February 2, 2000.  Dunn’s appointment in August 1999 is recorded in The MSDE 
Bulletin, August 25, 1999.  Neither Education Week nor The Baltimore Sun reported a response to 
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officials was mixed.  “I cannot say strongly enough how much I feel they have made an 
error,” said Samuel C. Stringfield, a member of the Baltimore School Board and an 
educational research scientist at Johns Hopkins University. “I’m not happy,” responded 
State Senator Charles M. Mitchell IV of West Baltimore. “We lived through the EAI 
experiment, and look where that got us.”  Conversely, J. Tyson Tildon, the president of 
the Baltimore School Board and a neuroscientist at the University of Maryland, 
welcomed the decision:  “While there are concerns, I think one has to use this as a wake-
up call.”13   
 Appearing before the Maryland State House Ways and Means Committee the next 
day, Grasmick had some explaining to do. House delegate Clarence Davis, representing 
Northeast Baltimore, echoed Mitchell in citing the confidence a decade earlier in EAI and 
the ensuing disappointment. Grasmick guaranteed that the state takeover would differ 
significantly from Baltimore’s experience with EAI:  the school manager would be bound 
by a “performance-based” contract stipulating “very strict benchmarks.”  Testifying 
before the same committee, Baltimore Teachers Union (BTU) president Marietta English 
built on the concerns raised by Davis:  “How can a third party do better than those of us 
who live here, who went to Baltimore city schools, who send their children to Baltimore 
city schools, and who will still be here when the contractor fails and goes home?”  
Baltimore’s new school chief, Robert Booker, sidestepped the matter of outsourcing to 
underscore the considerable needs of the city’s children and to lobby the committee for 
                                                                                                                                            
Dunn’s question. See also Maryland State Department of Education, minutes, February 1, 2000, 
7, http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/stateboard/index.html. 
13 Libit, “Maryland Assumes Control”; and JoAnna Daemmrich, “Takeover of Three Schools 
Questioned,” Baltimore Sun, February 3, 2000. 
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more state aid.  Booker said that in his many years as a school administrator in Los 
Angeles, he had never seen children as underserved.14 
 
The only other company to compete with Edison for the contract to run Furman 
Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello was Mosaica, an educational management 
organization running eight schools at that time—five in Michigan, two in Pennsylvania, 
and one in New Jersey.15  Founded in 1997 by the husband-and-wife team of Gene and 
Dawn Eidelman—who had previously operated a network of child care centers for 
corporations—and based in New York, Mosaica pitched an  integrated curriculum, called 
Paragon, applying several disciplines to the study of a series of civilizations in 
chronological order in each grade.  Mosaica also promised individualized lesson plans for 
all students, Spanish instruction in kindergarten and beyond, abundant use of technology, 
and a longer school day (by one hour) and year (by twenty days).16 
 Edison made the same promises of abundant technology and a longer day and 
school year.  Moreover, Edison promised brisk improvement.  After touring Furman 
Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello in February, Richard O’Neill, the Edison vice 
president for development who later soured on the company’s marketing strategy, 
                                                
14 Daemmrich, “Takeover.” 
15 Alex Molnar, Jennifer Morales, and Alison Vander Wyst, Profiles of For-Profit Education 
Management Companies: Year 1999-2000 (Milwaukee: Center for the Analysis of 
Commercialism in Education, 2000), 16-17, 
http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/78986/content/02_1999-00.pdf. See also Steven F. Wilson, 
Learning on the Job: When Business Takes on Public Schools (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 62-67. 
16 Liz Bowie and JoAnna Daemmrich, “Two Companies Vying to Manage Troubled Schools 
Visit Three Sites,” Baltimore Sun, February 15, 2000; Katie Wang, “Charter Schools Fight to 
Exist,” The Morning Call, March 12, 2000. 
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predicted the Edison model would produce quick results.  “I think this idea that reform 
takes years is bogus,” O’Neill said.  Should Edison fail to turn the tide in one year, he 
added, “we should have our feet held to the fire.”17 
 The Maryland School Board settled unanimously in March on Edison, citing the 
company’s wider experience, better results, and more detailed plans. The state awarded 
Edison a five-year renewable contract and committed to paying the company the same 
amount per student spent throughout the Baltimore system, which in 2000 amounted to 
$7,400. With 1,400 students in total at Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello, 
Edison stood to collect $10.4 million a year, though the company had only nominal 
control over much of that sum. Even with the unprecedented autonomy conferred by the 
state to operate free from union regulations, Edison had to pay competitive salaries to 
attract and retain good teachers and moreover couldn’t economize by increasing class 
size for fear of both provoking yet more criticism and undermining the performance of 
their students, whose test results would be the key determinant of the company’s 
effectiveness.18 
 Aiming to thwart the takeover, the BTU revived an ill-fated lawsuit it had filed in 
Baltimore Circuit Court in 1993 against the city for having hired EAI.  The BTU alleged 
the state had improperly delegated to Edison the authority to set salaries and implement 
disciplinary procedures; dispensed more money to Edison per student, a charge that 
would be henceforth debated repeatedly; and, most fundamentally, violated its 
commitment to the city’s schoolchildren by diverting funds to a commercial school 
                                                
17 Bowie and Daemmrich, “Two Companies.” 
18 Darcia Harris Bowman, “Md. Picks Edison to Run Three Baltimore Schools,” Education Week, 
March 29, 2000, 3. 
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operator.  “A fair allocation of the city’s limited resources,” the BTU contended, “… 
does not include a profit to a private sector company.”19 
 Backing Grasmick again, The Baltimore Sun weighed in derisively against the 
BTU: 
At least the Baltimore Teachers Union is consistent.  Consistently against change 
and innovation, that is.  Consistently blocking progress and yammering about how 
the status quo works just fine….  There are legitimate questions about what would 
happen to teacher pensions and benefits in the Edison schools.  Edison must 
provide good answers to those questions, and reassure potential employees that 
fairness will prevail.  But the BTU is way off base with its lawsuit.  It sends the 
wrong message—to the public and to city kids, who desperately need a better 
education.  Unfortunately, the union is all too consistent in that regard.20 
 While this BTU lawsuit against privatization, like the last one, went nowhere, it 
was grounded not in fear as before but in bitter experience that both the Sun and 
Grasmick acknowledged as substantial.21  The Sun  declared that the state’s venture with 
Edison would have to be different from Baltimore’s alliance with EAI.  And Grasmick 
had vowed it would. In addition to the state’s new accountability measures, Edison’s 
freedom to hire and fire and its distinctive curriculum, Grasmick had declared,  made this 
second experiment in privatization far different.22 
                                                
19 Eric Siegel, “School Pact Draws Suit,” Baltimore Sun, April 21, 2000.  
20 “Are City Teachers Ready for Reform?” Baltimore Sun, April 24, 2000. 
21 Erika Niedowski, “Judge Backs School Plan,” Baltimore Sun, August 23, 2000. 
22 Bowie, “Board Votes”; “Second Chance for Privatization.” 
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 As Edison introduced its new teachers to its philosophy and methods in a 
weeklong program at Towson University in July, Grasmick underscored the singularity of 
this undertaking:  “This is the first time that a state, in a sense, has assumed this 
responsibility, and it’s not been a decision by a local system.  We have no model.  We’re 
creating a model.  And there’s a lot at stake.”  To Dwight D. Jones, an Edison regional 
vice president overseeing the program at Towson University, the company’s model was 
likewise unique, and quality control at each school was of paramount importance.  “It has 
to look like what we call the Edison brand,” said Jones, who would go on to become 
Colorado’s commissioner of education and then superintendent of the Las Vegas school 
system. “It’s going to be clean.  It’s going to be well lit.  It’s going to be organized in a 
certain way….  We leave nothing to chance.”23 
 
When EAI arrived in Baltimore in 1992, the company received a warm reception from 
many corners.  The Sun, the BTU, the Baltimore School Board, Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke, 
Superintendent Walter G. Amprey, and the city’s esteemed Abell Foundation all 
welcomed EAI.  In fact, Robert C. Embry Jr., the president of the Abell Foundation, who 
would a decade later become an adamant opponent of Edison, had invited John T. Golle, 
EAI’s founder and president, to Baltimore in 1991 to learn more about the company. 
Impressed with Golle’s message, Embry recommended EAI to Schmoke and had the 
Abell Foundation pay for a group of school and union officials to tour a private school in 
                                                
23 Erika Niedowski, “New School Model Begins,” Baltimore Sun, July 30, 2000. 
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Minnesota and a public school in Florida run by EAI.24 BTU president Irene Dandridge 
and Assistant School Superintendent Charlene Cooper Boston returned with an 
enthusiastic report to the city’s school board. Dandridge was especially impressed with 
Golle. “He’s very personable, very committed,” Dandridge said.  “If you just listened to 
him, you’d turn all your schools over to him.”25 
 With Schmoke’s endorsement, Amprey proposed turning over one middle and 
eight elementary schools to EAI.  The Sun lauded both Schmoke and Amprey for 
venturing to work with the private sector to streamline operations and deliver better 
results.26 Leaders of the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance nevertheless expressed 
anger with Schmoke and Amprey for failing to consult them and protested the diversion 
of funds to a for-profit school operator.27 More resistance followed.  Baltimoreans United 
for Leadership Development (BUILD) held a forum on the deal that was attended by 
nearly 500 BUILD delegates as well as Schmoke.28  “We will fight you on this,” BUILD 
cochair Reverend Robert Behnke said at the forum to Schmoke, “because the whole thing 
is contrary to public education.”29 
                                                
24 Marion Orr, “Baltimore: The Limits of Mayoral Control,” in Mayors in the Middle: Politics, 
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26 “Schools in Another Dimension,” Baltimore Sun, June 11, 1992. 
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July 15, 1992. 
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 BTU president Dandridge subsequently backpedaled to caution that the contract’s 
language was too loose, especially regarding EAI’s freedom to replace $12-an-hour BTU 
teacher aides with $8-an-hour college interns. And City Comptroller Jacqueline McLean 
voiced concern about EAI’s financial stability.  With McLean and another member of the 
city’s Board of Estimates dissenting, Amprey’s proposal was approved by a vote of 3-2, 
granting EAI a five-year contract three times the size of the contract awarded Edison 
eight years later.  EAI got all nine schools Amprey had listed, with a total enrollment of 
4,815 students.  With per-pupil expenditure in Baltimore at $5,549 in 1992-1993, the 
contract was worth $26.7 million in its initial year, though all but 10 percent of that 
amount, reported the Sun, went to the city for administrative costs and to teacher salaries 
and benefits.30 
 Golle, like Chris Whittle, had no background as an educator.  After graduating 
from the University of Minnesota in 1966 with a bachelor’s degree in business, Golle 
(pronounced goalŊie) joined Xerox in corporate sales.  Four years later, he cofounded a 
consultancy providing human resources advice to Fortune 500 companies.  In 1986, 
dissatisfied with the lockstep curriculum his two sons went through in Minnesota public 
schools, Golle decided to develop a network of moderately priced private schools with 
individualized curricula so students could proceed at appropriate paces.  Golle hired 
David A. Bennett, who had twenty-four years of experience as a public school 
administrator, away from the superintendency of the St. Paul, Minnesota, school system 
to be his president.  Golle and Bennett began with one school in Minnesota and another 
                                                
30 Mark Bomster, “Contract Passed with Firm to Run City Schools,” Baltimore Sun, July 23, 
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in Arizona, each charging about $5,000 a year.  However, start-up costs proved too steep 
to take the plan to scale.  So Golle and Bennett, like Whittle and Schmidt after them, 
reconceived their company as a subcontractor working with public school districts.  In 
1991, they took on their first client: South Pointe Elementary, a school with 720 students 
in a poor neighborhood of Miami.  To boost the adult-to-student ratio while keeping costs 
down, EAI hired University of Miami students as teacher aides at $7 an hour.  To 
enhance self-paced learning, EAI invested in classroom computers and retraining of 
staff.31 
 For Golle, as with Whittle, the rigor of business methods would pave the way to 
better schooling.  Through efficiencies in administration, maintenance, food preparation, 
and purchasing, Golle claimed he would reduce noninstructional spending in Baltimore 
by 25 percent, plow 80 percent of the savings back into the classroom, and retain 20 
percent of the savings as profit.32 In particular, Golle contended, such savings would be 
achieved through bottom-up budgeting overseen by KPMG Peat Marwick and 
sophisticated building maintenance carried out by Johnson Control Services. The 
resulting difference in the classroom would include, as in Miami, a “personal education 
plan” for every student designed in consultation with parents; an instructional assistant 
for every teacher to facilitate small-group learning; several computers in every 
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Operation in Fla. School,” Baltimore Sun, June 10, 1992.  
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classroom; and a computer, phone, and desk for every teacher.33  Like the New American 
Schools Development Corporation before him and Benno Schmidt after, Golle predicted 
remarkable gains at average costs.  “We pledged to Baltimore,” Golle said as the school 
year was about to begin, “that without spending any additional dollars, we will 
dramatically improve the quality of education for children.”34  
 Golle’s optimism notwithstanding, the chorus of skeptics grew.  Teachers 
picketed outside City Hall a week before schools opened.  An art teacher in the picket 
line complained that she had been involuntarily transferred from two schools taken over 
by EAI because art had been dropped from the curriculum.  “We were deceived,” she 
said.  “We were not treated as professionals.”  Meanwhile, thirty-seven of the 160 
teachers at EAI’s nine schools requested transfers.  Three weeks into the school year, 
company officials parried two hours of angry questions at an evening gathering of 
approximately eighty parents.  One complaint concerned the unauthorized mainstreaming 
of children with special needs.  Company officials vowed no steps would be taken 
without parental approval.  Another complaint concerned the replacement of roving 
teachers of art and music with low-paid interns functioning as teacher aides. While 
teachers registered their praise by November for EAI’s significant improvement of both 
                                                
33 Ann LoLordo and Laura Lippman, “Firm Calls Rein on Costs Key to Profit on Schools,” 
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building maintenance and purchasing protocol, they faulted EAI’s individualized 
curriculum for lack of structure.35 
 Despite implementation problems, Wall Street responded to EAI’s first year in 
Baltimore with enthusiasm.  From June 1992 to June 1993, the company’s stock climbed 
from $7 a share to $33.  The company had gone public in April 1991 at $4 a share.36  
Basic to this enthusiasm, however, was a basic misreading of company financials by EAI 
executives, analysts, and investors.  This same mistake would be repeated several years 
later by Edison executives, analysts, and investors in assessing the company’s progress.  
The damage for both companies would be irreparable.  The issue concerned revenue 
recognition.  EAI booked as revenue budgetary allocations for teacher salaries and other 
costs over which the company had no control.  Company revenue accordingly appeared 
to be as much as ten times the actual figure. 
 While this representation of revenue didn’t alter the reportage of company 
earnings, it necessarily gave the impression of far greater volume and growth.  In an 
article entitled “Schools Manager Aces Market Test,” the Sun, for example, incorrectly 
reported  in June 1993 that EAI “now averages $8 million in quarterly revenues vs. 
$800,000  a year ago.”37  Yet, as noted above, the Sun had reported a year earlier after the 
Board of Estimates approved EAI’s five-year contract that EAI retained only 10 percent 
of the per-pupil allocation:  in the first year, $3.4 million went back to the city for 
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administrative expenditures and $20.6 million went directly to teachers salaries and 
benefits, leaving EAI $2.7 million to manage its nine schools.  By September, the Sun 
reported grumblings from some analysts about EAI’s accounting methods but proceeded 
regardless to report revenue as the company had presented it.38 
 The tide turned in November, by which time EAI’s stock had soared to $48.75 a 
share.  City comptroller Jacqueline McLean, who had voted against the EAI contract in 
July 1992 because of concerns about the company’s balance sheet, spoke up against 
turning over additional Baltimore schools to EAI.  McLean accused EAI of misleading 
investors on revenue, falling far behind in submission of audited financial statements, and 
distorting the impact of its pedagogical strategies.  “They have a good dog and pony 
show,” McLean said.  Broadcast on CNBC, McLean’s comments sent the stock down 14 
percent in one hour.  While the stock recovered much lost ground by day’s end, a new 
narrative had taken hold and would in time prevail.39  A month later, the Sun ran a 1,600-
word analysis of EAI’s accounting practices.   One professor of finance was quoted in the 
story as describing EAI’s methods as “nonsensical.”  Another was quoted as describing 
the methods as “very misleading.”  At the end of February, the stock closed at $21.25, 
down 64 percent from its peak three months before and never to rebound.40 
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 More troubling for EAI than its misrepresentation of revenue was its 
misrepresentation of academic progress and its failure to provide sufficient assistance to 
children with special needs.  The company reported in an ebullient press release in 
August 1993 that the 4,800 students at its nine schools had advanced almost a full grade 
level after just three months of new management.  The company backtracked in June 
1994 to concede that such progress applied only to a subgroup of 954 underperforming 
students at five schools.  EAI lost more credibility and saw its stock plunge 18 percent on 
the day of this concession.41  Allegations that EAI shortchanged learning-disabled 
students moreover led to both state and federal investigations.  At one school, it was 
discovered, EAI dismantled remediation programs for almost 300 students and decreased 
the special education staff from twenty-four teachers to eleven.  The director of special 
education for the U.S. Department of Education concluded that EAI had violated 
procedures at six of its nine schools and issued the state a stern warning to exercise more 
vigilant oversight. Ultimately, a federal judge found Superintendent Amprey in contempt 
for failing to properly supervise EAI and removed special education—one-third of the 
superintendent’s bailiwick—from his control.42 
 Making matters worse, reading and math scores dropped from 1992 to 1994 at the 
eight elementary schools managed by EAI while scores in both subjects climbed over the 
same period for the city’s other elementary schools as a whole.  On these tests—ranging 
from 1 to 99, with 50 as the national average—scores in reading at EAI schools dropped 
                                                
41 Kim Clark and Michael Ollove, “EAI Test Revelation May Hurt Credibility,” Baltimore Sun, 
June 8, 1994. 
42 Mike Bowler, “Officials Disagree about EAI Violations,” Baltimore Sun, August 4, 1994; 
Bowler, “The City Superintendent Receives His Report Card,” Baltimore Sun, April 30, 1997. 
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from 39.8 to 37 while they rose for Baltimore schools as a whole from 42.3 to 44.8; 
scores in math dropped for EAI schools from 41.7 to 40 while they rose for city schools 
from 44.4 to 47.7.  Meanwhile, scores at EAI’s elementary school in Miami failed to 
advance during three years under the company’s management.43 
 Persisting in EAI’s corner, Mayor Schmoke and Superintendent Amprey 
contended that EAI’s presence in Baltimore should be credited with catalyzing the city’s 
overall improvement.44  Amprey was so enamored of EAI that he had flown to 
Connecticut in May on behalf of the company to lobby the Hartford City Council to hire 
EAI to run the state capital’s school system, with thirty-two schools and a total 
enrollment of 26,000 students.  In praising EAI, Amprey went so far as to say that 
Baltimore would have been better served had it hired the company to manage all of its 
schools.  “I asked for nine,” Amprey said.  “I wish I asked for 178.”45 
 While EAI landed a five-year contract to run all of Hartford’s schools, the 
company soon acknowledged its limitations and scaled back its role to managing five 
schools while overseeing only maintenance and business operations at the remaining 
twenty-seven.  Questions about spending and effectiveness nevertheless dogged the 
company and Golle in particular.  A report issued by the Center for Educational Research 
at the University of Maryland in August 1995 concluded that EAI received 11 percent 
more in funding per pupil than Baltimore schools in a comparison group and yet posted 
no better results; in an analysis published a year later, Craig E. Richards of Teachers 
                                                
43 Gary Gately, “EAI Schools’ Test Scores Fall Short,” Baltimore Sun, October 18, 1994. 
44 Gary Gately, “Amprey Defends Work of EAI,” Baltimore Sun, October 20, 1994. 
45 Gary Gately, “Amprey Wants EAI to Run More Schools,” Baltimore Sun, May 6, 1994. 
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College, Columbia University, determined that EAI received 26 percent more in funding 
per pupil for students in elementary school and 36 percent more per pupil for students in 
middle school.46 Meanwhile in Hartford, Golle came to be derided as the Music Man, 
referring to the con artist in the play and movie by that name who sells band instruments 
and uniforms to innocent folk in a small Iowan city with the false promise he would lead 
a boys’ ensemble that would give the city new life.47   
By the spring of 1996, EAI was out of Baltimore and Hartford as well as Miami 
and done as a subcontractor. Renamed the Tesseract Group, the company moved on to 
manage preschools, private schools, and charter schools. Yet even in this safer space, the 
company failed to make money.  In 2000, the Tesseract Group filed for bankruptcy.48 
 Amprey was also soon out of Baltimore and done as a school administrator.  In 
the spring of 1997, following a thirty-one-year career in the Baltimore school system 
begun as a social studies teacher at a junior high, Amprey stepped down as 
superintendent, earning from the Sun an A for effort, an A for style, and a C- for 
effectiveness, and took a job as national vice president of an education subsidiary of 
Tele-Communications Inc., the cable TV giant soon after absorbed by AT&T before 
being spun off to Charter Communications and Comcast.49 
                                                
46 See Richards, Shore, and Sawicky, Risky Business, 67, 104-109. 
47 “Hartford System Hires EAI,” Baltimore Sun, October 4, 1994; Vance H. Trimble, An Empire 
Undone: The Wild and Hard Fall of Chris Whittle (New York: Birch Lane, 1995), 339; June 
Kronholz, “Desk Sergeants: Tesseract and Others March Briskly ahead in School Privatization,” 
Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1999. 
48 Mark Walsh, “For-Profit School Management Company Hits Hard Times,” Education Week, 
February 9, 2000, 5; Walsh, “Losing Money, Tesseract Sells Charters, College,” Education Week, 
June 7, 2000, 5. 
49 Jean Thompson, “Amprey Leaving Schools Post,” Baltimore Sun, April 28, 1997; Bowler, 
“The City Superintendent Receives His Report Card,” Baltimore Sun, April 30, 1997. 
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 Reflecting on his struggles, Golle concluded that for-profit management of district 
schools was a lose-lose proposition: “Sometimes I feel that I’m between the hydrant and 
the dog.  If you make too much money, they say, ‘How dare you make too much money 
off these children?’  If you don’t make any money, they say, ‘You’re a bad 
businessperson.’”50  
 
Of the eight elementary schools run by EAI, two—Graceland Park and Mary E. 
Rodman—appeared on the same list of persistently underperforming schools from which 
Grasmick in 2000 chose Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello to be taken over by 
the state.  Students at Graceland Park and Mary E. Rodman, in fact, posted lower scores 
in reading and math than their peers at Furman Templeton in 1996, 1997, and 1999.  
More surprising, students at Montebello, which would soon become Edison’s flagship, 
posted lower scores in reading and math than their peers at Furman Templeton from 1996 
through 1999.  Montebello, in fact, ranked at the very bottom of Baltimore’s 121 
elementary schools in both 1998 and 1999.  Taken together, the proficiency levels for 
third- and fifth-graders at Montebello in 1998 in reading and math stood at 3 percent; in 
1999, the figure was 4 percent for the same grades in the same subjects.  Furman 
Templeton and Gilmor recorded averaged proficiency levels in 1999 of 8 and 7 percent, 
respectively (see Table 2.1). 
 Still more surprising, the seven other schools at the bottom of the city recorded a 
combined proficiency level just below that of Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and 
Montebello.  The students at these seven schools likewise came from disadvantaged 
                                                
50 Trimble, An Empire Undone, 339. 
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homes:  84 percent of the students at the three schools to be turned over to Edison 
qualified for free or reduced-price lunch in 1999; 89 percent of the students at the other 
seven qualified for the same.51 
Elementary School Grade 3 
Reading 








Arundel 6.8 0 11.4 5.3 5.9 
Bay-Brook 4.7 0 4.5 18.5 6.9 
Dr. Martin Luther  
King, Jr. 
3.4 2 14.2 0.8 5.1 
Furman Templeton* 5.6 3.6 0 23.9 8.3 
Gilmor* 9.4 5 10.1 2.6 6.8 
Graceland Park 6.6 1.6 11.3 4.7 6.1 
Lafayette 8.3 4.8 6.4 6.3 6.5 
Mary Rodman 4.3 4.3 10.9 6.3 6.5 
Montebello* 5.3 1.9 5.6 2.4 3.8 
William Paca 4 2.3 6.1 14.3 6.7 
Mean of future Edison 
schools 
6.8 3.5 5.2 9.6 6.3 
Mean of remaining seven 5.4 2.1 9.3 8.0 6.2 
Baltimore City 17 21.4 17.5 18.8 18.7 
Table 2.1 Percentage of students graded proficient on the 1999 Maryland School Performance 
Assessment Program (MSPAP); mean figures are unweighted by student population except in the 
case of grade-level scores for Baltimore City; the asterisk indicates schools taken over by Edison 
in 2000. Data source: Maryland State Department of Education by e-mail, July 2012. 
 
 These differences would become central to the argument against Edison waged by 
the Abell Foundation, the BTU, and community activists rattled by Baltimore’s bad 
experience with EAI.  Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello were indeed failing 
schools serving poor children, but no more so than these seven other schools in 1999.  In 
2000, after Grasmick had issued her decision and before Edison took over, reading and 
math scores at Furman Templeton did drop steeply, from 8 percent proficient to 1 
                                                
51 Data derived from NCES Table Generator, https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/table Generator.aspx. 
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percent, but they went up modestly at both Gilmor and Montebello.  The central issue is 
what happened from 2001 onward.  Edison turned things around at Montebello in one 
year, as Richard O’Neill, the Edison executive, had predicted the company would, or its 
feet should be held to the fire.  Yet reading and math scores dropped at Furman 
Templeton and Gilmor during their first year under Edison.  
 Over the next four years, from 2002 to 2005, Edison’s three schools collectively 
exhibited improvement, and in 2002, 2003, and 2005, they together outperformed the 
seven others with which they were grouped in 1999.  In 2006, however, the tide turned.  
Though Edison’s personnel and practices were firmly in place, its schools slipped and 
continued to slip.  Grasmick remained solidly in Edison’s corner, much as Amprey 
persisted in praising EAI despite bad news.  But the Sun and North Avenue, the 
metonymical term for the Baltimore City Public School System (BCPSS), eventually 
joined the Abell Foundation and the BTU in taking up O’Neill’s challenge to put 
Edison’s feet to the fire. 
 
Before academic results for Edison’s three schools in Baltimore became a cause for 
concern, Edison’s critics, picking up where analysts of EAI had left off, charged that the 
company received much more money per pupil than other Baltimore schools.  A former 
Baltimore School Board member and Maryland secretary of human resources named 
Kalman Hettleman made this argument repeatedly.  Just as Edison was putting down 
roots in Baltimore in July 2000, Hettleman wrote in an op-ed in the Sun that Edison 
would be getting as much as $2,400 more than the average Baltimore allocation of $5,000 
per student. Hettleman made this case again in response to a laudatory article two weeks 
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later in the Sun about summer preparations and professional development at Furman 
Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello.52 
 In Edison’s defense, Grasmick fired back with her own op-ed in the Sun that 
Edison’s payment appeared larger only because Edison would be responsible for its own 
administrative expenditures, meaning that the additional $2,400 simply matched 
Baltimore’s per-pupil overhead.  Grasmick explained that while Baltimore would cover 
the cost of some technical support and health services, Edison would otherwise receive 
“virtually no centralized services free of charge” and moreover would keep its schools 
open for a longer day and year without any subsidy.  In turn, Grasmick’s op-ed provoked 
an angry letter from the leaders of the BTU, contending that Edison’s fees came at the 
expense of Baltimore’s other schools.53 
 Like the leaders of the BTU, Hettleman didn’t buy Grasmick’s explanation and 
responded with another op-ed in the Sun in December reiterating his claim and adding to 
it that Edison benefited in two significant ways from a special arrangement with the state 
for provision of services to its eighty-five students with serious learning disabilities:  first, 
the state would pay the highly regarded Kennedy Krieger Institute $2.1 million—or 
$25,000 per student—for instruction of learning-disabled children in self-contained 
classes at Edison’s three schools while other Baltimore schools had to make do with half 
that allocation for children with the same needs; second, in doing so, the state conferred 
                                                
52 Kalman R. Hettleman, “State Not Being Fair in Schools Takeover,” Baltimore Sun, July 12, 
2000; Hettleman, “Privatized City Schools Receive Greater Funding,” Baltimore Sun, August 8, 
2000. 
53 Nancy S. Grasmick, “Privatizing Schools Gives Kids a Chance,” Baltimore Sun, August 12, 
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Edison a hidden advantage by relieving its teachers of a significant instructional burden 
and thereby boosting the likelihood of better results on standardized exams.54 
 Instead of Grasmick, Richard O’Neill, Edison’s vice president for development,  
replied this time to Hettleman, reiterating the point that Edison’s payment covered 
administrative costs and countering that the state had encouraged other Baltimore schools 
to make the same arrangement with Kennedy Krieger.  Sticking to his guns, Hettleman 
responded to O’Neill’s letter with a letter of his own, contending that the state had shown 
Edison preferential treatment.55 
 This conflict over costs climaxed in September 2005 when the Abell Foundation 
issued a 4,500-word report buttressing Hettleman’s claims and moreover asserting that 
several schools in equally tough straits had outperformed Edison’s schools without 
Edison’s additional funding.  As with a generational battle over territory, the facts 
remained long in dispute, but one thing was clear:  both sides had come to distrust, if not 
detest, each other.  Grasmick vehemently rejected the report, arguing that Edison had 
transformed Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello with no monetary advantage 
and questioning whether any of the schools listed in the Abell report had ever been in 
such bad shape. When asked to comment on the Abell report in October 2005, Benno 
Schmidt said, “I don’t believe a word those people print.”56 
                                                
54 Kalman R. Hettleman, “Edison’s 3 Schools Must Reveal Costs,” Baltimore Sun, December 1, 
2000. 
55 Richard O’Neill, “Edison Schools Serves City Well,” Baltimore Sun, December 16, 2000; 
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29, 2000. 
56 Sara Neufeld, “Privately Run City Schools Cost More to Improve,” Baltimore Sun, September 
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 When asked the same question several days later, Jim Howland, the CEO of 
Edison’s Educational Services Group, shook his head and attributed the negative 
assessment of the company to entrenched opposition to the concept of for-profit 
management of schools.  “We turned around three schools in Baltimore on the state take-
over list,” Howland said, “and they hate us in Baltimore.”  Howland said that the distrust 
of for-profit educational management in Baltimore and elsewhere had become so intense 
that he saw Edison’s future confined to the provision of ancillary services, from after-
school tutoring and summer enrichment programs to professional development, 
curriculum guidance, and test preparation.  Managing some schools, Howland said, made 
sense to keep the company in the public eye and to hone services that could be sold in 
supplementary form to a wider market, but the number of schools would have to be 
limited.  A year later, following four years at Edison, Howland left the company to 
become president of the international division of Dun & Bradstreet, a leading corporate 
information conglomerate.57 
 Like Howland, Whittle, too, contended that entrenched opposition to for-profit 
educational management made it hard for Edison to get a fair shake.  When asked during 
an interview in his corner office overlooking Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue in November 
2005 if John Golle was right to compare an EMO to a man between a fire hydrant and a 
dog, Whittle grimaced and nodded. “When I appeared before the Maryland State School 
Board when the company’s stock was high,” Whittle added, “I got beaten up as a 
                                                
57 Jim Howland, interview, New York, October 18, 2005. For insight into the growth in private 
provision of ancillary services, see Patricia Burch, Hidden Markets: The New Education 
Privatization (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
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profiteer.  When I appeared before the same people a year later when the stock was low, I 
got beaten up as a bad businessman.”58 
Yet unlike Howland, Whittle maintained that for-profit educational management 
had a robust future, both in that interview and in a book he wrote on education that was 
published the same month as the Abell report. In Crash Course: Imagining a Better 
Future for Public Education, Whittle described the nation’s schools and many abroad as 
being run by 2030 by mammoth competing EMOs with such names as Grawson Schools 
(an apparent conflation of McGraw Hill and Pearson Education or Edison) and Horizon 
Schools (an apparent transmutation of child-care giant Bright Horizons Family 
Solutions). Whittle not only predicted that the nation would move “rapidly” in this 
direction between 2005 and 2015, but he also reclaimed the language of historical 
necessity he used in trumpeting Edison in 1992 as the free-market answer to the nation’s 
educational ills.  Whittle asserted that in his view, “the changes proposed in this book are 
as inevitable as the fall of the Berlin Wall.”59  
The changes Whittle proposed in Crash Course comprised boosting teacher 
quality by doubling pay and covering the cost by substantially cutting the number of 
teachers; reducing instructional time significantly by devoting an increasing portion of 
the school day to independent learning (so that third-graders, for example, would be “on 
their own” two hours a day while high school students would spend only one-third of 
their day in a conventional classroom); and  putting students to work as corridor, 
cafeteria, and study-hall monitors, as receptionists answering phones and giving school 
                                                
58 Chris Whittle, interview, New York November 8, 2005. 
59 Chris Whittle, Crash Course: Imagining a Better Future for Public Education (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 2005), 5, 158-165. 
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tours, as graders of papers and exams, and as tutors (“with fifth-graders helping first-
graders, eighth-graders helping fifth-graders, and so forth”).60 
Whittle won praise as a visionary in blurbs from Wendy Kopp, the founder of 
Teach for America (TFA), and Lamar Alexander, the former governor of Tennessee and 
U.S.  secretary of education who, as noted earlier, was previously a stakeholder in 
Whittle Communications and member of Channel One’s advisory board. In separate 
forewords, Walter Isaacson, the president and CEO of the Aspen Institute and former 
managing editor of Time, and Tom Ridge, the former governor of Pennsylvania and U.S. 
secretary for homeland security, likewise lauded Whittle.  The only significant response 
from education scholars came from Henry M. Levin in a critical essay in Education Next 
entitled, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, “Déjà Vu All Over Again.”61 
 
In updating Hettleman’s argument, William S. Ratchford II, the author of the Abell report 
and the former director of the Maryland Department of Fiscal Services, wrote that in 
fiscal year 2005, Edison posted $3.2 million as retained revenue (or profit), equivalent to 
$1,425 per pupil and nearly 16 percent of its contract payment of $20.1 million. In 
refutation of those contending that the private sector is more efficient, Ratchford noted 
that while the BCPSS spent $647 per pupil on central administration, Edison spent 
$1,059.  And echoing Hettleman, Ratchford argued that the state’s contract with Kennedy 
Krieger for learning-disabled students at Edison’s three schools indeed amounted to a 
significant subsidy. 
                                                
60 Ibid., 101-133. 
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 Reflecting four years later on the controversy over costs, Laura Weeldreyer, the 
deputy chief of staff under Andrés Alonso, the CEO of the BCPSS, dismissed objections 
to Ratchford’s analysis with a shake of her head.  “As a huge charter advocate,” 
Weeldreyer said during a March 2009 interview in her office on the fourth floor of the 
BCPSS headquarters on North Avenue, “I know charters contend they have their own 
administrative costs.  But they use so many of our administrative services and must: we 
provide transportation, lunch, testing, and data analysis, as their scores are our scores.  
They use our office of student placement, our office of suspension services.  They can’t 
suspend students and not report the suspensions through us.  Whether they like our 
services or not, they have to use them.”62 
 Weeldreyer knew Baltimore and its schools well.  Following three years as an 
elementary school teacher in New Orleans through TFA from 1991 to 1994, Weeldreyer 
taught middle school in Baltimore for one year and then worked for Baltimore’s Citizens 
Planning and Housing Association and Maryland’s Advocates for Children and Youth.  
Weeldreyer moved to BCPSS headquarters in 2000, serving first as executive director of 
the Office of New and Charter Schools and, after that, as a regional superintendent before 
becoming deputy chief of staff in 2008.  In addition, her husband had been a middle 
school teacher in the Baltimore system since 1993.  Without pause, Weeldreyer reeled off 
budgetary figures distinguishing charter from district schools.  “Since we moved to per-
pupil expenditures last year,” she said in 2009, “we can show definitively that charters 
get more than district schools, so long as they don’t have location or building costs, and 
Edison does not have those costs in Baltimore.  Last year, charter schools received 
                                                
62 Laura Weeldreyer, interview, Baltimore, March 27, 2009. 
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$9,115 per student; this year, $9,006.  For the conventional district school, we have a 
weighted system, starting with $4,800 per student; for needy or gifted students, there’s an 
additional allocation of $2,200; for students getting free or reduced-price lunch, there’s 
an extra allocation of $900.  For a student qualifying in all categories, the per-pupil 
expenditure is $7,900.  That’s the top.”63 
 Yet of greater concern to Ratchford than cost was academic achievement.  
Ratchford’s study was a cost-benefit analysis, and he didn’t see the benefit, though his 
assessment of outcomes was brief.  Ratchford wrote that though student performance on 
state exams at Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello improved under Edison, it 
didn’t improve as much as at three of the other seven persistently underperforming 
schools with which Edison was grouped in 1999.64 
 Ratchford failed to describe the results in much detail, but an examination of test 
scores confirms his conclusion and furthermore buries doubts raised by  Grasmick that 
the three schools Ratchford cited—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Bay-Brook, and William 
Paca—had not been in as bad shape (see Table 2.1).  These three schools were in 
addition, in sum, even more underprivileged, according to data from the National Center 
for Education Statistics:  whereas the percent of students entitled to free and reduced-
price lunch in 1999 at Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello was 91, 95, and 68, 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 William S. Ratchford II, “Going Public with School Privatization,” The Abell Report, 
September/October 2005, 2-8. Ratchford’s list of schools from 1999 doesn’t comport precisely 
with the ten lowest-performing recorded on the Web site of the Maryland State Department of 
Education, but his determination nonetheless holds that Edison’s three schools were selected from 
a group of comparable schools. 
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respectively, it was 91, 95, and 94 at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Bay-Brook, and 
William Paca.65 
 Without any external intervention, Ratchford wrote, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Bay-Brook, and William Paca outperformed Edison’s three schools.  In 1999, students at 
these three schools collectively posted an averaged proficiency level of 6 percent in third- 
and fifth-grade reading and math, as did students at Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and 
Montebello. The schools in other words started at the same place.  In 2003, Maryland 
changed its exam in response to No Child Left Behind (NCLB).  The Maryland School 
Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP) became the Maryland School Assessment 
(MSA), and, as in states across the country, proficiency levels soared.  Baltimore’s 
citywide proficiency level in reading for third-graders, for example, was 13 percent in 
2002.  In 2003, it was 39.  A year later, it jumped to 55.  By 2005, it was up to 61.66 
 The only compelling explanation for this dramatic improvement was that NCLB 
stipulated that the federal government would cut educational funding to states whose 
schools didn’t reach proficiency targets, as defined by Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).  
States consequently lowered the bar to make AYP and in the process made a mockery of 
the definition of proficiency.  Regardless, the performance of schools within states still 
revealed relative achievement. In compliance with NLCB, the MSA was administered to 
students in grades three through eight, but for purposes of consistency with analysis of 
results for the MSPAP, which was administered to elementary students in the third and 
                                                
65 Sara Neufeld, “Privately Run City Schools”; National Center for Education Statistics, 
http://nces.ed.gov/. 
66 MSPAP data obtained by e-mail from the Maryland State Department of Education, July 2012; 
MSA data come from the Web site of the Maryland State Department of Education, 
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
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fifth grades, only scores for third and fifth grade are examined here. For the non-Edison 
trio cited by Ratchford, the averaged proficiency level for 2005 in third- and fifth-grade 
reading and math was 71 percent.  For Edison’s three schools, it was 56 percent (see 
Table 2.2).67 
Elementary School Grade 3 
Reading 








Arundel 40.7 22.2 36.6 12.2 27.9 
Bay-Brook 80.9 78.7 74.4 51.2 71.3 
Dr. Martin Luther  
King, Jr. 
81.9 73.5 83.5 65.6 76.1 
Furman Templeton* 52.9 60.8 37.2 37.2 47 
Gilmor* 64.2 62.7 38.9 41.1 51.7 
Graceland Park 34.6 26.9 51.3 30.8 35.9 
Lafayette 58.5 37.5 58.3 25.0 44.8 
Mary Rodman 33.8 47.9 75.9 26.4 46 
Montebello* 69 71 69.7 71 70.2 
William Paca 79.7 74.4 49.2 63.6 66.7 
Mean of Edison schools 62 64.8 48.6 49.8 56.3 
Mean of remaining seven 58.6 51.6 61.3 39.3 52.7 
Baltimore City 61 56.5 57.6 48.5 55.9 
Table 2.2 Percentage of students graded proficient on the 2005 Maryland School Assessment 
(MSA); mean figures are unweighted by student population except in the case of grade-level 
scores for Baltimore City; the asterisk indicates schools taken over by Edison in 2000.  Data 
source: Maryland State Department of Education, http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
 
 
 Students at Edison’s three schools in 2005 still outperformed peers in sum at the 
seven schools with which they had been grouped in 1999—something Ratchford 
neglected to mention—but that, too, would change the following year, and the gap would 
                                                
67 The demographic data had hardly budged from 1999. The percent of students in 2005 entitled 
to free or reduced-price lunch was as follows: at Bay-Brook, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
William Paca, 90, 88, and 93, respectively; and at Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello, 
91, 88, and 80, respectively.  The percentage of nonwhite students at the non-Edison schools was 
89, 99, and 95, respectively; and at the Edison schools, it was 99.  See National Center for 
Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ 
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only grow wider before closing somewhat in 2009. In 2006, these seven schools 
outperformed Edison’s three by 6 percentage points; and in 2007, by 11.  In 2008, these 
schools (down to six, as Lafayette Elementary was closed in 2007) not only outperformed 
Edison’s three by 25 percentage points but also surpassed the city average, as they would 
again in 2009 (see Table 2.3). 
Elementary School 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Arundel 8.5 6.4 28.8 36.6 27.9 27.9 45.3 63.3 83.5 
Bay-Brook 4.6 33.6 45.2 79.1 71.3 88.5 84.7 84.9 77.4 
Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. 23.1 17.6 43.7 54.9 76.1 65.7 54.8 65.8 78.1 
Furman Templeton* 0.5 3.0 19.8 55.5 47.0 48.2 46.6 43.4 60.7 
Gilmor* 7.5 14.7 33.9 47.2 51.7 43.9 41.8 38.2 64.2 
Graceland Park 11.1 8.4 30.6 44.6 35.9 74.2 65.8 84.6 86.6 
Lafayette 17.8 21.7 36 63.4 44.8 53.5 41.7 x x 
Mary Rodman 14.8 8.2 31.1 28.3 46.0 36.8 50.1 56.9 74.5 
Montebello* 31.5 63.5 49.7 69.8 70.2 63.3 56.4 61.5 73.3 
William Paca 3.5 11.1 27.1 48.7 66.7 60.2 71.5 81.6 86.6 
Mean of Edison 
schools 13.2 27.1 26.9 57.5 56.3 51.8 48.3 47.7 66.1 
Mean of remaining 
seven 11.9 15.3 34.6 50.8 52.7 58.1 59.1 72.8 81.1 
Baltimore City 23.1 17.2 39.2 50.6 55.9 59.5 63.8 72.2 77.9 
Table 2.3 Mean proficiency rates for third- and fifth-graders in reading and math on the MSPAP 
for 2001-2002 and on the MSA for 2003-2009; mean figures are unweighted by student 
population except in the case of Baltimore City; the asterisk indicates schools taken over by 
Edison in 2000.  Data source:  Maryland State Department of Education, 
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
 
 The man behind Ratchford’s report was Robert C. Embry Jr., the president of the 
Abell Foundation since 1986 and, in the opinion of several local officials, Baltimore’s 
shadow mayor. It was Embry, as previously noted, who recommended EAI to Mayor 
Schmoke in 1991 and then had the Abell Foundation fund visits by Baltimore school 
officials to schools run by EAI in Minnesota and Florida. The Abell Foundation itself is 
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the city’s local version of the Ford Foundation, making grants of more than $263 million 
to community initiatives and research projects since its establishment in 1953.68 
 Embry was born in Baltimore in 1937, graduated from its public schools, went to 
Massachusetts for his bachelor’s degree at Williams College and his law degree at 
Harvard, returned to Baltimore to clerk for a U.S. Appeals Court judge, and then worked 
several years for a local law firm before becoming Baltimore’s commissioner of Housing 
and Community Development in 1967.  Ten years later, President Jimmy Carter named 
Embry assistant secretary of housing and urban development.  As important to Embry as 
good housing and thoughtful city planning were solid public schools.  In addition to 
financing educational initiatives as head of the Abell Foundation to improve Baltimore’s 
schools, Embry served during his free time as president of the Baltimore Board of School 
Commissioners and then the Maryland State Board of Education. 
 As his endorsement of EAI made clear, Embry wasn’t instinctively opposed to 
for-profit school management. Moreover, Embry supported not only Baltimore’s 
partnership with EAI for school management but also the city’s contract with Sylvan 
Learning Centers, the tutoring company, for supplementary assistance to learning-
disabled children at six city schools.  Embry declared to a reporter for the Sun  in 1993 
that just as Harborplace made Baltimore “a model for physical development,” the city’s 
collaboration with EAI and Sylvan stood to make it a model for educational reform.69 
                                                
68 Abell Foundation Web site, http://www.abell.org/. 
69 Gary Gately, “Private Firm’s Influence May Grow in City Schools,” Baltimore Sun, September 
1, 1993; Gately, “Education Gospel According to City Schools’ Chief Amprey,” Baltimore Sun, 
September 19, 1993. 
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 Sitting in his office on the twenty-third floor of a downtown skyscraper with a 
panoramic view of the Baltimore Harbor, Embry explained in March 2009 that on top of 
EAI’s failure, it was a combination of the 2004 MSA results at Edison’s three schools 
and subsequent reports from teachers at Montebello about test tampering that led him to 
change his mind about for-profit educational management.  Embry had already been 
concerned about how simple it was for schools to cheat on statewide exams and sent an 
op-ed to the Sun in August 2004 making his case in detail, explaining that teachers can 
easily give students extra time, point out correct responses as they walk about 
classrooms, and afterward change incorrect responses on bubble sheets and finish 
unanswered questions; moreover, teachers are allowed to view the exams in advance. But 
the Sun declined to publish Embry’s submission.70 
 A month later, Embry wrote Grasmick that he had just reviewed Edison’s 2004 
MSA results for third- and fifth-graders, had doubts about their authenticity, and urged 
her to recall two Baltimore elementary schools—Glenmount and Tench Tilghman—
whose extraordinary 1995 MSPAP scores plummeted when independent monitors from 
the state oversaw the examination the following year.  The percentage of fifth-graders at 
Glenmount scoring proficient in math, for example, dropped from 88 in 1995 to 27 in 
1996.  “If the scores are accurate,” Embry wrote Grasmick about the 2004 MSA results at 
Edison’s three schools, “they have significant implications for the future of city schools. 
To validate these successes, you might want to have the 2005 tests independently 
monitored…. If you are interested … we would be delighted to pay any associated costs 
or provide the monitors.”  In a 409-word response explaining the state’s protocol and, in 
                                                
70 Robert C. Embry Jr., interview, Baltimore, March 27, 2009; “Test Security,” unpublished, 
August 3, 2004, shared by Embry. 
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particular, its careful oversight of Edison’s three schools in 2003-2004, Grasmick 
thanked Embry for the offer but declined.71 
 Upon subsequently hearing from a teacher at Montebello that the school suffered 
from widespread cheating on statewide exams of just the nature he had described in his 
rejected op-ed submission and that several of this teacher’s colleagues had written 
Grasmick about the problem to no avail, Embry in March 2005 revised his op-ed, 
changed the title from “Test Security” to “Catching the Cheaters,” and resent it.  This 
time, the Sun ran Embry’s submission.  Embry alleged that weak supervision by the 
Maryland State Department of Education had permitted significant cheating by school 
administrators and teachers to boost student scores.  “Particularly troubling,” Embry 
wrote, “is when a for-profit firm such as Edison Schools, Inc., which operates three 
schools in Baltimore, is compensated in part based on its test scores—information that is 
solely under Edison’s control with no external monitoring.”72 
 The day after the Sun published the op-ed, Embry e-mailed Ben Feldman, chief 
accountability officer of the BCPSS, to find out the test results for Montebello before the 
arrival in 2000 of its celebrated principal, Sarah Horsey, as well as the test results for the 
two Baltimore elementary schools she had previously led—Rognel Heights and 
Pimlico—before, during, and after her tenure.  Feldman e-mailed Embry a spreadsheet 
with data inexplicably going back only as far as 2002—Horsey had led Rognel Heights 
                                                
71 Robert C. Embry Jr., letter to Nancy Grasmick, September 17, 2004; Jean Thompson, 
“Baltimore School Test Scores Cut after State Probe,” Baltimore Sun, January 8, 1997; Nancy 
Grasmick, letter to Robert C. Embry Jr., November 23, 2004.  Embry forwarded correspondence 
by e-mail, July 22, 2011. The 1995 math score comes from Thompson; the 1996 math score 
comes from the Web site of the Maryland State Department of Education, 
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
72 Robert C. Embry Jr., “Catching the Cheaters,” Baltimore Sun, March 8, 2005. 
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from 1989 to 1996 and Pimlico from 1996 to 2000—and claimed he was unable “to cull a 
telling pattern.”  Embry dropped that path of inquiry and wrote Grasmick several days 
later about his conversation with the teacher at Montebello.  Grasmick wrote Embry back 
that “all allegations regarding cheating on state tests received by the Maryland State 
Department of Education are taken very seriously and are carefully investigated.”73 
 Still unpersuaded, Embry appealed to Grasmick at the end of April to meet with 
the teacher in question and to authorize an independent re-administration of the MSA 
exam just given in March.  To provide urgent cause for his concern, Embry attached to 
his letter an article published that morning by the Associated Press about a celebrated 
principal at an Edison school in Chester, Pennsylvania, alleged to have given eighth-
graders at her school answers to the state’s standardized exam.   Grasmick responded to 
Embry that while it would be inappropriate for her to meet with the teacher, the head of 
the Assessment Branch of the Division of Accountability and Assessment would be more 
than willing to do so and provided the man’s name and number; Grasmick didn’t 
acknowledge Embry’s recommendation that the MSA be re-administered by independent 
monitors.74 
 While Embry didn’t get anywhere with Feldman or Grasmick, an examination of 
MSPAP data as well as newspaper archives makes clear that Embry’s suspicions were 
justified. Montebello’s scores did indeed spike after Edison and its inaugural principal, 
                                                
73 Robert C. Embry Jr., e-mail to Ben Feldman, March 9, 2005; Ben Feldman, e-mail to Robert C. 
Embry Jr., March 17, 2005; Embry, letter to Grasmick, March 14, 2005; Grasmick, letter to 
Embry, March 23, 2005. Embry forwarded correspondence by e-mail, July 22, 2011. 
74 Embry, letter to Grasmick, April 29, 2005, citing Associated Press, “Edison Principal 
Suspended While Cheating Charge Investigated,” April 29, 2005; and Grasmick, letter to Embry, 
May 9, 2005. Embry forwarded correspondence by e-mail, July 22, 2011. 
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Horsey, took over the school in 2000.  In addition, on top of the allegations of test 
tampering at an Edison school in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 2005, an investigation of an 
Edison school in Wichita, Kansas, in 2001 found the principal and assistant principal 
guilty of instructing teachers to give third- and fifth-graders extra time on state exams, to 
read aloud reading comprehension passages, and to point to correct answers.75 
 While scores at Furman Templeton and Gilmor dropped in their first year under 
Edison, scores at Montebello went up as follows: in third-grade reading and math, the 
percentage of students graded proficient jumped from 10 and 4, respectively, in 2000 to 
27 and 40 in 2001; in fifth-grade reading and math, the percentage of students graded 
proficient jumped from 8 and 2, respectively, in 2000 to 29 and 31 in 2001.  This hike in 
scores repeated itself the following year, to the degree that 90 percent of fifth-graders 
scored proficient in math (see Table 2.4). 
 More troubling still is that Horsey had been extolled for dramatically improving 
results at her previous school, Pimlico Elementary, which eighteen months after her 
departure was exposed for test tampering.  Horsey took over as principal at Pimlico in 
1996.  Under Horsey, Pimlico saw its scores soar.  After one year, the percentage of 
third-graders ranked proficient in reading and math on the MSPAP jumped from 5 and 3, 
respectively, to 25 and 15; and the percentage of fifth-graders ranked proficient in 
reading and math on the MSPAP jumped from 10 and 3, respectively, to 21 and 35.  By 
2000, the percentage of third-graders ranked proficient in reading and math was up to 73 
                                                
75 Associated Press, “Officials at Edison School in Wichita Removed over Testing Fraud Claims,” 
The Topeka-Capital Journal, December 23, 2001; Dale Mezzacappa, “Edison’s Role in City Gets 
Murky,” Philadelphia Inquirer, December 24, 2001. See also Kenneth J. Saltman, The Edison 
Schools: Corporate Schooling and the Assault on Public Education (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 73-74. 
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and 85, respectively; and the percentage of fifth-graders ranked proficient in reading and 
math was up to 85 and 80, respectively.  Horsey was hailed in a long front-page profile in 
the Sun as a turn-around genius:  “In the past four years under Horsey, Pimlico has 
become the proverbial rose in the forest.  Rare is the inner-city school that has risen from 
the depths of failure to compete on Maryland tests with the average performance of 
schools in much more well-off suburbs.”76 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Furman Templeton           
Third-grade reading 0 0 2.8 23.9 58.3 52.9 43.5 37.3 43.9 63.0 
Third-grade math 0 0 1.8 18.2 61.2 60.8 45.7 45.2 40.8 52.1 
Fifth-grade reading 2.3 1.9 4.9 23.7 46.5 37.2 47.1 50.0 47.2 72.1 
Fifth-grade math 2.0 0 2.3 13.4 56.0 37.2 56.3 53.8 41.7 55.7 
Gilmor            
Third-grade reading 14.0 5.1 5.2 19.8 46.2 64.2 49.3 35.6 48.6 63.6 
Third-grade math 18.0 7.6 20.0 25.7 51.9 62.7 41.1 39.7 41.7 60.4 
Fifth-grade reading 5.0 6.3 10.3 55.4 34.7 38.9 37.8 33.3 39.3 65.5 
Fifth-grade math 9.4 11.0 23.4 34.8 56.0 41.1 47.3 58.7 23.0 67.2 
Montebello           
Third-grade reading 9.6 27.0 51.7 48.5 82.3 69.0 71.4 57.5 60.2 74.4 
Third-grade math 3.6 39.7 60.3 53.8 70.7 71.0 81.0 47.9 60.5 57.9 
Fifth-grade reading 8.2 28.7 52.2 53.7 70.1 69.7 46.9 53.1 70.0 87.8 
Fifth-grade math 1.7 30.7 89.9 42.9 55.9 71.0 53.8 67.2 55.4 73.0 
Baltimore City           
Third-grade reading 20.3 18.5 12.9 39.1 54.6 61.0 65.1 68.8 73.1 76.7 
Third-grade math 22.3 22.0 13.1 41.9 54.3 56.5 60.4 62.0 72.2 78.0 
Fifth-grade reading 22.3 24.6 20.9 44.4 49.9 57.6 58.7 60.3 75.9 82.3 
Fifth-grade math 24.5 27.1 22.0 31.2 43.7 48.5 53.7 63.9 67.4 74.6 
Table 2.4 Percentage of students graded proficient on the MSPAP for 2000-2002 and on the 
MSA for 2003-2009; Baltimore City ran Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello in 1999-
2000 while Edison did so the ensuing years. Data source: MSPAP data obtained from the 
Maryland State Department of Education by e-mail, July 2012; MSA data come from the 
Maryland State Department of Education,  http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
  
                                                
76 Howard Libit, “The Power of a Strong Principal Leadership:  Sarah Horsey Pushes Pimlico 
Elementary Teachers and Pupils to Be the Best in Baltimore,” Baltimore Sun, May 29, 2000. 
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 In January 2002, however, the Sun reported as an aside in a story about citywide 
test results that a significant portion of the 2001 MSPAP exams at Pimlico were ruled 
illegitimate due to discovery of improper assistance from teachers, precisely the activity 
Embry had been told was taking place at Montebello. Those results deemed legitimate 
were markedly below results from 2000 (see Table 2.5 and Chart 2.1). Horsey’s 
successor and two additional administrators were reprimanded, and five teachers were 
suspended for twenty days without pay.77  The 2002 MSPAP results for Pimlico plunged 
further, landing just above the school’s 1996 results.  Likewise, Rognel Heights 
Elementary, which Horsey led from 1989 to 1996, was one of six Baltimore schools, the 
Sun reported in January 1997, along with the two Embry cited in his September 2004 
letter to Grasmick—Glenmount and Tench Tilghman—found guilty by a state probe of 
test tampering in 1995.  The percentage of fifth-graders at Rognel Heights graded 
proficient in 1995 on the MSPAP in math, for example, was 100.  The next year, with 
state monitors proctoring the exam, the percentage was 30.78 
Pimlico 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Third-grade reading 3.1 5.1 24.7 18.8 33.8 73.1 21.7* 8.1 
Third-grade math 5.2 3.0 15.4 14.3 43.0 85.3 9.5* 13.1 
Fifth-grade reading 5.4 10.1 21.4 15.8 45.9 77.0 37.5* 18.4 
Fifth-grade math 4.1 2.5 35.3 32.7 60.2 80.4 21.3* 7.9 
Table 2.5 Percentage of students graded proficient on the MSPAP at Pimlico Elementary School; 
the scores for 1997 through 2000 were posted while Sarah Horsey was principal; because the 
state voided the scores of more than half of the school’s students in 2001, the results are qualified 
with an asterisk. Data source: Maryland State Department of Education by e-mail, July 2012. 
 
                                                
77 Erika Niedowski, “City MSPAP Scores Up for Fifth Straight Year,” Baltimore Sun, January 29, 
2002. 
78 Thompson, “Baltimore School Test Scores Cut”; Web site of the Maryland State Department of 
Education, http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
Chapter 2: Back to Baltimore 
 132 
 Worse yet, the grounds for suspicion don’t stop there. In 2003, the first year of the 
MSA—which on account of NCLB, as explained earlier, made attaining proficiency 
much easier than the MSPAP—proficiency levels at Montebello mysteriously dropped 
and by a significant degree:  from 64 percent for combined proficiency in third- and fifth-
grade reading and math to 50 percent. Horsey was in her third and final year at the helm 
of Montebello before becoming a regional supervisor. Proficiency levels meanwhile 
jumped for Baltimore as well as Furman Templeton and Gilmor (see Table 2.3 and Chart 
2.1). For the city as a whole, the mean rate of proficiency in third- and fifth-grade reading 
and math climbed from 17 percent to 39 percent. Only Montebello and four other of 
Baltimore’s 114 elementary schools posted declines; and only Montebello and one other 
school posted double-digit declines.  Either the capacity of teachers and students at 
Montebello—and the other four schools—plummeted in one year or the consequences at 
Pimlico led administrators and teachers into proctoring exams according to the rules.79  
Efforts to seek comment from Horsey produced no results.80 
 In sum, the test results at Rognel Heights, Pimlico, and Montebello from 1993, 
the first year the MSPAP was administered, to 2003, the first year of the MSA, exhibit a 
striking pattern (see Chart 2.1). According to a former Edison administrator in Baltimore, 
who would speak only on condition of anonymity, principals and teachers in Baltimore 
knew scores at Montebello had been cooked.  This former administrator also contended 
                                                
79 In addition to Montebello Elementary posting a decline of 13.8 percentage points in third- and 
fifth-grade reading and math proficiency from 2002 to 2003, Bentalou dropped 6 points; Franklin 
Square, 4; Frederick, 0.9; and Mount Royal, 18.2.  MSPAP and MSA data obtained from the 
Maryland Department of Education, July 2012.  
80 Calls were made to Sarah Horsey’s home number on March 13, March 14, March 20, and April 
14, 2014, and messages were left each time for comment, but no reply was ever received. 
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that Edison officials, with all their statistical expertise, had to know this, as well, but they 
needed the Montebello success story as a selling point.  Indeed, amidst Edison’s 
campaign to win a major management contract in Philadelphia, a front-page story in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer in November 2001 about Edison’s first year in Baltimore 
highlighted the spike in scores at Montebello, noting in particular that “the percentage of 
first graders who passed the state reading test went from 42 to 93, the highest in the 
city.”81 
 In pushing for that contract, Edison spokesman Adam Tucker deflected news in 
the Philadelphia press of disappointing outcomes at Edison schools in Trenton and 
Wichita by pointing to the test scores at Montebello.82  Edison even bused parent activists 
in Philadelphia to Baltimore to see Montebello as well as Gilmor in action.83  In addition, 
Montebello was showcased as one of Edison’s finest schools in a July 2003 PBS 
Frontline documentary about the company.  Frontline host John Merrow reported that 
when he asked Whittle to see Edison at its best, Whittle sent him to Montebello.84  
 The 2003 MSA results were published in August.  Had they been published 
earlier or the Frontline documentary aired later, Merrow could not have told such a 
laudatory story.  Had the odd pattern of test results at Rognel Heights, Pimlico, and 
Montebello been discovered, Merrow likewise could not have told such a laudatory story:  
                                                
81 Susan Snyder, “In Baltimore, Edison Fixes Schools while Facing Critics,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, November 5, 2001. 
82 Dale Mezzacappa, “Edison’s Role in City Gets Murky,” Philadelphia Inquirer, December 24, 
2001. 
83 Menash Dean, “Parents’ Trip Sheds Light on Edison,” Philadelphia Daily News, November 9, 
2001. 
84 PBS Frontline, “Public Schools Inc.,” July 3, 2003.   
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the news of cheating at Rognel Heights and Pimlico on top of the statistical improbability 
of such radical improvement at all three schools would have provoked disturbing 
questions. 
 
Chart 2.1 Percentage of third- and fifth-grade students graded proficient in reading and math 
combined on the MSPAP from 1993 to 2002 and on the MSA in 2003.  On account of 
suspiciously high scores at Rognel Heights in 1994 and 1995, state officials monitored exams at 
the school in 1996. Scores of more than half of the students at Pimlico in 2001 were voided by the 
state because of reports of improper assistance from teachers. In the case of 1993, Maryland data 
do not reflect a reading exam given to third-graders. Data source: MSPAP data obtained from the 
Maryland State Department of Education by e-mail, July 2012; MSA data come from the 
Maryland State Department of Education, http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE. 
 
 In aggressively coaching students for standardized tests, school leaders have 
significantly raised scores without any allegations of wrongdoing—other than that of 
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illegal.  Rudy Crew, chancellor of New York City’s schools from 1995 to 1999 and 
superintendent of Miami-Dade County Public Schools from 2004 to 2008, had risen to 
prominence as superintendent of schools in Tacoma, Washington, by doing just that with 
the assistance of a teacher-training firm he brought in from Lexington, Massachusetts, 
called the Efficacy Institute.85 In the autumn of 1994 in Tacoma, the average score of 
fourth-graders on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) was the 42nd percentile 
and of that of eighth-graders the 45th percentile. Disgusted with these results, Crew took 
the unusual step of arranging a second administration of the CTBS in the spring and 
ordered workshops across the district in test preparation for principals and teachers.  
Many teachers went on to tailor their curricula to the CTBS and regularly administer 
practice tests.  On the spring administration of the CTBS, the average score of fourth-
graders climbed to the 63rd percentile and of eighth-graders to the 58th percentile.86 
 While significant, this improvement in Tacoma paled in comparison to the gains 
in Baltimore.  The gains in Tacoma in the spring of 1995, after all, were achieved by the 
same students on exams of the same level of difficulty given after six more months of 
schooling.  And despite the district-wide shift in strategy, the CTBS scores in the autumn 
of 1995 and 1996 represented only modest improvement over the 1994 scores:  fourth-
grade scores over these three years went from the 42nd to the 49th and 48th percentile; 
eighth-grade scores went from the 45th to the 51st and 49th percentile.87  The context and 
                                                
85 Peter Sacks, Standardized Minds: The High Price of America’s Testing Culture and What We 
Can Do to Change It (New York: Perseus, 2001), 140-151. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Michael Vaden-Kiernan et al., Evaluation of the Efficacy Initiative: A Retrospective Look at the 
Tacoma School District (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 1997), 5-6. 
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magnitude of gains in Baltimore, by contrast, suggested that Embry was indeed right to 
conclude that more than concentrated test preparation was taking place at Montebello.  
 
For Edison officials, Embry’s op-ed in March 2005 and Ratchford’s report six months 
later were mere distractions.   Of far greater import was finding an explanation for the 
downturn in results from 2005 onward and reversing course.  After all, Edison had been 
granted the freedom to hire and fire that Whittle—and Lieberman—had claimed was 
critical.  And the company exercised that freedom vigorously.  Edison to start brought in 
Horsey and two other seasoned principals—JoAnn Cason from Baltimore and Darryl 
Bonds from Wichita, Kansas—to run its three schools.  Edison paid these principals 
significantly more than North Avenue compensated principals and included provisions in 
their contracts for substantial performance-based bonuses.  Horsey brought with her eight 
teachers from Pimlico. Cason, the new principal of Gilmor, brought five teachers with her 
from the school she had led in South Baltimore, Carter G. Woodson Elementary.  
Following her second year, Cason would receive a $20,000 bonus for meeting Edison 
goals, and following her fifth year, she would receive a bonus in excess of that; Horsey 
would earn several bonuses and, like several top performers, a Mustang convertible 
presented at the company’s annual summit. Because of disappointing results, Bonds 
would be replaced after one year in charge of Furman Templeton.88  
 Even with such freedom to hire and fire, Edison couldn’t fill positions, hold onto 
valued staff, or get the right leaders.  Bonds confessed to being overwhelmed as the 
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Improve Two Schools,” Baltimore Sun, January 30, 2002. 
Chapter 2: Back to Baltimore 
 137 
principal of Furman Templeton.  “I’ve seen some stuff I’ve never seen kids do before,” 
he told a reporter for the Sun six weeks into the school year.  And in that time, he lost his 
assistant principal, business manager, office manager, and two teachers.  Horsey’s 
successor at Montebello moved on after only two years.  Following her first year as 
principal of Montebello, in 2005-2006, Camille Bell said thirty of forty-five staff 
members left, some because they were asked to go and others of their own volition.  
Cason’s successor at Gilmor nearly provoked a revolt by teachers and parents, according 
to Laura Weeldreyer, the deputy chief of staff for the Baltimore City Public Schools.  
“We did a site review and were appalled,” Weeldreyer recalled in 2009. “The teachers 
and parents hated this woman.  We feared her head would soon be on a stick.”  
Weeldreyer explained that she immediately called Marlaina Palmeri, Edison’s regional 
vice president, to voice her concern.  Palmeri conceded Edison had chosen the wrong 
person to head Gilmor and had the principal replaced.  When asked how Edison could 
make such a mistake, Palmeri said it was harder than expected to get people to work in 
West Baltimore.89 
 Indeed, when Ken Cherry took over as principal of Furman Templeton in July 
2007, he had to hire half a faculty, and by mid-October, nine of twenty-seven teachers 
resigned. Cherry said teachers didn’t feel safe.  In describing a scene that could have 
easily appeared in The Wire but never did, Cherry’s predecessor, Evelyn Randall, 
                                                
89 Erika Niedowski, “Trying for a New Start,” Baltimore Sun, October 10, 2010; Bell, interview, 
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recounted at a March 2007 City Hall meeting on school neighborhood violence how one 
of her crossing guards had been told by a drug dealer at gunpoint to get off his corner.90   
 Palmeri’s life was urban education.  She had been an educator in Rochester, New 
York, for twenty-eight years:  twelve as an elementary school teacher, five as a vice 
principal, eight as a principal of a Title I elementary school, and three as the director of 
the city’s magnet schools. She earned a doctorate in educational administration from the 
University of Rochester in 1998 and joined Edison in 1999 as a regional supervisor.  At 
once elegant, diplomatic, and encyclopedic, Palmeri could be mistaken for a senior State 
Department official. She said she had never seen a neighborhood as underserved and 
dangerous as West Baltimore.91 
 Yet Edison had embraced this challenge of working in the nation’s toughest 
neighborhoods.  Company officials maintained that its longer school year (195 days 
instead of 180) and day (from 8 to 3:40 rather than 2:40), its house system, administrative 
freedom, and research-based curriculum would all have a compensatory effect.  Though 
Edison terminated its policy in 2002 of giving every student a home computer on account 
of the high cost, it invested heavily in technology.  During a tour of Montebello in 2009, 
Bell, the school’s ebullient principal, cited in this regard the school’s twenty-one 
Promethean interactive whiteboards, each costing about $6,000, and noted that Edison 
had never denied her requests for resources of any kind. Bell, who had taught in public 
schools for seven years and served as a vice principal for one year in Rochester, New 
York, where she had come to know Palmeri, said that such responsiveness from above 
                                                
90 Ken Cherry, interview, Baltimore, March 27, 2009; Sara Neufeld, “School Due More Police 
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along with the latitude she had on site made Edison’s model special.  “At an Edison 
school,” Bell said, “I have the liberty to do what I need to do for my children. I remember 
at my district school, you had to fight to do right by children.”92  
 Edison was moreover granted the freedom in 2001 by the State Board of 
Education to enroll out-of-zone students and year after year waged an impressive 
publicity campaign with glossy mailings to entice top students from beyond each school’s 
official boundaries.  Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello by law had to accept 
zoned students but they could enroll out-of-zone students whose parents had filled out 
applications.  According to Weeldreyer, about 60 percent of the 556 students at Furman 
Templeton in 2009 came from beyond the school’s official zone.  This privilege, 
however, came with a downside: resentment and distrust.  Baltimore School Board 
member Kenneth A. Jones, for example, accused Edison of skimming the best students 
from neighboring zones and rejecting or pushing out “difficult and expensive” students.93 
 Edison’s schools, in addition, had the advantage of a rigorously developed 
monthly benchmark testing system to evaluate the progress of its students and prepare 
them for annual statewide exams.  Every four weeks, students filed into a computer lab to 
sit at terminals to take reading and math assessments designed and analyzed by 
specialists at Edison’s national headquarters. The company long prided itself on its 
methodical use of this system to monitor student development and diagnose strengths and 
weaknesses.  To track results on site, each Edison school had a “mission control center,” 
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as several Edison administrators put it, where walls were covered with color-coded charts 
listing every student and his or her score on the monthly assessments.  At Furman 
Templeton, blue denoted Advanced; green, Proficient; and black, Basic. At Montebello, 
the corresponding colors were purple, green, and red.  In explaining the numbers 
covering the walls of her data room, perched in an isolated space above the school’s 
gymnasium that appeared to have once served as a physical education office, Bell said, 
“My mission is to grow the purple population.” Moreover, in the lobby of each Edison 
school were charts listing the monthly scores in reading and math of each class section 
lest any teacher or student forget the importance of statewide exams.94  
Assisting in the benchmark assessment process were regional experts in testing 
who concentrated on aligning Edison’s monthly routine with statewide exams, much like 
the outside consultants Rudy Crew brought to Tacoma.  Their purpose was singular, as 
evident at the meeting of administrators after school in the library at Montebello in 
November 2005 described at the beginning of this study. And the consequences for 
principals whose students didn’t meet company targets for proficiency in reading and 
math were procrustean. JoAnn Cason, the celebrated principal of Gilmor who during that 
meeting had echoed John Chubb’s directive that Edison’s schools must score higher than 
neighboring schools, or there would be “no reason for Edison,”95 fell victim to this logic. 
In July 2006, Edison terminated Cason on account of persistently low test scores at 
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Gilmor. Though lauded for bringing peace and efficiency for five years to a school 
previously notorious for disorder, Cason did not make Edison’s numbers.96 
According to Weeldreyer, Cason sank her heart into her job and transformed the 
school climate, but that was not enough for Edison.  Todd McIntire, an Edison senior vice 
president for operations, confirmed Weeldreyer’s take and added that Chubb’s focus on 
test results often meant abrupt terminations.  “When numbers came in July or August,” 
McIntire recalled, “there was always a lot of tension.  Chubb would examine the test 
results and then shuffle people in and out.  And many good people got shuffled out.”97 
 
The science of methodical benchmarking, the liberty to enroll selected out-of-zone 
students, the longer school year and day, the research-based curriculum, the house 
system, and the freedom to hire and fire nevertheless had no enduring impact.  When the 
2006 MSA results were published, this became clear.  For the first time, scores dropped 
at all three Edison schools in Baltimore.  Meanwhile, scores climbed not only for the 
seven schools with which Furman Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello had been grouped 
in 1999 but also for Baltimore City schools in general (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).98 
The best answer Edison could muster contradicted the sales pitch made by its own 
Richard O’Neill in February 2000 that reforming schools doesn’t take years; Edison’s 
response moreover distorted the relative straits of its three schools before the company 
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took them over.  “School improvement is a long process,” Chubb said to a reporter for the 
Sun.  “We started working in the schools six years ago when there were no worse schools 
in Baltimore.”99 Again, Gilmor, Furman Templeton, and Montebello had indeed been 
persistently low-performing schools but no more so than seven other Baltimore schools 
with which they had been grouped in 1999 that had subsequently exhibited greater 
improvement without additional funding or administrative latitude (see Tables 2.1 and 
2.3).  
Breaking from six years of consistent support of Edison, the Sun cited the low test 
scores at the three schools in an editorial the following day entitled “No Magic Bullet” 
and turned on the company:  “Arguments for privatizing government functions often raise 
legitimate and practical issues—expediency, economic savings, a higher degree of 
professionalism.  But privatizing public schools is nothing more than an act of 
desperation….  There are some school privatization success stories around the country, 
but what matters here is that Baltimore is not among them.”100 
The editorial page of the Sun had endorsed Grasmick’s plan to privatize 
underperforming schools in Baltimore in September 1999, praised her selection of Edison 
in April 2000, and lauded Edison in May 2001 after its first year of managing Furman 
Templeton, Gilmor, and Montebello.101  In addition, the paper had run a five-part series 
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about the first year of Furman Templeton under the company.102  On only one occasion 
up to this point had the Sun questioned Edison’s wherewithal.  In a June 2002 editorial, 
the paper opposed Edison’s petition to add grades seven and eight to Furman Templeton, 
Gilmor, and Montebello.  The State Board of Education had allowed the company to add 
grade six the previous year.  The issue for the paper’s editors was news of Edison’s 
financial predicament.103 
Just as EAI’s stock went into a tailspin following charges in November 1993 that 
the company had booked as revenue money that went directly from the district to staff 
and thus gave the impression of much greater volume and growth of business, Edison’s 
stock took a nosedive following revelations in February 2002 that Edison employed the 
same form of inappropriate revenue recognition. Along with stock analysts, Baltimore’s 
city comptroller, Jacqueline McLean, had exposed EAI.104  Bloomberg News exposed 
Edison.  Adam Feild, Edison’s chief financial officer, conceded in a conference call with 
analysts that Edison received only about 50 percent of the $375.8 million reported in 
revenue for fiscal 2001 and moreover admitted that the company’s practice of sending 
client school districts two invoices—representing “gross” and “net” amounts—did not 
make sense, as school districts pay only the net amount.105  Edison’s stock had closed 
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December 2001 at $19.65 a share and March 2002 at $13.90 a share.  After the SEC 
confirmed the Bloomberg allegations in May, the stock cratered.106  By the end of June, 
the company’s stock had fallen to $1.01, representing a second-quarter decline of 93 
percent, the second-worst performance that quarter of all NASDAQ companies, worse 
even than that of WorldCom, the telecom giant exposed as an accounting mirage.107 
For the editors of the Sun, permitting a company under such financial duress to 
add two grades to each of its three schools in Baltimore would be irresponsible.  And yet 
they maintained their confidence in the company, so much so that they suggested Edison 
be allowed “to add another grade to one or more of these schools” and if the company’s 
financial house were put back in order, another grade later in time.108 
After the report of the 2006 MSA scores, however, the Sun gave up on Edison.  
When Grasmick urged Baltimore to take over the state’s contract with Edison in 2007—
following fulfillment of the initial five-year contract with the state and a two-year 
extension—the Sun firmly rejected the recommendation. Grasmick would have pursued 
another extension of the state contract, but she encountered stiff resistance from the 
Maryland General Assembly.  “Given Edison’s lackluster record,” the Sun intoned in an 
April 2007 editorial, “city school officials should resume managing the schools…. 
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Edison does appear to have done a good job of engaging parents and communities in its 
reform efforts…. But its achievements have been inconsistent.”109 
In agreement with the Sun, Weeldreyer contended that Edison’s impact on 
balance was negative.  While Edison staffers brought budgetary discipline to each school 
and helped shape citywide practice with their insights, Weeldreyer said, the company 
failed to improve instruction.  In large part, Weeldreyer attributed this failure to the 
company’s inability to nurture or retain talented teachers: 
Edison had business managers for all their schools, and that seemed to help their 
schools work much better. In fact, when the city school system moved to a per-
pupil expenditure formula, we invited Edison to show us how they coached 
principals through the budgeting process. And they have some great decision-
tree tools. Those were helpful to us in preparing principals to take on a zero-
based budgeting process. But did it really help for the schools to have business 
managers? Two of Edison’s schools last year were in utter chaos because of 
massive teacher turnover. It seemed from an adult vantage point that the schools 
had better infrastructure, but that didn’t change what the kids were experiencing 
in the classroom. . . . I don’t think from a kid’s perspective, business managers 
did squat for them, since twenty-five classrooms had first-year teachers who 
didn’t know what they were doing.110 
 
Rather than heed the Sun, the Baltimore School Board complied with Grasmick and other 
Edison advocates—including 250 Edison parents, schoolchildren, and staff members who 
had attended a School Board meeting in January to lobby for the extension—and voted in 
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May to issue the company a new contract that would run through 2009. But the city 
allocation for Edison would be less than what the state had provided, confirming the case 
made by both Hettleman and Ratchford. Edison’s 195-day school year and seven-hour-
and-forty-minute day would consequently be reduced to the city standard of 180 days and 
six hours and forty minutes.111 
 With MSA results at Furman Templeton and Gilmor considerably lower in 2007 
and 2008, BCPSS CEO Andrés Alonso announced in March 2009 that he would urge the 
School Board at its upcoming meeting on the twenty-fourth of the month to let the 
contracts with the company expire.  Only Montebello met the federal standard of AYP in 
2008.  Edison officials protested that Alonso should take the long view and not focus on 
merely the past two years.112 
 Palmeri made precisely this case as I accompanied her to this meeting of the 
School Board at the BCPSS headquarters on North Avenue, a five-story gray stone 
edifice with Ionic columns supporting decorative entablatures above the building’s 
southern and northern wings. As we exited her car in the abutting parking lot, Palmeri 
nodded in the direction of a nearby yellow school bus.  “Good, they got here,” she said 
and went on to explain that Edison had paid for the bus to transport parents and children 
to show support for the company at the meeting; Edison had likewise funded school 
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buses to get parents and schoolchildren to rally on behalf of the company at a school 
board meeting of a similar nature in San Francisco in 2001.113 
 More than 120 Edison parents, schoolchildren, and staff members filled the 
building’s largest hall.  Many of the Edison contingent sat on the floor, including Furman 
Templeton’s principal, Ken Cherry.  Nearly all wore T-shirts, reading Furman Templeton 
or Gilmor across the front and Attitude=Altitude across the back.  From Edison 
headquarters in New York and seated in the front row of the audience were Roberto 
Gutierrez, senior vice president for communications, and Michael Serpe, senior vice 
president for public affairs, both in dark suits.114 
 The central item on the meeting’s agenda was Alonso’s $1.27 billion budget 
proposal for fiscal 2010, intended to close a $55 million shortfall.  If the board approved 
the budget, the North Avenue staff would be cut from 1,189 workers to 1,007, and Edison 
would lose its contract to manage Furman Templeton and Gilmor.115 
 The meeting began promptly at 6 p.m. with Board Chair Brian A. Morris calling 
for order and asking everyone to rise for the color guard presentation by a stoical 
uniformed array of flag-bearing students from Edmondson High School.  Following 
approval of minutes from last month’s meeting, Alonso and the ten board members 
patiently listened during a public comment period to ten speakers voicing a range of 
concerns.  Among them, local civil rights advocate Edna Lawrence, addressed by Morris 
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as Grandma Edna, complained that her ten-year-old granddaughter had been dragged into 
a bathroom by three boys at an unidentified school, wrestled herself free to report the 
incident to her teacher, and yet nothing was done about it.  Latasha Peterkin next rose to 
the microphone and asserted that she had repeatedly complained to the principal of Carter 
High School that her sophomore son wasn’t learning anything in science class; she got 
nowhere, then took her concerns to North Avenue’s head of secondary schools, and yet 
nothing was done about it.  “I’m just tired of being pushed around,” Peterkin said. “I’m 
tired of being ignored.”  Both Lawrence and Peterkin far exceeded the three minutes 
allotted to each speaker and had to be coaxed by Morris into wrapping up their 
grievances.116 
 From Gilmor, fifth-grader Isaiah Reese, fourth-grader Shamiria Darby, and third-
grader Tykera McDowell each read a statement about how much they valued Edison’s 
approach to learning, highlighting the company’s monthly benchmark method of 
assessment and its core values of perseverance, respect, integrity, determination, and 
excellence.  McDowell closed with a wide-eyed appeal: “Can you please, please, please 
keep Gilmor an Edison school?”  The Edison crowd burst into a standing ovation.  Leslie 
Sturdevant, the mother of a fifth-grade boy at Furman Templeton, followed with a 
glowing account of her son’s success in the school’s gifted and talented program.  “These 
children cannot be left behind,” she said to loud applause.117 
 At 8:02 p.m., the board voted on Alonso’s budget proposal, approving it 9-1. 
North Avenue would resume management of Furman Templeton and Gilmor. The Edison 
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crowd returned to its feet and quietly filed out of the hall defeated.  Alonso and the board 
moved on to renew the contract of a struggling charter high school and to agree to set 
aside funds to rent trailers outfitted as classrooms should the need arise.118 
 In the corridor outside, Bell hugged Palmeri. 
 “It’s the end of an era,” Bell said.  “Nine years.” 
 “I feel kind of numb,” Palmeri responded. 
 Gutierrez and Serpe meanwhile fielded questions on camera with a reporter from 
Baltimore’s ABC affiliate, Channel 2. 
 
With the loss of Furman Templeton and Gilmor, Palmeri was relieved of her 
responsibilities as a regional supervisor.  Offered a role within Edison with less authority, 
Palmeri declined and left the company in April.  In January 2010, she took a job as an 
executive with a New York-based competitor called Global Partnership Schools, founded 
by Sunny Varkey, an educational entrepreneur in Dubai, and coheaded by Manny Rivera, 
former Rochester superintendent and Edison vice president for development, and Rudy 
Crew, following his leadership of Miami-Dade County Public Schools.119 
 While Edison would see its contract renewed in 2010 and 2011 to continue 
managing Montebello, the school had failed to make AYP in 2009 and each subsequent 
year.  On June 27, 2011, Bell, Montebello’s leader since 2005, was abruptly let go by the 
company.  Upon emerging from a meeting at Montebello with Councilwoman Mary Pat 
Clarke about neighborhood violence, Bell was handed a letter of termination. According 
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to Bell, the letter provided no explanation. According to a company spokesman, the 
decision concerned a personnel matter that could not be disclosed. Parents waged a 
protest on Bell’s behalf, but to no avail.120 
 Bell had been meeting with Clarke to discuss, in particular, the ramifications of 
the drive-by shooting death in May of a twelve-year-old seventh-grader at Montebello 
named Sean Johnson.  With three friends, Johnson was sitting on the front porch of a 
home one mile from Montebello watching an NBA playoff game on television on a 
Tuesday evening.  Bullets hit all four, but the others survived.  Johnson was hit four 
times, twice in the chest, twice in the head.121 
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Chapter 3: The Philadelphia Story 
 
 
You need to think about whether you’re prepared to come into this city absent the support 
of the mayor or any major elected officials and run a school system. 
- Congressman Chaka Fattah to Chris Whittle, President, Edison Schools, Philadelphia 
City Hall hearing, The Philadelphia Daily News, November 8, 2001 
 
Hours before Andrés Alonso and the Baltimore School Board convened on March 24, 
2009, to determine among other things Edison’s role in managing Furman Templeton and 
Gilmor, The Philadelphia Public School Notebook ran a story on its Web site entitled 
“Edison on the Ropes in Baltimore; Is Philly Far Behind?”  Complementing the article 
was a vintage photo of Tommy Murphy driving Adolph Wolgast into the ropes in their 
legendary twenty-round 1913 boxing match in San Francisco.1 
 While Edison’s entry into Baltimore in 2000 generated headlines and conflict, the 
company’s move into Philadelphia in 2002 brought news coverage and discord of an 
entirely different dimension.  And the ensuing years brought no peace.  Much akin to the 
Murphy-Wolgast fight, the company’s long battle in Philadelphia would make its time in 
Baltimore look like a preliminary bout. 
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 Four critical factors explain the difference between Edison’s experiences in 
Baltimore and Philadelphia:  transparency, scope, timing, and labor relations. While 
Maryland selected Edison in an open process, Pennsylvania signed an agreement with 
Edison behind closed doors to produce a study of the Philadelphia school system that 
would in turn pave the way to a significant managerial role for the company.  While 
Edison entered Baltimore to manage three schools, the company entered Philadelphia, in 
accordance with its study, to manage as many as forty-five schools and run the district’s 
central office itself. When Edison competed for the contract in Baltimore, the company 
was robust and untarnished.  The company at that point had lost only one of the seventy-
one contracts it had signed since 1995. When Edison tried to market itself two years later 
in Philadelphia, the company had lost its sheen.  It had lost six more contracts and, more 
importantly, had suffered an ugly defeat in New York, failing to gain the support of 
parents in a prominent quest to take over five underperforming schools; in the process, 
the company got drubbed in the press as avaricious and out of touch. Finally, while in 
Baltimore, Edison was granted a waiver by the state to operate outside the rules and 
regulations of the teachers’ union contract, in Philadelphia, Edison, despite all of its 
support in Harrisburg, obtained no such freedom.2  
 
Edison was not new to Pennsylvania.  In 2000, the company started operating one charter 
school in Phoenixville, a middle-class suburb northwest of Philadelphia, and another in 
York, a struggling city south of Harrisburg.  In 2001, Edison assumed a significant role in 
the Chester Upland School District, encompassing Chester, a factory town south of 
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Philadelphia in steep decline, and two small neighboring townships.  Pennsylvania had 
outdone Maryland and turned over all ten schools in Chester Upland to commercial 
operators.  This marked another national first.  While Maryland had made history in 2000 
in turning over three of Baltimore’s schools to Edison and while Inkster, Michigan, had 
likewise made history in 1999 in turning over all three of its schools to Edison, never 
before had a state outsourced the management of all of a district’s schools to commercial 
operators.3  
 At the outset, Edison was contracted to run six of Chester Upland’s ten schools; 
LearnNow, a for-profit operator of charter schools, was contracted to run three; and 
Mosaica, another for-profit operator of charter schools, one.4  Within three months, 
Edison had purchased LearnNow for $36 million in stock.  Edison in the process 
increased its presence in Chester Upland to nine schools and took over eight charter 
schools under LearnNow management.5 LearnNow’s cofounders, Jim Shelton and 
Eugene Wade, served for a year as Edison executives and then headed their separate 
ways (Shelton moved on to positions with the NewSchool Ventures Fund, a philanthropy 
dedicated to educational entrepreneurship, and the Gates Foundation before joining the 
Obama administration in 2009 as deputy secretary of education for innovation and 
improvement; Wade went on to found and lead Platform Learning, a company providing 
after-school and summer tutoring to students at schools deemed in need of improvement 
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by No Child Left Behind, and then in 2013 UniversityNow, a for-profit tertiary institution 
delivering low-cost degrees via online and conventional instruction).6 
 Mosaica joined Edison as the only other EMO in Chester Upland but in a sharply 
reduced capacity.  Mosaica retreated to a minimal role just before the school year began, 
agreeing to employ only the school’s principal and vice principal.  Mosaica’s president, 
Michael J. Connelly, said the company had concluded it could only take over the school 
if conferred the authority to manage it as a charter, with all the autonomy over staffing 
and finances such authority implied.7 
 Though lacking the administrative freedom it was granted in Baltimore, Edison 
forged ahead in Chester Upland, promised great results, won support from the Chester 
Upland Education Association, the 500-member local union affiliate that had failed 
months earlier in court to block the state takeover, and garnered praise from many 
teachers learning the company’s pedagogical strategies at workshops conducted over the 
summer.8  Achieving success in Chester Upland would be a tough challenge, though.  
Chester Upland had been designated by the state in 2000 as one of twelve failing school 
districts and was the only one in that group immediately placed under the supervision of 
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an external governing board; the Harrisburg School District was also taken over 
immediately by the state, but it was turned over to the city’s mayor, Stephen R. Reed.9  
 Philadelphia was by far the biggest school district on this unenviable list and the 
next one slated by state officials for external oversight.  While Edison prepared in the 
summer of 2001 for the upcoming school year in Chester Upland, the company was 
commissioned by Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge to produce a report on how to boost 
test scores and contain costs in Philadelphia. Of the city’s 264 schools, 176 were judged 
by the state to be failing; only 12 percent of the city’s 210,000 students scored 
“proficient” on state exams; truancy averaged 20,000 students a day; school buildings 
were crumbling; the district struggled to fill teaching positions; violence plagued many 
schools; and the system was on course to overspend its annual budget of $1.7 billion by 
$216 million and faced a $1.5 billion deficit over the next five years.10 
 Ridge ordered the study on August 1 after striking a deal with Philadelphia mayor 
John Street. According to the deal, Ridge agreed to lend the city enough money to pay its 
bills through the summer while Street, in return, consented to suspend a federal lawsuit 
initiated by the city in 1998 claiming the state’s formula for funding schools to be racially 
discriminatory and to allow an external team of experts to study the district and develop a 
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long-term plan to cover costs. In addition, Street and Ridge concurred that if no such plan 
were agreed upon within ninety days, the state would take over the school system.11 
 Pennsylvania Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike, however, saw little 
reason for optimism.  Whether the city’s federal lawsuit was justified on racial grounds or 
not was moot.  What was clear was that Pennsylvania’s school funding formula placed 
low-income districts—from hard-pressed cities to poor inner-ring suburbs and rural 
townships—at a distinct disadvantage.  Bringing in a team from a company like Edison to 
find efficiencies stood to accomplish little; turning the city’s school system over to the 
state likewise stood to dodge a glaring problem.  Wallace Nunn, a Republican serving on 
the Pennsylvania Board of Education and the County Council of Delaware County, 
comprising forty-nine municipalities outside of Philadelphia, contended that 
Philadelphia’s budgetary crisis could only be solved if the state significantly raised the 
personal income tax and applied the money to equalizing disparities between school 
districts.  Both James Rhoades, a Republican in the state Senate and head of the Senate 
Education Committee, and Mario Civera, a Republican in the state House and chair of a 
bipartisan select committee on school funding, echoed Nunn.  “You cannot let 
Philadelphia fall into the Delaware River,” said Civera.  “The way we fund education is 
an antiquated system.  The state is just going to have to step up to the plate and provide 
more money.”12 
 In the wake of Ridge’s agreement with Street, Civera’s committee recommended 
precisely what Nunn had endorsed.  In a bill crafted by committee member Nicholas 
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Micozzie, a Republican representing Delaware County, the committee proposed shifting 
the burden of school funding from local property taxes, which pegged educational 
spending to the value of housing, to statewide personal income taxes.  “Pennsylvania’s 
system for funding public education is one of the worst in the nation,” Micozzie said.  
“It’s unfair to students, unfair to taxpayers, and it’s inadequate to ensure a quality 
education for every child.” Micozzie’s hybrid bill called for raising the state personal 
income tax rate from 2.8 percent to 4.6 percent, lowering local property taxes, tying the 
statewide per-pupil expenditure to the average spent in the thirty-three best-performing 
districts, and providing additional funds to districts with more low-income students and 
greater special-education needs. With this reformulation, Micozzie said Philadelphia’s 
annual state subsidy for schooling would climb from $807 million to $1.5 billion and thus 
end the city’s budgetary woes and afford Philadelphia students the education they 
deserved.13  Yet Micozzie’s proposal ran into immediate opposition from House majority 
leader John Perzel, a Republican representing Philadelphia, and got deflected for months 
of study and hearings.14 
 
To many outsiders, as well, the Philadelphia school crisis had little if anything to do with 
managerial or pedagogical strategy and much more to do with insufficient funding. “Few 
disagree,” wrote Catherine Gewertz in Education Week amid this battle between 
Harrisburg and Philadelphia, “that Pennsylvania’s system needs changing.  In the past 30 
                                                
13 Thomas Fitzgerald, “Pennsylvania Proposal Would Raise Income Tax to Aid Schools,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 14, 2001. 
14 Ibid.; Anthony R. Wood and Ovetta Wiggins, “House Panel Says Cut Property and Wage 
Taxes,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 11, 2002. 
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years, the state’s share of public school funding has dropped from 54 percent to 37 
percent….”  Placing Pennsylvania in the context of the nation as a whole, Gewertz cited a 
report published by the Education Commission of the States (ECS) the same month 
Ridge turned for help to Edison.  According to the ECS, a nonpartisan research center 
based in Denver, states on average in 2001 covered 48 percent of school budgets while 
only thirteen states provided under 40 percent; in addition, forty states used a foundation 
formula akin to Micozzie’s proposal, whereby spending in all districts could go no lower 
than a standard determined by spending in well-performing districts.15 
 The differences in per-pupil expenditure in Pennsylvania were indeed striking.  
While Philadelphia, for example, spent $7,944 per student in 2000-2001, the five school 
districts along the Paoli/Thorndale Line—traditionally known as the Main Line—of the 
region’s commuter rail system, taking suburbanites southeast into Philadelphia and back, 
spent, on average, $11,437 per student; if treated as one school district, with 24,003 K-12 
students in total, the Main Line suburbs spent $11,421 per student (see Table 3.1).16   
 Philadelphia was in other words expected to educate its children spending 70 
percent as much per pupil as the school districts of Great Valley, Haverford, Lower 
Merion, Radnor, and Tredyffrin-Easttown.  Making matters worse, children in 
Philadelphia came to school with many more needs than their peers in the leafy Main 
Line suburbs, inspiration long ago for The Philadelphia Story, the Broadway  play  that  
became  a  film classic starring Cary Grant, Katharine Hepburn, and Jimmy Stewart. This 
inequality had endured for some time.  Over the previous five years for which data are 
                                                
15 Catherine Gewertz, “Forces Target Pennsylvania School Aid Changes,” Education Week, 
November 28, 2001, 18, 20. 
16 Ibid. 
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available, Philadelphia spent, on average, 68 percent as much per pupil as its neighboring 
Main Line school districts.  This disequilibrium likewise applied to nearby Chester 
Upland, though to a lesser degree.  In 2000-2001, when Edison moved in to manage nine 
of the district’s schools, Chester Upland was spending 85 percent as much per pupil as 
the Main Line school districts.  Over the previous five years, Chester Upland spent, on 
average, 75 percent as much per pupil (see Table 3.1 and Chart 3.1).17  
School District 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00 2000-1 
Great Valley $8,416 $8,849 $8,910 $9,304 $9,876 $10,783 
Haverford $7,772 $7,399 $7,491 $7,752 $8,061 $8,460 
Lower Merion $10,848 $10,134 $11,681 $12,123 $12,875 $13,955 
Radnor $11,950 $11,964 $12,689 $13,402 $13,038 $13,149 
Tredyffrin-
Easttown 




$9,569 $9,559 $9,995 $10,348 $10,763 $11,421 
Chester-Upland $6,891 $6,981 $7,365 $8,096 $8,812 $9,696 
Philadelphia $6,550 $6,810 $6,720 $7,105 $7,378 $7,944 
Philadelphia/Main 
Line 
0.68 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.70 
Pennsylvania 
Average 
$6,421 $7,013 $7,123 $6,998 $7,309 $7,672 
Table 3.1  Per-pupil expenditure for the school districts of Chester-Upland, Philadelphia, the 
Main Line suburbs, and Pennsylvania as a whole; the figures for the Main Line suburbs are 
collectively presented as averages weighted by student population; the figures for Pennsylvania 
are presented as unweighted averages for the state’s 501 school districts. Data source: 
Pennsylvania Department of Education, Current Expenditures for All LEAs, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us.   
                                                
17 Ibid. 
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 While Edison officials had claimed from the company’s start and persisted in 
claiming that on account of streamlined operations, top managerial talent, research-based 
curricula, and high-quality professional development, they would efficiently deliver a 
world-class education,18 they never contended they could take a high-poverty urban 
school district to the level of, say, Lower Merion at 60 percent the cost. No amount of 
professionalism, operational efficiency, and technological savvy could compensate for 
the funding gaps evident across Pennsylvania and many other states. 
 
Chart 3.1  Per-pupil expenditure for the school districts of Chester Upland, Philadelphia, and the 
Main Line suburbs; the averages for the five school districts of the Main Line are weighted.  
Pennsylvania Department of Education, Current Expenditures for All LEAs, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us.   
 
                                                
18 Edison Project, The Edison Project: Partnership Schools Make an Affordable, World-Class 
Education Possible for Every Child (New York: Edison Project, 1994), 10, 16-17, 26, 34, 38-39, 
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Clearly, comparable funding is not the sole determinant of comparable schooling.  
Chester Upland, in fact, spent more per pupil than Haverford in the last three of the six 
school years listed in Table 3.1.  Moreover, disparity in interdistrict funding was not an 
issue two years earlier when Edison took over three schools in Baltimore because per-
pupil expenditure in Baltimore was relatively high.  In spending $7,963 per pupil in 
1999-2000, the school district of Baltimore City spent 90 percent as much as the state’s 
richest district, Montgomery County, and 109 percent as much per pupil as neighboring 
suburban Baltimore County.19  Yet it is hard to fathom how comparable funding could 
not be considered a necessary condition for comparable schooling, especially for children 
from disadvantaged families.  After all, the logic behind additional funding from the 
federal government (in the form of Title I allocations) to schools where 40 percent or 
more of the children come from low-income homes derives specifically from the concept 
of positive discrimination to counteract the forces of poverty.  This was the logic behind 
Micozzie’s sidelined bill, as well. 
 
The turning point for Philadelphia and similar school districts came in 1993, when 
Pennsylvania froze its school-funding formula. While the population of poor and 
immigrant children in inner-cities grew and local tax revenue declined, state assistance 
failed to compensate.20  By 1998, the financial situation of the Philadelphia School 
District had grown so severe that the mayor and superintendent at that time—Edward 
                                                
19 Maryland Department of Education, Selected Financial Data: Ten-Year Summary, 2001-2002, 
Table 15, 
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE/newsroom/special_reports/financial.htm. 
20 Catherine Gewertz, “It’s Official: State Takes Over Philadelphia Schools,” Education Week, 
January 9, 2002, 1, 14-15. 
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Rendell and David Hornbeck, respectively—threatened to shut the system down unless 
the state agreed to contribute more funding.  The state legislature’s response was Act 46, 
a law empowering the state to take over the district if it slid into financial or academic 
“distress.”  Lawsuits calling for a more equitable funding formula met with similar 
defeat, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that the issue belonged to the 
legislature, not the judiciary.21  
It was this deadlock that led to Hornbeck’s resignation in August 2000 and 
ultimately Ridge’s deal with Street and Edison.22  Adding fuel to the crisis, Ridge not 
only hired Edison to produce a study of the Philadelphia school system without seeking 
competitive bids but also agreed to pay the company $2.7 million.23 
Even Brandon Dobell, an analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston who was bullish on 
Edison, expressed disapproval of the arrangement.  Along with Howard M. Block, an 
analyst at Banc of America Securities, Dobell took the consulting contract to mean 
Edison would end up running a cluster of the city’s schools and, on that account, 
forecasted greater earning potential for the company.  A report Dobell co-authored 
termed the contract “a strong endorsement for the Edison value proposition—perhaps the 
strongest we have seen thus far in Edison’s lifetime.”24  Indeed, Edison’s stock spiked 6 
percent on the day of the announcement of the contract.25  Yet Dobell saw the conflict of 
                                                
21 Mezzacappa, “Political Tension”; Gewertz, “It’s Official.” 
22 Ibid. 
23 Martha Woodall, “Of Philadelphia Schools or Edison, Who’s Really Rescuing Whom?,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, August 19, 2001. 
24 Ibid. 
25 William Bunch, “Stock in Edison Schools Rose on News of City Deal,” Philadelphia Daily 
News, August 3, 2001. 
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interest inherent in commissioning a study from a company that stood likely to 
recommend its own services.  “This contract is a bit strange,” Dobell said to a reporter for 
The Philadelphia Inquirer. “It is kind of like putting a fox in charge of the henhouse.”26 
Instrumental to Ridge’s agreement with Edison was Floyd Flake, yet another 
example of Whittle’s hiring acumen.  Much as Whittle long before won clout in the 
political and publishing worlds by making Hamilton Jordan and William S. Rukeyser 
senior executives of Whittle Communications and much as he achieved academic 
credibility for Edison by naming John Chubb chief education officer and Benno Schmidt 
president and CEO, Whittle scored a strategic coup in bringing aboard Flake in May 2000 
as president of Edison’s charter school division and the company’s chief spokesman. 
The appointment of Flake generated a detailed story in The New York Times. 
Flake had not only been a Democratic congressman for eleven years, representing a 
portion of Queens, New York, from 1986 to 1997, but also was and would remain senior 
pastor of the Allen African Methodist Episcopal Church in Queens. With 12,000 
members, Flake’s congregation was one of the biggest churches in the state.  Moreover, 
Flake was famously nonpartisan. Flake had endorsed such Republicans as Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and Governor George Pataki in their runs 
for office. Flake even prefaced a talk on educational policy by George W. Bush in 1999 
at the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank, with a warm introduction,  going so 
                                                
26 Woodall, “Of Philadelphia Schools.” 
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far as to call Bush “my homeboy.”27  And Flake had worked closely in Congress with 
Ridge, his colleague in the House for nine years.28 
While Flake’s bipartisan flair may have worked magic in Harrisburg, the $2.7 
million contract was a public relations disaster in Philadelphia.  Flake’s role as Edison’s 
chief spokesman and ex officio liaison to African-American communities made no 
difference.  The response from nearly every corner was indignant and relentless. Whereas 
the Maryland School Board’s designation of Edison to run three schools in Baltimore a 
year before provoked little more than a lawsuit by the Baltimore Teachers Union, which 
The Baltimore Sun dismissed as groundless and went nowhere,29 Ridge’s contract with 
Edison triggered protest from the Black Clergy of Philadelphia and Vicinity; the local 
affiliates of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN); 
Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth; the Parents Union for Public Schools; the 
Philadelphia Home and School Council; Parents United for Better Schools; Asian 
Americans United; the Public Interest Law Center; the Philadelphia Student Union; 
Youth United for Change; the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers; the Philadelphia 
Board of Education; the interim superintendent (titled CEO in keeping with a growing 
trend); the city budget director; the city secretary of education; the state auditor; Mayor 
                                                
27 Edward Wyatt, “Floyd Flake to Take Post with Education Company,” New York Times, May 3, 
2000, B3. 
28 Woodall, “Of Philadelphia Schools or Edison.” 
29 Eric Siegel, “School Pact Draws Suit,” Baltimore Sun, April 21, 2000; “Are City Teachers 
Ready for Reform?,” Baltimore Sun, April 24, 2000. 
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Street; former Mayor Rendell; and city councilman and future mayor Michael Nutter.  
And in contrast to Baltimore, the local press sided with the opposition. 
 
Among the first groups to protest Governor Ridge’s agreement with Edison was the 
Philadelphia chapter of ACORN, a national anti-poverty organization focused on voter 
registration and housing advocacy.30 A day after the announcement on August 1, Jeff 
Ordower, chief organizer of Philadelphia’s ACORN, told The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
“We will not let Edison come into the district without a fight. Through privatization, you 
lose accountability.”31 
ACORN had played a decisive role five months earlier in preventing Edison from 
entering New York to take over five persistently underperforming schools.  Yet the 
terrain in New York differed significantly.  While New York’s mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, 
adamantly supported Edison and was an ally of Floyd Flake, much as Governor Ridge 
strongly backed Edison and was a friend of the company’s new spokesman, Giuliani was 
powerless.  All Giuliani could do was urge his schools chancellor, Harold O. Levy, to 
endorse Edison as the EMO parents of students at these five schools should choose in a 
referendum.32  In fact, Edison had aimed to take over forty-five schools in New York, the 
                                                
30 ACORN was famously forced to fold in 2010 after employees in Baltimore, New York, and 
Washington, D.C., were exposed in undercover videos for providing tax advice to muckraking 
conservative activists posing as a pimp and prostitute.  See Clark Hoyt, “The ACORN Sting 
Revisited,” New York Times, March 20, 2010. 
31 Susan Snyder, “Groups Vow a Fight if City Schools Seek Privatization,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
August 3, 2001. 
32 Edward Wyatt, “Privatizing of Five Schools Faces a Fight,” New York Times, January 30, 2001; 
Michael O. Allen and Dave Saltonstall, “Rudy: Give ‘Em 20 Schools,” New York Daily News, 
April 1, 2001; Anemona Hartocollis, “As Election on Privatizing Schools Winds Down, Call 
Goes Out for Plan B,” New York Times, April 1, 2001. 
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same number it vied to manage in Philadelphia.  Though headquartered in New York, the 
company ran no schools in the city and was eager to exhibit its managerial and 
pedagogical know-how on the nation’s biggest educational stage.33 
According to New York State law, the only way Edison could take over any of 
these five schools was if the parents of more than half of the students first voted to 
convert the school to charter status.  In Edison’s battle in New York City, the state was 
not pushing privatization, as had been the case in Maryland and as would be in 
Pennsylvania.  Rather, it was the mayor, and he had to play by the state’s rules.  Levy 
followed Giuliani’s call to recommend Edison, yet Levy recollected a decade later that he 
did so reluctantly. Levy explained that Giuliani had summoned him to his office on a 
Friday afternoon with no explanation. When Levy arrived, Giuliani was in his office with 
Whittle. “This man can have a dramatic impact on the school system,” Levy recalled 
Giuliani telling him upon introducing Whittle. “I want you to turn over forty-five schools 
to him.” After a short polite conversation, Whittle left, Levy said, and then he warned the 
mayor that doing business with Edison would be a big mistake. “Do you know who this 
guy is?,” Levy remembered asking the mayor. “He’s lost more people more money than 
anybody on the planet.”  Levy said Giuliani asked him to compile a report on Whittle for 
Monday. After reading the report, Giuliani, according to Levy, walked back his 
recommendation of forty-five schools to five.34 
                                                
33 Edward Wyatt, “Defeat Aside, Edison Plans to Expand,” New York Times, April 1, 2001.  
Edison would absorb a charter school in the Bronx—Harriet Tubman—later in the year through 
its acquisition of LearnNow, but that single-school contract fell far short of Edison’s aspirations 
in New York. 
34 Harold O. Levy, interview, New York, June 13, 2016. 
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In complying with Giuliani’s request, Levy took the necessary steps in arranging 
parental votes at each of the five schools. He gave Edison officials the names, addresses, 
and phone numbers of all the parents of the 5,000 children in the five schools, and saw to 
it that the Board of Education funded a mailing from Edison to the parents explaining the 
company’s merits.  ACORN, led by the career agitator Bertha Lewis, lashed back that 
Levy had tilted the playing field.  Conceding Lewis’s point, Levy agreed to fund a 
mailing from ACORN to the same parents explaining the downside of outsourcing to 
Edison the management of their children’s schools and to postpone the referendum period 
by one week—from the second and third weeks of March to the third and fourth weeks.35 
Yet Lewis was not alone in blasting Levy and Edison.  Nor was she done.  
Though more than thirty years had passed since racial tensions over school staffing and 
curricula in the Ocean Hill and Brownsville neighborhoods of Brooklyn led to a series of 
citywide teacher strikes that bitterly divided New Yorkers, distrust of City Hall and the 
Board of Education in some quarters still burned.  At a forum in Harlem featuring 
representatives from Edison and community organizations, Hazel Dukes, president of the 
New York chapter of the NAACP, declared that Levy should “be put in a dungeon, and 
let us get on with the education of our children.”  Irving Hamer Jr., himself a member of 
the Board of Education, compared the privatization of underperforming schools to the 
infamous Tuskegee experiment, a clinical study of the development of untreated syphilis 
in black men told by the U.S. government they were getting free medical check-ups.36 
                                                
35 Edward Wyatt and Abby Goodnough, “School Privatization Foes Say Chosen Company 
Unfairly Gets Board’s help with Vote,” New York Times, February 26, 2001. 
36 Ibid. 
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Lewis likewise decried the privatization proposal as “race and class to the max” 
and along with her ACORN staff and volunteers canvassed hard and wide to defeat it.37  
In some cases, reporters from The New York Times learned after the vote, ACORN staff 
and volunteers canvassed too hard, misrepresenting Edison as a company that charges 
tuition at its charter schools, does not make accommodations for bilingual students, and 
expels underperformers.38  
Despite the negative publicity, Edison officials expected to win the support of 
more than half the parents at two schools at least and thereby gain the foothold in New 
York that had long eluded them.39  Whittle, in particular, exuded confidence.  In late 
March, the day before the ballots were counted, Whittle again expressed his mission and 
conviction in Cold War terms, saying to a major Edison investor, “The Kremlin of 
American education is about to crumble.”40 
Of 5,000 ballots, only 2,286 were cast.  And of those cast, only 453 were for 
Edison.  Not one school came close to the plurality necessary for conversion to charter 
status.  In sum, 9 percent of eligible parents voted for the proposal.  Flake was both 
incredulous and disgusted.  “Given the energy and effort and sacrifice our team put into 
this, I certainly thought we would have more votes,” he said.  “It got caught in a cloud of 
                                                
37 Abby Goodnough, “Public Lives: Agitator Turns Charm against School Privatization,” New 
York Times, March 14, 2001. 
38 Abby Goodnough, “Scope of Loss for Privatizing by Edison Stuns Officials,” New York Times, 
April 3, 2001; Lynette Holloway, “Parents Explain Resounding Rejection of Privatization at 5 
Schools,” New York Times, April 13, 2001. 
39 Goodnough, “Scope of Loss.” 
40 Anonymous source, March 29, 2001. 
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misinformation. In the end it was a matter of parents misunderstanding what we do.”41 
With the defeat at the polls, the company’s stock took a beating, dropping from an all-
time high of $38.75 on February 8 to $19.50 on March 30, when the results were 
announced.42 
 Editorials in The New York Daily News and The New York Post along with 
columns by Joyce Purnick and John Tierney in The New York Times and Michael Kramer 
in The New York Daily News took Flake’s frustration to another level.  In an editorial 
entitled “The Kids Lose Again,” The New York Post rebuked Edison’s opponents: “Look 
for broad smiles on the faces of Edison’s institutional enemies—politicians whose 
parochialism is exceeded only by their cynicism, and union leaders utterly incapable of 
subordinating their own interests to those of children whose only real hope is a decent 
education.”  Elaborating on the case made by the Post, the editors of the Daily News three 
days later concluded: “It was a no-brainer, an effort to pluck some of the city's worst 
schools from the educational gutter and give their students a real shot at both learning and 
success in life. But thanks to a union, a chancellor, a platoon of tired politicians and an 
army of apathetic and/or misguided parents, those students will continue to be shackled 
by illiteracy and hopelessness.”43 
 Kramer, Purnick, and Tierney conveyed similar dismay and derision. 
“Uninvolved parents share the blame,” wrote Kramer, “and the evidence suggests that 
                                                
41 Goodnough, “Scope of Loss.” 
42 Securities prices come from Wharton Research Data Services, Center for Research In Security 
Prices (CRISP), https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/, subscription required. 
43 “The Kids Lose Again,”  New York Post, March 31, 2001; “Kids Are Losers in Edison Vote,” 
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most of the parents of the kids in the five schools are indeed uninterested in their 
children's education. If they cared, they would have turned out in droves.”  Purnick went 
further: “What an embarrassing time for New York City.  Students in five failing schools 
are thrown a life preserver and their parents opt for drowning.”  Likewise convinced of 
Edison’s effectiveness, Tierney deplored an opportunity lost and questioned the integrity 
of Edison’s adversaries: “It would be interesting to see how the black politicians, 
organizers and parents who rallied against Edison would react if middle-class white 
students ended up with the new computers, textbooks and refurbished classrooms 
promised by Edison. Would the Rev. Al Sharpton wish the white students well in their 
improved schools? Or would he be organizing rallies against this new evidence of 
racism?”44   
 Of academics, Diane Ravitch was cited in the Times as a critic of the outcome. 
Ravitch, who, as previously noted, would later become an ardent opponent of market-
based reforms, claimed Edison stood to run exemplary schools in the city to showcase to 
policymakers as well as shareholders its managerial and pedagogical expertise.45 
 Yet nothing had been lost in the opinion of the prominent school choice advocate 
Seymour Fliegel.  The city did not need Edison to know how to run schools, Fliegel said 
in the Times.  As one example of a successful model readily available for replication, 
Fliegel cited an experiment in which he partook in the 1960s, the  More Effective Schools 
(MES) program, orchestrated by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and 
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implemented at twenty-one schools in New York City:  class size was capped at twenty-
two; teachers were given additional planning time; principals were freed from paperwork 
by administrative assistants; and wrap-around services included a guidance counselor for 
every two grades, a social worker and psychologist on staff at each school, and a 
psychiatrist making weekly visits.46  In lamenting the termination of the MES program, 
Fliegel later recalled that Albert Shanker, president of the UFT, had explained to him that 
he had to choose between endorsing continued funding of the program and higher salaries 
for teachers throughout the system and opted for the latter.47  
 
In Philadelphia, parents would not be polled, and nothing akin to the MES program was 
being offered. Parents would have no say beyond voicing their concerns at four forums 
cosponsored by the Philadelphia chapter of the Black Alliance for Educational Options 
and the Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs Coalition.  The decision would ultimately rest 
with a five-member commission appointed jointly by Pennsylvania’s governor and 
Philadelphia’s mayor.  ACORN in Philadelphia was accordingly toothless by New York 
standards.  Yet the organization and likeminded opponents of privatization nevertheless 
persisted in protesting. 
 The protesting began immediately.  Two days after the announcement of Ridge’s 
deal with Edison and a day after ACORN’s Ordower vowed to battle Edison, the 
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Program Conducted by the Center for Urban Education, United Federation of Teachers, 
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NAACP, the Black Clergy of Philadelphia and Vicinity, the Parents Union for Public 
Schools, and Parents United for Better Schools together filed an appeal with U.S. District 
Court Judge Herbert Hutton to reject Mayor Street’s request for a ninety-day stay of the 
city’s federal lawsuit against the state claiming the state’s formula for funding schools to 
be racially discriminatory.  “This delay is depriving Philadelphia children of any 
opportunity for fair educational achievement,” said Michael Churchill, a lawyer with the 
Public Interest Law Center who was representing the four groups.  “Privatizing schools at 
the same level of funding will not give Philadelphia students a fair chance to compete 
with suburban students, where they are spending, on average, $2,000 more on each 
child’s education.”48  Acknowledging this significant disparity in funding, the editorial 
page of The Philadelphia Daily News, the city’s afternoon paper, echoed Churchill on the 
same day, scoffing at the contention that “Edison has a magic bullet for public education 
that has eluded the district—and everyone else in the country.”49 
 One week later, approximately thirty-five parents and community activists 
affiliated with ACORN and the Alliance Organizing Project (AOP) stormed the Edison 
suite in the State Office Building in Philadelphia and demanded a meeting with Whittle.  
Construction workers had yet to finish laying carpet and painting walls for the new work 
space for the twenty-five Edison employees dispatched to Philadelphia to study the city’s 
school system.  State troopers and city policemen intervened to break up a one-hour 
standoff and steered the protesters outside into the 101-degree heat while ACORN and 
AOP representatives met with Edison officials to arrange a meeting.  Edison executive 
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vice president Eugene Wade was flummoxed:  “You don’t have to take over our office to 
get a meeting with us.  Just pick up the phone.”50 
In addition to meeting afterward with ACORN and AOP members, Edison 
officials appeared at the four forums cosponsored by the Philadelphia chapter of the 
Black Alliance for Educational Options and the Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs 
Coalition and parried gibes at each.  At the first forum, held the evening of August 30 in 
the basement of Mount Carmel Baptist Church in West Philadelphia and moderated by 
Democratic state senator Anthony Hardy Williams, many of the 250 parents and 
community activists showed up to shout down Edison.  Williams, himself the cofounder 
of a K-8 charter school run by the EMO Mosaica, sought with marginal effect to deflect 
criticism of Edison and to guide the discussion to discovering solutions for the city’s 
schools.51 
“Speaker after speaker,” recounted Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Larry Eichel, 
“said you didn’t need a $2.7 million report to tell you that the schools don’t have enough 
money. Or that buildings are decrepit, that classes are too big, that there aren’t enough 
textbooks and that computers aren’t sufficiently available.”52 “Edison Isn’t the Issue was 
the title of Eichel’s column. Elmer Smith, a columnist for The Philadelphia Daily News, 
dismissed this forum and the following three held over the next two weeks as “show 
hearings” and cited a poll conducted by Hart Research Associates finding 65 percent of 
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Philadelphia’s public school parents strongly opposed to Edison’s management of city 
schools.53 
With his parting words to the General Assembly upon leaving Harrisburg for 
Washington, D.C., in October to head the new Office of Homeland Security, Ridge 
fanned the flames of discontent.  In exhorting the General Assembly to help his 
successor, Lieutenant Governor Mark Schweiker, in turning around the Philadelphia 
School District, Ridge added, “Nearly a quarter million children are educated in it—or, 
truth be told, not educated.”  The CEO of the Philadelphia School District, Philip 
Goldsmith, called Ridge’s comment “a kick in the gut.”54  Schweiker proved no less 
brusque.  Dismissing concerns about criticism in the press of his stance on the 
Philadelphia school crisis, Schweiker said he wasn’t worried:  “After all, only 13 percent 
of the district’s high school juniors are able to read the newspapers with basic 
comprehension.  And that’s not counting those who drop out.”55 
With no vote, little confidence in forums and hearings, and no affection for 
Schweiker, Edison opponents took to demonstrating—at teach-ins, rallies, and marches.  
At a teach-in in late October organized by Youth United for Change the day after 
Schweiker’s swipe, 200 students, teachers, administrators, and parents voiced their anger 
with the process playing out and the prospect of Edison taking a managerial role in 
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Philadelphia.  Echoing many at the teach-in, Daniel Pena, a high school sophomore, 
called Edison “a cold-hearted monster” and Schweiker ignorant.56 
In the wake of Schweiker’s endorsement of Edison’s eighty-page report at the end 
of the month, the demonstrations would intensify.  Synthesizing the report as his 
blueprint for transforming the Philadelphia School District, Schweiker called for 
abolishing the Board of Education, made up of nine members appointed by the mayor; 
replacing it with a five-member School Reform Commission (SRC), with four members 
appointed by the governor and one by the mayor, as stipulated by Act 46; and turning 
over the district’s central office to a private firm, which would, in turn, replace some or 
all of the district’s top fifty-five administrators and report to the SRC.57 
Schweiker also proposed dividing the city’s 264 schools into three groups: some 
thirty or forty high-performing schools would simply be monitored, but not controlled; 
from sixty to eighty low-performing schools would be managed by local community 
organizations or outside operators, like Edison, with forty-five schools going to a “lead 
provider”; and the remaining 170 or so schools would be retrofitted with a choice of one 
of three curricula.  In addition, Schweiker recommended offering principals performance-
based bonuses worth up to 30 percent of their salaries; creating a new corps of 
approximately 1,500 master teachers—or 15 percent of the district’s total—and paying 
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them an additional $7,500; outsourcing custodial work; upgrading information systems; 
and selling the Board of Education’s downtown nine-floor art deco headquarters.58  
 With Schweiker’s announcement came Edison’s commitment to take control.  
Adam Tucker, the company’s vice president for communications, expressed confidence 
in the company’s understanding of the Philadelphia School District and affirmed its 
capacity to turn it around:  “We spent ninety days studying Philadelphia, and we know 
we can absolutely deliver on the governor’s proposal. We hope to be a partner, and we 
know we’re up to the challenge.”59  Whittle underscored the company’s qualifications:  
“There’s not another organization in America that can take something like this on.  
We’ve been training for this.”60 
 
In response to Governor Mark Schweiker’s proposal on October 30, 2001, and Edison’s 
ambitions, opponents massed and chanted the next day on the steps of the art deco 
landmark building Edison had recommended putting up for sale.  After attending the 
rally, Pedro Ramos, the president of the school board, said, “This is a bad Halloween 
story.  People are coming to town with Frankenstein trying to convince us that it’s Prince 
Charming.”  Mayor Street, who had agreed in August to welcome Edison to conduct its 
study in exchange for emergency funding from Governor Ridge, likewise professed 
shock:  “A plan like this would literally take control of our system and turn it over to a 
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corporate entity.”61  Especially troubling to some critics was the prospect of a firm like 
Edison running the central office at the same time it ran a cluster of schools.  To these 
critics, a conflict of interest was inherent.  “Nobody can contract with themselves and be 
expected to do a credible job,” said School Board member Michael Masch after 
Schweiker had outlined his plan two weeks earlier.62 
City councilman and future mayor Michael Nutter would contend that Street had 
only himself to blame:  “It seems to me you invited the fox into the henhouse.  Now the 
complaint is the fox is having dinner.”63  Street would, in turn, claim he had been duped 
by Harrisburg into thinking Philadelphia would be an active partner, not a voiceless 
domain.64  
One week later, on the first Wednesday of November, 350 students, teachers, 
parents, and politicians massed and chanted outside City Hall on the eve of the first of 
two day-long hearings bringing together state, city, and Edison officials as well as 
academic experts and community leaders.  One organizer of the rally, Helen Gym, of 
Asian Americans United, directed a question at the heart of the funding debate:  “If this 
[privatization] is so innovative, why aren’t they doing it in Lower Merion?”65 
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 During the first day of the City Hall hearings, on November 8, U.S. Congressman 
Chaka Fattah tangled with Whittle and left him with a warning:  “You need to think about 
whether you’re prepared to come into this city absent the support of the mayor or any 
major elected officials and run a school system.”  Ramos went a step further in 
addressing Whittle:  “If you’re part of a hostile takeover, you and your shareholders will 
regret it.”  Ramos’s grim forecast sparked a standing ovation.66 
While Edison indeed lacked much political support in Philadelphia, Fattah 
overstated the case.  Two prominent Democratic lawmakers had endorsed Edison:  State 
Senator Anthony Hardy Williams, who moderated the first Edison forum, at Mount 
Carmel Baptist Church in August, and who had cofounded a charter school and expressed 
interest in managing some of the schools designated as underperforming; and State 
Representative Dwight Evans, who had also started a charter school and expressed 
interest in managing schools in this same category.67 
In addition, Kenny Gamble, the legendary R&B artist and producer, had endorsed 
Edison, as had the president of the Philadelphia chapter of Nueva Esperanza, Reverend 
Luis Cortez.  Like Evans and Williams, Gamble had already started a charter school, 
through his nonprofit community organization, Universal Companies, and was intent on 
running more charter schools.  Gamble had, in fact, been in talks with Edison officials as 
early as April to join forces, and his organization had undertaken work from the company 
to study parent and community involvement in Philadelphia schooling (the product of 
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that endeavor would become a fifty-four-page appendix to Edison’s report to the 
governor).68 
Cortez had also founded a charter school and saw privatization as an opportunity 
for improving community engagement.  For all four men, funding was not the central 
problem for Philadelphia’s schools, but rather bureaucratic complexity and union work 
rules.  What John Chubb and Terry Moe had articulated a decade earlier in theory in 
Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, Cortez, Evans, Gamble, and Williams put in 
local everyday terms.69  “The failure [of the Philadelphia School District] is so blatant and 
so severe,” Cortez said at a gathering chaired by Gamble on the day of Schweiker’s 
announcement of his privatization plan, “that if you live in our community, you have no 
choice but to see this as an opportunity, a right—a civil right—to defend our children.”70 
Fattah was in essence right, though.  While Evans and Williams were major 
elected officials, their support of Edison along with backing from notable Philadelphians 
like Gamble and Cortez would not give Schweiker the authority to turn over the school 
system to Whittle.  In protest against Schweiker’s proposal, Mayor Street started working 
out of an office in the Board of Education building the day after Fattah and Ramos had 
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admonished Whittle in City Hall, refused to negotiate with Schweiker until privatization 
of the central administration was off the table, and dared state officials to carry him out.71 
Within two weeks, Schweiker conceded.  The governor was technically 
empowered by Act 46 to follow through in taking over the Philadelphia School District in 
the manner he wished, “with or without Street on board,” observed Philadelphia Inquirer 
columnist Larry Eichel, but doing so appeared politically untenable.  Street had already 
provoked significant pushback.  If Schweiker persisted in implementing Edison’s 
recommendation to outsource management of the school system, Street stood to sabotage 
the effort, however costly to the city.72 
 
Territorial jealousy clearly explained some of the resistance to the Edison report and 
Schweiker’s endorsement.  Forfeiture of local control naturally constitutes a blow to civic 
pride, no matter the wisdom of an outsider.  Edison, after all, made several constructive 
recommendations in its eighty-page report.  Edison made a compelling case to create a 
widespread corps of mentor teachers; to upgrade and coordinate the district’s archaic and 
disparate information systems; and to rationalize purchasing. The company moreover 
advised the district to substitute a “dizzying array” of more than seventy different 
reading, math, and science curricula throughout the district with a choice of three 
programs.  Such consolidation, the company contended, would make it easier for students 
to move from one classroom or school to another without falling behind; Edison reported 
several cases of classes at the same grade level within the same building using different 
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curricula.  Such consolidation, Edison maintained, would also assist teachers in getting 
support and guidance from district subject administrators.  Lastly, Edison, most 
importantly, made a strong argument to give principals more freedom in how they staffed 
their schools.73 
 Yet these recommendations, however meritorious and lucidly expressed, were 
obscured by Edison’s evident purpose of taking over the district, by the report’s tone, and 
by several telling lapses in research and argumentation.  In implicitly endorsing itself to 
take over the school district, Edison provoked immediate distrust.  Columnists for The 
Philadelphia Inquirer and The Philadelphia Daily News dismissed the company’s role as 
a consultancy issuing impartial advice as a charade.74  Moreover, the tone of the report 
was judged derisive.  With its headline for an article assessing the report, the typically 
urbane Philadelphia Inquirer made this point clear: “Edison Rips District over 
‘Accountability.’”75 
The language throughout the report was indeed damning.  Regarding 
accountability, in particular, Edison slammed the district on the first page of the 
executive summary:  “Over the past decade, the district’s management has overseen the 
                                                
73 Edison Schools Inc.,  Strengthening the Performance of the Philadelphia School District, 2, 4, 
14-17, 25, 28, 34, 45, 48-53, 58-60, 65. While central to the controversy in Philadelphia, this $2.7 
million report was difficult to locate a decade later. The company itself did not have a copy, Jeff 
Wahl, CEO of EdisonLearning, informed me by e-mail on May 16, 2013. The only copy I could 
find was in the Pennsylvania State Library in Harrisburg. 
74 Elmer Smith, “The Battle over the School Takeover,” Philadelphia Daily News, November 2, 
2001; Tom Ferrick Jr., “Report by Edison Is Pages of Politics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 
7, 2001; Acel Moore, “Edison Plan for Philadelphia Schools Will Extend History of Failure,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 8, 2001. 
75 Susan Snyder, “Edison Rips District Over Accountability,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 6, 
2001. 
Chapter 3: The Philadelphia Story 
 182 
expenditure of more than $10 billion with no clear accountability for the results.”76  
Edison went on to call these results “dismal.”77  
Edison conceded that these results were, in part, the consequence of economic 
disadvantage but proceeded to sidestep the role of life outside of school.  Instead of 
digging deeper, Edison pointed out that students in three districts of comparable size 
(Clark County, Nevada; Houston, Texas; and Broward County, Florida) did 18 percent 
better on the SAT in 1999-2000 while their districts in 1998-1999 spent 7 percent less per 
pupil.78  Edison concluded, “Based on such comparisons, we believe student achievement 
in the P[hiladelphia] S[chool] D[istrict] can be improved dramatically.”79 
In comparing school districts by size without reference to demographic data or 
costs of living, Edison denied readers important context for understanding the challenges 
facing the Philadelphia School District. Philadelphia’s students were and remain 
significantly poorer than their counterparts in the comparison districts; and in cost-
adjusted dollars, Philadelphia spent considerably less per pupil than the comparison 
districts.80 
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Despite assistance on the report from prestigious firms—including IBM, 
McKinsey, MetaMetrics, and Public Financial Management—Edison made an 
incomplete case.81  Edison neglected to acknowledge that the portion of students in 
Philadelphia qualifying for free or reduced-price lunch, a standard measure for economic 
disadvantage, was much higher than in the three other districts it had cited: 69 percent in 
2000 in contrast to a weighted average of 46 percent for the three other districts.  The 
portion of Philadelphia’s children aged five to seventeen living below the poverty line in 
2000 was likewise 24 percent in contrast to a weighted average of 18 percent for the same 
cohort in the three other districts.82  Furthermore, while Edison was right that the three 
other districts spent, on average, 7 percent less per pupil than Philadelphia in 1998-1999, 
Edison failed to acknowledge that the cost of living in these three other districts at that 
time was, on average, 16 percent lower than in Philadelphia.83  This means, by extension, 
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that the other three districts were spending, on average, not 7 percent less per pupil than 
Philadelphia but 11 percent more; conversely, Philadelphia was spending 10 percent 
less.84     
In an op-ed in The Philadelphia Inquirer entitled “Company’s Report Doesn’t 
Inspire Trust,” published several days after the release of the Edison study, Michael 
Casserly, executive director of the Council of the Great City Schools, faulted Edison for 
overlooking such demographic and economic distinctions. Casserly also contended that 
while Edison was right that district students performed poorly on state and national 
standardized exams, the company painted a bleaker picture than necessary.  Edison could 
and should have noted, Casserly wrote, that since the implementation six years earlier of 
the district’s reform program, Children Achieving, elementary school students had 
recorded significant progress:  from 1996 to 2000, the portion of fourth-graders reading at 
or above the basic levels, according to the nationally normed SAT-9 test, climbed 
consistently from 44 percent to 60; fourth-graders were also outpacing their peers on the 
state exam over this same period; and the district’s fourth- and eighth-graders posted 
average scores on the SAT-9 in comparison to their peers in eleven other major cities 
with similar levels of poverty and school spending, with students in six cities doing better 
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and five doing worse.  Casserly elaborated on his critique of the Edison report in a thirty-
five-page analysis in December.85  
For a company censuring a school district for poor accountability, such porous 
analysis made Edison an easy target for critics.  The oversights amounted, at best, to a 
rushed job and, at worst, to a deliberate effort to exaggerate the underperformance of the 
school district in order to win a major managerial contract.   On top of Casserly’s 
corrections, allegations of misrepresentation piled on:  the district’s chief financial 
officer, Rhonda Chatzkel, claimed the student-teacher ratio was not 16.9 to 1, as Edison 
had reported, but 17.6 to 1, in line with districts of similar size; the district’s chief 
operating officer, Thomas McGlinchy, argued that Edison had significantly 
underestimated the efficiency of school custodians by failing to note that many worked 
five-hour, not eight-hour, shifts; and the district’s interim CEO, Philip Goldsmith, 
countered in a scathing six-page rebuttal he read before the soon-to-be abolished Board 
of Education that Edison had brought no insights but had merely studied the district’s 
plans and then spun them as the company’s own prescriptions.86  
Whether the critics were right or wrong about these additional matters—no letters 
of correction from Edison officials ran in the newspapers printing these charges—became 
moot.  The reaction by Street, School Board and City Council members, local newspaper 
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columnists, and community activists forced Schweiker’s decision.  The editorial page of 
The Wall Street Journal repeatedly weighed in from afar for full privatization—calling 
Edison a trailblazer and Schweiker the state’s greatest revolutionary since 1776—but to 
no avail.87  
 
Schweiker surrendered at the end of a day in late November marked by a rally at the 
Capitol of 800 high school students bused in from Philadelphia by the Philadelphia 
Student Union and Youth United for Change to protest his privatization plan.  Eugene 
Tinsley, a junior in the crowd, remade in plain language the funding argument long ago 
articulated by state lawmakers Nicholas Micozzie, Wallace Nunn, James Rhoades, and 
Mario Rivera:  “We are sick and tired of going to classes with no books.  The state has set 
up an unfair way of funding our schools and then blamed us for the results.”88 
Following a two-hour impromptu meeting with Street that evening in 
Philadelphia, Schweiker announced that he had agreed to drop his insistence on 
privatizing the management of the district’s central office.  Schweiker’s compromise with 
Street called instead for employing Edison as a consultant to the district.89  While this 
concession satisfied Street enough to return to the negotiating table, it was a hollow 
victory to many on the left.  “I think we didn’t get a new deal,” said J. Whyatt Mondesire, 
president of the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP. “We got a raw deal.  There was no 
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victory here.  Nothing’s changed.  It’s really privatization through the back door instead 
of coming through the front door.”90 
More demonstrations followed.  Mondesire one week later, on Wednesday, 
November 28, led hundreds of protesters in a march from the State Office Building, 
temporary home to Edison’s team of twenty-five staffers, one mile south on Broad Street 
to City Hall, where they blocked traffic on Market Street and drowned out the choir 
singing for spectators at the annual lighting of the city’s Christmas tree.91  The next 
morning, hundreds of high school students organized by the Philadelphia Student Union 
and Youth United for Change walked out of class.  Many marched on the School Board 
headquarters, guarded by a phalanx of policemen to prevent their entry.  Meanwhile, 
school-employee unions and community allies brought suit in Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to overturn Act 46, declaring it unconstitutional and requesting an injunction to bar 
a state takeover until the issue was resolved.  In the afternoon, approximately 200 
students gathered at City Hall.  A delegation met with Street.  The protesters then 
marched to the School Board headquarters and linked hands to form a human chain 
encircling the whole building while chanting, “Hey, hey! Ho, ho! Edison has got to go” 
and “It’s not hard, it’s not funny, all the other kids have money.  Like the kids across the 
nation, we just want our education.”92  The following day, twenty-five ministers, all 
members of the Black Clergy of Philadelphia and Vicinity, joined the protest by blocking 
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traffic at the intersection of Broad and Vine Streets, two downtown arteries, as well as the 
entrance and exits to the Vine Street Expressway.93 
While Street and Schweiker continued to meet to hammer out an agreement, 
Edison responded to the series of protests with a $430,000 public relations campaign, 
featuring eight days of newspaper ads and TV commercials, commencing on December 
12, as well as a Web site and telephone hot line for more information about the 
company.94 Discontent nevertheless persisted.  On December 18, the Philadelphia Student 
Union and Youth United for Change carried out their biggest protest so far.  At 10:30 
a.m., more than 1,000 students walked out of class at high schools across the city and 
made their way to City Hall.  After a rally at City Hall, the crowd grew and marched up 
Broad Street to rally again outside the State Office Building.95   
 
Much as the lawsuits filed by teachers’ unions against state interventions involving 
Edison in Baltimore in 2000 and in Chester Upland in 2001 gained no traction, the same 
held for the suit filed by the coalition of opponents to privatization on November 29 
against Act 46.  Meeting the same fate was a preemptive suit filed by the same group—
on the same day as the massive student walkout—against Schweiker for violating 
conflict-of-interest regulations in hiring Edison as a consultant and then using its 
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recommendations to contract with the company itself.96  A fifty-nine-page critique of the 
Edison consulting deal on the same conflict-of-interest grounds by the state auditor 
general, Robert P. Casey Jr., several months later likewise garnered significant press 
coverage but generated no legal repercussions.97 
 Reflecting on the futility of these challenges, Len Rieser, executive director of the 
Education Law Center in Philadelphia and a lawyer who had contested the state takeover, 
observed in 2009 during an interview in his office in a century-old brick-and-limestone 
building four blocks from City Hall, “When you get rescued, you don’t get to choose 
what kind of life preserver you want.  The public got bumped out of the discussion.”98  
 In the end, while Street did not get everything he wanted, he negotiated a much 
better rescue than many had expected.  In addition to saving the central office from 
privatization, Street talked Schweiker into granting him two appointments, instead of one, 
to the five-member SRC and into accepting $45 million from the city in additional annual 
school funding, instead of the $75 million Schweiker had sought to match the $75 million 
in additional annual school funding the state would be allocating to the city.  The deal 
was announced by Schweiker and Street at the Convention Center the afternoon of 
Friday, December 21, making Philadelphia by far the largest school district in the nation 
ever taken over by a state government.99 The shift in “policy regime” rooted in the 1983 
                                                
96 Menash Dean, “Suit Claims Conflict,” Philadelphia Daily News, December 18, 2001; Barbara 
Laker, “Judge Denies Request for Injunction on Edison,” Philadelphia Daily News, December 28, 
2001. 
97 Casey, “Performance Audit.” 
98 Len Rieser, interview, Philadelphia, February 9, 2009. 
99 Susan Snyder and Marc Schogol, “City Agrees to State Takeover,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
December 22, 2001. 
Chapter 3: The Philadelphia Story 
 190 
report A Nation at Risk and focused on results and accountability had taken the state and 
local form of a massive public-private partnership.100 
 In keeping with their practice of protesting every step of the takeover process, 
students afterward blocked traffic outside the Convention Center.101 Schweiker the next 
day named James Nevels to lead the SRC.  Nevels was chairman and CEO of the 
Swarthmore Group, the nation’s eighth-largest minority-owned investment company, as 
well as a member of the Board of Control for the Chester Upland School District, which 
chose Edison the previous March to run six of its ten schools.102  While Nevels called 
Edison “a great company,” he did not use his blanket authority over his first thirty days to 
commit to Schweiker’s plan to sign a six-year $101 million consulting deal with the 
company.103  Nevels instead waited for the other four SRC members to be named and 
then with them on March 26, 2002, agreed on a smaller contract with Edison, naming the 
company lead consultant, among twelve consultants, for a period running no longer than 
two years and on undisclosed terms.104 
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This diminishment of expected authority, however, paled in comparison to the 
news three weeks later.  On April 17, the SRC announced its plans for the schools in 
greatest need of improvement.  Edison was awarded management of twenty schools, 
instead of the expected forty-five. Twenty-two additional schools were assigned to a mix 
of two universities, two smaller EMOs, and two local nonprofit community 
organizations: Temple University got five schools; the University of Pennsylvania, three; 
Florida-based Chancellor Beacon Academies Inc., five; New York-based Victory Schools 
Inc., three; Kenny Gamble’s Universal Companies, two; and Foundations Inc., four.   The 
panel decided on more modest intervention at twenty-eight additional schools under 
consideration: nine would become charter schools, which were free to seek corporate 
partners, and nineteen would be reorganized but would most likely remain under district 
auspices.105 
The announcement came at the end of a day fraught with tension.  Members of the 
Philadelphia Student Union had camped overnight outside the district headquarters and 
then locked arms in the morning to form a human barricade to prevent the SRC from 
holding its meeting inside.106  The SRC relocated a mile away to the African American 
Museum and deliberated for three hours at the front of a room filled with more than 100 
parents, students, and community activists intermittently protesting as members voiced 
opinions and cast their votes.107 
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While local opponents derided the SRC for doing the governor’s bidding, the 
editors of The Wall Street Journal accused the SRC of caving in to populist pressures by 
allotting Edison twenty schools instead of forty-five.  “The latest move is a compromise 
of the compromise,” the editors concluded:  first, Schweiker backed down on turning 
over the district’s central office to Edison; next, the SRC gave Edison under half the 
number of schools expected.108 
Investors, in turn, bailed.  Edison’s stock had recovered since Bloomberg News 
reported in February that the company had misrepresented revenue in much the same way 
EAI had a decade earlier in Baltimore.  The stock dropped 11 percent the day the 
Bloomberg story appeared, from $13.45 to $12 a share, but in the ensuing two months, it 
climbed as high as $14.25.  When the SRC announced Edison would be getting twenty 
schools, not forty-five, the stock dropped 8 percent, from $12.79 to $11.78.  Two weeks 
later, after Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns had both downgraded the stock, it was down 
another 56 percent, closing April at $5.23.  The consensus on Wall Street was that 
without the share of business in Philadelphia that Edison had projected, the company 
would not be able to achieve the economies of scale necessary to become profitable in the 
foreseeable future.  Investors also appeared nervous about the SEC’s pending ruling on 
Edison’s definition of revenue.  How much of the decline in share value derived from the 
Philadelphia news and how much from fears of a negative determination from the SEC is 
hard, if not impossible, to know. What is certain is that the SEC ruling, as previously 
explained, was devastating. When the SEC issued its report on May 15 validating the 
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Bloomberg story, Edison’s stock had already fallen to $3.34.  News of the SEC report 
drove down the stock another 33 percent in one day, to $2.25.109  
In the wake of the SEC report, which required that Edison revise past revenue 
reports and hire an internal audit manager, Edison not only suffered a black eye for the 
sloppy bookkeeping for which it had faulted public school districts but also provoked ten 
class action shareholder lawsuits.110  Edison correctly contended that it had accounted for 
all expenses in reporting revenue.  But the company had to concede—after having 
vigorously disputed the Bloomberg account—that its practice of booking money 
designated by districts for school employees as company revenue exaggerated the scale 
of its business; of equal importance, this practice substantially diminished the ratio of the 
company’s losses.111 
Revenue for managing its seven schools in Las Vegas, for example, should have 
been limited to the money paid by the district to Edison for running the schools and 
compensating the company administrators hired to do that job.  Instead, in perhaps its 
most egregious case of revenue misrepresentation, Edison reported $30 million in 
revenue for its 2001-2002 contract with Las Vegas while $21.3 million of that sum went 
directly to teachers, secretaries, custodians, bus drivers, and cafeteria workers, meaning 
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Edison had overstated its revenue for this contract by 244 percent.112  For its business as a 
whole that year, Edison reported $465.1 million in revenue when $178.7 million of that 





















1996 4 2,250 $     11,773 
 
NA $   (10,103) 86% & NA 
1997 11 (12) 7,150 38,559 NA (11,422) 30% & NA 
1998 22 (25) 12,600 65,630 $   37,251 (26,483) 40% & 71% 
1999 43 (51) 23.900 125,085 68,570 (49,433) 40% & 72% 
2000 61 (79) 37,500 208,971 125,061 (50,630) 24%  & 40% 
2001 88 (113) 57,000 350,508 221,336 (38,512) 11% & 17% 
2002 114 (136) 74,000 465,058 286,356 (86,040) 19% & 30% 
2003 133 (149) 80,000 425,628 281,959 (25,028) 6% & 9% 
Table 3.2 Edison’s schools, enrollment, reported and amended revenue, and net income, 1995-
2003; the difference in school counts is explained by Edison’s policy of tallying divisions within 
one building, such as K-5 and 6-8, as separate schools; revenue was revised downward 
considerably by order of the SEC in 2002 to exclude funds allocated by districts directly to 
employees. Data sources: Brian Gill et al., Inspiration, Perspiration, and Time: Operations and 
Achievement in Edison Schools (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 13; enrollment, the company’s 
school count, and financial figures come from Edison Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange 
Commission File #000-27817 (Form 10-K),” September 28, 2000, September 30, 2002, and 
September 29, 2003. 
 
Achieving economies of scale had been Edison’s central fiscal challenge.  Edison 
appeared in 2001 to be on its way to achieving economies of scale.  Yet the SEC report 
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made clear the appearance was an illusion. According to its annual reports to the SEC, 
the company’s losses over revenue had declined to 11 percent by 2001.  But for an 
impairment charge of $36.9 million in company stock the following year for its 
acquisition of LearnNow, the company’s losses over revenue would have allegedly been 
11 percent again, not 19 percent. By 2003, the loss appeared to be down to 6 percent (see 
Table 3.2). 
However, because much of what Edison tallied as revenue went directly from 
school districts to employees, its alleged rate of growth was greatly exaggerated.  While it 
was still accurate for Edison to calculate its administrative costs as a portion of total 
operating costs to determine its efficiency as a school operator, it was misleading for the 
company to depict as revenue money it never touched. In the case of fiscal year 2002, for 
example, company revenue would be lowered from $465.1 million to $286.4 million. 
This meant company losses of $86 million amounted to 30 percent of revenue, not 19 
percent.  
Administrative costs over total operating costs did nevertheless exhibit a steady 
decline. For economies of scale to set in, this is precisely where progress was required. 
Whittle was keenly aware of this. In a PowerPoint presentation at an investor conference 
in July 2000 at the St. Regis Hotel in New York before Edison’s second public offering, 
Whittle displayed a graph showing an inverse relationship between revenue growth and 
administrative costs. Whittle predicted that within three years, administrative costs would 
drop from 15 percent of total expenditures (the figure for the nine months ending March 
31, 2000) to 7 percent.  With public school districts spending on average 27 percent of 
their budgets on administration, Whittle said, Edison would record earnings of 20 
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percent,  send 13 points of the difference back into the classroom and retain 7 points as 
profit.114 
Yet Edison’s spending on administration (“Administration, curriculum, and 
development” in its filings with the SEC) never reached single digits, instead rising to 21 
percent for the fiscal year ending 2000, dropping to 15 percent for 2001 and then to 14 
percent for 2002, and returning to 15 percent for 2003, 8 points above what Whittle had 













Site costs paid 
by district 
Administrative 
costs over total 
operating costs 
1996 $     7,717 $     21,876 NA NA 35% 
1997 12,755 49,981 NA NA 26% 
1998 18,258 86,499 $58,120 $28,379 20% 
1999 49,984 174,755 118,240 56,515 29% 
2000 54,232 260,506 176,597 83,909 21% 
2001 57,851 392,436 263,264 129,172 15% 
2002 71,230 509,703 367,879 178,702 14% 
2003 67,809 439,379 295,710 143,669 15% 
Table 3.3 Edison’s administrative costs in relation to total costs, 1996-2003.  Data source: Edison 
Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File # 000-27817 (Form 10-K),” September 
28, 2000, September 30, 2002, and September 29, 2003.   
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 Adding to Edison’s pain in the spring of 2002 was news of contract terminations. 
On May 16, Edison’s largest school and one of its original four, the Boston Renaissance 
Charter School, announced it would terminate its relationship with the company at the 
end of June, citing inadequate improvement in test scores as well as curricular 
inflexibility; Boston Renaissance had 1,300 students in kindergarten through eighth grade 
and paid Edison $9 million a year.  A month later, on June 18, another of Edison’s 
original four clients voted to terminate its contract at the end of the school year, as well.  
The school board of Mount Clemens, Michigan, which had outsourced the management 
of one of its schools to Edison in 1995 and subsequently added three more schools, 
concluded that the company’s fee was too high.  Edison officials countered that the 
company was owed money by the district and could no longer run the four schools at the 
current rate. Chris Cerf, Edison’s president and chief operating officer, who would a 
decade later become New Jersey’s commissioner of education, claimed that given the 
cost of the contract to the company, this parting  of ways should be viewed as “positive to 
the company’s finances.”  The market disagreed, sending Edison’s stock down 34 percent 
in three days, from $1.52 to $1.00.116  
Making matters worse still was the SRC’s selection of Paul Vallas in July as the 
new CEO of the Philadelphia School District.  Within weeks of assuming office, the 
former CEO of the Chicago Public Schools, who had just lost to Rod Blagojevich in the 
Democratic primary race to become governor of Illinois, nullified the SRC’s contract 
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with Edison as the district’s lead consultant.  “There’s no need for a lead consultant,” 
Vallas said on August 1.  “That’s what I’m here for.”117 
With the stock tailspinning, Edison’s very presence in Philadelphia as a school 
manager was in jeopardy.  As the company averaged $2,500 in start-up costs for each 
student at its new schools, the bill in Philadelphia for upgrading twenty schools serving 
14,500 students would amount to $36,250,000.  Given its negative cash flow, lack of 
assets, and plummeting market value, the company would have a hard time raising that 
sum through loans.118   Raising funds as Edison had three times before with public 
offerings was out of the question with the share price so low. 
To the rescue came Merrill Lynch, Edison’s lead underwriter in 1999, and Leeds 
Weld & Co. The same day Vallas rejected the need for Edison’s input as a consultant, 
Edison announced that Merrill Lynch would expand a $35 million revolving-credit 
agreement with the company by $20 million and that Leeds Weld would lend the 
company another $20 million.  Merrill Lynch and Leeds Weld would in turn receive 
rights to buy up to 10.7 million new shares of Edison at $1 a share; if the two New York-
based firms exercised these options, they would own a 17 percent stake.119   
While the new funding kept Edison’s plans alive in Philadelphia, more bad news 
soon after streamed in from Georgia and Texas.  On August 15, the Bibb County Board 
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of Education in Georgia voted unanimously to terminate its five-year contract with 
Edison, commenced in 1999, to run two of the district’s schools two years early; the 
board cited stagnant test scores, declines in enrollment, and high teacher turnover.120  
Much worse for Edison, a week later, at the recommendation of their superintendent, the 
trustees of the Dallas Independent School District also voted unanimously to terminate its 
five-year contract with Edison, commenced in 2000, two years early, but this contract 
was for running seven schools; Superintendent Mike Moses cited low test scores and 
budget constraints.121  The following week, Edison shares were trading below 50 cents.  
The same bold accounting practices and grand expectations that doomed Whittle 
Communications in 1994 appeared to be undoing Edison eight years later.  On August 27, 
Edison was put on notice by NASDAQ that it would be delisted if the company’s stock 
did not close above $1.00 for ten trading days in a row before November 25.122 
 
In the course of twelve months, Edison’s administrative profile in Philadelphia had 
dropped from potentially running the district’s central office to potentially serving as the 
sole consultant to the district with a six-year $101 million contract to serving as the lead 
consultant among twelve consultants with a two-year $36 million contract to having no 
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consulting role at all.123  Moreover, though Edison was awarded far more schools to run 
in Philadelphia than the company had ever won in any city, the total numbered less than 
half what many had figured. 
 “The Philadelphia School District was once touted as the big-ticket contract that 
would rescue Edison Schools Inc. from its never-turned-a-profit troubles,” wrote reporter 
Chris Brennan in The Philadelphia Daily News the day after Vallas had said he would not 
keep Edison as a consultant. “Now it could be Edison CEO Chris Whittle’s Waterloo.”124 
 Edison’s first months in Philadelphia validated Brennan’s assessment. Bad press 
came early and kept appearing for one matter after another:  the company’s botched 
management of inventory; its dismissal of non-teaching personnel; Vallas’s indignant 
reversal of some of these dismissals; disorder and violence at several schools under 
company management; the midyear resignation of a veteran principal; failure to submit 
financial reports on time; delay of payment by the district for this tardiness; and lavish 
administrative spending.  In addition, bad news from neighboring Chester Upland about 
Edison’s management of nine schools in the district since September 2001 deepened 
doubts about the company’s capacities. 
Expecting a premium of $1,500 per student in Philadelphia, Edison ordered new 
musical instruments, physical education equipment, textbooks, workbooks, science 
materials, and art supplies for all twenty of the schools it was taking over.  While 
Pennsylvania secretary of education Charles Zogby had endorsed this premium, the SRC 
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needed to approve it.125  Vallas and countless Edison critics, including Mayor Street, 
Congressman Fattah, and columnist Elmer Smith of The Philadelphia Daily News, made 
such approval difficult. Street, Fattah, and Smith challenged the premium, issuing 
variations on a bitter argument: if Edison found the school district inefficient, it should 
not get a per-pupil premium at all.126  “This is the same Edison Schools, Inc., that 
authored a report claiming reform is not about money,” wrote Smith. “They pocketed 
$2.7 million for that wisdom.”127  Zogby countered that Edison and other EMOs were 
taking over historically underfunded schools in need of compensatory resources.  Vallas 
and Philadelphia secretary of education Debra Kahn accused Zogby of misunderstanding 
basic school finance: because the takeover schools had been predominantly staffed by 
junior faculty, payrolls had been lower but not allocations for materials and services.128 
The SRC heard both sides and agreed unanimously at the end of July to give 
Edison an extra $881, not $1,500, per pupil.129  Edison’s response to this unexpected cut 
in funding was twofold.  In the final week of August, the company sent in trucks to load 
up the new instruments, books, equipment, and materials and return them to their 
vendors.  Edison’s critics in Philadelphia professed disbelief.  The company’s supporters 
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in Harrisburg refused to comment.  Chris Brennan of The Philadelphia Daily News took 
the move to be an embarrassing sign of the company’s financial frailty, ultimately having 
nothing to do with the cut in funding and everything to do with the plunge in the 
company’s market value and the recent loss of fourteen contracts in Georgia, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Texas.130 
Edison’s second cost-cutting measure caused far more controversy and trouble.  
The same week Edison hauled away its new inventory, the company announced the 
layoff of nearly 200 school secretaries, supportive services assistants (SSAs), who help 
teachers in running classes with struggling or unruly students, and non-teaching assistants 
(NTAs), who monitor hallways as well as libraries and cafeterias to keep order.  Edison 
declared it would use just one secretary per school, instead of three or four, and would 
use disciplinary strategies it had effectively implemented in schools across the country to 
make up for the dismissed SSAs and NTAs.131 
Edison spokesman Adam Tucker explained, “We know, because we've done this 
in schools across the country, that our staffing model, curriculum and professional 
development, when combined with successful existing school strategies, do not require 
NTAs.” One ten-year veteran NTA who was laid off shot back that Tucker knew nothing 
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about the role played by NTAs or the nature of Philadelphia schools.  Jerry Jordan, the 
vice president of the Philadelphia Teachers Union, expressed concern about children’s 
safety and vowed to fight the layoffs:  “Children need supervision.  We’re attempting to 
talk to the administration, to anybody who will listen, saying this is not a good model; it’s 
going to be harmful for kids.”132  Tucker defied such objections:  “Edison was not hired 
in Philadelphia to perpetuate the status quo. Reform means change. The staffing model 
we are putting in place, we believe, will increase student achievement and help the 
district financially.”133  The consensus among Edison executives, according to one 
company official, was that the NTAs and SSAs were merely beneficiaries of an “urban 
patronage mill,” doing little for an easy check: this arrangement had to go for the school 
system to operate more efficiently.134 
Yet Vallas disagreed and did not let Tucker have the final word.  Vallas 
summarily ordered Edison to hire back one full-time NTA and two part-time SSAs for 
each school.135  “I want to make sure they have enough backup,” Vallas said.136 
Philadelphia, after all, was not Baltimore.  As a miniature district unto itself in 
Baltimore from 2001 to 2007, Edison received its additional funding directly from the 
state and had significant autonomy in operating its schools. But in Philadelphia, Edison 
received its additional funding from a commission jointly appointed by state and city 
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officials and had limited freedom in deciding resource allocation.  While the CEO of 
Baltimore’s schools from 2001 to 2007 had to treat Edison like a school district within a 
school district, the CEO of Philadelphia’s schools ruled Edison like an experimental 
project with its own curriculum and supplementary funding from an external source.  If 
Vallas deemed a personnel decision imprudent, he could intervene and did. 
Within one month of the start of the school year, however, it was clear Vallas had 
not intervened enough.  Edison did not have enough backup.  In the course of two weeks 
at Shaw Middle School in West Philadelphia, a thirteen-year-old girl suspended for 
fighting returned to school and started another fight; four thirteen- and fourteen-year-old 
boys were charged by the police with disorderly conduct for fighting right after dismissal; 
and two girls were arrested for setting fire in a girls’ bathroom.  Edison spokesman 
Tucker tried to downplay the significance of these events by noting that Shaw had a long 
history of disciplinary problems.  But that explanation did not square with Edison’s 
decision to cut the positions of four NTAs and two secretaries at Shaw.  Vallas responded 
by dispatching a veteran administrator to coach Shaw’s principal and demanding Edison 
rehire the dismissed NTAs.137 
At the same time fights were breaking out at Shaw, a vicious battle between two 
fourth-graders ruptured class across the Schuylkill River at Edison’s Waring Elementary 
School.  Desks were overturned.  Classmates were cheering and jeering.  The teacher, 
twenty-two, 5’2”, and several months out of college, called the office for help, but no one 
picked up. The fight’s instigator, who had already been in two classroom skirmishes that 
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same week, then grabbed a pair of scissors off the teacher’s desk and threatened to stab 
the other student in the face. Two teachers from neighboring classrooms heard the 
commotion and ran in to restore order.  Making matters worse, Waring’s principal took 
six days to report the incident to district personnel and failed to mention in her report the 
scissors or the threat.   Vallas launched an investigation.  Shaken up, the teacher did not 
return to Waring and resigned a week later.138 
Hallway disruptions and fires meanwhile plagued Edison’s Gillespie Middle 
School in North Philadelphia.  Vallas responded at the beginning of October by 
temporarily adding fifteen NTAs and five school police officers.139  Four miles away, at 
Edison’s Penn Treaty Middle School, just blocks from the Delaware River, teachers 
complained that the dismissal of five NTAs rendered hallway conduct chaotic.  “What 
was Chris Whittle thinking?” asked one veteran teacher, reflecting on the company 
leader’s assertion that Edison’s core values of respect, compassion, and integrity along 
with better instruction would obviate the need for customary supervision.  “They don’t 
expect us to do discipline because they don’t expect discipline to be an issue.  I think they 
have their head in the sand.”140 
Even an Edison principal who firmly believed in the company’s model concluded 
it could not work without the funding initially expected.  Janice Solkov, a veteran school 
administrator with a doctorate and thirty years of experience as an educator, found herself 
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so overwhelmed as the principal of Edison’s Morton McMichael Elementary in West 
Philadelphia that she informed the company in mid-November that she would step down 
at the end of December. Solkov explained her sense of defeat in a long article in The New 
York Times and again in an op-ed in The Washington Post.141 
Without the business manager Edison had promised and the second school 
secretary that the company had laid off, Solkov said she could not keep up with 
paperwork.  Compounding this managerial challenge was the requirement that she report 
to both district and company supervisors, meaning twice the number of meetings and 
twice the number of forms to fill out.  For this redundancy, Solkov faulted the district for 
failing to give Edison sufficient autonomy and thus made clear how hard it can be for an 
EMO to operate within a school district. Moreover, the shortfall in funding kept Solkov 
from opening the school library and negated the company’s signature policy of providing 
home computers for all students in third grade and above as well as laptops for all 
teachers, making implementation of Edison’s curriculum all the more difficult.142 
Graver still, Solkov’s teachers were overwhelmed.  Within the first two weeks of 
the school year, a first-year sixth-grade teacher quit, and a veteran fifth-grade teacher, 
who suffered from multiple sclerosis and used a cane, was struck by a student and taken 
to the hospital in an ambulance.  With a teacher shortage in the district, Solkov had to 
make do with serial substitutes.  “I felt like I was drowning, and I did not see a way to 
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stay afloat,” Solkov confessed to the Times reporter. “Maybe in some other real world, it 
[the Edison model] can work. I’m not sure it can work in the Philadelphia real world.”  
Richard Barth, the company’s senior vice president for Philadelphia, acknowledged to the 
same reporter the burden of running an Edison school:  “This is a bear of a job.  It is not 
for everyone.”143  Three years later, Barth left Edison to become CEO of the Knowledge 
Is Power Program (KIPP), the nonprofit charter network.144 
 
While Edison did not hire back more NTAs and SSAs than Vallas ordered, the company 
eventually admitted the need for more adults in its schools. With Vallas, Edison devised a 
work-around. Through the school district, Edison was permitted to hire employees of 
eight community-based organizations—such as We Overcome, West Philadelphia 
Coalition of Neighborhoods and Businesses, and Security Universal—as  hall monitors 
for half the cost of unionized NTAs.145 
Keeping down costs was not Edison’s only bookkeeping problem.  The company 
was seven weeks late in submitting three required documents: an audited financial 
statement for the past fiscal year; a guarantee entitling the city to the company’s assets, 
such as computers and textbooks, should the company declare bankruptcy; and proof 
from the company’s creditors of money borrowed.146  Known for running a tight ship, 
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Vallas, who had worked for fifteen years as a budget analyst for the Illinois legislature 
before becoming CEO of Chicago’s public schools, withheld $5.3 million in scheduled 
payments to Edison until October 28, a week after all the necessary paperwork was 
filed.147 
Edison in addition suffered more bad press for holding a three-day conference 
earlier in the month for 175 principals at the posh Broadmoor Resort in Colorado Springs 
at the same time the company was behind in its financial paperwork and borrowing 
money to stay afloat.  Ten principals from Philadelphia and nine from Chester Upland 
attended the $300,000 retreat.  At a news conference about a new after-school initiative, 
Vallas lambasted Edison for lavish spending. “If a company’s in trouble,” Vallas said, 
“the company shouldn’t be having expensive sabbaticals or orientations in far-off 
places.”  Sidestepping the approximate per-day cost of $550 per principal, travel not 
included, Edison spokesman Tucker attempted to deflect Vallas’s response: “Any school 
system that does not invest time, money, and resources in the development of its 
principals will never reach its full potential.”148 
Yet the cost of the conference was not the only impolitic development to make it 
into both The Philadelphia Inquirer and The Philadelphia Daily News.  Equally startling 
was Whittle’s recommendation in a keynote address at the conference that students 
should be put to work as office assistants or technology aids in schools to nurture 
responsibility and to cut costs.  “We could have less adult staff,” Whittle said, laying the 
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foundation for the previously cited argument he would flesh out three years later in his 
book on school reform, Crash Course: Imagining a Better Future for Public 
Education.149  “I think it’s an important concept for education and for economics that 
Edison needs to raise to another level.”150 
Had there been any doubts about Edison’s intentions in laying off NTAs and 
SSAs in August, Whittle made plain that he believed personnel costs exceeded their 
value.  Whittle said that if each student in a school of 600 worked five hours per week, 
seventy-five adults could be replaced.  Whittle forecasted that such a system could be in 
place by 2004.  Vallas fired back:  “It is not going to happen on our watch….  Healthy 
work never hurt anybody, but kids [while in school] need to be in classrooms.”151  
 If the turmoil at the beginning of the school year at Shaw, Waring, Gillespie, Penn 
Treaty, and Morton McMichael did not furnish evidence enough against Whittle’s 
proposal for fewer adults in school buildings, bad news from neighboring Chester Upland 
conveyed how difficult it would be to put Whittle’s theory into practice.  As in 
Philadelphia, so in Chester Upland, Edison was faulted for poor school management: 
behavior problems increased; suspension and truancy rates climbed;  and violent 
incidents at Chester High School, in particular, mounted.152  Brent Staples reported in a 
column in The New York Times in March 2002 that Edison was on course to issue 3,000 
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suspensions for the school year in Chester Upland, amounting to one suspension for 
every two students in its nine schools.   Tom Persing, chairman of Chester Upland’s 
state-appointed Control Board and a retired U.S. Marine, faulted Edison: “That is not 
working with the problem.  That is burying the problem.”153 
Chester school authorities moreover faulted Edison in October 2002 for failing to 
set up computer labs and provide teachers with laptops, as promised, and threatened 
termination of its contract with the company.154  Worse yet, a week later, Edison got bad 
news from Harrisburg for its schools in Chester: the results on state exams in reading and 
math given to students in fifth, eighth, and eleventh grades the previous spring declined 
for nearly every cohort at the nine schools under Edison during the company’s first year 
in Chester Upland.  One middle school posted gains in eighth-grade reading yet far more 
significant drops in fifth- and eighth-grade math; and Chester High School posted gains 
in eleventh-grade math.  The tenth school in the district, and the only one not managed by 
Edison, meanwhile posted gains in both reading and math.  Edison spokesman Tucker 
downplayed the drop in scores, claiming the first year typically involved a transition 
period for schools under Edison. Persing was unpersuaded.  “I’m disappointed and 
disillusioned,” said Persing in an interview with The Philadelphia Inquirer in October 
2002. “I know this is a difficult situation, but still, I would have expected incremental 
increases.”155 
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With authorities in Chester Upland threatening to terminate their contract with Edison, 
with test scores there sinking rather than rising, and with Philadelphia withholding 
payment until paperwork had been properly submitted, Edison’s stock hit an all-time low, 
falling to 14 cents a share on October 10.  Edison fought back with three identical full-
page ads over the next three weeks in The New York Times celebrating its first decade. 
Edison claimed in the ads that the company had boosted student performance “and at 
historic rates”; had won significant parental support; had grown at a rapid pace to become 
the nation’s thirty-sixth largest school district, with more than 80,000 students; was 
finally on its way to earning a profit; and had done all of this despite being “the most 
scrutinized school system in America, bar none.”156 
The company’s stock edged up. Yet had NASDAQ adhered to its threat in August 
that the company would be delisted if it failed to close above $1.00 for ten consecutive 
trading days before November 25, the company’s ticker would have disappeared from 
computer screens. Leniency prevailed. With a heated run-up in purchasing before the 
precipice date, November 11, the stock climbed to 68 cents.157  Two days later, for the 
first time in four months, the stock closed above $1.00 and stayed north, but for several 
                                                                                                                                            
of eighth-graders in reading at Showalter Middle School, which climbed by 15.7 percent from 
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days the following spring.158  Whether propelled by Edison’s full-page ads in The New 
York Times or engineered by Edison to keep its listing, the buying spree spared Edison 
yet another embarrassing defeat. 
Neither the ad campaign nor the company’s retention of its NASDAQ listing 
meant much if anything, however, to newspaper editors or school officials in 
Philadelphia. To the editorial board of The Philadelphia Daily News, Edison’s time in 
Philadelphia was up by March 2003.159  Vallas stood by Edison but called for a 49 
percent cut in its per-pupil premium, from $881 to $450.160 Edison advocates in 
Harrisburg pushed back and won the company a $750 per-pupil premium for the next two 
years.161 
Another EMO did not have such support in Harrisburg.  Vallas terminated the 
district’s contract with Chancellor Beacon Academies, which was running five 
Philadelphia schools, and provoked no opposition.  Vallas contended that Chancellor 
Beacon, which would merge a year later with charter operator Imagine Schools Inc., had 
no positive impact and brusquely predicted an easy changeover.  “Since there wasn’t 
much management going on in the first place [by Chancellor Beacon],” Vallas said at a 
news conference, “I think the transition is going to be pretty simple.”  Chancellor Beacon 
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CEO Octavio Visiedo, previously superintendent of schools for Miami-Dade County, 
expressed dismay at Vallas’s decision and tone, asserting that his company had not only 
fulfilled all terms of its contract but “far exceeded them.”162  Without strong allies in 
Harrisburg, Chancellor Beacon’s fate implicitly conveyed the inherent vulnerability of 
the EMO model. 
Despite this victory for Edison, company executives had no grounds for regaining 
confidence from analysts and investors.  The challenges ahead for Edison in school 
districts across the country were clearly steep. In particular, the midyear resignation of 
Janice Solkov, the veteran administrator and Edison believer, made that obvious. The 
press coverage in Philadelphia as well as New York had been brutal. And Vallas’s 
treatment of Chancellor Beacon sent a blunt message. 
In May 2003, Whittle proposed that he and his management team take the 
company private.163  In July, Edison’s board consented to a $95 million buyout 
orchestrated by Whittle with Liberty Partners, a New York-based private equity firm 
managing a portion of the pension fund for Florida’s policemen, teachers, and state and 
county employees.164  Edison investors received $1.76 a share, under 10 percent of the 
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IPO price of $18 in November 1999.  Whittle gained ownership of 3.7 percent of the 
company (and a commitment to a minimum salary of $600,000) while Liberty Partners 
assumed possession of the rest.165  The privately held EMO that went public in order to 
privatize the management of more public schools had gone private after a beating in the 
public market. 
 Chris Brennan of The Philadelphia Daily News was right.  And Pedro Ramos, the 
president of the Philadelphia School Board who had a year-and-a-half earlier warned 
Whittle that he and his shareholders would regret participating in a hostile takeover of the 
school system, was also right.  Philadelphia could and would be Whittle’s Waterloo; and 
New York could accordingly be seen in retrospect as his Leipzig, a crushing loss 
portending worse. Whittle had overestimated his company’s capacities and spread it too 
thin.  The defeat would unfold in stages but it would be decisive. And Edison would 
never again relive its early glory. 
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If you can be the “Intel inside,” so to speak, there's a significant opportunity for a for-
profit educational management organization to succeed.  McKinsey may help General 
Mills do a restructuring effort, but McKinsey doesn't issue the press release.  General 
Mills issues the press release. 
- Richard Barth, President, District Partnerships, Edison Schools, 1999-2006; CEO, 
Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP), July 19, 2006 
 
As a private company again, though this time under the reins of an investment firm 
focused on returns—not executives aiming to revolutionize American education—Edison 
transmuted fully into a multi-service provider, scaling back its management of schools 
and promoting the array of ancillary services it had begun offering in 1999.  In 2003, 
Edison Extra, which provided after-school and summer programs, was renamed Newton 
Learning; Edison Affiliates, which provided school districts professional development, 
curriculum guidance, and computer software for assessing student progress, was renamed 
Tungsten Learning; and Edison U.K. was rolled out as a consultancy working with 
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British school districts.1  The following year, the company sheared off the consultancy 
component of Tungsten Learning and called it Edison Alliance.2 
Edison Alliance, which could be termed “Edison Light,” quickly became the 
company’s most profitable division. This division responded specifically to the 
challenges of No Child Left Behind (NCLB).  Edison Alliance staff assisted school 
principals and teachers in aligning their curricula with state standards and in constructing 
monthly assessments to prepare students for the annual statewide exams in reading and 
math mandated by NCLB.  Edison Alliance started with thirteen schools in South 
Carolina in the summer of 2004.  The state paid $400,000 as an initial fee plus $327,000 
per school per year (with the annual charge to rise 3 percent each year).  In the spring of 
2005, Hawaii signed a two-year contract with Edison Alliance for seven schools valued at 
$3.9 million per year.  The contract in South Carolina was expected to run at least five 
years but was terminated after three.3  Edison’s contract in Hawaii, however, ballooned.  
By 2010, the company had thirty-eight Edison Alliance client schools in Hawaii.  With 
twenty-four full-time employees, the company coached administrators and teachers in 
elementary, middle, and high schools.4  The annual contract for elementary schools in 
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Hawaii in 2010 cost $300,000; for middle schools, $350,000; and for high schools, 
$450,000.5  With a small staff, no brick-and-mortar costs, no liability for untoward 
events, and a low profile, Edison Alliance proved to be the scalable antithesis to the 
company’s original model of school management.  
“Edison Alliance is a much smaller revenue business, with healthy margins and 
without strife,” said Richard Barth, an Edison executive for seven years before leaving 
the company in January 2006 to become CEO of the Knowledge Is Power Program 
(KIPP), the nonprofit charter network that would, in turn, prove to be the managerial 
alternative to Edison.6  Reflecting on the success of Edison Alliance, Barth said: "If you 
can be the ‘Intel inside,’ so to speak, there's a significant opportunity for a for-profit 
educational company to succeed.  McKinsey may help General Mills do a restructuring 
effort, but McKinsey doesn't issue the press release.  General Mills issues the press 
release.  The problem with whole-school management is that the EMO assumes too big a 
role."7  
For similar reasons, Newton Learning also evolved into a strong division.  But its 
success would be short-lived.  Newton Learning started in 2001 with 20,000 students in 
its after-school and summer programs. In 2005, Newton Learning served 115,000 
students: 50,000 in after-school programs; and 65,000 in summer programs.8   NCLB 
fueled this business, too. NCLB mandated that local education authorities use a portion of 
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their Title I money, allocated by the federal government to assist disadvantaged students, 
to contract with external organizations to provide “supplementary educational services” 
(SES) for students in schools failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for three 
consecutive years.9  Yet school districts soon devised ways to dodge the stipulation that 
they use their Title I funds to hire outsiders to do all of this supplementary work and 
instead provided much of it on their own.  The logic behind this stipulation was clear, 
though the expectations struck many as unreasonable:  if schools failed to make AYP, 
their administrators and teachers should not be hired to assist underperforming students; 
rather, such work should be outsourced to private entities who might do a better job and 
who could be easily terminated if they did not.10 
At the helm of this revolt in 2005 against the U.S. Department of Education was 
the CEO of the Chicago Public Schools, Arne Duncan, who would four years later 
become the U.S. secretary of education.  Of Chicago’s 82,000 students receiving SES, 
40,000 partook in the city’s own program when all of them, according to NCLB, were 
supposed to be enrolled in programs run by outside providers.  In a sideshow illustrating 
both how the private sector ran into stiff opposition and how political disempowerment 
leads to a loose, rather than strict, interpretation of the law, Duncan defied the federal 
government. “The authors of the law had the best of intentions for kids,” Duncan said in a 
2005 interview with Education Week. “But you can’t blindly follow rules that hurt kids, 
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that are absent of logic.”11  Duncan won this battle by diverting funds slated for summer 
school.  Other districts developed different work-arounds to keep SES in house:  
Philadelphia created an “intermediate unit” within the system to provide SES; smaller 
districts located tutoring services at schools that had made AYP.12  The same local 
resistance to Edison as an EMO got in the way of Edison and other companies as 
providers of SES. 
Beyond these work-arounds, local districts barred outside providers from working 
within school buildings; made enrollment for tutoring from these providers arduous by 
requiring that parents fill out multiple forms; and placed low caps on per-pupil funding 
for services from outside providers (for example, Chicago imposed a limit of $1,500 per 
student in reimbursement to external providers, though the state had allotted $2,200 for 
this purpose).  By 2006, of the 2.5 million students eligible for tutoring, only 585,000, or 
23 percent, received it.  Of those students, about 60 percent received their tutoring from 
school districts, not outside providers, as intended by NCLB.  In financial terms, the 
consequence was blunt: of $2.5 billion in federal funds earmarked in 2005-2006 for SES 
mandated by NCLB, $400 million went to private-sector organizations, whether for-profit 
or nonprofit.13  Edison and many other companies set on a significant share of the SES 
market got muscled out.14   
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Growth for Tungsten Learning was likewise ephemeral. This division, too, grew 
quickly but hit a different wall. At the outset, the market for Tungsten’s benchmark 
assessment software in 2001 was limited to Edison’s eighty-eight schools, enrolling 
57,000 students.  By 2005, the company’s software was being used in 377 schools in the 
United States, enrolling 135,000 students, and forty schools in the United Kingdom, 
enrolling 22,000 students. Yet under pressure from Liberty Partners, Edison had stopped 
marketing Tungsten Learning.  “We’re honoring our contracts,” said Jim Howland, CEO 
of Edison’s Educational Services Group, in 2005, “but we’re not moving forward, though 
we might down the road.  It was a matter of cost.  We were fast becoming the number 
one company in formative assessment, but we couldn’t compete with publishing houses 
that cross-sell software with their textbooks and thereby keep their costs down.  We need 
to be focused.  And for a $400 million company, Liberty Partners thought we had too 
many divisions.”15 
 
With Tungsten Learning squeezed out by major textbook publishers, Newton Learning 
constrained by politics, and the company’s core business of managing schools limited by 
low margins as well as politics, Liberty Partners took decisive steps to restructure the 
company.  They started at the top.  Whittle and Schmidt were pushed out of their 
administrative roles in December 2006, though they retained their seats on the company’s 
board of directors.16  Terry Stecz, who had joined Edison as its chief operating officer in 
2004 following two decades as an executive in the pharmaceutical sector, became the 
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company’s CEO. Under Stecz, Edison Schools in June 2008 became EdisonLearning and 
marked its transformation with the acquisition of an online education software developer, 
Provost Systems, based in Santa Clara, California.17 
 With the landscape for school management and supplementary after-school and 
summer services so forbidding, online education represented a promising alternative.  
Much like Edison Alliance, an online division is neither labor intensive nor threatening to 
local school boards intent on retaining day-to-day managerial authority over their 
schools; furthermore, the product itself is far easier to assess than day-to-day instruction, 
as online courses, in the end, constitute discrete goods little different from textbooks.  
And the demand for online educational services was booming. 
 One market was homeschooled children who do some, if not all, of their work 
online.  According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the number of 
American children homeschooled in 2007, the latest year for which data are available, 
was 1.5 million, out of a school-age population of 51 million. The number in 1999 was 
850,000; and in 2003, 1.1 million.18 The annual growth rate from 1999 to 2003 was 
accordingly 6.7 percent; and from 2003 to 2007, 8.1 percent.  By 2012, the latest year for 
which data is available, the number was 1.8 million. The annual growth rate had slowed 
to 3.7 percent but remained significant.19 Another market was schools seeking to offer 
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courses online that they could not provide in person.  Schools unable to hire faculty to 
teach Chinese, Russian, or advanced math could now deliver virtual versions of these 
courses.  In addition, districts seeking to curb costs could likewise replace teachers with 
online programs.  By one estimate, online instruction costs 36 percent less per student 
than conventional teaching.20 
 But EdisonLearning would be playing catch-up.  Far ahead in this new sector 
were K12 Inc. and Connections Academy.  K12 was founded by Ron J. Packard, a former 
McKinsey consultant, in 1999 with $40 million in capital from Oracle CEO Larry 
Ellison, erstwhile bond trader Michael Milken, and  Loews Corporation co-chair Andrew 
Tisch.  Based in Herndon, Virginia, K12 was already operating twenty-four cyber schools 
in fifteen states with 31,355 students when EdisonLearning announced its acquisition of 
Provost in June 2008 and would see enrollment climb to 37,542 the next school year.  
Founded as a subsidiary of Baltimore-based Sylvan Learning in 2001, Connections 
Academy was already operating twelve cyber schools in eleven states with 8,615 students 
when EdisonLearning acquired Provost and would see its enrollment climb to 13,278 the 
next school year.21 
                                                
20 While the average per-pupil expenditure at a brick-and-mortar school in Florida in 2010, for 
example, was $8,500, the cost at the state’s Florida Virtual School was $5,490.  See Paul E. 
Peterson, Saving Schools: From Horace Mann to Virtual Learning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 250. 
21 David K. Randall, “Virtual Schools, Real Businesses,” Forbes, July 24, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0811/084.html.  For enrollment data, see Molnar, Miron, and 
Urschel, Profiles of For-Profit Educational Management Organizations, Tenth Annual Report, 
July 2008, 14, http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/adrift-schools-a-total-marketing-environment-
the-tenth-annual-report-schoolhouse-commerc; and Alex Molnar, Gary Miron, and Jessica 
Urschel, Profiles of For-Profit Educational Management Organizations: Eleventh Annual Report, 
September 2009, 15, http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/Schoolhouse-commercialism-2008. 
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 By 2011, K12 and Connections had pulled away.  EdisonLearning was operating 
one cyber school in South Carolina, founded in 2009, and another in Colorado, founded 
in 2010.  The combined enrollment was 1,293.  By this time, K12 was running forty-nine 
schools in twenty-three states with 87,091 students.  Connections was running nineteen 
schools in eighteen states with 29,028 students and was poised to mushroom on news in 
September 2011 of its acquisition for $400 million by Pearson, the London-based 
multinational media giant.22  
 
Whittle and Schmidt meanwhile shifted course yet again in pursuit of a for-profit model 
of school management.  Instead of their original plan of running low-budget private 
schools, tailored for funding through vouchers, and their subsequent strategy of managing 
district and charter schools as a subcontractor, Whittle and Schmidt embarked on a 
mission to build a network of premium-quality private schools located in major cities 
around the world. 
 These schools would share the same global ethos and dual-language curriculum, 
compete with established private schools, charge the same amount, if not more, and serve 
children of parents apt to move among New York, London, Paris, Abu Dhabi, Mumbai, 
Shanghai, Singapore, Sydney, Mexico City, and Rio.  Whittle and Schmidt called their 
company Nations Academy.  They teamed up in 2008 with Sunny Varkey, the 
aforementioned educational entrepreneur based in Dubai whose company Global 
Partnership Schools was coheaded by former Edison executive Manny Rivera and former 
                                                
22 Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Educational 
Management Organizations, Fourteenth Edition, November 2013, 23, 37-38, 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12; Katherine Rushton, “Pearson Buys US 
‘Virtual School Academies’ for $400 M,” The Daily Telegraph, September 16, 2011. 
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superintendent Rudy Crew.  Whittle and Schmidt predicted that Nations Academy would 
comprise sixty schools around the world by 2021.23 
 After the market crash of 2008-2009 dried up funding, and irreconcilable 
differences surfaced with Varkey, Whittle and Schmidt in 2011 renamed their company 
Avenues and secured $37.5 million in funding from Liberty Partners, the same sum from 
LLR, a private equity group based in Philadelphia,24 and an undisclosed sum from John 
Fisher, an early investor in Edison, chairman of the board of KIPP, cochair of the Charter 
School Growth Fund, and president of Pisces Inc., the financial management organization 
for the Fisher family, founders of the casual clothing retailer Gap Inc.25 
 In keeping with past practice, Whittle went on a hiring spree and launched a 
relentless ad campaign.  Whittle hired the former heads of three elite private schools—
Phillips Exeter, Hotchkiss, and Dalton—as well as the director of the highly regarded 92nd 
Street Y Nursery School.26  And as with Channel One and the Edison Project,  Whittle 
promoted Avenues in full-page ads in The New York Times, beginning in February 2011 
with one full-page ad a week for five weeks in a row.27  Moreover, the new school was 
explained in detail in ads on the Internet and in The Wall Street Journal, The New Yorker, 
                                                
23Shelly Banjo, “Whittle Starts a City School,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Julian Guthrie, “The Fisher King,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 18, 1998; Chris Whittle, 
Fourth Annual Avenues New Year Letter, January 7, 2014, 9, http://www.avenues.org/New-
Year-Letter/Avenues_New_Year_Letter_2014.pdf. 
26 Jenny Anderson, “The Best School $75 Million Can Buy,” New York Times, July 8, 2011. 
27 For advertisements, see New York Times, February 1, 2011, A28; February 10, 2011, B20; 
February 16, 2011, A26; February 23, 2011, A24; and March 1, 2011, A21. 
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and The New York Times Magazine as well as complimentary neighborhood tabloids such 
as Downtown Express, Our Town, and West Side Spirit.28  
 This ad campaign from its beginning until the company’s first school opened in 
the Chelsea section of Manhattan in September 2012 included forty-six newspaper ads, 
seven magazine ads, and countless ads on the Internet.  And Avenues continued to 
advertise after opening its initial school, publishing another thirty-six newspaper ads and 
five magazine ads over the next sixteen months.  The cost, in sum, according to one 
advertising database, was $3 million.29  Some of the ads were basic announcements with 
clever graphics featuring notebooks depicted as passports and globes opening up as 
books, the latter of which became the company’s ubiquitous logo; others, recalling the 
ads published by Edison in nearly every issue of Education Week from 2004 through 
2007, were short essays by school staff or consultants in answer to such questions as 
“Can success be taught?,” “Can children learn language like music?,” “Time to reinvent 
the class schedule?,” and “Is the sky the limit for technology in school?”30  Recalling 
                                                
28 See, for example, Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2011, A30, February 8, 2011, A26, and 
February 28, A30;  Downtown Express, February 1, 2012, 16; West Side Spirit, February 2, 2012, 
3; Our Town, February 23, 2012, 4; The New York Times Magazine, September 16, 2002, 7; and 
The New Yorker, September 24, 2012, 25. 
29 Data come from adspender.kantarmediana.com.  The cost may have been lower than $3 million 
because of discounts issued by publications for volume. Ad$pender listed 605 Internet ads. 
30 The essays ran as a series under the heading “Open Thinking:  On a New School of Thought.” 
For the first in the series, “Can success be taught?,” see Downtown Express, February 1, 2012, 
16; for the second, “Can children learn language like music?,” West Side Spirit, February 2, 2012, 
3; for the third, “Time to reinvent the class schedule?,” New York Times, February 26, 2012, SR2; 
and for the fourth, “Is the sky the limit for technology in school?,” New York Times, March 4, 
2012, SR2. 
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claims of the Edison Project twenty years before, the company’s mission statement 
published on its Web site was titled “A New School of Thought.”31 
 Whittle and Schmidt, in addition, hosted more than fifty elegantly catered wine-
and-cheese information sessions for prospective parents at tony midtown venues like the 
Core Club and Harvard Club as well as SoHo’s posh Crosby Hotel.32  Despite these 
extraordinary efforts, enrollment the first year fell far below projections.  In July 2011, 
Gardner P. Dunnan, academic dean of Avenues, forecasted 1,320 students in nursery 
through ninth grade.33 Dunnan knew the private school landscape in New York 
intimately.  He had been headmaster for twenty-three years of the famously progressive 
Dalton School on the Upper East Side and then founder and director for ten years of The 
School at Columbia, a Dalton replica constructed as a faculty recruitment and retention 
device in Morningside Heights for the children of Columbia University professors. In 
February 2012, Dunnan predicted enrollment of between 800 and 1,100 students.34  On 
the opening day of its first school year, Avenues proclaimed in full-page ads in both The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal enrollment of “over 700."  The same full-
page ads soon after appeared in The New Yorker and The New York Times Magazine.35 
                                                
31 For the mission statement of Avenues, see http://www.avenues.org/avenues-school-mission, 
accessed April 3, 2014. 
32 Anderson, “The Best School”; Amanda M. Fairbanks, “Chris Whittle Seeks Global Reach in 
Private School Venture,” Education Week, September 26, 2012, 10-11. 
33 Anderson, “The Best School.” 
34 Gardner P. Dunnan, interview, New York, February 23, 2012. 
35 Advertisement, “The First First Day,” New York Times, September 10, 2012, A26; Wall Street 
Journal, September 10, 2012, A20; The New Yorker, September 24, 2012, 25; and New York 
Times Magazine, September 16, 2012, 8. 
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 The initial campus, located on 10th Avenue between 25th Street and 26th, is, as 
promised in the company’s ads, a polished model of a high-tech international school.  A 
former grocery warehouse reconfigured at the cost of $60 million, the building consists of 
215,000 square feet spread over ten floors.  The building borders the High Line, a former 
elevated industrial railroad spur reconstructed by the city and philanthropists at the cost 
of $152 million as a serpentine midair walkway punctuated by gardens and arresting 
vistas.36 Inside the school, a wall-sized assemblage of sixteen contiguous rectangular 
plasma screens flashing maps and news greets students at the top of the central staircase; 
plasma screens displaying student art and science projects likewise adorn hallways on 
every floor; all floors are anchored by commodious common areas, many of them filled 
with natural light; a 20,000-square-foot cafeteria overlooking the High Line resembles a 
chic minimalist dining room at a modern hotel; the restrooms appear to have been 
transplanted from a fine restaurant; all signs are in English, Spanish, and Mandarin in 
keeping with the school’s dual-language program, with students in nursery school 
through fourth grade spending half their day learning in English and the other half in 
either Spanish or Mandarin; and sound-proof practice rooms for student musicians flank a 
black-box performance space on the ground floor. 
 One parent with a son in nursery school and another in kindergarten praised 
Avenues during a tour he gave in March 2014. A high-tech executive who decades earlier 
had attended Dalton, he said that he and his wife chose the school for its impressive 
                                                
36 Avenues: The World School (brochure), 2011, 28, http://www.avenues.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Master_Brochure.pdf; Robin Pogrebin, “Renovated High Line Now 
Opens for Strolling,” New York Times, June 8, 2009. 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 228 
administrative hires, dual-language program, constructivist curriculum, and pervasive 
integration of technology.  But he confessed concern about insufficient diversity. 
 This lack of diversity was on prominent display during drop-off that morning in 
March.  Three security staff members, all wearing ties and logoed lanyards with company 
IDs and combating the cold in three-quarter black coats, stepped in and out of 10th 
Avenue directing a tangled stream of Range Rovers, yellow cabs, Cadillac Escalades, 
BMW sedans, and Lincoln Navigators, swung open passenger doors, and escorted 
children to the curb, frequently scooping them from vehicle to sidewalk like figure 
skaters practicing a basic maneuver for pairs competition.  Had the pace been slower, the 
staff worn caps, and the passengers been adults rather than children, the scene could have 
taken place at the Waldorf Astoria or the Plaza.  Stranger still, in a juxtaposition that 
could occur in few if any U.S. cities other than New York, this morning and afternoon 
ritual happens across the street from a two-square-block housing project comprising 
seven brick towers for 2,400 low-income residents.37  
 
If Avenues succeeds, it will do so against great odds.  Unlike the leaders of Edison, the 
leaders of Avenues do not have to battle doubts and barbs from taxpayers, policymakers, 
unionized teachers, and newspaper columnists. But they must deal with a notoriously 
vigilant advocacy group: private school parents.  In spending so much money on their 
children and expecting, in return, the best for them, this group will naturally press the 
leaders of Avenues to provide the same advantages as other high-priced private schools, 
from small classes and frequent science labs to robust programs in art, music, drama, and 
                                                
37 New York City Housing Authority, Development Data Book 2010, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf1/pdb2010.pdf. 
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sports.  Yet, as a for-profit entity, Avenues stands at a distinct disadvantage in meeting 
these demands.  With the exception of a handful of private schools, the competition in the 
United States are nonprofits. In fact, the National Association of Independent Schools 
(NAIS), the charter organization for private schools, bars for-profit operators from 
membership.38  In choosing a domain name ending in .org, rather than .com, the leaders 
of Avenues themselves implicitly betrayed discomfort with the school’s for-profit 
status.39 
 As a for-profit, Avenues cannot receive tax-deductible contributions to subsidize 
costs, as nearly every nonprofit private school does;40 and it must pay corporate income 
taxes, as no nonprofit private schools do.  In this corner, Avenues has had no choice but 
to charge more, offer less financial aid, and increase class size.  Tuition and fees in the 
school’s second year, 2013-2014, equaled $43,750 for students in all grades, from 
nursery through high school.  That sum amounted to $3,383, or 8.4 percent, more than the 
                                                
38 See NAIS membership requirements: http://www.nais.org/Articles/Pages/School-
Membership.aspx (last updated June 17, 2013).  Of the sixty-seven private schools in Manhattan, 
five are run as for-profit operations:  Avenues, British International, Dwight, Léman Manhattan 
Preparatory (formerly Claremont Academy), and York Preparatory.  
39 The Web site for Avenues is www.avenues.org.  While the .org suffix is widely understood as 
the suffix for nonprofit institutions, there is no rule limiting its usage.  As no .com domain name 
exists for Avenues, the issue was not lack of availability.  Incidentally, Edison and 
EdisonLearning both employed .com domain names. 
40 In commenting on Whittle’s contention that Avenues can make money from tuition alone, 
Steve Nelson, the head of the Calhoun School, a traditional nonprofit private school in 
Manhattan, said, “As far as I know, there’s not an independent school in New York City that 
covers its expenses from tuition, no matter how many students they have.”  See Anderson, “The 
Best School.” 
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averaged cost of tuition and fees at five well-regarded private schools in Manhattan 
constituting the competition.41 
 When asked about financial aid, Dunnan said in a 2012 interview that the goal 
was $2 million in assistance for the upcoming year, given an anticipated enrollment of 
1,100, meaning an average abatement of $1,818 per student.  Even if Avenues provided 
such aid, however, this sum would have fallen far short of the aid offered by the five 
private schools in this comparison group.  Based on figures from the latest filings with 
the IRS, the abatement at these five schools stood to average $6,091 per student in 2012-
2013.42 This difference puts Avenues out of financial reach for many more families and 
necessarily drives down diversity, which parents like the one who gave the tour of 
Avenues and educators—NAIS leaders, in particular—consider  a critical element of a 
dynamic learning environment.43  Finally, leaders of Avenues conceded that classes 
would be larger.  Dunnan said there would be eighteen in a class, rather than fourteen or 
                                                
41 According to the Web sites of these five schools, tuition and fees for 2013-2014 were as 
follows: Brearley, $39,000; Collegiate, $41,200; Dalton, $40,220; Nightingale-Bamford, 
$39,985; and Trinity, $40,628 (in the last case, the cost is a weighted average reflecting different 
costs for different cohorts). The average for all five is $40,387. 
42 According to the 990 forms filed with the IRS for fiscal year 2010, Brearley, Collegiate, 
Dalton, Nightingale-Bamford, and Trinity together conferred $23,534,826 in aid to approximately 
4,144 students, assuming enrollment in 2010 was the same as in 2013.  The weighted average of 
assistance in 2010 was accordingly $5,679; aid averaged by institution was at $5,688 nearly 
indistinguishable.  Using an inflation multiplier of 1.0726 to cover the subsequent three years, the 
projected allocation for 2013 would be $6,091.  
43 The commitment of the National Association of Independent Schools to diversity serves as a 
clear example of the belief of many educators in the importance of a heterogeneous student body.  
See, for example, the 2012 NAIS statement entitled “Equity and Justice,” 
http://www.nais.org/Series/Pages/Equity-and-Justice.aspx. 
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fifteen at Dalton and similar schools, but contended that research shows and his own 
experience confirms there is no impact on student outcomes with such a difference.44 
 In other countries with different tax policies, less competition from established 
private schools, more parents without budgetary concerns, and less interest in diversity, 
Avenues may generate significant demand. In his annual report in January 2014 on the 
state of Avenues, Whittle exuded his trademark enthusiasm:  enrollment at the first 
campus was just shy of 1,100 and was 1,300 the following year; a second school 
developed in collaboration with the highly regarded Rendafuzhong School (known as 
RDFZ) in Beijing was on schedule to open in the fall of 2016 on a new twenty-five acre 
campus; and exploration was underway for building schools in Shanghai, San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, São Paulo, London, and Delhi. To steer this growth, Jeff Clark, the CEO 
and president from 2005 to 2012 of National Heritage Academies, the country’s biggest 
charter management organization, had come aboard as the company’s president and 
COO; and to fund this growth, John Fisher had bought out Liberty Partners’ stake in 
Avenues and invested additional money in the company, making Fisher the majority 
owner.45  
 Yet such demand has yet to materialize. The deal with RDFZ fell through in 
February 2015, according to a company official with direct knowledge of negotiations. 
Whittle had spent several months in Beijing trying to cement an arrangement but failed. 
The Wall Street Journal reported in March that Whittle resigned, though the paper 
                                                
44 Gardner Dunnan, interview, New York, February 23, 2012. 
45 Whittle, Fourth Annual Avenues New Year Letter, 3, 5-7, 9-12.  According to Miron and 
Gulosino, Profiles, 5, National Heritage Academies ran sixty-eight schools with 44,338 students 
in 2011-12.  While Imagine Schools operated more sites, the company had fewer students. 
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conveyed his departure was involuntary, and the aforementioned company official 
confirmed it. Much as Whittle was forced out of Edison in 2006, he was forced out of 
Avenues nine years later. The Wall Street Journal reported that the company still planned 
to open a school in Beijing, though the paper explained that would not happen until 2017 
at the earliest.46 CNBC reported in November that the “cavernous yet sleek” offices of 
Avenues in Beijing were nearly empty and that no company officials would commit to 
setting a date for opening a school in the city.47 
 Beyond the difficulty of establishing commercially operated schools in foreign 
countries, Avenues faces competition from companies like itself that had arrived first.48 
As of the 2014-15 academic year, Nord Anglia Education, based in Hong Kong, had six 
schools across the United States (including one in New York), six across China 
(including two in both Beijing and Shanghai), and twenty-three more around the world. 
Meritas, based in Illinois, had seven schools across the United States (including one in 
New York) as well as one each in Switzerland, Mexico, and China. And GEMS (Global 
Education Management Systems), based in Dubai and run by Schmidt and Whittle’s 
former ephemeral partner Sunny Varkey, had one school in Chicago and sixty-eight more 
in thirteen other countries.49 
                                                
46 Sophia Hollander, “Education Entrepreneur Chris Whittle Resigns from Avenues School,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 6, 2015. 
47 Zoe Alsop, “Wealthey Chinese Love Private Schools but Private Equity Finds Profits Harder,” 
CNBC, November 29, 2015. 
48 “International Schools: The New Local,” The Economist, December 20, 2014, 88. 
49 School counts come from company Web sites, accessed April 16, 2015: 
http://www.meritas.net/; http://www.nordangliaeducation.com/; http://www.gemseducation.com/. 
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 This sector has so far appeared quite profitable for some operators.  In fact, Nord 
Anglia paid Meritas $559 million for six schools (enrolling 8,083 students) in June 2015 
and went public the same month at $24 a share with 104 million shares outstanding, 
meaning a market capitalization of $2.5 billion.50 Yet even if Avenues turns a corner and 
joins this league, the company’s influence will be irrelevant to Whittle’s initial ambitions 
to revolutionize American education.  At $45,000 a year per pupil, its model is not close 
to scalable.  In addition, the country abounds with scalable public schools infused with 
technology, from High Tech High, founded in San Diego in 2000, to Science Leadership 
Academy, founded in Philadelphia in 2006. And while Avenues and similar companies 
may increase the privatization of high school foreign-exchange programs, they stand to 
do so to only a marginal degree, competing at the edges for students who might otherwise 
study abroad through such established nonprofit programs as AFS (formerly American 
Field Service) and Youth for Understanding.   
 
Far from this niche market, EdisonLearning continued to struggle.  After two years as 
CEO, Stecz was fired.  Much as Stecz moved up from COO to replace Whittle as CEO in 
2006, Jeff Wahl moved up from COO to replace Stecz in 2008.  And much as Stecz 
joined the company after more than two decades in consumer health-care marketing 
rather than education, Wahl came aboard after more than two decades in financial 
management. 
                                                
50 Nord Anglia, press release: Nord Anglia Education Completes Acquisition of Six Schools from 
Meritas, June 25, 2015, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nord-anglia-education-
completes-acquisition-of-six-schools-from-meritas-300104965.html. 
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 Wahl grew up in Ohio, triple-majored in accounting, finance, and management at 
Walsh University, a Catholic school in his home state, worked several years as an 
accountant at KPMG, and then under the training and guidance of Jack Welch climbed 
the ladder at General Electric, rising to become president and COO of the Great Lakes 
region of GE Capital.  For Wahl, EdisonLearning was in desperate need of financial 
discipline. In the mold of Welch, Wahl cut costs in myriad ways. 
 In one of his most visible steps, Wahl moved EdisonLearning’s headquarters in 
August 2009 from 521 Fifth Avenue, on the corner of 43rd Street, three blocks east and up 
to 485 Lexington Avenue.  Wahl said in an interview at the new headquarters in May 
2010 that the move would save the company more than $2 million a year in rent and 
would, in addition, convey a different image.  “We already get enough grief for being a 
for-profit,” Wahl said. “We didn’t need to be on Fifth Avenue, too.”  Wahl moreover 
acquired at no cost the furniture of the previous tenant, Golf Digest magazine, from desks 
and tables to a set of facing white leather Mies van der Rohe Barcelona chairs in his 
corner office.  And Wahl left the layout as is, with one modification: the flags planted in 
the putting green in the center of the company’s new headquarters read EdisonLearning.51 
 Wahl also moved the financial services staff to the company’s operations office in 
Knoxville, Tennessee; ended the company’s relationship with the five marketing firms 
and  several consultancies it had on retainer; and cut travel and overhead costs by moving 
executives from headquarters to their respective regions, implementing a pre-approval 
process for trips, replacing travel agency contracts with a self-service reservation system, 
and using only limited-service hotel chains.  With these latter measures alone, Wahl 
                                                
51 Jeff Wahl, interview, New York, May 5, 2010.  
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claimed to have driven down annual costs for airfare, lodging, and meals from $6.3 
million in 2007 to $3.9 million in 2010.52    
 Adding that the company was no longer entering school management contracts 
that did not promise a good return, Wahl cited as an example his recent refusal to take 
over a charter school in rural Virginia.  “We’re now profitable because of what we don’t 
do,” Wahl said, “not because of what we do.”53 
 With EdisonLearning streamlined, Wahl projected significant growth, particularly 
in working with states competing for slices of the $4.35 billion set aside by President 
Obama’s Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative. Writing in his first year-end message to 
EdisonLearning staff, a month after congressional passage in November 2009 of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act authorizing RTTT, Wahl emphasized that the 
new legislation played to the company’s strengths.  The focus of RTTT on implementing 
data systems, raising teacher quality, and turning around failing schools, Wahl wrote, 
aligned precisely with work done by its Alliance division.  Wahl mentioned promising 
discussions in this regard with education officials in Illinois, Virginia, and Colorado as 
well as Washington, DC.54 
 Wahl also interpreted the tone and goals of RTTT as both vindication of the 
company’s long-established purpose as well as justification for optimism.  “As I look to 
the future,” he wrote, “I see more opportunity than this company has ever faced.  It’s as if 
our crusade has finally been won.  When our founders and predecessors were building 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Jeff Wahl, From the Office of the President and CEO, EdisonLearning, December 2009, 7, 
obtained from Wahl. 
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this organization in the 1990s, they argued … for choice, competition, accountability and 
transparency—ideas that were not popular with many educators at that time. We grew 
rapidly, but faced opposition at every turn.”55 
 Wahl grouped EdisonLearning with a tight, interconnected circle of four 
prominent organizations at the helm of school reform: Teach for America (founded in 
1989 by Wendy Kopp); KIPP (founded in 1994 by TFA alumni Mike Feinberg and Dave 
Levin and headed since 2006 by TFA alumnus and former Edison executive Richard 
Barth, Kopp’s husband); The New Teacher Project (founded in 1997 by TFA alumna and 
former Washington, DC, chancellor Michelle Rhee); and New Leaders for New Schools 
(co-founded in 2000 by RTTT architect Jon Schnur, Kopp’s fellow member of the class 
of 1989 at Princeton). Wahl continued: “It may seem immodest, but I do think that we … 
are winning the war of ideas. School reform is moving in the right direction.  Now, the 
challenge is showing that those ideas can truly work, with more students, schools and 
communities.”56   
 Privately, Wahl predicted the company would soon add eight more cyber charter 
schools to the two it was already running in Colorado and South Carolina; sign up 
another twenty-seven schools on top of the sixty-two it currently had under management 
across the country; and, in partnership with Magic Johnson, the Hall of Fame basketball 
player turned entrepreneur, announce a national network of credit-recovery centers 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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offering an array of online and conventional courses for high school dropouts working 
toward diplomas.57  
 In addition to partnering with Johnson, Wahl tried to reach a wider audience by 
diversifying the company’s leadership team and its message. When he joined Edison in 
2007, Wahl recalled in May 2010, the company’s seven executives comprised six white 
men and one black man.  Wahl said thirteen of the fifteen members of his leadership team 
were women and/or people of color.58  This reorientation was also in evidence two 
months later at the company’s summer summit, a meeting of 300 company executives, 
financial backers, and school administrators over four days at the Westin Hotel in the 
Gaslamp District of San Diego.  The company for years had been holding fall as well as 
summer summits, called ELDA for Edison Leadership Development Academy.  The 
summer summit in 2010 was focused on three Rs:  not the conventional three Rs of 
reading, writing, and arithmetic but rigor, relevance, and relationships. 
 In his welcome address, Wahl spoke about the low high-school graduation rates 
of inner-city students and the pressing need to boost rigor in their schools, add relevance 
to their lessons, and foster stronger relationships with their teachers.  Wahl closed with 
reflections about a favorite R&B song, Harold Melvin and the Blue Notes’ “Wake Up, 
Everybody.”  Wahl explained that the song was a favorite, in part, because of the second 
stanza, exhorting teachers to inspire their students.  On cue, a recording of the song filled 
the hotel ballroom as Wahl stepped away from the lectern.59 
                                                
57 Wahl, interview, New York, May 5, 2010. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Jeff Wahl, speech, ELDA, San Diego, July 8, 2010. 
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 The summit’s keynote speaker the following day was Cornel West, a professor of 
African-American Studies at Princeton as well as a veteran leader of the Democratic 
Socialists of America Party who would a year later march in Occupy Wall Street 
demonstrations in Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles.60   Before 
Wahl’s time, keynotes at summer and fall summits were typically given by company 
executives.  Keynotes were given on occasion by outsiders, such as Les Brown, a 
motivational speaker and radio DJ from Ohio, and Howard Fuller, a professor at 
Marquette University in Milwaukee and champion of vouchers and charter schools.  A 
keynote by a commentator as progressive and blunt as West was a new development and 
did not stop with West.  Four months later, at Fall ELDA, held in Palm Springs, 
California, keynotes were delivered by two equally progressive and blunt African-
American scholars:  Michael Eric Dyson, a professor of sociology at Georgetown, and 
Melissa Harris-Perry, a professor of political science at Princeton.61   
 Though conspicuously out of place at a summit for a for-profit school 
management company in a ballroom of a grand hotel, West quickly tried to ingratiate 
himself as a friend of EdisonLearning.  West opened by invoking the words of the jazz 
composer and saxophonist John Coltrane in calling the company “a force for real good” 
and lauding Wahl as a “courageous and visionary leader.”   He then embarked on a 
rambling sixty-five-minute oration, equal parts explication of paideia as education of the 
                                                
60 Karen Grigsby Bates, “Cornel West, a Fighter, Angers Obama Supporters,” National Public 
Radio, October 24, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141598911/cornel-west-a-fighter-
angers-obama-supporters; Lisa Miller, “I Want to Be Like Jesus,” New York Magazine, May 6, 
2012, http://nymag.com/news/features/cornel-west-2012-5/. 
61 Todd McIntire, telephone interview, July 1, 2014. 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 239 
soul as well as the mind, meditation on musical genius, and condemnation of “the age of 
Reagan,” “market values,” “big money,” and “indifference to the poor.”62 
 Dyson and Harris-Perry four months later delivered more straightforward 
addresses but likewise hammered away at corporate greed and institutional racism.63  
Like West, Dyson tried at the outset to ingratiate himself with the audience. Dyson said 
he was honored to be in the “august company of extraordinary pilgrims toward the 
promised land of educational enlightenment,” chuckled that Wahl was “a brother trapped 
in a white man’s body,” and went on to praise EdisonLearning for working in inner-city 
schools and paying close attention to data.64 But the unmistakable message from Dyson 
as well as West and Harris-Perry was that educational opportunity for the nation’s 
underprivileged children had much less to do with school choice or managerial methods 
than economic and racial justice. 
 Harris-Perry, in fact, went so far as to suggest that the movement for school 
choice stemmed from a collective failure to provide a good education for all children.  
Harris-Perry noted that in places like Princeton, where she lived at the time, one did not 
shop for an elementary school for one’s children because all the neighborhood schools 
were excellent.  But in places like New Orleans, where she said she would soon be 
moving to take a job at Tulane University, one had to shop hard because the school 
system had never been sufficiently funded.  This was in essence the argument made two 
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decades earlier by the political scientist Jeffrey Henig against the case for school choice 
articulated by John Chubb and Terry Moe.65 
 
When asked about such candor during a follow-up interview at EdisonLearning 
headquarters in February 2011, Wahl said that he had hoped West, Dyson, and Harris-
Perry might broaden awareness and stimulate productive debate.66  While West, Dyson, 
and Harris-Perry might have done so and while Wahl’s efforts to streamline the company 
might have generated more profit, EdisonLearning continued to lose ground. 
 Wahl was right about RTTT.  It indeed vindicated the company’s mission. The 
Edison Project—or Edison Schools or EdisonLearning—did not ultimately have to 
flourish to have an impact.  Whittle and Schmidt played a major role in transforming the 
discussion of public education by emphasizing competition, choice, and results.  As allies 
in this campaign, TFA, KIPP, The New Teacher Project, and New Leaders for New 
Schools—all non-profit organizations with a shared dedication to business principles—
would flourish.  But EdisonLearning would not. 
 The company’s most prominent loss came in Philadelphia.  When Wahl joined 
Edison Schools in 2006 as the company’s COO, Edison was managing 101 schools 
across the country and twenty-two in Philadelphia alone.   Amidst dueling accusations of 
poor collaboration, Edison and Chester Upland had parted ways the previous year. But 
the company was at the same time awarded two more schools in Philadelphia on top of 
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the twenty it had been assigned in 2002.67  In 2007, that number dropped back to twenty, 
the per-pupil premium fell from $750 to $500, and Paul Vallas left Philadelphia to run the 
school system of New Orleans.  In 2008, the number of Edison schools in Philadelphia 
dropped to sixteen.68 In 2009, the number fell to four.69  And by 2011, much as The 
Philadelphia Public School Notebook had predicted in 2009 the day after the Baltimore 
School Board’s decision to terminate two of three contracts with Edison, the company 
was out of Philadelphia.70 
 While Edison’s entry into Philadelphia had generated non-stop news coverage, its 
exit nine years later went unreported.  The same held for Edison’s exit two years later as 
the manager of its one remaining school in Baltimore, Montebello, even though Sarah 
Horsey, the principal celebrated for turning the school around a decade earlier, had 
returned to give the commencement speech.71  By 2013, in total, Edison was managing 
eleven schools—not eighty-nine, as Wahl had forecasted in 2010—and four cyber charter 
schools—as opposed to the ten Wahl had predicted that same year. 
 The eleven remaining schools comprised two conventional district schools—a 
high school in Gary, Indiana, and an elementary school in Davenport, Iowa—and nine 
                                                
67 Menash Dean, “Edison to Manage Two More Troubled City Schools,” Philadelphia Daily 
News, May 26, 2005; Dale Mezzacappa, “Edison in Chester: How Plan Failed,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, June 16, 2005. 
68 Susan Snyder, “Power Struggle Brewing in SRC?” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 23, 2007; 
Kristen A. Graham, “Philadelphia Taking Back Six Privatized Schools,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
June 19, 2008. 
69 Menash Dean, “SRC: Schools Must Hire More Minority Teachers,” Philadelphia Daily News, 
June 25, 2009. 
70 Todd McIntire, telephone interview, November 26, 2013. 
71 Ibid. 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 242 
charter elementary/middle schools—one in Bronx, New York, three in Atlanta, one in 
nearby College Park, two in Duluth, Minnesota, one in Colorado Springs, and one in 
Denver.  In addition to the two cyber charter schools EdisonLearning had launched in 
South Carolina in 2009 and Colorado in 2010, the company now had cyber charters in 
Georgia and Ohio. The partnership with Magic Johnson in running credit-recovery 
centers did get off the ground, as Wahl had projected, but growth was slow.  Called 
Magic Johnson Bridgescape, this new division had thirteen centers by 2013: eight in 
Ohio, two in Illinois, and one each in Georgia, New Jersey, and North Carolina.  
Company officials had forecasted opening fifty more centers during the summer of 2013 
across four states—California, Florida, Texas, and Virginia—but closed no deals.72 
 The one bright spot for the company was its Alliance division, helping schools 
align their curricula with state-mandated exams and assess the progress of their students 
through the course of the year.  By 2013, EdisonLearning had eighty-one client schools, 
each paying about $350,000 a year: fifty-five in Hawaii; eleven in Virginia; seven in 
Nevada; three in Indiana; two in Delaware; two in Pennsylvania; and one in California.73 
 According to Wahl, EdisonLearning had to retreat from the business of managing 
schools because the margins were dropping year after year.  Wahl attributed this 
development to budget cuts.  During the interview in February 2011, Wahl shared a chart 
documenting cutbacks in education budgets across the country:  Ohio short $1.7 billion; 
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Clark County, Nevada, $300 million; South Carolina, $800 million; and Missouri, $500 
million.74 
 Much as Edison expected a per-pupil premium of $1,500 upon entering 
Philadelphia in 2002 and instead received $881, only to see that drop to $750 in 2003 and 
then $500 in 2007, the company’s sales staff could no longer find worthwhile 
opportunities.  This was true for cyber charter schools, Wahl said, as well as brick-and-
mortar schools, whether run by districts or charter boards.   
 “When we first met with a governor in the southeast,” Wahl said with reference to 
a potential contract for a cyber charter school, “we were looking at receiving $6,500 in 
total per student.  By the end of his administration, that was down to $2,400.  If we don’t 
receive nearly twice that much, we lose money.”75  
 To Todd McIntire, who had risen within the company from school principal in 
2001 to senior vice president for operations for the eastern half of the country in 2011, 
the diminishing margins constituted an undeniable hurdle.  But in the case of running 
district schools, in particular, the more fundamental problem, in McIntire’s opinion, was 
the difficulty of adhering to internal methods and goals while answering to district 
authorities, especially when there was significant turnover in local leadership, as was the 
case in Philadelphia.  Moreover, McIntire said, the pressure on an EMO to bring about 
achievement gains in specific subjects could divert it from its mission of delivering a 
well-rounded education and thus engender distrust.  
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 Much as Janice Solkov resigned as principal of Edison’s Morton McMichael 
Elementary School in 2002 after four months on the job because of the challenge of 
reporting to both company supervisors and district officials, McIntire found that the 
persistent fluctuation in protocol and personnel in Philadelphia undermined the 
company’s capacity to do its job.  “From 2003 to 2008, our partnership has been with five 
different district managers,” McIntire recalled in January 2009.  “Plus, the structure of the 
relationship has changed three times over this period. In 2003, all schools were assigned 
to one of six different geographical managers; in 2004, this was changed to one manager 
for each EMO; in 2005, a new person was appointed to this position; the following year, 
another person was appointed to this position; in 2008, we were back to six different 
geographical regions.  It’s tough to build trust this way.”76 Months later, the relationship 
would change again, with Edison designated a strategic partner rather than a school 
manager, meaning another shift in responsibilities and reporting structure.77 
 This issue of changing protocol and personnel and Solkov’s problem of reporting 
to two different bosses were both in evidence during a visit to Edison’s Ludlow 
Elementary School in Northeast Philadelphia in February 2009.  The fifteen-minute walk 
from the subway stop at West Girard Avenue and North Broad Street brought to mind 
West Baltimore.  Abandoned lots and vacant buildings covered in graffiti marred one 
block after another.  The sidewalks were littered but lifeless.  Amid such blight, Ludlow, 
a four-story brick building constructed in 1927 with Gothic touches, including an arched 
entrance in gray stone, conjured an era of long-gone prosperity.  
                                                
76 Todd McIntire, interview, Philadelphia, January 13, 2009. 
77 Todd McIntire, interview, New York, July 29, 2009. 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 245 
 Munching on a signature Philadelphia soft pretzel at her desk at the beginning of 
the day, Charlotte Buonassisi, in her thirty-first year as a Philadelphia educator and in her 
fourth as Ludlow’s principal, said she was exhausted.  Buonassisi explained that in her 
time in charge of Ludlow, she had worked with four different regional superintendents 
and had to attend district as well as Edison administrative meetings and fill out 
paperwork for both.  “There’s no time to process all this information,” said Buonassisi. In 
her office at the time, in fact, were an Edison regional vice president for educational 
services and two officials from the district for a weekly meeting to coordinate efforts for 
differentiated instruction (so that teachers reach a range of students) and to discuss 
outcomes.78 
 The measurement of outcomes at Ludlow, as at every Edison school I visited, 
occurred in a designated data room, indistinguishable from other data rooms except for 
the colors chosen to identify levels of achievement.  Also, there was more color in 
Pennsylvania than in Maryland.  Whereas there are three levels of achievement in 
Maryland (Advanced, Proficient, and Basic), there are four in Pennsylvania (Advanced, 
Proficient, Basic, and Below Basic). 
 Despite all the color, as in Baltimore, so in Philadelphia, the mood in the data 
room was grim.  This was true at Edison’s Shaw Middle School, which I had visited the 
previous day, and Waring Elementary School, which I would visit the following week, as 
well as Ludlow.  At Shaw, the atmosphere was, in fact, menacing, with the principal and 
another Edison regional vice president for educational services interrogating a middle-
aged math teacher as to why his students repeatedly posted low scores on the benchmark 
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assessments, monthly standardized tests designed to prepare students for the annual state 
exam, the Pennsylvania School System of Assessment (PSSA). 
 “You can’t look to the benchmarks,” the math teacher fought back in a thick 
Balkan accent, “because the students don’t take them seriously.”  Shaw’s principal, 
Kwand Lang, thirty-six and with Edison for thirteen years, shook his head and explained 
it was the teacher’s responsibility to make sure his students took the benchmark 
assessments very seriously.  The teacher, George Prifti, fifty-nine and in his tenth year as 
a math teacher at Shaw following twenty-five years as a math and physics teacher in his 
native Albania, said he would do his best.79 
 In conversation with two Ludlow teachers, I heard concern that the focus on 
reading and math scores on the  PSSA had pushed science and social studies aside.  “We 
barely teach science and social studies anymore,” one teacher said.  Making AYP had 
become the school’s fixation.  To remind her students and perhaps herself of the targeted 
proficiency levels in reading and math for the year, a seventh-grade teacher whose class I 
observed had a poster on the wall above her desk:  “AYP: Reading, 63%; Math, 56%.” In 
covering fractions that day, she used PSSA model questions.  A third-grade teacher 
whose class I observed drilled students in reading exercises built around the PSSA.  Upon 
shifting from one set of questions to another, she led a routine fill-in-the blank chant: 
“We must work as a … TEAM … in order to make … AYP!”  Her students obliged in 
well-rehearsed unison.  I afterward witnessed variations of the same methods while 
observing a fourth-grade reading class and a fifth-grade math class.80 
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 The one space in Ludlow free of the stress evident in Buonassisi’s office, the data 
room, and the reading and math classes was an immaculate art studio, located on the top 
floor and filled with natural light from windows facing east and north.  The aproned 
teacher, an artist who lived in the neighborhood with her husband and young children, 
moved patiently between students immersed in making papier-mâché creations of their 
choice, from airplanes to dream houses.81 
 
Standing two days later in the middle of the two-story octagonal atrium of Edison’s 
Lincoln Charter School in York, 100 miles west of Philadelphia, I found myself 
surrounded by posters listing the proficiency rates of each class on monthly benchmark 
assessments in reading and math. I asked McIntire, with whom I had hitched a ride from 
Philadelphia early that morning, about this concentration on reading and math scores.  
McIntire said it was regrettable.  He was, after all, at heart a science teacher, he said.  
After earning a bachelor’s degree in physics from Grinnell College, in his native Iowa, 
McIntire taught science for nine years: two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Belize, 
two years at the American Embassy School in The Gambia, two years at Richard R. 
Green High School in New York, while simultaneously earning a master’s degree in 
education at Teachers College as a Peace Corps Fellow, and three years at the Beacon 
School, the same New York high school where this book began several years after 
McIntire had left (while McIntire and I did not overlap at Beacon, we got to know each 
other through Beacon staff we knew in common).  Following Beacon, McIntire served 
four years as director of technology for the White Plains City School District. Convinced 
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the business model could rationalize the management of schools, McIntire in 2000 left 
White Plains to become director of technology for LearnNow, the EMO acquired by 
Edison in 2001 soon after it had won a contract to run one of the ten schools in Chester 
Upland. 
 McIntire explained that the pressure on Edison to post competitive results in 
reading and math had grown so intense with the introduction of NCLB in 2003 that the 
company concluded that the holistic approach it had developed and proudly advertised 
would have to be curtailed.  “Reading and math scores became the company’s currency,” 
he said. Not only would foreign language, art, and music get less attention, McIntire said, 
but also science,  social studies, and even writing.  Edison had, in fact, developed a 
comprehensive writing curriculum, McIntire said, and once administered monthly 
benchmark assessments in science and social studies, too.  But the writing program and 
benchmark assessments in science and social studies, he said, got shelved.82 
 McIntire said he found this compromise disappointing and conceded that it 
opened up Edison to criticism for focusing on only what got measured, which in turn may 
have hindered the company’s growth. But McIntire countered that reading and math 
nevertheless constituted the subjects most fundamental to boosting the overall academic 
performance of underprivileged children.  McIntire added that Edison had developed 
systematic methods for teaching reading and math and for monitoring student progress.  
But implementing these methods, he reiterated, was often complicated by working with 
protean and controlling districts such as Philadelphia.83  Implementing these methods at a 
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charter school was far easier, as I would see in observing classes that day in York, but 
making money in managing a charter school could still be hard, as I would learn over 
lasagna and tossed salad that night in attending the monthly meeting of Lincoln’s board 
and hearing members press Edison for more for less.84 
 Despite the organizational challenges in Philadelphia, McIntire contended that 
Edison had brought about significant gains in reading and math.  This was the opinion of 
two scholars at Harvard, as well: Paul E. Peterson and Matthew M. Chingos, who 
coauthored studies in 2007 and 2009, both funded in part by Edison.85 
 The issue of Edison’s impact on achievement had for several years been the 
subject of rigorous assessment.  Following the critical analysis by Gary Miron and 
Brooks Applegate of Western Michigan University issued in 2000, cited earlier, the 
RAND Corporation published a 250-page study in 2005 called Inspiration, Perspiration, 
and Time: Operations and Achievement in Edison Schools.  RAND’s exhaustive study, 
involving visits to Edison schools across the country and sophisticated statistical 
treatment, was commissioned by Edison in 2000 and cost $1.4 million to complete.86 
 In comparing Edison schools to non-Edison schools with similar student 
populations, the RAND authors concluded, first, that it took Edison schools four years to 
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post as good or better results in reading and math; and, second, that after five years, 
Edison schools matched comparison schools in reading and surpassed comparison 
schools in math, though the achievement gains in math were not deemed statistically 
significant.87 
 The matter of statistical significance called for qualification and would repeatedly 
with the subsequent publication of competing academic claims.  The RAND authors 
found that the Edison gains in math were statistically significant if the baseline for 
comparison constituted results posted on state exams given in the spring of the first year 
(Y1) the schools were under new management.88 In promoting Edison, Chris Whittle 
cited this determination.89 However, the RAND authors also found that if, as is common 
practice for such investigation, the baseline for comparison constituted results from the 
year prior to the change in management (Y0)—and thus captured the impact of year one, 
which for many Edison schools was negative—the statistical significance disappeared.90 
 The RAND authors cautioned, though, that while this latter approach was 
chronologically sound, it did not account for two potentially significant factors: an abrupt 
change in student population when Edison took over schools; and the non-existence of 
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Y0 data for Edison schools (characteristically charters) that were brand new.91  A study of 
teacher retention published the same year by the Philadelphia think tank Research for 
Action (RFA) pointed to another potentially significant factor: an abrupt change in 
faculty population when Edison as well as other EMOs took over schools.92  Indeed, 
according to a 2003 story published by The Philadelphia Public School Notebook, 
teacher turnover from Y0 to Y1 at schools taken over by Edison and Victory spiked from 
19 to 40 percent and 17 to 40 percent, respectively.93 
 All these clarifications aside, the RAND authors conceded the point repeatedly 
made by McIntire:  “Local constraints, sometimes resulting from compromises required 
by local contracts, undermine the implementation of Edison’s preferred professional 
environment in some schools.”94  In this regard, John Chubb, Edison’s chief education 
officer, took the RAND study to mean that in the right circumstances, Edison delivered.95 
 In 2006, Douglas J. MacIver and Martha Abele MacIver, researchers at Johns 
Hopkins University, published another comparative study. Yet their study, funded by the 
National Science Foundation, was limited to Philadelphia.    Comparing district-run 
schools to those run by outside groups in Philadelphia and using test data from Y0 and 
earlier, the MacIvers concluded that Edison’s schools, on average, posted unimpressive 
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results: specifically, while Edison’s K-8 schools exhibited higher achievement gains in 
reading and math, Edison’s middle schools performed no better in math than peer schools 
and worse in reading.96  
 In 2007, RAND, in collaboration with RFA, published a similar study, funded by 
local foundations.97  But this time, researchers compared results from the forty-five 
schools in Philadelphia managed by all seven private managers as one group, on the one 
hand, to results from three district cohorts, on the other: twenty-one troubled schools that 
were restructured and provided intensive professional development as well as an 
additional $550 per pupil; sixteen underperforming schools that were deemed on their 
way up and were provided an additional $550 per pupil; and the remaining public schools 
in the city.98  All schools in the latter three groups employed a new K-8 curriculum 
comprising reading, writing, math, science, and social studies, with benchmark 
assessments every six weeks in all subjects but social studies.99 
 In examining reading and math scores for fifth- and eighth-grade students over six 
years (from 2000-2001 as Y0 through 2005-2006 as Y5) for schools in these four groups, 
the researchers found no justification for the city’s so-called diverse provider model: 
while all cohorts exhibited improvement, only the twenty-one restructured schools posted 
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significantly positive effects. In addition, the researchers concluded there was no 
evidence that competition from outside school managers had a catalyzing influence on 
the district as a whole.100  
 Taking issue with the methodology employed by RAND-RFA, Peterson and 
Chingos used a different approach.  Peterson and Chingos disaggregated results for 
schools run by for-profit and non-profit outside operators in Philadelphia, compared these 
results only to other low-performing schools from the pre-intervention period, and 
controlled for student movement in and out of schools.  Using the same time frame as the 
RAND-RFA researchers, they concluded in a study published later in 2007 that non-
profit school managers had a largely negative effect on student results in both reading and 
math while for-profit operators had a positive impact, with strong statistical significance 
in math.101  Peterson and Chingos drew the same conclusion two years later in a follow-
up study building on subsequent test results.102  
 But the debate continued. Responding to the initial paper by Peterson and 
Chingos, Vaughan Byrnes, a researcher at Johns Hopkins, countered in an article 
published in 2009 that five years of pre-intervention baseline test data, rather than one, 
should be used to guard against selection maturation or regression to the mean.  Byrnes 
moreover contended that comparing schools managed by EMOs only to other low-
performing schools from the pre-intervention period sidestepped the reality that some of 
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the highest-performing schools post-intervention belonged to the cohort of twenty-one 
troubled schools provided intensive professional development as well as an additional 
$550 per student.103     
 
Whether Peterson and Chingos were correct or RAND, RFA, the MacIvers, and Byrnes, 
all parties looked at school effectiveness within the narrow confines of reading and math 
scores.  Until 2006, reading and math scores were all that was available as test data.  But 
in 2006, Pennsylvania started administering an annual test in writing to students in fifth 
and eighth grades.  And in 2008, the state began administering an annual test in science to 
students in fourth and eighth grades.  As Edison was running sixteen schools in 
Philadelphia through 2009 and four of those schools through 2011, there are six years of 
writing scores to factor into an analysis of the company’s effectiveness.  And such an 
analysis provides much more than straight scores.  It pulls the curtain on the operation of 
a company driven to deliver what gets measured and little more.   
 Reading and math scores determined AYP, the federal standard for school 
effectiveness since the enactment of NCLB, and thus contract renewals for a company 
like Edison.  Results in subjects like writing or science did not matter.  They did not 
determine a school’s assessment.  They rarely, if ever, made it into the press.  Writing 
and science scores were accordingly measures that did not get measured.  And for 
precisely that reason, they are measures that measure a great deal. 
 If reading scores exceeded writing scores—and math scores, science scores—for 
Edison’s schools in Philadelphia to a greater degree than they did for other schools in the 
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district with similar student demographics, then it is fair to consider the distinction as 
evidence of the implicit danger of privatizing a complex service like education: the 
provider has every reason to concentrate on prominent metrics and otherwise shortchange 
the consumer.  Low scores in writing and science should in this regard convey not only 
little attention to writing and science but also little attention to any subject—from social 
studies and foreign language to art, music, and physical education—that does not get 
formally assessed. 
 As testing in science did not commence in Pennsylvania until 2008 and as proper 
science instruction requires lab equipment that ill-funded schools can ill afford, it makes 
sense for analytical purposes to focus on writing scores, given the six years of data and 
the low cost of instruction in writing.  As Edison worked with Philadelphia’s poorest 
students and as Pennsylvania disaggregates scores for students in many categories, 
including those economically disadvantaged, scores for students in this category at 
Edison’s schools may be compared to scores for students in the same category across the 
district.  While a significant majority of students in Philadelphia at this time were 
classified as economically disadvantaged, even more students in Edison’s schools 
belonged to this category.  In 2006, for example, 86 percent of fifth-graders and 82 
percent of eighth-graders across the district were defined as economically disadvantaged 
while 100 percent of fifth-graders and eighth-graders in Edison’s schools in the district 
were thus classified; five years later, the percentages were nearly unchanged.104  
                                                
104 Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2005-2006 PSSA and AYP Results and 2010-2011 




2011_pssa_and_ayp_results/1014980.  To arrive at net numbers for the district, the Edison 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 256 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Mean 
Edison Grade 5 Reading 17.2 14.7 34.0 27.3 21.4 37.1 25.3 
Edison Grade 5 Writing 16.8 14.2 12.8 21.1 17.9 25.7 18.1 
Reading – Writing 0.4 0.5 21.2 6.2 3.5 11.4 7.2 
Victory Grade 5 R 14.3 13.3 17.8 20.9 22.4 NA 17.7 
Victory Grade 5 W 21.6 16.9 17.9 24.9 24.8 NA 21.2 
Reading – Writing -7.3 -3.6 -0.1 -4.0 -2.4 NA -3.5 
Philadelphia Grade 5 R 30.0 30.2 33.3 38.1 38.4 43.0 35.5 
Philadelphia Grade 5 W 30.7 24.0 26.0 30.0 33.0 37.1 30.1 
Reading – Writing -0.7 6.2 7.3 8.1 5.4 5.9 5.4 
        
Edison Grade 8 R 32.5 35.0 48.8 53.1 65.5 51.0 47.7 
Edison Grade 8 W 28.5 34.4 26.1 30.2 36.6 32.1 31.3 
Reading – Writing 4 0.6 22.7 22.9 28.9 18.9 16.4 
Victory Grade 8 R 27.6 31.5 43.6 47.7 56.0 NA 41.3 
Victory Grade 8 W 34.4 33.1 35.5 37.4 42.5 NA 36.6 
Reading – Writing -6.8 -1.6 8.1 10.3 13.5 NA 4.7 
Philadelphia Grade 8 R 41.8 47.4 54.1 60.0 64.2 59.2 54.5 
Philadelphia Grade 8 W 39.1 44.2 39.4 44.6 50.1 46.9 44.1 
Reading – Writing 2.7 3.2 14.7 15.4 14.1 12.3 10.4 
Table 4.1  Percentage of students graded proficient on the PSSA reading and writing exams; and 
differences in proficiency in these subjects; students in all cohorts are  
classified as economically disadvantaged. Data source: Pennsylvania Department of Education, 
2005-2006 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP Results, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442.  
 
 What emerges from this analysis is twofold:  a classic illustration across the 
district of Campbell’s Law; and a classroom illustration in Edison’s schools of market 
                                                                                                                                            
numbers were subtracted.  Of 930 fifth-graders in Edison’s schools taking the writing exam, 930 
were classified as economically disadvantaged; of 1,211 eighth-graders in Edison’s schools 
taking the writing exam, 1,211 were classified as such.  For the district, minus Edison, 9,775 of 
11,350 fifth-graders belonged to this category, as did 9,171 of 11,201 eighth-graders.  In 2011, 
when Edison was running only four schools, 167 of 168 fifth-graders and 246 of 248 eighth-
graders belonged to this category; for the district, minus Edison, 8,916 of 10,389 fifth-graders and 
8,063 of 9,772 eighth-graders belonged to this category. 
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failure.  Much as Donald Campbell famously contended that the “more any quantitative 
social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to 
corruption pressures,”105 reading scores, which mattered for AYP, far exceeded writing 
scores, which did not; this finding comports with the conclusion of Brian Jacob in his 
study of the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools in the 1990s.106 
And much as the profit motive naturally accentuates the emphasis on results, this 
difference between reading and writing scores was even greater at schools managed by 
Edison. 
 The profit motive did not have to generate such pressure, however.  In fact, the 
one other for-profit school operator in Philadelphia at that time, Victory Schools, did not 
succumb.  Victory had been awarded contracts by the SRC in 2002 to run five schools 
and did so through 2010; as at Edison’s schools in Philadelphia, all fifth- and eighth-
graders at Victory’s schools were classified as economically disadvantaged.  Victory, the 
authors of the 2007 RAND-RFA report noted, was the only outside provider hired by the 
SRC—nonprofit or for-profit—to incorporate a comprehensive writing curriculum.107 The 
impact of this unlikely resistance to focus on reading and math alone was evident: the gap 
                                                
105 Donald T. Campbell, “Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change,” Social Research and 
Public Policies: The Dartmouth/OECD Conference, ed. G.M. Lyons (Hanover, NH: Public 
Affairs Center, Dartmouth College, 1975), 35.  
106 Brian A. Jacob, “Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing 
in the Chicago Public Schools,” Journal of Public Economics 89 (June 2005): 761-796. For 
additional insight into the perverse consequences of heavy monitoring of employees in general, 
see Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 429-437. 
 
107 Gill et al., State Takeover, 11.  
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between reading and writing scores for Victory students was far tighter than for Edison 
students (see Table 4.1).108  
 Reading and writing scores for Philadelphia as a whole—minus schools run by 
Edison and Victory—were tight in 2006 and 2007 and then spread.  In addition, the 
divide was wider for eighth-graders than for fifth-graders, suggesting a cumulative effect 
of focusing on reading at the expense of writing.  For 2008 through 2010, the divergence 
in proficiency for eighth-graders was striking, especially for Edison (see Chart 4.1).  The 
average proficiency rates in reading over these three years for these cohorts were close, 
especially for Edison and the rest of the district:  56 percent for Edison; 49 percent for 
Victory; and 59 percent for the rest of the district.  But the average proficiency rates in 
writing for this time period produced a different picture:  31 percent for Edison; 39 
percent for Victory; and 45 percent for the rest of the district.  
                                                
108 Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2005-2006 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP 
Results, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442.  The 
sample sizes for Edison’s fifth-graders for reading/writing for 2006 to 2011 were 1,003/930, 
708/684, 698/713, 593/570, 486/464, and 175/167.  For Edison’s eighth-graders, the sample sizes 
were 1,277/1,211, 1,296/1,188, 1,168/1,136, 1,106/971, 809/779, and 249/246.  The sample sizes 
for Victory’s fifth-graders for reading/writing for 2006 to 2010 were 287/259, 248/242, 247/246, 
234/217, and 210/206.  For Victory’s eighth-graders, the sample sizes were 410/384, 311/278, 
319/321, 277/270, and 266/259.  For the district,  
the sample sizes from 2006 to 2011 ranged from 7,743 to 10,093. 
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Chart 4.1  Percentage of eighth-grade students scoring proficient in reading and writing on the 
PSSA; students in all cohorts are classified as economically disadvantaged. Data source: 




    
At the heart of resistance to for-profit management of schools has been suspicion of 
corner-cutting to boost earnings. While this pattern of reading and writing scores for 
Edison does not qualify as explicit proof of such activity, it does imply a bottom-line 
approach to education so many opponents rejected. Atop shrinking margins, local 
territorial jealousy, and bureaucratic barriers, distrust of a for-profit company focused on 
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York, constituted a significant obstacle. What role distrust played in defeating Edison and 
the for-profit school management sector in general is difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify, but the defeat was decisive. 
 Whittle and the array of aforementioned Wall Street analysts had vastly 
misjudged the appeal of for-profit management of schools. Whittle’s prediction in 1991 
that Edison would run 1,000 schools with 2 million students by 2010 appeared in 
retrospect surreal.109 Among Wall Street analysts bullish on EMOs, Michael T. Moe of 
Merrill Lynch stood out.  Moe predicted in 1999 that in ten years, for-profit firms would 
be managing 10 percent of the nation’s K-12 schools.110  Had Moe been right, EMOs 
would have been running 10,000 schools in total in 2009.  They were  running 774.111 
 By September 2013, EdisonLearning had relocated its headquarters from New 
York to Knoxville, the company’s initial home two decades earlier, with Jeff Wahl 
working alone with the assistance of a secretary in an office park in Canton, Ohio.  And 
the company was on the block.  Liberty Partners, the private equity group that bought 
Edison in 2003, was winding down. 
 Liberty hired the Bank of Montreal (BMO) to find a buyer for EdisonLearning.  
Liberty sold its $37.5 million stake in Avenues, as noted earlier, to John Fisher.  That sale 
closed in November.112  In December, BMO sold the bulk of EdisonLearning to a 
                                                
109 Laura Simmons, “Whittle to Build 1,000 Schools: Cost of First 200 to Be $2.5 Billion,” The 
Knoxville-News Sentinel, May 15, 1991; and Mark Walsh, “Entrepreneur Whittle Unveils Plans 
to Create Chain of For-Profit Schools,” Education Week, May 22, 1991, 1 and 13.  
110 Michael T. Moe, Kathleen Bailey, and Rhoda Lau, The Book of Knowledge: Investing in the 
Growing Education and Training Industry (New York: Merrill Lynch & Co., April 9, 1999), 74-
75.   
111 Miron and Gulosino, Profiles, November 2013, 9. 
112 Whittle, Fourth Annual Avenues New Year Letter, 9. 
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supplementary educational services company based in Camden, New Jersey, called 
Catapult Learning.113 
 BMO failed to find a buyer for all of EdisonLearning.  Catapult, according to a 
company executive, was not interested in taking over the eleven school management 
contracts, the four online academies, or the thirteen credit-recovery centers run in 
partnership with Magic Johnson. Nor was anyone else interested. Catapult wanted only 
Alliance, the division helping school districts align curricula with state standards; 
eValuate, software used for benchmark assessments; Learning Force, an intervention 
program for students struggling in reading and math; and contracts to run summer school 
programs in Missouri and Illinois. 
 The price of the sale was not made public and for good reason.  The cost to 
Liberty of Edison in 2003 was $91 million, 90 percent below its initial valuation in 1999.  
Ten years later, Liberty, in turn, booked a loss of 85 percent on its investment.  
According to a banker with direct knowledge of the deal, Liberty received $18 million 
from Catapult for the lion’s share of EdisonLearning and redirected $3 million of that 
sum to Thom Jackson, EdisonLearning’s COO, to take over the remainder of the 
company and keep it going in order to honor prior commitments and thus avoid liability 
for breach of contract.  While this latter arrangement might sound implausible, it bears a 
close resemblance to what for-profit Corinthian Colleges did in 2013:  on its way to 
bankruptcy, Corinthian paid another company to take over four campuses in California.114 
                                                
113 BMO Capital Markets, M&A Advisory Deals, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.bmocm.com/industry-expertise/busservices/deals/. 
114 Richard Pérez-Peña, “College Group Run for Profit Looks to Close or Sell Schools,” New York 
Times, July 5, 2014. 
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 Much like KKR, which paid $240 million in 1994 for Channel One and all but 
gave it away to Alloy Inc. in 2007 for nothing more than assumption of liabilities,115 
Liberty would have served its client—the pension fund for Florida’s policemen, teachers, 
and state and county employees—far better by putting its money in an S&P 500 index 
fund; that investment a decade later would have been worth nearly $200 million. While 
Liberty may have retained earnings from 2003 through 2013, , what is nevertheless clear 
is that the private equity group paid much more for Edison than it got for the company a 
decade later.116  Like Wahl and Stecz before him, Jackson moved from COO to CEO and 
president.117  McIntire and many others, including Matt Given, EdisonLearning’s chief 
development officer, who had previously been vice president for development and 
government relations for Kaplan Virtual Education, moved over to Catapult.  
 The trajectory of high hopes and dashed dreams of Behavioral Research Labs, 
taken public in 1971 and shuttered in 1974, and Educational Alternatives Inc., taken 
public in 1991 and shuttered in 2000, was repeated.  Edison’s journey lasted longer but 
traced the same arc.  And just as the company’s exit from Philadelphia in 2011 and from 
Baltimore in 2013 went unreported, the sale of the once celebrated company garnered no 
media coverage.  In its press release, entitled “Combination Creates Largest Intervention 
                                                
115 Business Wire, “Alloy Broadens Media Offerings; Acquires Channel One,” April 23, 2007, 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070423005476/en.. 
116 Had Liberty played the tortoise instead of the hare, it could have invested that $91 million in 
an S&P 500 index fund such as State Street Global Advisors’ SPY.  On July 11, 2003, when 
Liberty was finalizing its purchase of Edison, SPY closed at $100.24 a share.  On December 13, 
2013, when BMO recorded the sale of EdisonLearning to Catapult, SPY closed at $178.11.  With 
annual dividends of 2 percent reinvested and taxed at the qualified dividend rate of 15 percent 
conferred corporations, that $91 million would have grown by December 2013 to nearly $200 
million. 
117 EdisonLearning, “EdisonLearning Names New Leadership Team,” January 31, 2014, 
http://edisonlearning.com/press-releases. 
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Services and Professional Development Provider,” Catapult did not even mention 
EdisonLearning. Catapult merely stated it had acquired Newton Alliance Inc., comprising 
Alliance, eValuate, Learning Force, and Summer Journey.118 In its press release 
announcing the ascendancy of Jackson, EdisonLearning made no mention of the sale.119 
Chart 4.2  Per-pupil expenditure for the school districts of Philadelphia and the Main Line 
suburbs; the averages for the five school districts of the Main Line are weighted. Data source: 
Pennsylvania Department of Education, Expenditure Data for All LEAs, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us.   
 
 The past repeated itself in Philadelphia, too.  Despite the efforts a decade earlier 
of such legislators in Harrisburg as Wallace Nunn, James Rhoades, Mario Civera, and 
                                                
118 Catapult Learning, “Combination Creates Largest Intervention Services and Professional 
Development Provider,” January 6, 2014, https://www.catapultlearning.com/catapult-learning-
acquires-newton-alliance/. 
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Nicholas Micozzie to level school funding across the state,120 Philadelphia continued to 
struggle with much less funding.  The contrast, for example, between per-pupil spending 
in Philadelphia and in the five neighboring school districts along the Main Line 
commuter rail (Great Valley, Haverford, Lower Merion, Radnor, and Tredyffrin-
Easttown) remained nearly unchanged (see Charts 3.1 and 4.2).  When Edison entered 
Philadelphia in 2002, the school district had 71 percent as much to spend per pupil as the 
Main Line school districts.  When Edison left Philadelphia in 2011, the school district 
had 76 percent as much to spend per pupil.  The next year, that amount dropped to 73 
percent and remained there the following year.121 
 Much as the state called in Edison in 2001 to study the Philadelphia School 
District and paid the company $2.7 million for its analysis, the Philadelphia School 
Reform Commission hired the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in 2012 to study the 
school district and paid the company $4.4 million, all of which came from private 
sources, for its advice.122  The title of BCG’s report, “Transforming Philadelphia’s Public 
Schools,” echoed Edison’s, “Strengthening the Performance of the Philadelphia School 
                                                
120 Thomas Fitzgerald, “Pennsylvania Proposal Would Raise Income Tax to Aid Schools,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 14, 2001. 
121 The per-pupil expenditure for Philadelphia versus the weighted per-pupil expenditure for these 
five Main Line school districts constitutes a consistent pattern from 1995-6 through 2012-13:  
1995-6 ($6,550/$9,569: 0.68); 1996-7 ($6,810/$9,559: 0.71); 1997-8 ($6,720/$9,995: 0.67); 
1998-9 ($7,105/$10,348: 0.69); 1999-2000 ($7,378/$10,763: 0.69); 2000-1 ($7,944/$11,421: 
0.70); 2001-2 ($8,332/$11,973: 0.70); 2002-3 ($8,790/$12,301: 0.71); 2003-4 ($9,768/$13,117: 
0.74); 2004-5 ($10,223/$13,888: 0.74); 2005-6 ($10,653/$14,398: 0.74); 2006-7 
($10,662/$14,825: 0.72); 2007-8 ($10,786/$15,664: 0.69); 2008-9 ($11,394/$16,320: 0.70); 2009-
10 ($12,223/$16,858: 0.73); 2010-11 ($13,096/$17,120: 0.76); 2011-12 ($12,352/$17,015: 0.73); 
2012-13 ($13,206/$18,006: 0.73).  All figures come from the Web site of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education, http://www.portal.state.pa.us. 
122 Benjamin Herold, “Consulting Group Playing Key Role in Philadelphia Plan,” Education 
Week, August 8, 2012, 12-13.  The William Penn Foundation provided $1.5 million; the 
remainder came from other donors. 
Chapter 4: Revision 
 265 
District.”  And much as Edison criticized the district for underperformance and 
recommended turning over its central office to a private firm, contracting with outside 
operators to run sixty to eighty struggling schools, consolidating curricula, conferring 
principals more autonomy to hire and manage, and outsourcing transportation and 
maintenance,123 BCG faulted the district for underperformance and recommended 
streamlining the central office, closing between twenty-nine and fifty-seven underutilized 
schools, segmenting the district by region into so-called portfolios of eight to ten 
“Achievement Networks” of charter and district schools, conferring principals more 
autonomy to hire and manage, and outsourcing more transportation and maintenance.124 
 Yet BCG’s report differed from Edison’s in one critical respect.  BCG stipulated, 
in italics, that involvement in the “Achievement Networks” be off limits to one group: 
“For-profit organizations would not be eligible.”125 
 
                                                
123 Edison Schools Inc., “Strengthening the Performance of the Philadelphia School District: 
Report to the Governor of Pennsylvania,” October 2001, 4, 14-17, 34, 45, 58-60. 
124 Boston Consulting Group Inc., “Transforming Philadelphia’s Public Schools:  Key Findings 
and Recommendations,” August 2012, 11, 12, 19, 38-40, 73, 
http://webgui.phila.k12.pa.us/uploads/v_/IF/v_IFJYCOr72CBKDpRrGAAQ/BCG-Summary-
Findings-and-Recommendations_August_2012.pdf. 
125 Ibid., 55. 









In more numerous respects than are commonly appreciated, the substitution of internal 
organization for market exchange is attractive less on account of technological economies 
associated with production but [sic] because of what may be referred to broadly as 
“transactional failures” in the operation of markets for intermediate goods. 
- Oliver E. Williamson, “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations,” The American Economic Review 61 (May 1971) 
 
In stipulating in its 2012 report that no for-profit organizations—that is, EMOs—would 
be eligible to run schools as part of its plan for Philadelphia, BCG did not provide an 
explanation. Disappointment with the decade-long experiment with Edison figures to 
have been the reason. The italicized proscription conveys a commitment not to repeat the 
past. The New York State legislature two years earlier had, in fact, amended its education 
law to read, underlined and in boldface, that applications from EMOs to manage charter 
schools would no longer be considered.1 What was nevertheless clear from Edison’s 
                                                
1 Laws of New York, 2010, Chapter 101, Section 1:  “An  application  to establish a charter 
school may be submitted by teachers, parents, school administrators,  community  residents  or  
any combination  thereof.... Provided however, for-profit business or corporate entities shall 
not be eligible....” (Emphasis in original.) Those EMOs with contracts were grandfathered. 
Chapter 5: Market Failure 
 267 
travails in Philadelphia as well as Baltimore, Chester, and several other cities is that 
businessmen had both underestimated the challenge of turning around schools in 
underprivileged communities and engendered significant distrust because of their 
commercial purpose. 
 Renovated facilities, established administrators, research-based curricula, and 
cutting-edge data systems would accomplish only so much in these communities. As 
described earlier, accomplished principals hired by Edison to run schools in Baltimore 
and Philadelphia confessed bewilderment.  Some could not retain staff or maintain 
student discipline or both.  Others who did failed to produce consistently better results on 
state exams.  In Chester, Edison resorted to student suspensions at alarming rates to 
maintain order and thus provoked the ire of not only the chairman of the district’s state-
appointed control board but also a columnist for The New York Times.2 
 Even when allocated more money per pupil, Edison struggled.  As explained at 
the outset of this book, because students themselves, technically speaking, constitute an 
input in the production function of education, schooling, like health care, differs 
substantially from conventional business.  Much as doctors struggle to achieve the same 
results for patients from low-income neighborhoods that they achieve for patients from 
middle- or upper-income neighborhoods, educators struggle in this context, too. With 
little if any control over enrollment, Edison was tasked with compensating for deficits at 
home and counteracting peer group effects.  Making matters worse, with high overhead 
for marketing, sales, and executive pay, funding for teacher aides to monitor student 
                                                
2 Brent Staples, “Editorial Observer: Fighting Poverty in a Worst-Case School,” New York Times, 
March 4, 2002. 
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behavior was frequently cut.  Edison’s calamitous start in Philadelphia in 2002 
constitutes a salient illustration of such cost-cutting. 
 Research into peer group effects indeed makes clear that troubled students distract 
classmates from their academic work and get them in trouble. Scott Carrell and Mark 
Hoekstra, for example, estimated in a 2010 study  “that adding one more troubled boy 
peer to a classroom of 20 students reduces boys’ test scores by nearly 2 percentile points 
(one-fifteenth of a standard deviation), and increases the number of disciplinary 
infractions boys commit by 40 percent.”3 Carrell and Hoekstra did not have sufficient 
data to estimate the compounding effect of two or more troubled boys, which stands to be 
nonlinear: that is, the impact on a classroom of three troubled boys could be much greater 
than three times the impact of one troubled boy.4 It is nevertheless evident that the 
negative externalities of bad behavior can be substantial for any school manager. 
 Running schools like efficient businesses cannot solve this problem because 
efficient management is beside the fact. Apart from decades of significant disparity in 
per-pupil funding between, for example, Philadelphia and neighboring suburbs, as 
documented earlier, children from low-income neighborhoods start school at a steep 
disadvantage.5 The nonprofit charter school networks that have succeeded in 
                                                
3 Scott E. Carrell and Mark L. Hoekstra, “Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed 
to Domestic Violence Affect Everyone’s Kids,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
2 (January 2010): 211-228.  The authors confined their study to the impact on classmates of 
children from homes documented in court records for domestic violence in one central Florida 
school district from 1995 to 2003.  The study concerned students in grades three through five in 
the district’s 22 elementary schools.   
4 Hoekstra confirmed this determination by e-mail, August 5, 2015. 
5 See Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, Economic, and Educational Reform to 
Close the Black-White Achievement Gap (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2004), 13-
59; and David C. Berliner, “Our Impoverished View of Educational Reform,” Teachers College 
Record 108 (2006): 949-995. See also David K. Cohen and Susan L. Moffitt, The Ordeal of 
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underprivileged communities have done so with greater control over enrollment and more 
money per pupil because of philanthropic largesse.  In addition, as nonprofits, they can 
operate with lower overhead.  Moreover, they have been spared the distrust and pushback 
generated by EMOs. 
 For precisely these reasons, there was talk in 2003 of Edison becoming a 
nonprofit rather than transitioning from a publicly traded company to a holding of the 
private equity group Liberty Partners.  Reflecting on the company’s demise at Edison 
headquarters in 2009, Tung Le, senior vice president for research and accountability, said 
he wished Edison had become a nonprofit. “It would have made our life much, much 
easier,” said Le, who had joined Edison in 1996 straight out of Harvard, where he had 
majored in government, as a teacher at the Boston Renaissance Charter School. 
According to Le, who remained with the company until 2012 before becoming the 
principal of the Heritage Christian School, a K-12 in Indianapolis, Edison executives 
were too wedded to their commercial ambitions to cut their losses and refashion their 
goals.  As a nonprofit, Edison, in Le’s opinion, could have retained executives with 
substantial though fixed salaries and would have prospered without distrust at every turn 
about its purpose.6 
   
Distrust greeted Edison in Baltimore and Philadelphia, as previously detailed, and never 
faded.  In this regard, long before Edison as well as Educational Alternatives Inc. (EAI) 
failed to flourish as forecasted, theory had established what practice would confirm.  In 
                                                                                                                                            
Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix the Schools? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 211-213, regarding the difficulty of turning around schools in low-income communities. 
6 Tung Le, interview, New York, March 16, 2009. 
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studying information asymmetry, transaction costs, mission alignment as well as 
obsolescing usefulness and territorial jealousy, one economist after another had revealed 
clear boundaries to the business model.   
 In an article published in 1963 in The American Economic Review on the 
economics of medical care, Kenneth J. Arrow contended that on account of the 
asymmetry of information between doctor and patient, “the behavior expected of sellers 
of medical care is different from that of businessmen in general.”7  Arrow elaborated:  
“Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the 
physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very much 
greater than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties.”  By contrast, 
Arrow wrote, the gap in information about “production methods” of conventional 
commodities is much tighter.8 
Citing a term coined by the sociologist Talcott Parsons, Arrow wrote that there is 
accordingly a “collectivity-orientation” to medicine that distinguishes it along with other 
professions from standard business, “where self-interest on the part of the participants is 
the accepted norm.”9 In illustration of this difference between the conduct of doctors and 
typical businessmen, Arrow continued: 
(1) Advertising and overt price competition are virtually eliminated among 
physicians. (2) Advice given by physicians as to further treatment by 
himself or others is supposed to be completely divorced from self-interest.  
                                                
7 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” American 
Economic Review 53 (December 1963): 941-973. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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(3) It is at least claimed that treatment is dictated by the objective needs of 
the case and not limited by financial considerations. While the ethical 
compulsion is surely not as absolute in fact as it is in theory, we can hardly 
suppose that it has no influence over resource allocation in this area.  
Charity treatment in one form or another does exist because of this tradition 
about human rights to adequate medical care. (4) The physician is relied on 
as an expert in certifying to the existence of illnesses and injuries for 
various legal and other purposes.  It is socially expected that his concern for 
the correct conveying of information will, when appropriate, outweigh his 
desire to please his customers.10 
 
 Times have obviously changed since Arrow’s article was published. Cancer 
centers, dermatology clinics, and orthopedic hospitals advertise their services today much 
like hotels, spas, and ski resorts.  And hospitals across the country have been recently 
exposed for charging whatever they can get away with.11  Arrow’s central contention 
nevertheless stands that because of the asymmetry of information between doctor and 
patient, doctors are not expected to act like conventional businessmen; Arrow’s argument 
indeed helps to explain the recent outrage directed at such hospital billing practices. 
 For everyday goods and services, as Arrow noted, the divide between provider 
and purchaser is not so wide, though it surely exists.  George Akerlof made this and its 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us,” Time, March 4, 2013, 16-55; H. 
Gilbert Welch, “Diagnosis: Insufficient Rage,” New York Times, July 4, 2013. 
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consequences clear in his 1970 article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics entitled 
“The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.”12 The 
recent revelation that eight restaurants in New Jersey belonging to the multinational chain 
T.G.I. Friday’s were found by the state’s Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control to be 
pouring bottom-shelf liquor in place of premium spirits ordered by customers provides a 
specific illustration of the gulf between provider and purchaser.13  While Akerlof’s used-
car dealer might sell lemons, a brand-name restaurant might pass off well gin as Bombay 
Sapphire or Hendrick’s.   
 Because of such information asymmetry, government agencies, like New Jersey’s 
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, as well as consumer groups step in to level 
transactions.  The Food and Drug Administration is dedicated to ascertaining that what 
we eat, drink, and take for medicine is safe and properly labeled; local health departments 
likewise regularly inspect restaurant kitchens.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
aims to protect investors by requiring timely, detailed reports from publicly traded 
companies and by investigating anomalous trading activity. The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration works to make sure that cars are soundly engineered. 
Furthermore, private publications like Consumer Reports issue comprehensive 
assessments of cars and countless other products to tell buyers what’s good, what’s not, 
and why. 
                                                
12 George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August 1970): 488-500. 
13 Marc Santora and Michaelle Bond, “Many Bars Misled Drinkers, New Jersey Says,” New York 
Times, July 31, 2013.  
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While schools are monitored by state and local authorities, ranked by newspapers, 
magazines, and Web sites, and visited on occasion by parents, the information these 
parties obtain is necessarily limited.  Moreover, just as there is an urgency to the 
diagnosis and treatment of an illness, there is likewise an urgency to the identification 
and remediation of a learning disability, lest a cognitive deficit evolve and in the process 
generate emotional difficulties. There is no such urgency to the purchase of a stock or 
bond, a car, a dishwasher, or a lawn mower; all such transactions afford the consumer the 
opportunity to shop around.  The difference between educator and student is, accordingly, 
much akin to the difference between Arrow’s doctor and patient.  The chasm in 
knowledge is similar; and the time element, crucial. 
Setting aside resistance from teachers to curricula imposed by an outside manager 
and animosity from civic leaders opposed to surrendering control of their schools—on 
display as early as the 1970s in Gary, Indiana, in response to the managerial role of 
Behavioral Research Labs (BRL)—the fundamental reason I found such outsourcing 
problematic when I began studying this subject a decade ago is that I knew too well as a 
teacher that the process of education lacks the transparency necessary for proper contract 
enforcement.  In the language of principal-agent theory, there is too much incentive and 
freedom for the school operator as agent to act selfishly, defying the interests of the 
taxpayer as principal. 
 The immediate consumer is, after all, a child or adolescent who is in little 
position, like Arrow’s medical patient, to judge the quality of service rendered, as noted 
in Chapter 1.  Even if the consumer is an adult, as is the case in the controversial for-
profit tertiary sector defined by the likes of Career Education, Corinthian, DeVry, 
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Education Management, Grand Canyon, ITT, Strayer, and the University of Phoenix, the 
gap between instructor and student does not afford sufficient transparency. That was the 
implicit message of Abraham Flexner’s previously cited critique of commercially 
operated medical schools in his 1910 study of medical training:  profits came at the 
expense of good equipment, properly staffed laboratories, complete curricula, and high 
standards.14 
This for-profit tertiary sector took off and for some time flourished in a way that 
EMO founders and analysts had forecasted for the K-12 sector. The difference in 
trajectories made sense. First, the consumer at the tertiary level is an adult, perhaps taking 
classes in the evening on the way home from work or perhaps online at home. Second, 
these institutions met a need unfilled by community colleges and universities that had 
failed to add capacity or flexible scheduling.  In this regard, the federal government had, 
in essence, outsourced a substantial portion of higher education to private operators, 
funding instruction with federal student loans and leaving administration to entrepreneurs 
rather than building more community colleges and universities. 
As the U.S. Department of Education has allowed for-profit tertiary institutions to 
collect up to 90 percent of tuition in the form of federal student loans (and up to 100 
percent in the case of veterans, servicemembers, and spouses),15 this sector differs little in 
financial terms from EMOs receiving approximately 90 percent of district per-pupil 
                                                
14 Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (New York: Carnegie Foundation, 1910; 
reproduced, 1972), p. 126.   
15 U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid, https://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-
center/school/proprietary. See also Alia Wong, “The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges,” The 
Atlantic, February 23, 2015. 
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funding to educate students in primary and secondary schools. The means of payment and 
the jurisdictions differ, but not the math, except that students at the tertiary level are 
taking out loans they must repay. However, as many students do not make it to 
graduation at these for-profit tertiary institutions and as many of those who do so fail to 
find gainful employment, they default on their loans at more than twice the rate of their 
counterparts who attended public or private nonprofit schools.16 The adult student is 
accordingly not the only consumer in the equation at the tertiary level. The taxpayer, too, 
is a party to the transaction and necessarily as an outsider knows much less about the 
quality of service rendered. 
The high dropout and default rates ultimately led to a backlash reflecting to some 
degree the rejection of BRL, EAI, and Edison. By 2014, attorneys general in thirty-seven 
states were conducting fraud investigations of for-profit colleges.17 By 2015, only DeVry 
and Grand Canyon of the eight aforementioned companies stood strong. Corinthian, a 
darling of Wall Street a decade earlier, was out of business.18 Education Management 
was trading for pennies a share. Career Education was trading 88 percent lower than in 
2010; ITT, 98 percent lower; Strayer, 81 percent lower; and Apollo, the parent company 
of the University of Phoenix, 75 percent lower.19 The election of Donald Trump as 
                                                
16 U.S. Department of Education, First Official Three-Year Student Loan Default Rates 
Published, September 28, 2012, http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/first-official-three-year-
student-loan-default-rates-published. See also Wong, “The Downfall of For-Profit Coleges.” 
17 Wong, “The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges.” 
18 Floyd Norris, “Corinthian Colleges Faltering as Flow of Federal Money Slows,” New York 
Times, June 26, 2014; Michael Stratford, “Corinthian Closes for Good,” Inside HigherEd, April 
27, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/27/corinthian-ends-operations-
remaining-campuses-affecting-16000-students. 
19 Share prices for the five-year span come from the close of trading on April 23, 2010, and May 
13, 2015. For Career Education (CECO), the decline was from $34.10 a share to $4.24; ITT 
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president in 2016 led to a rebound for the for-profit education sector. Trump, after all, 
had run his own for-profit university, focused on real-estate development, and his 
secretary of education, Betsy DeVos, was an ardent supporter of for-profit school 
management and an investor in several for-profit educational enterprises. DeVos, in turn, 
appointed likeminded deputies to reverse course. “Top officials in Washington who 
spearheaded a relentless crackdown on the multibillion-dollar industry,” reported The 
New York Times one month after the inauguration, “have been replaced by others who 
have profited from it.”20 Yet the rebound did not return the sector to its 2010 heights.  
Apollo was taken private in 2017 at under one-sixth its value in 2010.21 Career Education 
and Strayer were trading in 2018 at 40 percent their value in 2010; ITT, at 44 percent.22 
 
In a long article in The Yale Law Journal in 1980 on the economics of nonprofit 
organizations, Henry Hansmann built on Arrow’s argument and placed the disparity 
between provider and recipient at the heart of his analysis.23  Hansmann argued that 
schools, nursing homes, hospitals, and relief agencies like the American Red Cross or 
                                                                                                                                            
(ESI), $111.78 to $2.23; Strayer (STRA), $253.03 to $48.01; and the University of Phoenix 
(APOL), $63.53 to $16.82. 
20 Patricia Cohen, “For-Profit Schools, an Obama Target, See New Day Under Trump,” New York 
Times, February 20, 2017. 
21 Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, “University of Phoenix Parent Company Goes Private,” Washington 
Post, February 1, 2017.  
22 The share price on March 29, 2018, for CECO was $13.14; for ESI, $48.95; and for STRA, 
$101.05. 
23 Henry B. Hansmann, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,” The Yale Law Journal 89 (April 
1980): 835-901. 
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CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) do not fit the commercial 
model because of a particular type of “market failure.”24 
In the case of schools and relief agencies, the recipient is not the purchaser.  Much 
as one would not give money to a for-profit version of CARE because one would be hard 
pressed to know if the refugee or famine victim benefited as promised, one should be 
averse, Hansmann wrote, to using a for-profit provider of schooling for one’s children 
because one would likewise be hard pressed to know if services have been provided as 
promised (Hansmann’s analysis predated significant development of the for-profit 
tertiary sector). In the case of nursing homes and hospitals, the recipient may, in fact, be 
the purchaser but is regardless ill equipped to evaluate his or her own needs.25  The result 
in all cases, Hansmann concluded, is “contract failure,” as producers or providers cannot 
be policed “by ordinary contractual devices.”26  
Hospitals and nursing homes are nevertheless widely run as for-profit enterprises.  
The same holds for prisons, which companies started managing soon after the publication 
of Hansmann’s article.  Management of nursing homes in the United States has, in fact, 
long been proprietary.  According to a 1974 survey, 76 percent of nursing homes were 
run by for-profit entities; by 2013, the proportion had slipped but stood strong at 68 
percent.27 Since the publication of Hansmann’s article, the share of the nation’s 




27 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, National 
Nursing Home Survey, 1973-1974, DHEW Publication No. (H RA) 77-1779 (Hyattsville, MD: 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, July 
1979), 2; Lauren Harris-Kojetin et al., “Long-Term Care Services in the United States: 2013 
Overview,” National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Health Statistics 3 (37)  (2009) 12. 
Chapter 5: Market Failure 
 278 
community hospitals run by for-profit organizations has climbed significantly, from 13 
percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 2011.28  Corporate management of prisons came into 
existence in 1983 with the founding of Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).  By 
1990, CCA and its competitors were running 5 percent of the nation’s state and federal 
prisons; by 1995, 8 percent; by 2000, 16 percent; and by 2005, 23 percent.29 
In all three domains, insufficient transparency has hindered proper contract 
enforcement and thus opened the way to substantial breaches of protocol. Newspapers, 
magazines, academic journals, and watchdog organizations have consistently documented 
such violations.30 Several studies concern elder care. While nonprofit management of 
                                                
28 American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals from the 2013 AHA Annual 
Survey, http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml. 
29 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Federal 
Correctional Facilities, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 1, 20; 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Federal 
Correctional Facilities, 2000, August 2003, 2, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ csfcf00.pdf; 
Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2005, October 1, 2008, 1, A1, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csfcf05.pdf.  The proportion of the nation’s inmates in 
privately managed prisons does not correspond to the share of the nation’s prisons under private 
management, as privately run prisons, on average, house fewer inmates.  The growth rate has 
nevertheless been significant.  In 1990, 1 percent of the nation’s inmates were held in privately 
run prisons; in 1995, 2 percent; in 2000, 7 percent; and 2005, 8 percent.  
30 For illustrations of breaches of protocol by for-profit hospitals and health care companies, see, 
for example, Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein, “When Money Is the Mission—
The High Costs of Investor-Owned Care,” New England Journal of Medicine 341 (August 5, 
1999): 444-446; Solomon Moore, “Alleged Scheme Involved Homeless,” New York Times, 
August 10, 2008; Alex Berenson, “Long-Term Care Hospitals Face Little Scrutiny” and “Trail of 
Disquieting Reports from Hospitals of Select Medical,” New York Times, February 10, 2010; 
John Carreyrou, “Home-Health Firms Blasted: Senate Panel Alleges Big Providers Abused 
Medicare by Tailoring Patient Care to Maximize Profits,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2011; 
Julie Creswell and Reed Abelson, “A Giant Hospital Chain Is Blazing a Profit Trail,” New York 
Times, August 14, 2012; and Eduardo Porter, “Health Care and Profits, a Poor Mix,” New York 
Times, January 8, 2013.  For such breaches by for-profit prison management organizations, see, 
for example, Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex,” The Atlantic, December 1998, 51-
77; Margaret Talbot, “The Lost Children: What Do Tougher Detention Policies Mean for Illegal 
Immigrant Families?,” The New Yorker,  March 3, 2008, 58-67; Christopher Hartney and 
Caroline Glesman, Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in 
the U.S. (Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 2012); Sam Dolnick, “As 
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nursing homes has hardly been blameless,31 the incidence of deficiencies in care at for-
profit nursing homes has been significantly higher.  This has been documented by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as well as many scholars.32 In a 
rigorously constructed study published in 2002 in the Journal of Health Economics, the 
economist Shin-Yi Chou, for example, determined that residents of for-profit nursing 
homes who were not monitored by kin (defined as a visit by a spouse or child within the 
first month of admission) were more likely to suffer from dehydration and urinary tract 
                                                                                                                                            
Escapees Stream Out, a Penal Business Thrives,” New York Times, June 16, 2012; Dolnick, “At a 
Halfway House, Bedlam Reigns,” New York Times, June 17, 2012; Holly Kirby et al., “The Dirty 
Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate about 30 Years of Corrections Corporation of America,” Grassroots 
Leadership, June 2013, http://grassrootsleadership.org/cca-dirty-30; and Margaret Newkirk and 
William Selway, “Gangs Ruled Prison as For-Profit Model Put Blood on Floor,” 
BloombergBusiness, July 12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-12/gangs-
ruled-prison-as-for-profit-model-put-blood-on-floor. 
31 See Bruce C. Vladeck, Unloving Care: The Nursing Home Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 
1980), 122-127. Vladeck faulted both proprietary and nonprofit nursing homes for deficiencies in 
care. While Vladeck noted that comparative studies had “found no statistically significant 
differences in the quality of care,” it would be incorrect to infer much from these studies given 
that measurements for differentiation had, so far, been “too primitive.” Vladeck wrote that his 
impression from interviews and observations was that, on average, nonprofit nursing homes were 
“somewhat better.”  Sophisticated statistical assessments have since found significant differences 
in quality of care.  This may be the result of improvements in measurement or changes in practice 
at nursing homes or some combination. 
32 See Shin-Yi Chou, “Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An Empirical 
Analysis of Nursing Homes,” Journal of Health Economics 21 (March 2002), 293-311; Jane 
Banaszak-Holl et al., “Comparing Service and Quality among Chain and Independent U.S. 
Nursing Homes during the 1990s,” Center for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship, 
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 2002, 
https://centers.fuqua.duke.edu/case/knowledge_items/comparing-service-and-quality-among-
chain-and-independent-nursing-homes-during-the-1990s/; Will Mitchell et al., “The 
Commercialization of Nursing Home Care: Does For-Profit Cost-Control Mean Lower Quality or 
Do Corporations Provide the Best of Both Worlds?,” presentation, Strategic Management 
Society, Baltimore, November 2003, 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/seminarscalendar/Aparna_seminar_paper.pdf; Daniel R. Levinson, 
“Trends in Nursing Home Deficiencies and Complaints,” Office of Inspector General, 
Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, September 18, 2008, 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-08-00140.pdf; and Anna A. Amirkhanyan, Hyun Joon Kim, 
and Kristina T. Lambright, “Does the Public Sector Outperform the Nonprofit and For-Profit 
Sectors? Evidence from a National Panel Study on Nursing Home Quality and Access,” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 27 (Spring 2008): 326-353.   
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infections than their counterparts in the same circumstances at nonprofit nursing homes; 
Chou found this was all the more true if these residents were “cognitively unaware.”33 
While for-profit hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons cannot be regulated by 
conventional contractual means, their financial success should not be a mystery.  It 
derives not from contractual soundness but, rather, inadequate scrutiny and 
countervailing force. For precisely the reasons Arrow proffered, for-profit hospitals, like 
all hospitals, are hard to monitor and challenge.  As for nursing homes and prisons, 
Hansmann’s critique abides.  Yet the feeble elderly represent a marginalized population, 
and the incarcerated, a condemned one.  Neither group inspires the sympathy necessary 
for effective advocacy.  Concern for prisoners’ rights is especially muted.  As a case in 
point, a hedge fund chief joked in a presentation at an investor conference at New York’s 
Marriott Marquis in 2009 that the prison management sector bore a distinct advantage: if 
your customers try to leave, you can shoot them.34 
 
While it is true in the case of education, as I learned as a teacher and administrator 
responsible for scheduling at a high school in New York City called Beacon, that high 
school students may consistently identify certain teachers as lacking, it is also true that 
they’re apt to complain about certain teachers who are good but demanding and that 
they’re insufficiently informed about subject matter to know whether instructional 
corners are being cut in, say, a chemistry or language lab; elementary school students 
make for an even more vulnerable audience.  I was reminded of this problem at Beacon’s 
                                                
33 Chou, “Asymmetric Information.” 
34 Steve Schaefer, “Jailhouse Shock,” Forbes, October 21, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/21/ackman-corrections-corp-markets-equities-value.html. 
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twentieth-anniversary celebration in June 2013 when a 2008 graduate thanked me for 
having long before encouraged him to stick with a teacher whose class he repeatedly tried 
to switch out of in the first months of his junior year.  This alumnus said that he not only 
in time came to like this teacher a lot, as I had figured he would, but also learned from the 
experience how to adapt to classes in college as well as work situations that he initially 
found frustrating. 
As for the parent, taxpayer, and policymaker, he or she can know only so much 
about what is taking place inside schools.  Parent-teacher nights are shows and at that 
infrequent, brief shows.  The schools get spruced up:  custodians wax the floors; art 
teachers and their students redecorate bulletin boards in the lobby and corridors; and 
teachers cover the walls of their classrooms with student projects.   When the curtain goes 
up, administrators and teachers alike are dressed their best and radiate an uncommon 
warmth.  In the course of the evening, parents rarely spend more than five minutes 
speaking with individual teachers, and within two hours, the curtain falls, not to rise 
again for another four or five months. 
Tests likewise provide a murky picture of what’s going on.  The infamous 
incident in Texarkana, Arkansas, in 1970 described in the Introduction—where an 
experiment in performance-based contracting found that a company hired by the district 
to run its remediation program had allowed students to preview exam questions—
illustrated one dimension of the perverse consequences of testing.  The brazen correction 
of answer sheets by teachers or principals detected by forensic firms hired to do erasure 
studies and documented by Brian Jacob and Steven Levitt in their 2003 study of cheating 
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in the Chicago Public Schools illustrates another.35  Discovery in 2011 of pervasive test 
tampering by teachers or principals in Atlanta, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, 
D.C., gives greater weight to this concern.36   
However, far more widespread than outright disclosure of questions in advance or 
fixing of responses afterward is the pedestrian practice of teaching to the test, described 
earlier in Baltimore and Philadelphia.  This approach may lead to higher scores that 
parents, taxpayers, and policymakers can point to in the newspaper but typically 
constricts curricula, stifles imaginations, and denies classrooms their vitality. 
 
In technical terms, the issue of outsourcing school management is a make-buy decision 
that boils down to transaction costs.  If the costs of pricing, negotiation, transportation, 
and quality inspection involved in purchasing a good or service from an outside provider 
are deemed too high, as Ronald Coase argued in his seminal 1937 article in Economica 
entitled “The Nature of the Firm,” the buyer should internalize production of that good or 
service.37 
                                                
35 Shaila Dewan, “Experts Say Schools Need to Screen for Cheating,” New York Times, February 
13, 2010;  Brian A. Jacob and Steven D. Levitt, “Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the 
Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (August 
2003): 843-877.  See also Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist 
Explores the Hidden Side of Everything (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 25-37. 
36 Barbara Martinez and Tom McGinty, “Students’ Regents Test Scores Bulge at 65,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 2, 2011; Jack Gillum and Marisol Bello, “When Standardized Test Scores 
Soared in D.C., Were the Gains Real?,” USA Today, March 28, 2011; Kim Severson, “Systematic 
Cheating Is Found in Atlanta’s School System,” New York Times, July 5, 2011; Benjamin Herold 
and Dale Mezzacappa, “2009 Report Identified Dozens of PA Schools for Possible Cheating,” 
Philadelphia Public School Notebook, July 8, 2011, http://thenotebook.org/blog/113871/2009-
report-identified-pa-schools-possible-cheating. 
37 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4 (November, 1937): 386-405. 
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In the case of especially complex services or manufacturing processes, it is often 
too difficult and costly to write contracts with sufficient specificity.  In elaborating on the 
work of Coase, Oliver E. Williamson made this clear in a 1971 article in The American 
Economic Review on the vertical integration of production and clearer still in a 1985 book 
entitled The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.38  “In more numerous respects than are 
commonly appreciated,” Williamson wrote, “the substitution of internal organization for 
market exchange is attractive less on account of technological economies associated with 
production but [sic] because of what may be referred to broadly as ‘transactional failures’ 
in the operation of markets for intermediate goods.”39 
Competition between providers, in other words, looks great in theory but often 
involves costly inefficiencies in practice.  As John D. Donahue subsequently put it in his 
book The Privatization Decision, “Eternally hopeful calls for competition spring from the 
powerful intellectual aesthetic of economic theory, from a deep and almost mythic 
American faith in the benign effects of the competitive rough-and-tumble…. Yet the 
healthy conviction that competition is desirable is too often linked with the unwarranted 
inference that it is easy to arrange.”40 
Fundamental to such difficulty is distrust.  On account of relationships cultivated 
between firms over generations in Japan, Williamson put forth as an example, Japanese 
businessmen engage in more subcontracting than their American counterparts: “cultural 
                                                
38 Oliver E. Williamson, “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” 
American Economic Review 61 (May 1971): 112-123; Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985). 
39 Williamson, “The Vertical Integration of Production.” 
40 John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989), 126. 
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and institutional checks on opportunism” diminish “the hazards of trading.”41  In the 
tight-knit ultra-Orthodox Jewish community of diamond merchants in New York, 
contracts themselves are unnecessary, pointed out Jon Elster in his book Explaining 
Social Behavior. Verbal agreements suffice.42 When such trust can’t be mustered, the 
market mechanism must be rejected in favor of in-house production of the good or 
service, a decision that often results in the acquisition of the subcontractor, as classically 
illustrated by General Motors’ absorption of Fisher Body in 1926.43  
It is moreover not merely the cost of padded expenditures that can make 
subcontracting so expensive but also the price of writing and monitoring contracts to 
prevent and expose such padding.  What applies to businesses applies equally to 
municipal, state, and federal governments.  In assessing the privatization campaign 
waged in the 1990s by the World Bank, Rafiq Ahmed and Louis T. Wells turned the 
argument on its head.  “The core assumption of privatization enthusiasts—that the 
scarcity of government skills means that privatizing is easier than improving 
infrastructure in state hands—has been proved too simple,” they wrote in a book on 
governments in developing countries contracting with multinational corporations.  
“[E]ven more government skill may be required to privatize and to govern privatized 
infrastructure than is needed for the difficult task of running state-owned enterprises 
                                                
41 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 120-123. 
42 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 338. 
43 Ibid., 114-115. 
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well.”44 The determinants of market failure indeed transcend sectors, from manufacturing 
to medical care, corrections, education, and foreign direct investment. 
 Given the complexity and opacity of the educational process, trust takes on 
paramount significance when a district outsources school management.  Buying, rather 
than making, discrete goods like scheduling software and  textbooks or distinct services 
like busing and meal preparation involves straightforward contracting and can hence 
prove highly cost-effective.  The same holds for a range of specific tasks commonly 
outsourced by municipalities across the country. In a rigorous analysis commissioned by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development under President Ronald Reagan, the 
economist Barbara J. Stevens compared the costs of ten cities in Southern California 
using contractors for eight basic functions to the costs of ten cities in the same region 
using municipal agencies for the same functions, which comprised payroll preparation, 
tree maintenance, turf maintenance, trash collection, street cleaning, traffic signal 
maintenance, janitorial service, and street paving.  Controlling for quality, Stevens found 
that while there was no difference in the cost of payroll preparation, cities spent 
significantly less in using contractors for the seven other services, from 27 percent less on 
tree maintenance to 49 percent less on road paving.45  The high fixed costs for equipment 
                                                
44 Louis T. Wells and Rafiq Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property and National 
Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 281. 
45 Barbara J. Stevens, “Comparing Public- and Private-Sector Productive Efficiency: An Analysis 
of Eight Activities,” National Productivity Review 3 (Autumn 1984): 395-406.  The 
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of outsourcing by municipal governments, see Donahue, Privatization Decision, 131-149, and 
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explain this difference.  It makes little sense, of course, for a small city to buy asphalt 
distributor trucks and paving machines that it will not put to everyday use.  
 Yet outsourcing the management of a city’s schools does not entail such 
straightforward contracting.  Both the process and purpose of education are far less 
subject to objective assessment than trash collection and road paving.46  Albert Shanker, 
the president of the American Federation of Teachers, made precisely this point in 1994 
in objecting to Edison’s model in his weekly column in The New York Times sponsored 
by his union: “When a school district contracts with a for-profit company to build a new 
gymnasium, it’s relatively easy to make sure the district gets what it pays for. But when it 
considers hiring a for-profit company to manage schools, as a number are now doing, it’s 
a different story.  Assessing the quality of this kind of service is very tough, especially 
since there is little experience to go on.”47 
 For Edison and its EMO competitors, this difference in contracting added one 
more hurdle to the business of running schools as an outsider.  In addition to the 
substantial costs of marketing, contract negotiation, travel, investor relations, and 
professional development, Edison and its peers faced the persistent challenge of winning 
trust in a realm of necessarily incomplete contracts. 
Making matters worse, even if EMOs win such trust, they may not be able to 
maintain their contracts for long.  Many multinational corporations, explained Ahmed 
and Wells, enter into so-called obsolescing bargains when investing in foreign mining 
                                                
46 See Craig E. Richards, Rima Shore, and Max B. Sawicky, Risky Business: Private Management 
of Public Schools (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1996), 144-148. 
47 Albert Shanker, American Federation of Teachers advertisement, “Where We Stand: Striking a 
Good Bargain,” New York Times, June 5, 1994. 
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operations or infrastructure projects (such as telecommunication networks, water 
filtration systems,  energy plants, or utility grids), knowing full well that client countries 
in time will gain the know-how and desire to assume control.48  As Raymond Vernon put 
it in a 1967 lecture entitled “Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts,” both the client 
government and the foreign concessionaire have understood “that, once a bargain had 
been struck, once capital had been sunk by the foreign concessionaire, his bargaining 
position was bound to be weakened precipitately.”49 
The evolution of Indosat, an Indonesian subsidiary of International Telephone and 
Telegraph (ITT), provides a salient illustration of a concessionaire’s attenuating leverage, 
according to Ahmed and Wells.  When Indosat rejected a request in 1979 by President 
Suharto to lay a submarine cable across the Strait of Malacca, on the grounds that it 
would be a bad investment, the government nationalized the company, nullifying a 
twenty-year lease seven years early.50 After thirteen years, Indonesian engineers had 
developed the skills to run the network on their own, and the government could 
accordingly exit its agreement with ITT and spare its citizens the cost of a premium to a 
foreign company.51 
EMOs have likewise had to concede the ephemeral nature of their appeal.  Client 
districts or charter boards stand to conclude after several years that they can sever ties 
with EMOs, preserve the best practices, and thus save money without sacrificing quality. 
                                                
48 Wells and Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe, 66-73.   
49 Raymond Vernon, “Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts,” Proceedings of the American 
Society for International Law, April 1967, 84.  See also Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay 
(New York: Basic Books, 1971). 
50 Wells and Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe, 9, 34, 47. 
51 Ibid., 68. 
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When Winston Brooks explained as the superintendent of schools in Wichita, Kansas, in 
2002 why the city’s school board terminated its agreement with Edison to run two of four 
schools under contract, he gave voice precisely to this line of reasoning. Brooks noted 
that after seven years of working with Edison, Wichita had learned several important 
pedagogical strategies from the company and could continue to implement them 
independently without paying a premium.  Brooks said the district expected as a result to 
save $500,000 a year.52  Dudley Blodget, the head of the Boston Renaissance Charter 
School, another of Edison’s four initial clients in 1995, likewise contended after ending 
his relationship with Edison in 2002 that the company’s help was no longer needed.  
“We’ve now got the internal strength to be more independent,” said Blodget. “Edison is a 
great start-up model. We could never have gotten off the ground without them.  But now 
we want to run the school ourselves.”53   In both cases, Brooks and Blodget, in keeping 
with arguments made by Coase, Williamson, Vernon, and Ahmed and Wells, internalized 
production.  
 
Obsolescing appeal, asymmetry of information, transaction costs, and territoriality 
constitute four patent obstacles to for-profit educational management.  Less obvious but 
equally powerful is the “collectivity-orientation” of education that Arrow ascribed to 
medicine.  This orientation underlies the difficulty for EMOs of winning buy-in from 
                                                
52 Winston Brooks, interview transcript for Frontline: Public Schools Inc., PBS, July 3, 2003 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/edison. 
53D.C. Denison, “School of Hard Knocks in the Bull Market,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2002. 
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teachers. The service identification of teachers runs counter to the commercial purpose of 
EMOs.54 
 Much as model military personnel work for honor rather than financial 
compensation and are accordingly driven by their identity as soldiers, good teachers 
likewise work for civic distinction and are driven by their identity as educators.55 This 
conclusion comports with the seminal work of the British sociologist Richard M. Titmuss 
on blood donation.  To Titmuss, monetary compensation for blood donation appeared to 
nullify the reward of helping one’s community and thus diminish or, as economists would 
later put it, “crowd out” the intrinsic desire to donate blood.56  Building on Titmuss, the 
French economists Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole explained how in many contexts, 
individuals opt for altruistic behavior over financial gain to win social esteem.57  Building 
on Bénabou and Tirole, the Swedish economists Carl Mellström and Magnus 
Johannesson returned to Titmuss, subjected his case to the rigor of empirical analysis, 
and concluded that financial incentives can indeed crowd out altruistic behavior.58 
                                                
54 See George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape 
Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 22-25.  In 
contrast to conventional economic theory, whereby workers respond to financial incentives to 
maximize their “utility” as consumers, workers, according to Akerlof and Kranton, may aim as 
much to advance a cause to maximize their “utility” as servants of that cause. 
55 See Dan Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1975), 28-29, 103-106, 111-116, 121-124. 
56 Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1970; New 
York: The New Press, 1997), 114-116, 289-292. 
57 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole, “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,” American Economic 
Review 96 (December 2006): 1652-1678. 
58 Carl Mellström and Magnus Johannesson, “Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss 
Right?” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (June 2008): 845-863.  The authors 
note, however, that the effect was statistically significant only in the case of female participants in 
their study, which involved thirty-five men and fifty-four women. 
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 Workers who identify with the mission of their leaders dedicate themselves 
selflessly to their work, whereas their opposites do the bare minimum of what is required 
and typically look elsewhere for employment.59  It is in this framework that the challenge 
of EMOs to attract and retain gifted teachers becomes unmistakably clear.  This service 
identification or collectivity orientation, in addition, explains in part the difficulty for 
EMOs of achieving economies of scale.  All labor-intensive sectors are constrained by 
Baumol’s Law, as explained in Chapter 1.60 And yet several labor-intensive sectors 
without such service identification or collectivity orientation—from advertising and 
consulting to insurance and law—do achieve economies of scale. 
 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, for fiscal year 2009, 
school districts across the country devoted, on average, 81 percent of their budgets to 
salaries and benefits (see Table 1.1).  That same year, the advertising agency IPG devoted 
70 percent of its operating expenses to salaries and benefits; the consulting firm 
Accenture, 80 percent; the insurance company Aon, 70 percent; and the nation’s major 
law firms, 78 percent.61  However, in adding copy editors, analysts, actuaries, and 
associates to robust divisions or practices, advertising agencies, consultancies, insurance 
                                                
59 To Akerlof and Kranton, workers who identify with the mission of their leaders are “insiders,” 
dedicating themselves selflessly to their work, whereas workers who do not are “outsiders.” See 
Akerolf and Kranton, Identity Economics, 41-49. 
60 William J. Baumol, The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 20-24. 
61 Interpublic Group of Companies Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File #1-6686 
(Form 10-K),” December 31, 2009, 13; Aon Corporation, “Securities and Exchange Commission 
File #1-7933 (Form 10-K),” December 31, 2009; Accenture PLC, “Securities and Exchange 
Commission File #001-16565 (Form 10-K),” August 31, 2009, F-5; James D. Cotterman, 
“Compensating Partners and Associates in Trying Economic Times,” Altman Weil Direct: Report 
to Legal Management, September 2009, 1, 
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/64272ef8-56f0-4b9a-b519-
95351ee0310a_document.pdf. 
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companies, and law firms realize outsize returns for executives, partners, and 
shareholders.  While these returns are not exponential, as they can be in manufacturing, 
where unit costs of mass production are dwarfed by set-up or fixed costs, they are indeed 
sharply linear. 
 Major law firms, for example, stand to make $141,000 in annual profit off the 
work of each first-year associate, according to a 2012 study.  Firms, in this scenario, 
gross $468,000 on $327,000 spent on salary, benefits, training, recruiting, computers, 
office space, and secretarial assistance, amounting, in sum, to a 43 percent return for firm 
partners.62   But in this and similar fields, in contrast to education, there is no discomfort 
with outsize returns for two reasons.  First, there is no collectivity orientation or service 
identification to the work done.  Second, there is sufficient transparency for proper 
contract enforcement, as the purchaser of the good or service is the recipient. 
 When Accenture develops a new distribution strategy for Boeing, Kraft Foods, or 
Pfizer, it specifically serves the interests of company executives and shareholders, not the 
general public, though the general public is surely served indirectly through better 
service. Accenture likewise delivers its services to the executives with whom it 
negotiated contracts.  There is no third party, as there is in education, child care, or relief 
work. 
 The service identification or collectivity orientation of education is all the more 
clear in the context of public versus private goods.  While quality schooling and medical 
care serve private ends, they simultaneously serve essential public purposes, as well.  In 
                                                
62 Trenton H. Norris, “Law Firm Economics 101,” presentation, Berkeley School of Law, March 
13, 2012, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/careers/Law_Firm_Economics_101_Mar_2012_Berkeley.pdf. 
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contrast to private goods, such as wristwatches or concert tickets, which cannot be 
enjoyed by anyone if enjoyed by everyone, public goods, like clean air and water, cannot 
benefit anyone without benefiting everyone.63  As an educated citizenry is widely 
understood to lead to a more interesting, productive, and safer society, education in the 
general sense is much akin to clean air and water. The shared results accordingly call for 
shared investment, which, in turn, calls for careful accounting and personal sacrifice. For 
schools, such careful accounting means trim budgets, with surpluses, when they occur, 
plowed back into institutional development. And such personal sacrifice means an ethos 
defying commercial interests.  
Catholic schools, in particular, exemplify institutions driven by a collective 
mission.  Their leaders pride themselves on minimal overhead and depend on the selfless 
dedication of teachers, who until recently were in large part priests, brothers, and nuns.  
While less specifically mission-driven, public as well as independent schools likewise 
bear the impress of this same orientation and struggle to make budgets.  In fact, this 
orientation is so strong among American independent schools that its charter 
organization, the National Association for Independent Schools (NAIS), bars for-profit 
operators from membership.64  What applies to schools in this regard applies to police 
and fire departments as well as the armed forces.  Here, too, the shared results of public 
safety call for shared investment and thus careful accounting and personal sacrifice.  
                                                
63 See Sclar, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For, 23-26.  Sclar cites shoes and theater 
tickets as classic illustrations of private goods.  Sclar writes with regard to education: “There are 
many examples of goods that can be produced privately for a specific group of people but are so 
valued in terms of their external impacts that they are publicly provided to foster wider use.  
Primary and secondary education is the most obvious and salient example.” 
64 See NAIS membership requirements: http://www.nais.org/Articles/Pages/School-
Membership.aspx (last updated June 17, 2013). 
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The issue of educational management and distrust may be vividly viewed in the context 
of optics, or appearances, by the kind of car an academic leader drives—or in which he or 
she is driven.65  As a fractal, like a grain of sand under a microscope reflecting the 
contours of a coastline, the car is a powerful image, conveying not only self-regard of the 
user but also his or her disposable wealth.  In the loose sense of Benoit Mandelbrot’s 
exposition of embedded resemblance, the self-similarity of car and user is often distinct.66 
 If an academic leader has the disposable wealth for a luxury car, or if an academic 
institution budgets the money to provide its leader with a luxury car, pinched parents, 
faculty members, taxpayers, and students have cause to question the institution’s 
allocation of resources.  Because of the service identification or collectivity orientation of 
education and because of the information asymmetry inherent to schooling, academic 
leaders must reassure their constituents that dollars are being well spent. A luxury car 
consequently sows doubt. By contrast, for the reasons given earlier, few people if any 
would raise an eyebrow if an executive at Accenture, Boeing, Kraft Foods, or Pfizer 
drove—or was driven in—a luxury car. 
As the president of Harvard University in the early aughts, the economist Larry 
Summers, was derided by faculty and students for being chauffeured in a Cadillac 
limousine while a predecessor, the legal scholar Derek Bok, was lauded for driving an old 
Volkswagen Bug, parking it in a university garage, and walking across campus to his 
                                                
65 Regarding the power of optics, or appearances, in corporate psychology, see Nick Paumgarten, 
“The Death of Kings: Notes from a Meltdown,” The New Yorker, May 18, 2009, 43. 
66 Regarding fractals, see Jim Holt, “He Conceived the Mathematics of Roughness,” New York 
Review of Books, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/may/23/mandlebrot-mathematics-of-roughness/. 
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office.67 While strict cost-benefit analysis might have justified Summers’s decision to be 
driven rather than drive (as he could get important work done in the back seat rather than 
spend time behind the wheel), a loose assessment leads to a different conclusion, 
especially in the case of a Cadillac limousine rather than a conventional sedan. In this 
regard, Henry Rosovsky, a Harvard economist from an earlier era and the dean of the 
university’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences for many years as well as the university’s acting 
president for two, articulated an abstract conception of costs and benefits in his 1990 
book on university governance.  Acknowledging at once the issue of optics and fiduciary 
responsibility, Rosovsky cautioned that university leaders must be acutely aware of 
expenses and appearances.  Rosovsky noted, in particular, that the luxury of first-class 
plane travel for Harvard administrators in his day was prohibited by university policy 
“and rightly so.”68 
Much like Summers, an affable, gregarious headmaster of an independent K-12 
school where I taught in the 1990s was ribbed relentlessly for driving a Porsche 911 
Carrera convertible, given to him as a fiftieth birthday present by his wife, so much so 
that he decided to keep the car at his weekend home.  Though a private purchase, the 
Porsche conveyed an unsettling carefree message to parents struggling to pay tuition as 
well as faculty on tight budgets.  The headmaster, after all, was paid far more than 
teachers and provided free housing in a large, elegant residence on campus. 
                                                
67 Alan Finder and Kate Zernike, “Embattled President of Harvard to Step Down at End of 
Semester,” New York Times, February 21, 2006; Marcella Bombardieri, “Leader Forgoes Campus 
Salary: Harvard’s Bok Resists a Trend,” The Boston Globe, November 22, 2006. 
68 Henry Rosovsky, The University: An Owner’s Manual (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 54, 
257-258. 
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A classic scene in the 1992 film Scent of a Woman underscores the mismatch of 
educational management and executive ease.  When students at a tony prep school decide 
to humiliate their imperious headmaster, they target his brand-new dark Jaguar XJS.  
Putting their scientific and artistic skills to malicious use, they employ a remote-control 
device to inflate a massive balloon suspended from a lamppost by the headmaster’s 
designated parking spot in the heart of the campus just as he steps out of his car at the 
beginning of the day.  A blasphemous illustration spreads across the expanding balloon 
depicting the headmaster truckling to trustees.  Before a growing crowd of puzzled 
onlookers, the indignant headmaster pulls out his car key and lunges to puncture the 
balloon.  Both the headmaster and his car end up covered in white paint.69 
This fictional headmaster, the real headmaster, and Summers all missed the 
subtext, the subliminal message, much as EMO chiefs have failed to grasp the general 
implication of for-profit school management.  Chris Whittle, in fact, insisted on having 
his own car and driver.  This was true when he was publisher of Esquire in the 1980s, to 
the consternation of Phillip Moffitt, a college friend with whom he had bought the 
magazine, and when he ran Edison.  Moffitt, who served as Esquire’s editor, complained 
that such an expense was extravagant, especially in a city streaming with taxis; an Edison 
staff lawyer made the same observation two decades later.70 
Right or wrong, constituents took style to be substance. This psychological effect 
applies to the previously mentioned matter of teacher buy-in, in particular.  The financial 
focus of EMOs crowds out the altruistic spirit basic to teaching.  This is not to say that 
                                                
69 Scent of a Woman, directed by Martin Brest (Santa Monica, CA: City Light Films, 1992). 
70 Vance H. Trimble, An Empire Undone: The Wild and Hard Fall of Chris Whittle (New York: 
Birch Lane, 1995), 192; anonymous Edison staff lawyer, 2008. 
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teachers do not care about money; higher salaries have been documented to attract people 
to teaching.71  But it is to say that big salaries and bonuses for EMO executives alienate 
teachers driven by civic ideals. No EMO, in this regard, has generated among its teachers 
or administrators the enthusiasm of such nonprofits as Teach for America (TFA) or the 
Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP). 
While TFA may anger policy makers as well as career educators for mandating 
only a two-year commitment to the profession and while TFA’s Summer Institutes for 
new teachers may be inadequate as preparation for the classroom, more than 50,000 
college students vied for 5,000 spots in 2011, and those who succeeded put in long days 
for five summer weeks studying pedagogical theory and practice without pay.72  While 
TFA has recently slipped in its popularity, it is still a top recruiter on campuses across the 
country.73 Moreover, thousands of TFA participants and alumni meet regularly without 
pay at regional conferences to discuss educational policy without pay.74  While KIPP 
suffers from high teacher burnout and attrition, more than 3,000 KIPP teachers and 
administrators year after year attend the organization’s annual School Summit at the end 
                                                
71 Rothstein, “Teacher Shortages Vanish When the Price Is Right,” New York Times, September 
25, 2002. 
72 For selectivity and retention, see Morgan L. Donaldson and Susan Moore Johnson, “TFA 
Teachers: How Long Do They Teach? Why Do They Leave?,” Phi Delta Kappa 93, 2 (October 
2011): 47-51; Michael Winerip, “A Chosen Few Are Teaching for America,” New York Times, 
July 12, 2010; Andrew Doughman, “Legislative Showdown Brewing over $2 Million for Teach 
for America,” Las Vegas Sun, May 20, 2013.  For detail regarding the Summer Institutes, Annie 
Em, “No Pay from TFA,” Daily Kos, April 16, 2013, 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/04/16/1202244/-No-pay-from-TFA-Teach-for-America. 
73 “Schoolhouse Rocked,” Time, February 23, 2015, 15. 
74 See the Web site for TFA summits: http://www.teachforamerica.org/corps-member-and-
alumni-resources/alumni-summits 
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of July for four days of professional development without pay.75 And while these 
nonprofit organizations compensate their leaders with big salaries, as will be detailed in 
the next chapter, the salaries are fixed, in keeping with nonprofit practice.  EMOs, by 
contrast, pay significant bonuses to executives on top of hefty salaries.  Some EMO 
executives earn far more, in fact, than superintendents of school districts far greater in 
size and complexity. 
 In 2003, for instance, Edison operated 133 schools (with a total enrollment of 
80,000 students) as well as its Educational Services Group, comprising Newton Learning 
(providing after-school and summer-school programs), Tungsten Learning (providing 
professional development and assessment software), and Edison U.K. (an educational 
consultancy serving British school districts).  By contrast, the New York City Department 
of Education in 2003 operated 1,429 schools (with a total enrollment of 1.1 million 
students) as well as myriad supplementary programs.76 
 As chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, Joel Klein earned 
a fixed salary of $245,000.77  Setting aside profits that may have been made from early 
allocations of shares in the company, Edison executives made considerable sums. As 
CEO of Edison, Chris Whittle earned a base salary of $207,000 and a bonus of $625,000; 
as president and COO, Christopher Cerf earned a base salary of $293,269 and a bonus of 
                                                
75 See the Web site for KIPP summits:  http://www.kipp.org/kipp-school-summit.  According to 
Steve Mancini, KIPP’s  director of public affairs, about half of KIPP School Summit attendees 
are there on their own time. Mancini, interview, New York, July 18, 2014. 
76 NCES, “Characteristics of the 100 Largest Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts 
in the United States: 2002-03,” table 1:  
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/100_largest/tables/table_1.asp 
77 Karla Scoon Reid, “Former Justice Official to Head NYC Schools,” Education Week, August 7, 
2002. 
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$425,000; as chief education officer and executive vice president, John Chubb earned a 
base salary of $286,539 and a bonus of $285,000; and as vice chairman for business and 
finance, Charles J. Delaney earned a base salary of $288,192, a bonus of $450,000, and, 
as a newcomer, a restricted stock award valued at $330,000.78 In sum, while Klein ran a 
school system fourteen times bigger than Edison, he did not make half as much as any of 
the company’s four most highly paid executives and he did not make a quarter as much as 
the company’s vice chairman for business and finance.  
  
 To many teachers at schools managed by Edison, the high salaries and bonuses 
for executives could not be squared with their everyday pedagogical needs.  Megan Zor, 
who taught social studies from 2004 to 2006 at Gillespie Middle School in North 
Philadelphia, one of the twenty schools in Philadelphia turned over by the state to Edison 
in 2002, bristled at the contrast between executive pay and the condition of Gillespie.  
“How could people at the top be making lots of money,” Zor wondered three years later, 
“when we didn’t have soap in the bathrooms?  How could people at the top be making 
lots of money when we had six principals in two years, when we had no reading 
specialist, when we had no resources for the lowest-performing students, except the 
bubble kids [those students on the cusp of passing state exams]?”79 
 Zor had been placed at Gillespie through TFA upon graduating from the 
University of Missouri. Upon completing her two-year TFA commitment at Gillespie, 
Zor took a teaching position across town at the Shoemaker Campus of Mastery Charter 
                                                
78 Edison Schools Inc., “Securities and Exchange Commission File #000-27817 (Form 10-K),” 
September 30, 2003, 59.  
79 Megan Zor, interview, Philadelphia, February 10, 2009. 
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Schools. The principal of Shoemaker, Sharif El-Mekki, had been the principal of nearby 
Shaw Middle School, another of the twenty schools in Philadelphia turned over by the 
state to Edison in 2002; Shoemaker likewise had been one of five Philadelphia schools 
turned over by the state in 2002 to another for-profit firm, Chancellor Beacon Academies.  
Preceding both Zor and El-Mekki in moving from Edison to the nonprofit realm of 
charter schools was Richard Barth, who left the company in January 2006 as head of 
operations for its schools in Philadelphia and president of its District Partnerships 
Division to become CEO of KIPP.80 
 Preceding Barth in the move from Edison to KIPP was Gap founder and chairman 
Donald Fisher, who had donated $1.8 million in 1998 to fund the startup of an Edison 
charter school in San Francisco and pledged $25 million more to California school 
districts that signed on with Edison.81  Soon after viewing a 60 Minutes segment in 1999 
about KIPP’s two middle schools, one in Houston and the other in the Bronx, the denim 
magnate and his wife, Doris, wrote a check for $15 million to fund the replication of the 
charter school.82  By 2013, thanks to that initial donation and more support from Fisher 
and other philanthropists, KIPP numbered 141 schools across twenty states and the 
District of Columbia.83  Along with Doris and Donald Fisher came their aforementioned 
son John, a major investor in Edison who would become the chairman of KIPP’s board of 
directors. Preceding the Fishers was Scott Hamilton, an executive at the Edison Project 
                                                
80 Menash Dean, “Edison Schools Loses Top Official,” Philadelphia Daily News, January 17, 
2006. 
81 Ann Grimes, “School Board Seeks to Revoke Edison Charter,” Wall Street Journal, February 
20, 2001. 
82 Jay Mathews, Work Hard. Be Nice. (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin, 2009), 263-268. 
83 KIPP School Directory, http://www.kipp.org/schools/school-directory-home. 
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from its first days who then became associate commissioner of education for charter 
schools in Massachusetts and after that the managing director of the Fisher family’s 
foundation.  It was Hamilton who convinced Fisher to watch a videotape of the 60 
Minutes story. 




Chapter 6: The Nonprofit Alternative 
 
Mastery is what Edison was supposed to be. 
- Sharif El-Mekki, Principal, Edison Shaw Middle School, 2003-2008; Mastery 
Shoemaker Campus, February 10, 2009 
 
Edison and KIPP were conceived and born at the same time.  As educational concepts, 
they could be termed fraternal twins, offspring of the same movement to challenge 
conventional public education but distinct in appearance and behavior. 
 While Chris Whittle was planning his network of schools from 1992 to 1994 with 
Benno Schmidt, John Chubb, Chester Finn, Dominique Browning, Sylvia Peters, Daniel 
Biederman, and Nancy Hechinger at the corporate headquarters of Whittle 
Communications in Knoxville, Mike Feinberg and Dave Levin were teaching at 
elementary schools in Houston as young members of Teach for America (TFA) and 
brainstorming at night as housemates about how to better serve their students.  While 
Whittle and Schmidt were raising millions of dollars from Time Warner, Philips 
Electronics, and Associated Newspapers, Feinberg and Levin were securing thousands of 
dollars from the likes of Jim “Mattress Mack” McIngvale, the owner of a bustling 
furniture store on the north side of Houston. When Feinberg and Levin opened KIPP in 
Houston in 1994 with forty-seven fifth-graders in one classroom at Garcia Elementary 
School, Whittle was one year behind, opening four elementary schools in 1995—one 
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each in Massachusetts, Michigan, Kansas, and Texas—with a total enrollment of 2,250 
students.  By 1999, KIPP comprised two schools, the inaugural campus in Houston and a 
second in the Bronx, with a total enrollment just shy of 500.  Edison, by contrast, 
comprised sixty-one schools across seventeen states and the District of Columbia with a 
total enrollment of 37,500 students.1 
 
Chart 6.1  Number of schools managed by Edison and KIPP. The school counts for 
Edison from 1995 to 2003 come from Brian Gill et al., Inspiration, Perspiration, and 
Time: Operations and Achievement in Edison Schools (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 13; 
numbers for subsequent years come from correspondence with Edison officials. The 
school counts for KIPP come from correspondence with KIPP officials; the numbers for 
2012 through 2014 come from the organization’s Web site.  
 
 
                                                
1 Jay Mathews, Work Hard. Be Nice. (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin, 2009),, 94-99, 252-
253.  For Edison data, see Table 3.1. 
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 Although Edison and KIPP were never in official competition with each other, 
had there been such a competition, Edison would have ended up the proverbial hare, and 
KIPP, the tortoise.  By 2014, Edison was managing ten schools, down from eleven the 
previous year, along with four virtual schools and thirteen credit-recovery centers.2  KIPP 
meanwhile was managing 162 schools, up from 141 the previous year (see Chart 6.1).  
Until 2004, KIPP operated only middle schools.  By 2014, the organization was running 
sixty elementary schools and twenty-two high schools as well as eighty middle schools.3 
 KIPP had moreover spawned a multitude of lookalike nonprofit organizations 
aimed at closing the achievement gap between privileged and underprivileged children 
through longer school days, strict codes of conduct, intense concentration on standardized 
tests, and contracts with parents to check homework, support school rules, and attend 
parent-teacher conferences.  These organizations, commonly called Charter Management 
Organizations (CMOs), to be distinguished from for-profit Educational Management 
Organizations (EMOs), moreover set college as the goal for all students.  Finally, in 
keeping with Myron Lieberman’s opposition to unionized teachers as obstacles to 
collaboration and efficiency, these CMOS, like Edison and its EMO competitors 
managing charter schools, employed at-will contracts, retaining the right to dismiss 
teachers if and when administrators decided to do so.  By 2014, ten such CMOs shared 
the spotlight with KIPP and together, in sum, managed another 242 schools (see Table 
6.1).   
  
                                                
2 EdisonLearning lost its contract in 2014 to continue running an elementary school in 
Davenport, Iowa. 
3 Data collected from the KIPP Web site on July 20, 2014. 
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CMO Origin Schools and Locations, 2014 Total 
Achievement First New Haven, 
Conn., 1999 
17 in Brooklyn; 11 in Conn. (5 in New 
Haven; 4 in Hartford; 2 in Bridgeport); 




Oakland, 1999 35 across Calif.; 3 in Memphis 38 
Democracy Prep Manhattan, 
2006 
8 in Manhattan; 2 in the Bronx; 2 in 











15 in Philadelphia; 2 in Camden, N.J. 17 
Noble Network of 
Charter Schools 
Chicago, 1999 17 in Chicago 17 
Rocketship Public 
Schools 
San Jose, 2007 9 in San Jose; 1 in Milwaukee; 1 in 
Nashville 
11 
Success Academy Manhattan, 
2006 
15 in Manhattan; 9 in Brooklyn; 6 in 
the Bronx; 2 in Queens 
32 
Uncommon Schools Newark, 1997 21 in Brooklyn; 10 in Newark; 4 in 
Rochester; 3 in Boston; 2 in Troy, 
N.Y.; 2 in Camden, N.J. 
42 
YES Prep Houston, 1998 13 in Houston 13 
Table 6.1 Ten CMOs sharing KIPP’s pedagogical philosophy. Data collected from Web 
sites of each charter network in September 2014. 
 
 While none of Edison’s chief EMO competitors suffered Edison’s fate, none 
experienced growth close to KIPP’s.  In addition, EMOs as a whole steadily lost ground 
to CMOs.  The three EMOs rivaling Edison in 2001 were the Leona Group, with thirty-
three schools (fourteen in Arizona and nineteen in Michigan); Mosaica, with twenty-two 
schools across eleven states, from Massachusetts to Arizona; and National Heritage 
Academies (NHA), with twenty-eight schools (twenty-three in Michigan, four in North 
Carolina, and one in Rochester, New York).  By 2014, the Leona Group was running 
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sixty-five schools across five states; Mosaica, twenty-eight schools across seven states as 
well as several online academies; and NHA, eighty-two schools across nine states.4   
 Only EMOs focused on online education—such as K12 and Connections 
Academy—exhibited the exponential growth posted by KIPP.  As explained in Chapter 7, 
this virtual sector posed little if any threat to local school boards intent on retaining day-
to-day managerial authority over their schools.  For a school board to turn over school 
buildings as well as per-pupil expenditures to an EMO is one thing.  It is quite another to 
allocate funds to an EMO for online education of either home-schooled students or 
students interested in courses like Chinese, Russian, or advanced math that a typical 
school might not be able to provide.  Moreover, as labor-light enterprises, virtual EMOs 
can grow at much less cost than conventional brick-and-mortar EMOs.  
 This far less visible and slimmer form of educational outsourcing has accordingly 
taken off.  The number of virtual schools is deceptively small, as several enroll thousands 
of students:  Insight Schools of Portland, Oregon, for example, counted 3,200 students in 
its Washington State virtual high school in 2011-2012; Altair Learning of Columbus, 
Ohio, that same year counted 12,304 students in its K-12 Ohio program.5  But the number 
of students in virtual schools run by EMOs is patently significant.  While amounting to 
                                                
4 Data collected from Web sites of each EMO on July 24, 2014; to guard against double-
counting schools for Mosaica that have both elementary and middle divisions, schools 
with one address and one principal were counted as one school. 
5 Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education 
Management Organizations: Fourteenth Edition, 2011-2012 (Boulder, Colorado: 
National Education Policy Center, November 2013), 69, 79, 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12. 
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only 10,325 in 2003-2004, the number had climbed to 142,386 by 2011-2012 (see Charts 
6.2 and 6.3).6  
 
Chart 6.2  Number of EMO and CMO brick-and-mortar schools and of EMO virtual 
schools.  Data source: Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Education Management Organizations: Fourteenth Edition, 2011-2012 
(Boulder, Colorado: National Education Policy Center, 2013), 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12. 
 
 In sum, by 2011-2012, the latest academic year for which cumulative data are 
available, nearly one-third of students in schools managed by EMOs were online 
students; the number of CMO schools had far surpassed that of EMO schools; and the 
number of students in CMO schools had far exceeded the number of students in EMO 
brick-and-mortar schools. If this trend persists, enrollment in EMO virtual schools stands 
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to break 500,000 by 2020;7 enrollment in CMO schools stands to surpass 700,000;8 and 
the number of KIPP schools stands to exceed 275, with its total enrollment, which now 
averages 360 students per school, exceeding 90,000.9 
 What is nevertheless clear is that what hurt Edison and stymied its competitors 
enabled KIPP and its siblings.  The result was a fourth way of providing public 
education.  The traditional neighborhood public school constituted the archetype to be 
reformed. The schools of choice within the public school system developed from the 
1970s onward by the likes of Seymour Fliegel, Deborah Meier, and Ted Sizer constituted 
a second way: principals got waivers from local and state authorities to provide a more 
flexible curriculum to better address the academic and emotional needs and interests of 
students; and teachers remained unionized but consented to work outside the boundaries 
of contract regulations to this end. 
 Aiming to amplify such choice and run schools with even greater freedom from 
central offices, EMOs introduced a third way: with the managerial and marketing tools of 
big business, external operators like Edison used at-will employment contracts where 
possible and sought to provide richer curricula, boost test results, and, in the process, 
make a profit.  KIPP and its fellow CMOs introduced a fourth way, using the same 
managerial and marketing tools of big business, utilizing the same at-will employment 
                                                
7 This projection is based on the following local polynomial regression:  y=1915x2-
10926x+28319, with R2=0.99. 
8 This projection is based on the following linear regression: y=40568x-95004, with 
R2=0.81. 
9 This projection is based on the following local polynomial regression:  y=0.5366x2-
4.023x+7.2617, with R2=0.99.  The estimate of KIPP enrollment per school comes from 
Miron and Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education Management 
Organizations, 117. 
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contracts, seeking the same goals as EMOs, but substituting the pursuit of profit with a 
zeal for improvement defined by a shared credo of “no excuses.”   
 
Chart 6.3  Number of students in EMO and CMO brick-and-mortar schools and in EMO 
virtual schools. Data source: Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Education Management Organizations: Fourteenth Edition, 2011-2012 
(Boulder, Colorado: National Education Policy Center, 2013), 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12. 
 
 In the case of KIPP, in particular, the organization’s ubiquitous motto, “Work 
Hard. Be Nice,” and its five so-called pillars conveyed this intensity: first, “high 
expectations”; second, “choice and commitment” (by students, parents, and teachers alike 
to be affiliated with KIPP and to adhere to its high expectations); third, “more time” 
(meaning a longer school day and year); fourth, “power to lead” (meaning autonomy of 
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results.”10 
 The language in KIPP’s charter to describe parental obligations in their 
“Commitment to Excellence” is unequivocal: “We will make sure our child arrives at 
KIPP every day by 7:25 a.m. (Monday-Friday) or boards a KIPP bus at the scheduled 
time.... [W]e will check our child’s homework every night, let him/her call the teacher if 
there is a problem with the homework, and try to read with him/her every night. We will 
always make ourselves available to our children and the school, and address any concerns 
they might have.” The language used to describe the emphasis on results is likewise 
blunt:  “KIPP schools relentlessly focus on high student performance on standardized 
tests and other objective measures.  Just as there are no shortcuts, there are no excuses.  
Students are expected to achieve at a level of academic performance that will enable them 
to succeed at the nation’s best high schools and colleges.”11 
 This emphasis by KIPP on results is no less businesslike than Edison’s, which 
helps to explain the migration of key Edison people to KIPP, from Scott Hamilton, 
Donald Fisher, and John Fisher as backers to Richard Barth as an executive.  This 
emphasis on results by CMOs in general helps to explain the significant support and 
direction they receive from leaders in the financial and business communities. Bankers, 
fund managers, and corporate executives live by numbers.  And these people steer the 
boards of CMOs like KIPP. 
 The board of KIPP in 2014, for example, was chaired by John Fisher, head of an 
investment group called Sansome Partners, and comprised, among others, the CEOs of 
                                                
10 KIPP’s Five Pillars, http://www.kipp.org/our-approach/five-pillars. 
11 Ibid., 13, 15. 
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Netflix and Viacom as well as a senior managing director of Bain Capital. The board of 
Success Academy the same year was chaired by the maverick hedge fund CEO Daniel 
Loeb and included, among others, nine investment executives.  And the board of Mastery 
Charter Schools in Philadelphia was chaired by the senior vice president for finance and 
business operations at Comcast and comprised, among others, two private equity 
executives and a partner at Ernst & Young. For their philanthropic efforts, these 
benefactors are naturally inclined to judge progress in the same numerical terms they 
employ for assessing success in the workplace.  They are likewise inclined to endorse the 
philosophy of “no excuses” given the competitive ethos of their everyday lives. 
 The organizational resemblance of CMOs to major corporations may also be 
explained by this close relationship.  The leaders of KIPP and similar CMOs all bear 
corporate titles, from CEO, CFO, COO, and managing director to positions tailored to 
education like chief learning officer, chief academic officer, and chief research, design, 
and innovation officer.  The New York headquarters of the KIPP Foundation, located on 
the twentieth floor of an office building on Eighth Avenue two blocks north of Madison 
Square Garden, feels, in fact, corporate, except that the colors are brighter and conference 
rooms go by such names as Grit, Optimism, and Zest, in accordance with the 
organization’s can-do spirit and its adoption of eight traits central to an initiative begun in 
2011 focused on character education (which also include academic self-control, 
interpersonal self-control, gratitude, social intelligence, and curiosity).12 
                                                
12 Visit to KIPP Foundation headquarters, New York, September 30, 2014. For detail 
regarding KIPP’s initiative for character education, see Paul Tough, “What if the Secret 
to Success Is Failure?” New York Times, September 14, 2011. See also the KIPP Web 
page on character education, http://www.kipp.org/our-approach/character. 
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 The compensation of CMO executives likewise reflects corporate pay.  For the 
2012-13 school year, Barth, for example, earned $381,819 as CEO of KIPP; Eva 
Moskowitz earned $567,500 as CEO of Success Academy; Brett Peiser earned $267,396 
as CEO of Uncommon Schools; Thomas E. Torkelson earned $326,890 as CEO and 
president of IDEA Public Schools; Douglas S. McCurry and Dacia Toll earned $222,979 
and $234,565, respectively, as co-CEO and president of Achievement First; and James R. 
Willcox earned $266,587 as CEO of Aspire Public Schools.13 However, this pay, in 
contrast to that of EMO executives, is generally fixed.  If CMO executives do earn 
bonuses, they are marginal.14 CMO executives accordingly cannot benefit from cutting 
corners in the way EMO executives might. 
 This distinction explains in part the rise and resilience of Moskowitz, in 
particular.  While Moskowitz has provoked ire for her compensation,15 she has regardless 
become a folk hero of charter school parents, leading them in a protest march across the 
Brooklyn Bridge and in rallies in Foley Square and from the steps of City Hall and the 
                                                
13 Data come from GuideStar, www.guidestar.org.  In the case of Peiser, his base pay was 
$223,984, supplemented by $25,000 in additional compensation, $500 in incentive pay, 
and $17,912 in non-taxable benefits; in the case of Willcox, his base pay was $211,405, 
supplemented by $40,000 in incentive pay and $15,182 in non-taxable benefits. 
14 Henry B. Hansmann, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,” The Yale Law Journal 89 
(April 1980): 838:  “A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred 
from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such 
as members, officers, directors, or trustees.  By ‘net earnings’ I mean here pure profits—
that is, earnings in excess of the amount needed to pay for services rendered to the 
organization….” 
15 See, for example, Meredith Kolodner and Rachel Monahan, “Charting New Territory in 
Ed Salaries,” New York Daily News, December 13, 2009; Kolodner, “Top 16 NYC 
Charter School Executives Earn More than Chancellor Dennis Walcott,” New York Daily 
News, October 26, 2013.; and Kate Taylor, “New York City Comptroller to Audit 
Success Academy Charter Network,” New York Times, October 30, 2014.  
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State Capitol.16 By contrast, parents in New York a decade earlier did not allow Edison a 
chance to run even one public school. The leaders of Edison were disparaged and 
dismissed as profiteers. 
 Another difference between Edison and Success Academy along with KIPP and 
most CMOs is that the former was primarily in the business of taking over public schools 
while the latter engage almost exclusively in start-ups, opening new schools and adding 
one grade at a time.  Success Academy, KIPP, and similar CMOs occupy space in public 
schools but they rarely take over the operation of public schools, as Edison proposed 
doing in New York and as it did in cities across the country.   
 Though corporate in nature, CMOs for these reasons have provoked neither the 
distrust nor pushback engendered by EMOs. Their nonprofit identification and nimble 
development strategy have largely spared them public grief; garnered praise from 
network broadcasters, talk show hosts, op-ed columnists, radio commentators, and 
scholars; inspired significant philanthropic support; aligned idealistic teachers with 
management; and allowed executives to focus on pedagogical rather than financial 
matters.  Steady growth has followed.  And yet what fuels this growth necessarily limits 
it, as there’s a limited quantity of philanthropic dollars to fund development, a limited 
quantity of selfless teachers capable of working so hard, and, finally, a limited number of 
students for whom the “no excuses” environment of long school days, rigid discipline, 
                                                
16 Kyle Spencer, “Charter Schools Prepare for a New Regime at City Hall,” WNYC, June 
7, 2012, http://www.wnyc.org/story/301567-charter-schools-prepare-for-a-new-regime-
at-city-hall/; Ben Chapman, “Charter School Rally Sends Message to Bill de Blasio, Joe 
Lhota,” New York Daily News, October 8, 2013; Al Baker and Javier C. Hernández, “De 
Blasio and Operator of Charter School Empire Do Battle,” New York Times, March 4, 
2014; Elizabeth A. Harris, “Charter School Backers Rally, Hoping to Influence de 
Blasio’s Policies,” New York Times, October 2, 2014. 
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and academic rigor is suitable.   
 
One person with a rare perspective on the differences between CMOs and EMOs is 
Richard Barth, the CEO of KIPP since 2006 and an executive at Edison for the seven 
preceding years.  To Barth, the challenge of running an EMO was not so much balancing 
commercial and academic agendas but doing so under regular political fire.  Barth, in this 
light, was frequently accompanied by an armed bodyguard at the outset of running 
Edison’s schools in Philadelphia.17  "If KIPP were a for-profit organization, it would be 
much more difficult for us to grow,” Barth said six months into his new job at KIPP.  
“The for-profit approach adds a layer of politics that can be utterly distracting to the work 
that must be done."18 
 In the opinion of Dave Levin, the distinction is deeper: it is not merely perceptual 
but operational, which ultimately explains the difference in public response. The 
everyday objectives of EMOs and CMOs, Levin said during an interview in 2008 at a 
middle school in West Harlem called KIPP Infinity, are inherently irreconcilable.  “In 
managing a school, you can dance to only one beat,” Levin said. “You can’t think about 
both profits and academic results. Our sole concern is student performance.  And it has 
been from the start.  KIPP grew out of the efforts of teachers.  We are not 
businessmen.”19 
                                                
17 Richard Barth, telephone interview, July 19, 2006. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dave Levin, interview, New York, November 16, 2008. 
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 Another person with a rare perspective on the differences between CMOs and 
EMOs is Sharif El-Mekki, the principal of Edison’s Shaw Middle School in West 
Philadelphia from 2003 to 2008 and since the principal of the nearby Shoemaker Campus 
of Mastery Charter Schools, a CMO network founded in Philadelphia in 2001 that by 
2014 comprised fifteen schools in the city and two more across the Delaware River in 
Camden, New Jersey.  Shoemaker runs from grade seven through twelve.  Before 
Shoemaker was taken over in 2006, it was a middle school managed by the district, then 
by Miami-based EMO Chancellor Beacon Academies in 2002-2003 as part of the School 
Reform Commission’s experiment with privatization, and after that by the district again.20 
 Like KIPP, Mastery started out with older students. The organization’s first four 
schools, opened from 2001 through 2007, began in sixth or seventh grade. In 2010, 
Mastery opened its first elementary schools. Of Mastery’s fifteen schools in Philadelphia 
in the 2014-2015 academic year, eight were elementary schools and seven were middle or 
high schools or some combination. Mastery’s two schools in Camden, opened in 2014, 
were elementary schools.21  Unlike KIPP and most CMOs, Mastery has not, with the 
exception of its first school, built from scratch but has rather taken over struggling district 
schools and tried to turn them around.22 In all cases but one, these takeovers have been 
authorized by school officials without a parental vote; on the one occasion such a vote 
was required, at Steel Elementary in May 2014, parents rebuffed Mastery by a significant 
                                                
20 Susan Snyder and Martha Woodall, “Schools to Make Modest Changes,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, April 17, 2003. 
21 School counts come from Mastery’s Web site, 
http://www.masterycharter.org/schools.html. 
22 The one exception to this rule for Mastery was its Lenfest Campus, according to Sharif 
El-Mekki, interview, Philadelphia, May 5, 2014. 
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margin to keep the school in the district.23 Like KIPP, Mastery embraces high 
expectations, stipulates choice by students, parents, and teachers, requires more 
instructional time, confers school leaders considerable latitude, and focuses on results.  
The network motto is “Excellence.  No Excuses.” 
El-Mekki, a Philadelphia native, graduated in 1988 from Overbrook High School, 
several blocks up Lancaster Avenue from Shoemaker. He lettered in football at 
Overbrook as a defensive back and led the track team to a city championship as a 
sprinter. Two decades later, El-Mekki looked like he could still compete in either sport.  
Only a full beard and receding hairline gave away his age. After earning his bachelor’s 
degree in criminal justice from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, where he also ran 
track, El-Mekki returned home unclear about his next steps. He worked as a courier, hung 
out with friends, and played pick-up tackle football on Sunday afternoons on the field of 
John Bartram High School in Southwest Philadelphia.24 
El-Mekki nearly lost his life on that field. After he took an opponent down hard in 
a game in October 1992 and then got into a scuffle with him about it, four friends of the 
ball carrier sprung from the stands pointing guns.25 El-Mekki was hit twice in his left leg 
and once in his right. One bullet pierced an artery. He spent six weeks in the nearby 
Hospital of the University Pennsylvania and underwent seventeen operations.26 
                                                
23 Bill Hangley Jr., “Mastery Drops Out; Steel to Stay in District,” Philadelphia Public 
School Notebook, May 8, 2014, http://thenotebook.org/blog/147222/steel-stay-district-
hands-mastery-drops-out. 
24 El-Mekki, interview, Philadelphia, May 5, 2014. 
25 Ibid. See also Lea Sitton, “Ball Game Ends with Two Men Shot,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, October 5, 1992. 
26 Ibid. 
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Following his recovery, he worked as a tutor of juvenile delinquents at the city’s 
Youth Study Center and found his calling.  Upon learning a year later of a drive to recruit 
African-American men into teaching, El-Mekki became a teacher at Turner Middle 
School, also in West Philadelphia. He worked at Turner for seven years as a teacher and 
three as an assistant principal.  It was Barth who recruited El-Mekki to become the 
principal of notoriously troubled Shaw. El-Mekki said he was attracted to Edison by the 
quality of its professional development and its coordination of curricula with benchmark 
assessments pegged to state tests.27 
His primary concern at Shaw, El-Mekki said, was to restore order.  El-Mekki took 
over Shaw in January of the first year of Edison’s management of the school. He recalled 
several years later that he was astounded to learn in September 2002 that Edison had laid 
off its nonteaching assistants (NTAs).  “I remember reading that in the paper when I was 
at Turner,” El-Mekki said, “and I thought these people at Edison are crazy. They have 
made a big mistake.”28 
In one of his first moves as Shaw’s principal, El-Mekki got the school district to 
send Shaw three police officers in addition to the NTAs Paul Vallas had required Edison 
to rehire. El-Mekki succeeded in bringing peace to Shaw and implementing the Edison 
model.  He said the quality of Edison’s professional development and curricula had lived 
up to his expectations.  And as Shaw was designated by the district as a hard-to-staff 
school in the summer of 2004 and thus given "full site select" status, El-Mekki was given 
authority to hire all staff directly, rather than work with placements made by the central 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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office, per convention. However, despite this advantage and his satisfaction with Edison’s 
professional development and curricula, El-Mekki said he never got the faculty 
commitment or the control over resources he needed to make Shaw the school he thought 
it could be.29 
With Mastery, El-Mekki said he found what he was looking for.  “Mastery is what 
Edison was supposed to be,” El-Mekki said during his first year in charge of Shoemaker 
in 2009 while giving a tour of the spotless, serene school, its floors gleaming and its 
corridors and classrooms decorated with neat posters both proclaiming the number of 
days until statewide exams and invoking the words of Maya Angelou, Frederick 
Douglass, Albert Einstein, and Eleanor Roosevelt on hard work and its rewards. Students 
looked sharp in school-issue gray shirts with Mastery logos and navy slacks. “We have 
full mission alignment here with the faculty,” El-Mekki said, “and we have total control 
over our budget.”30 
 
El-Mekki did not identify with corporate interests.  Like Feinberg and Levin, he was not 
a businessman and did not think of himself as one.  He rather identified with the political 
radicalism of his parents, Hamid Khalid and Aisha El-Mekki, who joined the Black 
Panthers in the 1960s to protest police brutality in Philadelphia and to cultivate 
community pride.  El-Mekki was, in fact, arrested in 2005 for defying a police officer 
while attending an antiwar rally with his mother, brother, and son outside a downtown 
convention hall where President George W. Bush was delivering a speech.  El-Mekki was 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 El-Mekki, interview, Philadelphia. February 10, 2009. 
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soon after cleared of any wrongdoing, but his politics were made plain in articles about 
the arrest in the local press.31   “I tell our teachers that we must work as freedom fighters, 
as nation builders,” El-Mekki said several years later in reflecting on his politics as well 
as his vocation.32 
 El-Mekki nevertheless sided with many in the business community in contending 
that teachers’ unions have put job protection ahead of instructional quality and school 
climate.  El-Mekki conceded that inner-city schools like Overbrook, Turner, Shaw, and 
Shoemaker need more funding, but he contended that commitment from faculty is an 
equally pressing matter and accordingly endorsed at-will teacher contracts.33  To Joseph 
Ferguson, Mastery’s COO since 2009, mission alignment with the faculty constituted the 
fundamental difference between the CMO and the Philadelphia School District, where he 
had worked the four previous years in operations at the central office.  School leaders, 
Ferguson said following his fifth year with Mastery, need autonomy.  “I get collective 
bargaining,” he said.  “I’m all for collective bargaining.  But you can’t run a school 
without the freedom to staff it.”34 
 Along with El-Mekki, many teachers at schools managed by Edison in 
Philadelphia moved to schools run by Mastery.  There were eight such teachers at El-
Mekki’s school alone in the 2013-2014 school year. Across town in North Philadelphia at 
                                                
31 Robert Moran and Daniel Rubin,, “Two Arrested in Philadelphia Protest,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, December 13, 2005.  Charges against El-Mekki were soon after dropped for 
lack of evidence.  See Moran, “Assault Charges against Principal are Dropped,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, December 17, 2005. 
32 El-Mekki, interview, Philadelphia, May 5, 2014. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Joseph Ferguson, telephone interview, May 6, 2014. 
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Mastery’s Simon Gratz High School were two more that year, including George Prifti, 
the veteran math teacher from Albania who had tangled with El-Mekki's successor at 
Shaw four years earlier over the value of monthly benchmark assessments.35 
 Shaw itself became a Mastery school in 2014 and in the process buttressed El-
Mekki’s point that Mastery fulfilled the Edison vision: formerly drab hallways and 
stairwells sparkled; students and staff worked with comparative ease.36 In a dizzying and 
equally telling twist, Shaw did not merely become another Mastery school. It became the 
Hardy Williams campus of the Mastery network as home to the former Hardy Williams 
Academy Charter School. Mastery in 2011 took over the charter school, which was 
founded in 1999 by one-time Edison advocate State Senator Anthony Hardy Williams as 
the Renaissance Advantage Charter School.37 The school had started out under the 
management of Advantage Schools Inc., an EMO based in Boston. When New York-
based Mosaica Education Inc. bought Advantage in 2001, Renaissance Advantage 
became another Mosaica school. In 2004, Renaissance Advantage left Mosaica for 
Edison. Five years later, Senator Williams stepped down as the school’s chairman of the 
                                                
35 Simon Gratz High School, Mastery Charter Schools, visit, May 7, 2014.  See Chapter 7 
regarding Prifti’s battle at Shaw in 2009. 
36 Based on visits to Shaw Middle School under Edison, February 2, 2009, and to Shaw as 
Mastery Hardy Williams High, May 6, 2014.  
37 Woodall, “Hardy Williams Academy Joins Mastery Charter Schools Network,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, March 11, 2011; Menash Dean and Solomon Leach, “Candidate 
Williams’ Grade as School Founder: Incomplete,” Philadelphia Daily News, March 19, 
2015.  
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board, the school severed its relationship with Edison, and the school’s name was 
changed to honor the senator’s father, the late State Senator Hardy Williams.38    
 
Edison Mastery  
Category Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Access to resources 4.5 2.9 7.6 1.2 
Commitment of administrators 3.8 1.9 8.9 1.0 
Commitment of colleagues 5.7 1.4 8.9 0.7 
Commitment of students 5.0 1.5 7.8 1.2 
Personal commitment 7.9 1.4 9.1 0.8 
Professional development 4.6 2.5 8.0 1.0 
Quality of leadership 3.8 2.4 8.8 0.7 
Quality of working environment 4.6 2.4 7.9 1.2 
Sense of achievement 5.2 2.1 8.0 1.0 
Composite 5.0 2.1 8.3 1.0 
Table 6.2 Results, on a scale of 1 to 10, along with standard deviations, from a survey in 
2014 of twelve Mastery Charter School staff members who had previously worked at 
schools in Philadelphia managed by Edison. 
 
According to a four-page survey—consisting of fixed and open-ended questions—on the 
differences between working at Edison and Mastery filled out anonymously in 2014 by 
twelve staff members at Shoemaker, Simon Gratz, and a third Mastery school (Thomas, 
located in South Philadelphia), mission alignment constituted a salient distinction. These 
respondents defined their experience at Mastery as far more collaborative, effective, and 
rewarding.39  While this sample is tiny, it is tightly defined, and the results are themselves 
                                                
38 Dean and Leach, “Candidate Williams’ Grade.”. See also Steven F. Wilson, Learning 
on the Job: When Business Takes on Public Schools (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 66. 
39 Much as George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton described enfranchised, committed 
workers as “insiders” and their opposites as “outsiders,” these respondents defined their 
experiences at Matery and Edison, respectively, in similar terms.  See Akerlof and 
Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-
Being (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 41-49. 
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tight and clear.  On a scale of 1 to 10, for example, respondents, in sum, rated the quality 
of working environment 4.6 at Edison and 7.9 at Mastery (see Table 6.2). 
 In answering the open-ended questions, respondents made the following 
observations: 
• "Edison felt like a corporation.... I did not have a sense of Edison's mission; that is 
the tremendous difference between Edison and Mastery.  Our mission statement is 
reinforced by the type of culture we aim to create." 
• "There was no effort to work hard under Edison, to reach a goal together." 
• "Edison didn't build a culture, didn't seem to have a presence, besides infrequent 
professional development.... Mastery has educators who are more dedicated, who 
put lots of hours into their work." 
• "My experiences at Edison and Mastery have been drastically different.  I 
attribute this to a one-team mentality of all the adults at Mastery, high 
expectations for students and educators, and the prioritization of student 
achievement." 
• "We had no supplies at Edison: no books, no copy paper, no writing paper, no 
pencils.  There were some teachers' guides that we were expected to plan from, 
but none of the connected materials [for students]." 
• "It appeared on the surface level [under Edison] that all curricula were valued, but 
in terms of exhaustive effort and support, math/reading scores were where heavy 
support and follow-through occurred....  With Mastery, there's support across 
various subject areas, not just math and reading." 
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• "Teams at Mastery very deliberately focus on overall questions, like 'Are we 
doing what's best for students?' At Edison, this question came up between 
colleagues, but it was never at the forefront...." 
 
Beyond faculty buy-in, administrative autonomy, and school climate at Shoemaker and 
other schools run by Mastery, the results for Mastery students on the annual state exam, 
the Pennsylvania School System of Assessment (PSSA), supported El-Mekki’s 
conclusion that Mastery fulfilled the expectations that he and many others had of Edison. 
It was not merely that Mastery students did far better on the reading and math exams than 
their peers at schools run by Edison or the city as a whole. Far more striking and telling 
were their results on the writing exams. 
 As explained in Chapter 5, on top of the exams in reading and math for students 
in grades three through eight mandated by No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2002, 
Pennsylvania started administering annual exams in writing to students in fifth and eighth 
grades in 2006 as well as in science to students in fourth and eighth grades in 2008.   
Because only scores on the reading and math exams determined a school’s Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP), the NCLB standard for school effectiveness, scores on the 
science and writing exams barely, if ever, got mentioned.  As measures that did not get 
measured, scores on the science and writing exams stood to measure a great deal and thus 
afford a rare window into how schools in Pennsylvania operated: what a school does 
when nobody is paying attention stands to say much more than when everybody is 
looking. 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 Mean 
Edison Grade 5 Reading 34.0 27.3 21.4 37.1 NA 30.0 
Edison Grade 5 Writing 12.8 21.1 17.9 25.7 NA 19.4 
Reading - Writing 21.2 6.2 3.5 11.4 NA 10.6 
Philadelphia Grade 5 Reading 33.3 38.1 38.4 43.0 31.1 36.8 
Philadelphia Grade 5 Writing 26.0 30.0 33.0 37.1 28.3 30.9 
Reading - Writing 7.3 8.1 5.4 5.9 2.8 5.9 
KIPP Grade 5 Reading 26.9 36.5 30.3 38.7 25.0 31.5 
KIPP Grade 5 Writing 27.7 34.4 30.1 37.5 29.8 31.9 
Reading - Writing -0.8 2.1 0.2 1.2 -4.8 -0.4 
Mastery Grade 5 Reading NA NA NA 29.5 33.3 31.4 
Mastery Grade 5 Writing NA NA NA 42.4 48.7 45.6 
Reading - Writing NA NA NA -12.9 -15.4 -14.2 
       
Edison Grade 8 Reading 48.8 53.1 65.5 51.0 NA 54.6 
Edison Grade 8 Writing 26.1 30.2 36.6 32.1 NA 31.3 
Reading - Writing 22.7 22.9 28.9 18.9 NA 23.5 
Philadelphia Grade 8 Reading 54.1 60.0 64.2 59.2 53.2 58.1 
Philadelphia Grade 8 Writing 39.4 44.6 50.1 46.9 42.2 44.6 
Reading - Writing 14.7 15.4 14.1 12.3 11.0 13.5 
KIPP Grade  8 Reading 73.8 79.3 78.2 73.3 74.5 75.8 
KIPP Grade 8 Writing 83.7 67.2 83.6 82.8 70.4 77.5 
Reading - Writing -9.9 12.1 -5.4 -9.5 4.1 -1.7 
Mastery Grade 8 Reading 65.6 78.8 78.2 66.8 72.6 72.4 
Mastery Grade 8 Writing 72.9 76.0 80.6 71.3 77.2 75.6 
Reading - Writing -7.3 2.8 -2.4 -4.5 -4.6 -3.2 
Table 6.3:  Percentage of students in Philadelphia graded proficient on the PSSA reading 
and writing exams; and differences in proficiency in these subjects.  Students in all 
cohorts are classified as economically disadvantaged.  Data source: Pennsylvania 
Department of Education, 2007-2008 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP Results, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442. 
 
 In this regard, schools run by KIPP and Mastery in Philadelphia appear to have 
provided a far more well-rounded education than Edison, in particular, and Philadelphia’s 
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public schools, in general. An amplification of the table of PSSA results in Chapter 7 
reveals a conspicuous pattern from 2008 to 2012. For comparative purposes, only the 
scores of students classified as economically disadvantaged are addressed in this analysis. 
A significant majority of students in all groups were classified as economically 
disadvantaged over this time period. For the Philadelphia School District as a whole, 82 
percent of eighth-graders in 2008-2009, for example, were classified as economically 
disadvantaged. For Edison in Philadelphia that year, 99 percent of students belonged to 
this category; for KIPP, 79 percent; and for Mastery, 79 percent.40 
 The proficiency rates in reading for fifth-graders at schools run by KIPP and 
Mastery were low and either lower than the proficiency rates in writing or slightly above. 
For fifth-graders at schools run by Edison and Philadelphia, the proficiency rates in 
reading were also low but consistently above the proficiency rates in writing. For eighth-
graders at schools run by KIPP and Mastery, the proficiency rates in reading were much 
higher and at the same time close to the proficiency rates in writing. The results for 
eighth-graders at schools run by Edison and Philadelphia were utterly different: 
proficiency rates in reading also climbed, but proficiency rates in writing lagged 
significantly (see Table 6.3 and Chart 6.4).41 
                                                
40 These figures derive from numbers of eighth-graders taking the PSSA math exam in 
2009, as reported by the Pennsylvania Department of Education,  
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442: for 
the Philadelphia School District (minus students enrolled in schools run by Edison, KIPP, 
and Mastery), 8,233 of 10,064 were classified as economically disadvantaged; for the 
fourteen schools with eighth-graders run by Edison, 983 of 996 belonged to this category; 
for the one school run by KIPP with eighth-graders, 59 of 75 students; and for the three 
schools with eighth-graders run by Mastery, 217 of 273. 
41 Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2007-2008 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP 
Results, 
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 Results on the science exams appear to provide an equally telling story but of a 
very different nature. KIPP and Mastery schools along with Edison and the district as a 
whole posted results on the science exams far below results on the math exams, which 
seems to convey a disturbing lesson: no matter how committed, staff at schools run by the 
likes of KIPP and Mastery may struggle to teach subjects that are not adequately funded. 
As with reading and writing, scores on math and science exams should be similar. But 
good instruction in science requires much more funding than good instruction in writing: 
up-to-date science textbooks are expensive; and science is hard to teach effectively 
without regular labs, which require designated space, significant equipment, and careful 
supervision, which, in turn, means smaller classes. 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442.  The 
sample sizes for Edison are provided above for Table 7.1. The sample sizes for KIPP’s 
fifth-graders for reading/writing for 2008 to 2012 were 67/65, 63/64, 122/123, 137/144, 
and 132/141.  For KIPP’s eighth-graders, the sample sizes from 2008 to 2012 were 42/43, 
58/58, 55/55, 60/64, and 51/54.  The sample sizes for Mastery’s fifth-graders for 
reading/writing for 2011 and 2012 were 193/203 and 252/263.  For Mastery’s eighth-
graders, the sample sizes from 2008 to 2012 were 227/225, 217/217, 284/284, 367/376, 
and 431/439.  The years 2006-2007 are not covered in this table because the sample sizes 
for KIPP and Mastery were quite small.  For the district, the sample sizes from 2008 to 
2012 all exceeded 7,700. 
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Chart 6.4 Mean percentage of eighth-graders in Philadelphia rated proficient on the 
PSSA reading and writing exams from 2008 to 2012 (in the case of Edison, from 2008 to 
2011). Students in all cohorts are classified as economically disadvantaged.  Data source: 
Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2007-2008 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP 




 In the well-funded five school districts along the iconic Main Line outside of 
Philadelphia (Great Valley, Haverford, Lower Merion, Radnor, and Tredyffrin-
Easttown), scores on the PSSA math and science exams taken by eighth-graders are 
indeed tightly grouped. In 2009, for example, the combined rates of proficiency for those 
five school districts on the eighth-grade PSSA math and science exams were 86 and 79 
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disadvantaged students in these five districts bear real relevance to the scores of students 
in Philadelphia. In the 2008-2009 school year, 6 percent of the students in these five 
districts belonged to this category.42 
 Results for these economically disadvantaged students in the Main Line districts 
were, in fact, much lower than those of their classmates from middle- and upper-income 
homes, but their math and science scores were far tighter than those of the economically 
disadvantaged students in schools run by Edison, KIPP, Mastery, or Philadelphia. This 
was true for all five years for which PSSA data for science exams are available. Yet in 
four of these five years, the economically disadvantaged students at KIPP and Mastery 
posted higher math scores than their economically disadvantaged peers in the Main Line 
districts (see Table 6.4 and Chart 6.5).43 
 To what degree smaller classes, more experienced teachers, better and more 
frequent labs, or more advantaged or motivated classmates explain the far higher science 
scores posted year after year by economically disadvantaged Main Line students is hard 
to know. But the difference in resources necessary for smaller classes, more experienced 
teachers, and better and more frequent labs has certainly been pronounced.  The Main 
                                                
42 According to the Web site of the Pennsylvania Department of Education cited above, of 
the 2,071 eighth-graders in the Main Line school districts who took the PSSA math exam 
in 2008-2009, 122 were classified as economically disadvantaged. 
43 Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2007-2008 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP 
Results, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442. The 
sample sizes for math/science were as follows: for Edison, 973/944, 942/918, 809/783, 
and 247/245; for Philadelphia, 8,958/8,649, 8,550/8,340, 7,855/7,798, 8,126/8,066, and 
8,089/7,930; for KIPP, 42/41, 59/59, 58/56, 60/60, and 50/51; for Mastery, 226/208, 
217/213, 274/286, 371/361, and 429/415; and for the Main Line, 68/65 (with Radnor and 
Tredyffrin-Easttown not reporting), 121/122, 130/145, 131/135, and 162/167. 
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Line school districts in 2008-2009, for example, spent 43 percent (or $4,926) more per 
pupil than Philadelphia (see Chart 5.2).44 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 Mean 
Edison Grade 8 Math 47.4 47.3 54.8 48.2 NA 49.4 
Edison Grade 8 Science 13.5 9.9 18.8 14.7 NA 14.2 
Math – Science 33.9 37.4 36.0 33.5 NA 35.2 
Philadelphia Grade 8 Math 46.2 47.6 57.6 53.5 48.7 50.7 
Philadelphia Grade 8 Science 18.8 18.7 21.4 21.7 19.4 20.0 
Math – Science 27.4 28.9 36.2 31.8 29.3 30.7 
KIPP Grade 8 Math 64.3 74.6 72.4 71.7 78.0 72.2 
KIPP Grade 8 Science 17.1 20.3 26.8 25.0 27.5 23.3 
Math - Science 47.2 54.3 45.6 46.7 50.5 48.9 
Mastery Grade 8 Math 62.9 81.6 73.7 71.2 80.0 73.9 
Mastery Grade 8 Science 11.1 31.5 30.1 24.9 30.6 25.6 
Math - Science 51.8 50.1 43.6 46.3 49.4 48.2 
Main Line Grade 8 Math 63.2 61.2 72.3 64.9 74.7 67.3 
Main Line Grade 8 Science 43.1 49.2 57.2 50.4 58.7 51.7 
Math - Science 20.1 12 15.1 14.5 16 15.5 
Table 6.4  Percentage of economically disadvantaged students in Philadelphia and the 
Main Line school districts graded proficient on the PSSA math and science exams; and 
differences in proficiency in these subjects. Data source: Pennsylvania Department of 
Education, 2007-2008 through 2010-2011 PSSA and AYP Results, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442. 
 
                                                
44 Pennsylvania Department of Education, Expenditure Data for All LEAs, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us.   
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Chart 6.5 Mean percentage of eighth-graders rated proficient on the PSSA math and 
science exams from 2008 to 2012 (in the case of Edison, from 2008 to 2011). Students in 
all cohorts are classified as economically disadvantaged.  Data source: Pennsylvania 




Outside of exam results, the everyday differences in operations between an EMO and 
CMO comport with the contrast in public perceptions of the two models remarked on by 
Barth and Levin. The consequent advantage for CMOs, and KIPP in particular, has been 
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school, Barth said.45  Levin agreed and recalled that right after the laudatory segment 
about KIPP on 60 Minutes in 1999 that won over Gap cofounders Doris and Donald 
Fisher, “Mike [Feinberg] got a call from a school district official who said, ‘We’d like to 
order twenty KIPPs.’”  Unlike Edison, KIPP accordingly did not need to employ a team 
of sales executives or run a series of ads pitching its model.  News coverage alone did the 
job.  Smart branding, lucid, detailed annual reports, and sharp, interactive Web sites for 
the national organization and each region would in time follow but merely served to 
amplify the message conveyed by TV, radio, and print journalists. 
News coverage of KIPP’s early years was, in fact, unanimous in its approval.  In 
addition to the 1999 segment on 60 Minutes, a glowing follow-up piece aired by the CBS 
program in 2000, and an adulatory essay in between by David Grann in The New 
Republic, newspaper articles year after year hailed KIPP.46  A Nexis search of KIPP in 
major newspapers during its first year of expansion, from September 2001 through June 
2002, produced seventeen articles, all of them with a positive tenor; by contrast, a Nexis 
search of Edison during its first year of operation, from September 1995 through June 
1996, produced forty-seven articles, twenty-seven of which had a negative tenor.  
Furthermore, a Nexis search of KIPP four years later, from September 2005 through June 
2006, produced twenty-two articles, again all of a positive tenor; a Nexis search of 
Edison four years after its first year of operation, from September 1999 through June 
                                                
45 Barth, telephone interview, July 19, 2006. 
46 CBS, 60 Minutes, September 19, 1999, and August 6, 2000.  See also David Grann, “A 
Public School that Works: Back to Basics in the Bronx,” The New Republic, October 4, 
1999, 24-26. 
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2000, produced twenty-six articles, six of which had a negative tenor.47  
 Beyond impressive music programs at many KIPP schools, high scores on 
standardized tests in reading and math for KIPP students as well as impressive rates of 
college matriculation for KIPP graduates, the selfless commitment of KIPP teachers and 
principals inspired much of this positive coverage and continued to capture attention. 
KIPP staff typically started their day at 7 a.m., finished at 5 p.m., remained available to 
their students afterward by a KIPP-issued cell phone for homework help, and taught 
every other Saturday morning as well as three weeks over the summer. 
KIPP was in this vein featured on ABC World News, CBS Evening News, NBC 
Nightly News, several National Public Radio programs, PBS Frontline, The Oprah 
Winfrey Show, and even The Colbert Report.48  Bob Herbert and Thomas Friedman hailed 
KIPP for its ideals and ethos in op-ed columns for The New York Times; Stanley Crouch 
and Leonard Pitts did the same in op-ed columns for The New York Daily News and The 
Miami Herald, respectively; and Jay Mathews, education columnist for The Washington 
Post, wrote a series of articles about the dedication of KIPP staff and built on those 
articles with a book about the organization’s unlikely evolution.49 The husband-wife team 
                                                
47 Survey of Nexis articles done on July 19, 2006, via www.web.lexis-nexis.com. 
48 ABC, ABC World News, October 15, 2007, and February 27, 2010; CBS, CBS Evening 
News, March 7, 2010, and February 27, 2014; CBS, The Oprah Winfrey Show, April 12, 
2006; Comedy Central, The Colbert Report, October 1, 2008; National Public Radio, All 
Things Considered, May 28, 2005, News and Notes, September 6, 2007, Weekend Edition 
Saturday, October 7, 2006, and Morning Edition, January 18, 2010; NBC, NBC Nightly 
News, October 5, 2009; PBS, Frontline, October 5, 2005. 
49 Bob Herbert, “A Chance to Learn,” New York Times, December 16, 2002; Herbert, “48 
of 48,” New York Times, June 5, 2009; Thomas Friedman, “Steal This Movie, Too,” New 
York Times, August 24, 2010; Stanley Crouch, “Teachers Deserve More; So Do We,” 
New York Daily News, September 9, 2000, Crouch, “Mayor Can Look in City for Schools 
that Work,” New York Daily News, June 27, 2002; Leonard Pitts Jr., “Schools Where 
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of historian Stephan Thernstrom and political scientist Abigail Thernstrom used the 
shared CMO credo of “no excuses” as the title of their 2003 book on closing the 
achievement gap and punctuated their analysis with praise of KIPP for its vision and 
resolve.  Malcolm Gladwell devoted the penultimate chapter of his 2008 book, Outliers, 
to KIPP’s exceptional results and linked them to the exceptional hours demanded of 
teachers and students alike.  And Paul Tough likewise celebrated KIPP in his 2012 book 
on character development, How Children Succeed: Grit, Curiosity,  and the Hidden 
Power of Character, for the organization’s relentless commitment to nurturing better 
behavioral as well as academic outcomes.50  
This publicity cleared the way for KIPP’s expansion and kindled the philanthropic 
funding to make it happen.   On top of the $15 million the Doris and Donald Fisher Fund 
gave KIPP in 2000 to start replicating, the foundation has since given the organization 
another $85 million.51  Through 2013, the Walton Family Foundation had given KIPP 
$58.7 million;52 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, $25.4 million;53 the Robin Hood 
                                                                                                                                            
Students Learn,” Miami Herald, November 25, 2007, Pitts, “Leave Education to the 
Principals, Teachers, Parents,” Miami Herald, November 28, 2007; Mathews, Work 
Hard. Be Nice. 
50 Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom, No Excuses: Closing the Racial Gap in Learning 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 43-60, 66-80, and 272-273; Malcolm Gladwell, 
Outliers: The Story of Success (New York: Little, Brown, 2008), 250-269; Paul Tough, 
How Children Succeed: Grit, Curiosity, and the Hidden Power of Character (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2012), 44-54 and 86-104. 
51 Steve Mancini, KIPP Foundation, Director of Public Affairs, interview, New York, 
September 30, 2014. 
52 Motoko Rich, “A Walmart Fortune, Spreading Charter Schools,” New York Times, 
April 25, 2014. 
Chapter 6: The Nonprofit Alternative 
 333 
Foundation, $21.3 million;54 and the Tiger Foundation, $3.1 million.55  Atlantic 
Philanthropies made a one-time contribution to KIPP in 2006 of $14.6 million.56  And in 
recognition of KIPP’s distinctive methods, the U.S. Department of Education made a 
one-time Investing in Innovation grant to KIPP in 2010 of $50 million to fund the 
organization’s expansion.57 
The impact of this support—as well as the degree of achievement of KIPP 
students—has been the subject of intense debate.  According to a study of KIPP 
achievement published in 2011 by researchers at Western Michigan University (WMU), a 
sample of twenty-eight KIPP schools across the country in 2007-2008 received, on 
average, 50 percent—or $6,500—more in funding per pupil than their neighboring 
district schools.  The WMU researchers, led by Gary Miron, the coauthor of the 
aforementioned critique of Edison Schools in 2000, attributed $5,760 of that difference to 
philanthropic giving.  In total, according to this study, these twenty-eight schools, with a 
                                                                                                                                            
53 According to the Web site of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the total given to 
KIPP through 2014 was $25,429,087: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-
Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database#q/k=kipp. 
54 Audited financial reports for 1997to 2013 acquired by e-mail from the Robin Hood 
Foundation. 
55 Based on correspondence with Liz Nellis, Program Associate, Tiger Foundation, 
September 18, 2014. 
56 According to the Web site of Atlantic Philanthropies, the purpose of this one-time 
contribution was core support along with evaluation: 
http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/grant/core-support-and-evaluation. 
57 Michele McNeil, “49 Applicants Win i3 Grants,” Education Week, August 11, 2010, 1 
and 28-29.. 
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combined enrollment of 6,461 students, collected $37.2 million in donations.58 
In arriving at this advantage of $6,500 per pupil, the WMU researchers tallied 
only contributions made to the regional offices of KIPP to which these twenty-eight 
schools belonged, leaving out contributions made to the KIPP Foundation, the 
organization’s national office, which is based in San Francisco and provides professional 
development and monitors quality across the network.  Philanthropic giving to the KIPP 
Foundation in 2007-2008 amounted to $15.3 million, the researchers noted.  Citing the 
KIPP Foundation’s annual report, the researchers pointed out that the foundation 
estimated it had spent $1,175 per student that year on professional development, school 
start-up costs, and school support.59 
Responding for KIPP to the report, spokesman Steve Mancini fired back with a 
press release.  Sidestepping the role played by the KIPP Foundation, Mancini argued that 
the WMU researchers would have arrived at a far lower sum had they collected data for 
all fifty-eight schools in operation in 2007-2008.  “This sample of twenty-eight schools 
included seventy-one percent of the network’s private revenue but only forty-five percent 
of students served in 2007-08,” Mancini wrote.  In addition, Mancini maintained that the 
WMU researchers had failed to explain that charter schools customarily use a significant 
portion of revenue to build or lease facilities, while district schools have no such costs in 
                                                
58 Gary Miron, Jessica L. Urschel, and Nicholas Saxton, “What Makes KIPP Work? A 
Study of Student Characteristics, Attrition, and School Finance,” March 2011, 21, 
published jointly by the National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, and the Study Group on Educational 
Management Organizations, Western Michigan University, March 2011, 
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP195_3.pdf; for detail regarding philanthropic 
funding, see 21, Appendix C, 17-29, and Appendix D, 30.  The number of schools in this 
sample (twenty-eight) was derived from Appendix D. 
59 Ibid., 32, citing KIPP: 2009 Report Card, 105, http://www.kipp.org/reportcard/2009. 
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their budgets; that they had overlooked that KIPP has higher administrative expenses 
because it must cover the fixed costs of creating and running schools that grow one grade 
level a year; and, finally, that through no fault of their own, the researchers had factored 
in $6.6 million of public money misclassified as private revenue by KIPP Newark.  In 
sum, Mancini concluded, philanthropic funding amounted to $2,500 per student in 2007-
2008.60 
The battle continued in the pages of The New York Times, with Mancini, Miron, 
and scholars at the Brookings Institution and the University of California at Berkeley 
weighing in with their opposing views.  What was regardless clear is that KIPP depended 
heavily on philanthropic dollars, whether it was $2,500 per student or far more.  After all, 
as Mancini explained in the Times, KIPP’s extended day, Saturday classes, and three-
week summer programs cost the organization between $1,200 and $1,600 per student.61  
Covering that cost alone demands significant philanthropic help.  And that continues to 
be true. 
In fiscal year 2011—running from July 2011 through June 2012, and the latest 
period for which data are available—the KIPP Foundation, for example, took in $33.9 
million in philanthropic contributions, excluding government grants. In addition, regional 
KIPP offices took in another $102.1 million in philanthropic contributions, excluding 
government grants.  After cumulative fundraising expenses of $6.6 million, KIPP in sum 
brought in $129.4 million of funding to supplement federal, state, and local allocations.  
                                                
60 KIPP press release, March 30, 2011, http://www.kipp.org/news/statement-by-kipp-
regarding-report-what-makes-kipp-work-by-dr-gary-miron-and-colleagues-at-western-
michigan-university. 
61 Sam Dillon, “Study Says Charter Network Has Financial Advantages Over Public 
Schools,” New York Times, March 31, 2011. 
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With 34,074 students in KIPP schools across the country in 2011-2012, this additional 
money meant—with several qualifications—an extra $3,796 per student (see Table 6.5).62 

















Albany, 10-11 286 $0 $1,208 $1,208 N/A $11,712 
Albany, 11-12 283 $186 $954 $1,140 $1,731 $14,072 
Arkansas 646 $1,541 $1,208 $2,749 $448 $7,031* 
Arkansas 860 $1,615 $954 $2,569 $528 $6,665* 
Atlanta 905 $4,348 $1,208 $5,556 $278 $9,275* 
Atlanta 1231 $14,113 $954 $15,067 $735 $8,608* 
Austin 992 $2,728 $1,208 $3,936 $1,700 $8,761 
Austin 1480 $1,475 $954 $2,429 $1,658 $8,033 
Baltimore 631 $1,328 $1,208 $2,536 $507 $9,425 
Baltimore 816 $2,729 $954 $3,683 $605 $9,264 
Charlotte 343 $1,661 $1,208 $2,869 $470 $6,700 
Charlotte 355 $1,380 $954 $2,334 $309 $4,361 
Chicago 425 $2,262 $1,208 $3,470 $809 $7,447 
Chicago 543 $3,313 $954 $4,267 $711 $7,183 
Colorado 594 $1,599 $1,208 $2,807 $487 $7,260* 
Colorado 826 $1,629 $954 $2,583 $404 $6,904* 
Columbus 210 $2,523 $1,208 $3,731 $1,142 $6,100 
Columbus 306 $625 $954 $1,579 $800 $6,200 
Dallas 307 $1,961 $1,208 $3,169 $1,596 $8,560 
Dallas 332 $5,260 $954 $6,214 $1,743 $5,929 
Gary, IN 297 $0 $1,208 $1,208 N/A $8,195 
Gaston, NC 701 $0 $1,208 $1,208 N/A $8,042 
Gaston, NC 709 $0 $954 $954 N/A $7,579 
Houston 6448 $1,299 $1,208 $2,507 $468 $9,090 
Houston 7884 $797 $954 $1,751 $371 $8,303* 
Indianapolis 238 $0 $1,208 $1,208 $162 $7,000 
Indianapolis 265 $9,865 $954 $10,819 $689 $7,368 
Jacksonville 92 $27,660 $1,208 $28,868 N/A N/A 
Jacksonville 176 $4,631 $954 $5,585 N/A $5,200 
Kansas City 252 $348 $1,208 $1,556 $1,696 $7,115 
Kansas City 180 $1,842 $954 $2,796 $2,489 $9,510 
Los Angeles 1266 $3,496 $1,208 $4,704 $1,152 $6,102* 
Los Angeles 1671 $3,117 $954 $4,071 $1,207 $5,264* 
                                                
62 See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 990, for separate 
KIPP regions as well as the KIPP Foundation, available online via GuideStar at 
www.guidestar.org. Enrollment data come from summing student counts for each region 
from KIPP’s annual report cards, available at www.kipp.org. 
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Lynn, MA 373 $7,159 $1,208 $8,367 N/A $11,297 
Lynn, MA 471 $5,183 $954 $6,137 N/A $11,517 
Memphis 398 $5,195 $1,208 $6,403 $1,190 $7,782 
Memphis 516 $1,943 $954 $2,897 $696 $7,721 
Minneapolis 153 $4,740 $1,208 $5,948 $3,182 $11,580 
Minneapolis 158 $3,298 $954 $4,252 $3,172 $12,575 
Nashville 293 $2,499 $1,208 $3,707 $782 $8,013 
Nashville 313 $2,587 $954 $3,541 $1,004 $8,100 
Newark 1281 $2,572 $1,208 $3,780 $1,670 $14,609 
Newark 1497 $5,810 $954 $6,764 $1,546 $15,406 
N. Orleans, 10-11 1792 $1,501 $1,208 $2,709 N/A $7,148 
N. Orleans, 11-12 2462 $971 $954 $1,925 N/A $7,895 
NYC 1736 $12,514 $1,208 $13,722 None $12,443 
NYC 2301 $3,846 $954 $4,800 None $13,527 
OKC 277 $1,511 $1,208 $2,719 N/A $5,384 
OKC 272 $1,683 $954 $2,637 N/A $4,680 
Philadelphia 697 $2,535 $1,208 $3,743 $1,879 $9,634* 
Philadelphia 947 $1,839 $954 $2,793 $1,631 $10,273* 
San Antonio 731 $4,118 $1,208 $5,326 $504 $8,614* 
San Antonio 883 $362 $954 $1,316 $252 $7,771* 
San Diego 364 $93 $1,208 $1,301 $863 $6,500 
San Diego 361 $195 $954 $1,149 $875 $6,500 
SF Bay Area 2288 $2,713 $1,208 $3,921 $458 $6,016* 
SF Bay Area 2459 $7,398 $954 $8,352 $367 $5,936* 
St. Louis 156 $8,108 $1,208 $9,316 $1,287 $7,119 
St. Louis 254 $5,843 $954 $6,797 $1,982 $8,900 
So. Fulton, GA 321 $6,170 $1,208 $7,378 N/A $7,956 
So. Fulton, GA 320 $2,884 $1,040 $3,924 $763 $8,016 
Tulsa 338 $3,210 $1,208 $4,418 None $3,400 
Tulsa 317 $3,977 $954 $4,931 None $4,092 
Washington 2078 $2,269 $1,208 $3,477 $2,598 $13,600 
Washington 2626 $1,344 $954 $2,298 $2,163 $14,391 
2010-11 Mean 846 $2,935* $1,208 $4,142* $1,101 $8,403 
2010-11 Total 27,909 $81,909,159 $33,702,615 $115,611,774 N/A N/A 
2010-11 Mean 1065 $2,843* $954 $3,796* $1,137 $8,367 
2011-12 Total 34,074 $96,858,230 $32,503,704 $129,361,934 N/A $305,262,521 
Table 6.5  Enrollment, funding, occupancy costs, and district charter allocations for KIPP schools 
by region for the school years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. The district charter allocations do not 
necessarily include supplementary funding from districts for such goods and services as 
textbooks, classroom supplies, transportation, and special education evaluation. The total is not 
listed for 2010-11 as KIPP did not list the allocation received from Jacksonville for that year. If 
Jacksonville allocated the same amount per pupil to students in charter schools that it did the 
following year, the total would be $251 million for 2010-11. Total occupancy costs are not 
available as several regions do not list charges. Gary, Indiana, is listed only for 2010-11 as KIPP 
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Gary folded after that school year. Amounts followed by an asterisk are weighted averages: for 
KIPP regions with several schools receiving different amounts per pupil; and for net giving per 
pupil by region and in total. Net giving amounts exclude fundraising expenditures and reflect 
annual contributions, not expenditures. The unweighted average for net giving per pupil by region 
was $3,626 in 2010-11 and $3,147 in 2011-12.  For three regions, contributions came through 
more than one local KIPP authority: KIPP schools in Chicago received funds from both a non-
profit organization overseeing the schools and a non-profit organization responsible for the region 
as a whole; KIPP Newark (known formally as TEAM Academy Charter Schools) received 
additional funds from the Friends of TEAM Academy Charter Schools; and KIPP NYC benefited 
to a small degree from funds raised by boards of individual schools in the local network. 
Philanthropic figures and occupancy costs come from 990s filed by the KIPP.  Enrollment figures 
and basic district charter allocations by region come from KIPP’s annual report cards. These 
figures were confirmed as correct during a meeting at KIPP headquarters on September 30, 2014, 
with the organization’s COO, Jack Chorowsky, and managing director of finance and accounting 
for KIPP NYC, Charizma T. Williams. 
 
One qualification about this additional funding concerns location. While all regions 
receive funding from the KIPP Foundation, each region has its own board of directors 
responsible for raising money for its schools. Much as some divisions within a university 
raise much more money from alumni and outside benefactors than others, some KIPP 
regions raise much more money than other KIPP regions.  The range in effectiveness of 
these boards is wide.  The KIPP New York City board along with boards for the 
individual schools within the region, for example, raised $21.7 million net in the 2010-
2011 school year, with a total enrollment of 1,736 students, and $8.8 million net in the 
2011-2012 school year, with a total enrollment of 2,301.63  By contrast, the KIPP Albany 
board raised no money in 2010-2011, with a total enrollment of 286, and $52,500 net in 
2011-2012, with a total enrollment of 283 (see Table 6.5). 
In the case of large amounts raised, such as the sum collected by KIPP New York 
                                                
63 The bulk of this money was raised by the board of KIPP NYC.  The board of KIPP 
AMP independently raised $15,875 in 2010-2011 and $16,615 in 2011-2012; of KIPP 
Academy (or Bronx), $254,004 in 2010-2011 and $61,950 in 2011-2012; of KIPP 
Infinity, $46,222 in 2011-2012; and of KIPP STAR, $19,134 in 2010-2011 and $18,035 
in 2011-2012. 
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City in 2010-2011, much of the money may come from major one-time gifts for capital 
projects or endowments for future spending.  The money is certainly not all for annual 
operational purposes. The difference in effectiveness of boards just the same exposes the 
limits of any CMO.  Raising money in Albany, Gary, Indiana, or Gaston, North Carolina, 
is far more difficult than doing so in New York, Houston, or Los Angeles.  Even KIPP 
San Diego has had trouble raising money.  
 A second qualification about this additional funding concerns costs of occupancy 
that district schools do not bear.  Only in New York City and Tulsa did KIPP in 2011-
2012, for example, benefit from free co-location within district buildings. In every other 
city KIPP operated, the organization built or bought buildings or it leased space from 
school districts, commercial realtors, or, in eight cases across the country, local 
archdioceses.64  The cost in 2011-2012, according to reports filed with the IRS by KIPP 
regional offices, averaged $1,137 per student and ranged from $252 per student in San 
Antonio to $3,172 in Minneapolis, the latter of which illustrated Mancini’s point about 
high overhead (while KIPP Minneapolis was already in its fourth year, enrollment had 
grown to only 158 students, falling far short of expectations).  As with philanthropic 
contributions, the occupancy costs the previous year were also nearly identical.  The costs 
in 2010-2011 averaged $1,101 per student and ranged from $162 per student in 
Indianapolis to $3,182 in Minneapolis.65 
 More recently, according to KIPP COO Jack Chorowsky, the organization has 
                                                
64 KIPP: 2011 Report Card, http://www.kipp.org/results/annual-report-card/2011-report-
card.  For free co-location for New York and Tulsa, see 90-96 and 103.  For leases from 
local archdioceses, see 43, 50-51, 82-83, 85, 133, 135. 
65 Occupancy costs are listed on page 10 of 990 filings. 
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trimmed its occupancy costs by leasing space at nominal rates in buildings constructed or 
owned by philanthropies.  The aforementioned Robin Hood Foundation, for instance, 
largely funded the construction of a new home in the South Bronx for KIPP’s College 
Prep High School.  The building opened in 2013 and costs KIPP only $1 a year.  The 
high school had outgrown its space in West Harlem allocated by the city, Chorowsky 
explained, and nothing appropriate was available elsewhere in the system despite years of 
intense efforts to find space.  Robin Hood came to the rescue, he said, and similar 
philanthropies have negotiated similar leases with KIPP in Newark, Philadelphia, 
Washington, DC, Atlanta, Houston, and Los Angeles.66  This development constitutes an 
invisible and welcome form of support for the organization.  Yet like the philanthropic 
dollars it mimics, it can exist to only a finite degree, as there are only so many 
foundations with such capacity. 
Occupancy costs accordingly consume a substantial portion of philanthropic 
dollars and amount to a major barrier to growth for KIPP and all charter networks.  The 
Achievement First network, for example, had to raise from philanthropists $12 million of 
the $36 million needed to construct a new high school in New Haven, Connecticut, in 
2014. “There’s all this talk about philanthropic advantage for charter networks,” said Ken 
Paul, Achievement First’s vice president for development, upon conducting a tour of the 
new school in 2015. “But philanthropy just gets us to sea level.”67 
Where KIPP, Achievement First, and other networks do not have such occupancy 
or construction costs, its schools can operate on about the same footing as neighboring 
                                                
66 Jack Chorowsky, COO, KIPP Foundation, interview, New York, September 30, 2014. 
67 Ken Paul, Vice President for Development, Achievement First, interview, New Haven, 
CT, March 26, 2015. 
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district schools.  The degree to which this holds depends on the region, as some school 
districts are more generous to charters than others.  In New York City, much as 
previously described in Baltimore, charter schools with free co-location, got more money 
per pupil than district schools, according to studies in 2010 and 2011 by the New York 
City Independent Budget Office (IBO).  This contradicted widespread claims, such as the 
contention by one Wall Street Journal columnist amidst the 2013 New York City 
mayoral race that charter schools in the city receive “several thousand dollars less” per 
pupil than neighboring traditional public schools.68   
With Bill de Blasio vowing as a mayoral candidate to end free co-location for 
charter schools, charter advocates, like the columnist for The Wall Street Journal, fought 
back that charter schools already received far less funding.  Basic to the case of one 
charter advocacy group making this argument was the complex matter of pension 
obligations:  as teachers at traditional public schools participate in retirement programs 
with payments pegged to income and with guaranteed health-care benefits, future costs 
could far exceed current contributions and must accordingly be accounted for in 
determining per-pupil expenditures; by contrast, teachers in charter schools typically 
participate in defined-contribution retirement programs, which cannot, by their very 
                                                
68 Matthew Kaminski, “A South Bronx Success Worried about the Next Mayor,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 4, 2013.  Researchers at the University of Arkansas soon after 
published a detailed study documenting significant underfunding of charter schools in 
states and specific districts across the country.  The researchers concluded that in New 
York City, in particular, in fiscal year 2011 district schools received $24,044 per pupil 
while charter schools received $16,420 per pupil, or 31.7 percent less.  See Meagan 
Batdorff et al., Charter School Funding: Inequity Expands, April 2014, 
http://www.uaedreform.org/charter-funding-inequity-expands/.  This study did not cite 
the IBO analysis of 2010 or 2011. 
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nature, suffer from  underfunding.69 
According to officials at the IBO, the purpose of their studies was to assess 
“actual public spending in support of charters and traditional schools in a given school 
year, as presented in the Bloomberg Administration’s financial plan.”  In this regard, they 
countered in their defense that estimates of future obligations varied too much to factor 
into their analysis.70 
In the opinion of the IBO, charter schools without free co-location were indeed at 
a disadvantage.  Using figures from the New York City Department of Education (DOE) 
budget for 2008-2009, the IBO explained in its 2010 report, with qualifications a year 
later, that charters without free co-location failed to benefit from money allocated for 
facilities, utilities, upkeep, and security as well as for debt service for construction of 
DOE buildings.  The resulting contrast was $15,672 per student in traditional public 
schools, which comprised $2,215 in pension costs for staff as well as $2,712 spent on 
facilities, utilities, upkeep, security, and debt service,  and $13,661 per student—or 12.8 
percent less—in charter schools without free co-location.71 
                                                
69 New York City Charter School Center, Press Release, NYC Charter School Center 
Statement and Background Advisory Regarding New Report from Save Our States, 
October 4, 2013, http://www.nyccharterschools.org/resources/statement-report-save-our-
states.  See also Harry J. Wilson and Jonathan Trichter, A Full Analysis of the All-In 
Funding Costs for District Public Schools and Charter Schools: The IBO February 2010 
Fiscal Brief Revisited, https://www.scribd.com/doc/173211810/NYC-School-Funding-
White-Paper-FINAL, October 16, 2014. 
70 Doug Turetsky, “Answering Back: SOS Report on IBO’s Comparison of Public 
Funding for Charter and Traditional Schools Doesn’t Make the Grade,” IBO Web Blog,  
October 10, 2013, http://ibo.nyc.ny.us/cgi-park/. 
71 New York City Independent Budget Office (hereafter IBO), Fiscal Brief: Comparing 
the Level of Public Support: Charter Schools versus Traditional Public Schools, February 
2010, 3, http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/charterschoolsfeb2010.pdf.  For 
qualifications the following year to update data, see Ray Domanico and Yolanda Smith, 
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However, charter schools in 2008-2009 with free co-location, received 4.5 
percent—or $701—more per student, the IBO reported, for a total of $16,373.  This sum 
comprised three parts: $12,444 per student for general education spending, which 
covered pension costs for staff; $1,217 in pass-through money for everything from 
textbooks and health-care services to classroom supplies and library materials; and the 
$2,712 spent on facilities, utilities, security, upkeep, and debt service.72 
The IBO moreover implied that because charter schools without unionized staff—
and most charter schools operate without union presence—are at liberty to offer less 
generous pension plans, they stand to have more money for general operating purposes.73  
The IBO made a similar case about the 2009-2010 budget, with charter schools with free 
co-location receiving 4 percent—or $649—more per student than district schools.74 
In a meeting to review charter school finances at the central office of the New 
York City DOE several months after de Blasio had taken office, Ola Duru, the DOE’s 
director of operations for the division of charter school accountability, confirmed the 
IBO’s assessment as accurate.  Like Laura Weeldreyer, the deputy chief of staff for 
Baltimore’s public schools, Duru is a charter advocate; she was, in fact, the founding 
chief of operations for a charter network in Brooklyn.  And like Weeldreyer, Duru said 
                                                                                                                                            
IBO Web Blog, Charter Schools Housed in the City’s School Buildings Get More Public 
Funding per Student than Traditional Public Schools, February 15, 2011, 
http://ibo.nyc.ny.us/cgi-park/.   
72 IBO, Fiscal Brief, “Comparing the Level of Public Support,” 2010, 3, 7; Domanico and 
Smith, 2011, along with a supplement on change in methodology,  
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/chartersupplement2.pdf. 
73 IBO, Fiscal Brief: “Comparing the Level of Public Support,” 2010, 7. 
74 Domanico and Smith, “Charter Schools Housed in the City’s School Buildings,” 2011. 
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charters with free co-location experienced no financial disadvantage.75 
By this point, the very issue of occupancy costs for charter schools in New York 
City had become moot:  siding with charter advocates, Governor Andrew Cuomo had 
circumvented Mayor de Blasio in March and sealed a deal with Republican legislators in 
Albany to guarantee charter schools in New York City the most generous terms in the 
country:  the DOE was required to make space available for free to charter schools; if the 
DOE could not find such space, it had to provide up to $40 million a year in funding for 
rental of private space.76 By 2015, the IBO reported, funding for charter and district 
schools was essentially the same: charter schools with free co-location received $29 less 
per pupil, whereas charter schools in private space were compensated with mandated 
rental assistance that covered all but $139 of the difference per pupil.77 
Philanthropic contributions to KIPP and networks like it can consequently go far 
in New York City. The needs are nevertheless many. In this regard, a third qualification 
concerning the advantage conferred KIPP by philanthropic contributions relates to KIPP 
Through College (KTC). For students who graduate from KIPP middle schools but don’t 
attend one of the organization’s twenty-two high schools, KTC provides college 
guidance, administers test prep, conducts financial-aid workshops, and coordinates 
campus tours. Moreover, KTC provides mentoring to all former KIPP students while 
                                                
75 Ola Duru, New York City Department of Education, Director of Operations for Charter 
School Accountability and Support, interview, New York, July 29, 2014. 
76 Javier Hernández, “State Protections for Charter Schools Threaten de Blasio’s 
Education Goals,” New York Times, March 30, 2014. 
77 New York City Independent Budget Office, Schools Brief: Charter Schools versus 
Traditional Public Schools, July 2015, 
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/charter_schools_versus_traditional_public_schools_
comparing_the_level_of_public_support_in_school_year_2014_2015_july_23_2015.pdf. 
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they’re in college to help them make it through college. Funding for KTC comes from the 
KIPP Foundation as well as the KIPP regions.  In some regions, such as New York, KTC 
accounts for approximately 30 percent of money raised.  KTC in New York in 2014 had 
seventeen people on staff helping 1,036 KIPP alumni.  The annual budget was $2.9 
million, or $2,800 per student.78  While KTC thus implicitly benefits KIPP schools in 
conveying to students that they are on the road to college, it is an alumni program and 
accordingly not an operational expenditure. 
In sum, once the costs of occupancy and KTC are deducted from philanthropic 
contributions, there is little more, on average, than the $1,200 to $1,600 necessary to fund 
the longer school day, Saturday classes, and three-week summer programs.  According to 
Mancini, most KIPP regions as of 2014 had, in fact, eliminated Saturday classes and cut 
the school day from 9.5 hours to 8.5.  Mancini said KIPP cofounder Mike Feinberg, a 
passionate advocate of more time in school, fought this change but relented in the face of 
mounting complaints from teachers about the need for more manageable schedules.79 
 
Along with eliminating or, at least, driving down occupancy costs, making the schedules 
of teachers more manageable is critical to the future of KIPP and similar CMOs.  Much 
as there is a finite supply of philanthropic dollars to support KIPP’s extra efforts, there is 
a finite supply of teachers capable of year after year putting in ten-hour days at school 
and remaining available to students in the evening and over the weekend by cell phone, 
                                                
78 IBO, Schools Brief, 2015. 
79 Mancini, interview, New York, September 30, 2014. 
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as required, for homework help.80  On top of stamina, KIPP teachers, like all teachers in 
underprivileged communities, need rare patience and acumen to connect with and guide 
students combating economic disadvantage.  Of KIPP’s 50,221 students in 2013-2014, 88 
percent qualified for free or reduced-price lunch.81 
 Teacher retention has accordingly been a central challenge for KIPP as well as 
similar CMOs.  The price is not merely time, energy, and money lost to recruitment and 
training of replacements but also quality of instruction.  In a study published in 2008 of 
KIPP’s five middle schools in the San Francisco Bay region, SRI International elucidated 
the degree of the problem: only 51 percent of eighty-four teachers in 2006-2007 returned 
in 2007-2008; 69 percent did so the year before; and 60 percent did so two years earlier.82  
By contrast, the rate of teacher retention at charter schools and at urban public schools 
across the country in 2008-2009, according to the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES), was 76 percent and 84 percent, respectively.83 
 The study, authorized by KIPP and funded by the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, moreover reported that of the 121 teachers hired in total by the schools since 
2003-2004, only forty-three, or 36 percent, were still in the classroom by 2007-2008, 
                                                
80 For detail on the challenge of recruiting the necessary human capital to scale up “no excuses” 
CMOs, see Steven F. Wilson, “Success at Scale in Charter Schooling,” American Enterprise 
Institute, March 19, 2009, https://www.aei.org/publication/success-at-scale-in-charter-schooling/. 
81 Enrollment for 2013-2014 reported by Mancini August 12, 2014.  Demographic data comes 
from KIPP 2013 Report Card, 14, http://www.kipp.org/reportcard. 
82 Katrina Woodworth et al., San Francisco Bay Area KIPP Schools: A Study of Early 
Implementation and Achievement (Menlo Park, California: SRI International, 2008), x, 32-33.  
SRI did not provide the number of teachers on staff in 2004-2004 or 2006-2007. 
83 Ashley Keigher, Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results from the 2008-09 Teacher Follow-Up 
Survey (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, 2010), 7-8, 
http://nces.edu.gov/pubsearch. 
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though twenty-three, or 30 percent, had continued to work for KIPP in different 
capacities. To KIPP administrators and teachers alike at these five schools, according to 
SRI, this turnover distracted staff from instructional responsibilities and undermined 
collaboration and innovation.84 
 Acknowledging the problem in their 2009 annual report, KIPP’s national officials 
declared teacher retention a central priority and conceded that those KIPP schools with 
lower teacher turnover rates perform better.85 This conclusion along with the observations 
about teacher turnover reported by SRI comports with abundant research.  A recent 
example of such research is a 2013 article in the American Educational Research Journal 
entitled “How Teacher Turnover Harms Student Achievement” by Matthew Ronfeldt, 
Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. 
 In studying the effect of teacher turnover on 850,000 fourth- and fifth-grade 
students in New York City schools over eight years, Ronfeldt and his coauthors found 
that teacher turnover had a significantly negative impact on student performance in both 
math and reading and, moreover, proved especially harmful in schools with higher 
proportions of low-achieving students.  According to the authors of this study and many 
other scholars whose work they cite, the explanation for the negative impact of high 
teacher turnover appears to derive not only from insufficient experience of new teachers 
but also from inadequate institutional stability, in turn fundamental to fostering 
cooperation among colleagues, nurturing new faculty, and developing trust with students.  
Whether teachers individually peak in their effectiveness after seven or eight years as 
                                                
84 Woodworth et al., San Francisco Bay Area KIPP Schools, 32-34. 
85 KIPP: 2009 Report Card, http://www.kipp.org/reportcard/2009, 14. 
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classroom instructors, as some scholars have claimed, is beside the point, according to 
Ronfeldt and his coauthors:  students and young teachers alike benefit from the guidance 
of veteran faculty.86  
 KIPP officials in their 2009 annual report noted progress since 2006-2007, with 
an increase of teacher retention from 62 percent to 69 across the country, and pointed out 
that an additional 6 percent of teachers in 2009 stayed within the KIPP network, some 
taking teaching positions at different KIPP schools and others taking on administrative 
responsibilities.87  To KIPP’s great credit, the organization has been forthcoming about 
this problem. Since the publication of the SRI study in 2008, KIPP has documented in its 
annual reports the teacher retention rate for nearly every region. Yet the commitment of 
KIPP officials to improve retention has run up against the stubborn reality of how hard it 
is to keep teachers on staff while demanding so much of them.  According to data drawn 
from its annual reports, the weighted teacher retention rate for KIPP schools was 73 
percent in 2010-2011; 69 percent in 2011-2012; 69 percent again in 2012-2013; and 68 
percent in 2013-2014 (see Table 6.6).88 
                                                
86 Matthew Ronfeldt, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff, “How Teacher Turnover Harms 
Student Achievement,” American Educational Research Journal 50 (February 2013): 4-36.  For 
additional analysis of the institutional costs of high teacher turnover, see also Michael A. Abelson 
and Barry D. Baysinger, “Optimal and Dysfunctional Turnover: Toward an Organizational Level 
Model,” The Academy of Management Review 9 (April 1984): 331-341; Anthony S. Bryk and 
Barbara Schneider, Trust in Schools: A Core Resource for Improvement (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2002); Kacey Guin, “Chronic Teacher Turnover in Urban Elementary Schools,” 
Education Policy Analysis Archives 12 (August 2004): 1-25; Judith Warren Little, “Norms of 
Collegiality and Experimentation: Workplace Conditions of School Success,” American 
Educational Research Journal 19 (Autumn 1982): 325-340; Fred M. Newmann et al., School 
Instructional Program Coherence: Benefits and Challenges (Chicago: Consortium on Chicago 
Research, 2001). 
87 KIPP: 2009 Report Card. 
88 All data were derived from KIPP’s annual report cards, http://www.kipp.org/reportcard.  Raw 
numbers come from the report cards.  Weighted averages were computed by the author.  
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 KIPP’s struggle appears to mirror that of other ambitious CMOs set on radically 
improving the lives of underprivileged children.  While no other CMO has reported 
teacher retention data in such detail,89  the New York City Charter School Center 
(NYCCSC) reported numbers for charter schools in the city for 2006-2007 through 2010-
2011 that reflect those of KIPP:  69 percent in 2006-2007; 73 percent in 2007-2008; 67 
percent in 2008-2009; 74 percent in 2009-2010; and 70 percent in 2010-2011. For 
comparative purposes, the NYCCSC also reported teacher retention rates for the city’s 
district schools for the same years: 84 percent in both 2006-2007 and 2007-2008; 86 
percent in 2008-2009; and 87 percent in both 2009-2010 and 2010-2011.90  For the nation 
as a whole, according to NCES, teacher retention in 2012-2013 was 82 percent at both 
charter schools and urban public schools.91  
 Though Achievement First has not published teacher retention data, the CMO did 
upon request provide numbers for its schools for 2012-2014 (see Table 6.7). Like KIPP, 
                                                                                                                                            
Mathematica Policy Research reported a weighted retention rate of 78.9 percent for 2010-11, but 
this rate was based on a survey of principals at fifty-three middle-schools out of a total of ninety-
six schools in the network; the response rate from those principals was, in turn, 93 percent. 
Regarding the retention rate reported by Mathematica Policy Research, described above as the 
inverse of the reported attrition rate, see Christina Clark Tuttle et al., KIPP Middle Schools:  
Impacts on Achievement and Other Outcomes, Mathematica Policy Research, February 27, 2013, 
14, 29, 103, 
http://www.mathematicampr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/education/KIPP_middle.pdsf.  
Interpretation of the data was confirmed by Tuttle in correspondence with the author on 
September 15, 2014. 
89 IDEA Public Schools has shared teacher retention data in reports issued every two years since 
2008, http://www.ideapublicschools.org: in 2008, teacher retention was 80 percent; in 2010, 87 
percent; and in 2012, 77 percent.  Rocketship posted on its Web site that teacher retention has 
year after year been 70 percent.  See http://www.rsed.org/faq.cfm. 
90 New York City Charter School Center, The State of the NYC Charter School Sector, 2012, 39, 
http://www.nyccharterschools.org/data. 
91 Rebecca Goldring, Soheyla Taie, and Minsun Riddles, Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results 
from the 2012-13 Teacher Follow-Up Survey (Washington, DC: National Center of Education 
Statistics, 2014), 7-8, http://nces.edu.gov/pubsearch. 
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Achievement First employs the “no excuses” model, placing great demands on its 
teachers as well as students. However, unlike KIPP and much like Mastery, Achievement 
First grew far more gradually, comprises a much smaller number of schools (twenty-nine 
in 2014-2015 in contrast to 162 for KIPP), is concentrated in one region (spreading from 
Brooklyn to Providence), and utilizes a significantly tighter administrative and curricular 
philosophy, with member schools functioning as subdivisions rather than relatively 
autonomous affiliates, as in the case of KIPP. Achievement First’s slightly better 
numbers appear to reflect both these advantages and limitations. 
 2009-10 
 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
 
Region Teachers Retained  T R T R T R T R 
Arkansas 41 71% 42 70% 61 69% 78 57% 80 59% 
Bay Area, CA 122 71% 127 66% 134 74% 133 71% 150 69% 
Los Angeles, 58 77% 79 80% 97 72% 129 85% 163 73% 
Colorado 31 64% 42 64% 56 70% 67 43% 72 67% 
Washington, D.C. 129 58% 166 64% 222 64% 253 67% 311 70% 
Jacksonville, FL N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 71% N/A N/A 43 63% 
Atlanta, GA 47 69% 62 77% 77 72% 110 78% 140 67% 
Chicago, IL 37 57% 28 68% 35 58% 45 67% 61 82% 
New Orleans, LA 84 86% 159 78% 186 75% 245 66% 252 65% 
Baltimore, MD 30 54% 48 84% 62 86% 74 73% 86 73% 
Massachusetts N/A N/A 28 73% 40 78% 61 80% 81 83% 
St. Louis, MO N/A N/A 12 100% 16 64% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Newark, NJ 93 79% 118 84% 130 84% 168 81% 195 85% 
New York, NY 106 70% 148 85% 186 74% 243 81% 286 73% 
Gaston, NC N/A N/A N/A N/A 47 54% 53 61% 58 70% 
Philadelphia, PA 27 43% 47 68% 72 75% 83 59% 99 72% 
Memphis, TN 27 71% 28 65% 31 48% 49 39% 79 42% 
Nashville, TN N/A N/A N/A N/A 22 42% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Austin, TX 43 69% 63 77% 85 74% 124 60% 180 63% 
Dallas, TX N/A N/A 17 61% 16 78% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Houston, TX 293 71% 366 68% 428 62% 507 65% 567 60% 
San Antonio, TX 33 67% 46 59% 58 47% 82 76% 98 60% 
Teacher total 1,201 1,626 2,073 2,504 3,001 
Returnees 836 1,183 1,429 1,727 2,032 
Mean retention 67.4% 73.2% 67.8% 67.2% 68.2% 
Weighted retention 69.6% 72.8% 68.9% 69.0% 67.7% 
Table 6.6 Number of teachers by KIPP region and the percentage of those who returned to the 
classroom at the same school the following year. Mean retention is defined by region. Rates of 
retention of staff within the organization as teachers at different schools or in non-instructional 
capacities were higher. For 2012-14, only regions with two or more schools reported retention 
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data. The weighted rates of within-network retention were 75.4 percent in 2009-10, 79.7 percent 
in 2010-11, 74.8 percent in 2011-12, 74.9 percent in 2012-13, and 74.4 percent in 2013-14.  Data 
source: All data were derived from KIPP’s annual report cards, http://www.kipp.org/reportcard.  
  
 Yet the numbers for Achievement First were still low.  For 2013-14, for example, 
the average retention rate for the CMO’s twenty-five schools was 75.4 percent. At that 
rate, only 32.3 percent of teachers would be working at the same school four years later. 
For KIPP, with a retention rate of 68.2 percent per school in 2013-14, the portion four 
years later would be 21.6 percent.92  
 2012-13 2013-14 
Region Teachers Retained Teachers Retained 
Bridgeport, CT 52 83% 62 68% 
Hartford, CT 69 75% 78 69% 
New Haven, CT 125 74% 135 74% 
Brooklyn, NY 346 77% 417 75% 
Providence, RI NA NA 14 100% 
Teacher total 592 706 
Returnees 454 522 
Mean retention by school 76.1% 75.4% 
Weighted retention 76.7% 73.9% 
Table 6.7 Number of teachers by Achievement First region and the percentage of those 
who returned to the classroom at the same school the following year. Mean retention is 
defined by school rather than region because of the small number of regions 
(Achievement First comprised 22 schools in 2012-13 and 25 schools in 2013-14). Rates 
of retention of staff within the organization as teachers at different schools or in non-
instructional capacities were marginally higher. The weighted rates of within-network 
retention were 77% percent in 2012-13 and  76.6% percent in 2013-14.  Data source: All 
data obtained from Tracey Geller, Director, Human Capital, Achievement First, by e-
mail, July 9, 2015. 
 
                                                
92 These determinations are based simply on compounding the retention rates over four years (i.e., 
0.7544 = 0.323). 
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For KIPP, the struggle with teacher retention has varied both by region and by year for 
each region.  Moreover, KIPP’s struggle varies within region by school, something 
KIPP’s annual report cards do not capture, yet something made clear through school 
visits and interviews. In New York City, for example, the organization’s four middle 
schools exhibited significantly different rates of teacher retention from 2005-2006 to 
2008-2009. KIPP Academy, located in the Bronx and founded by Dave Levin in 1995 as 
the network’s second school, experienced hardly any teacher turnover over these three 
years: only two of twenty-one teachers moved on.93  Likewise, at KIPP Infinity, located 
in West Harlem and founded in 2005, only two of twenty teachers over the same three 
years departed.94  However, at KIPP STAR (which stands for Success Through 
Achievement and Responsibility), located in nearby Morningside Heights and founded in 
2003, ten of twenty-one teachers left after both the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school 
years.95  And at KIPP AMP (an acronym for Always Mentally Prepared), located in the 
Crown Heights section of Brooklyn and founded in 2005, teacher turnover was also 
repeatedly high.  By 2010-2011, only two of the twenty-six teachers on staff along with 
the principal remained from the founding faculty six years earlier.  
 Both teachers—Fabiano Pinheiro and Nicole Lavonne Smith—taught a 
combination of Portuguese and capoeira, the Brazilian martial art blending music, dance, 
acrobatics, and combat.  Following the final day of summer school in July 2011 while 
overseeing dismissal from the sidewalk, Smith said that she would not have lasted as a 
                                                
93 Blanca Ruiz, principal, KIPP Academy, interview, New York, October 20, 2008. 
94 Marya Murray-Diaz, school operations manager, KIPP Infinity, interview, New York, October 
22, 2008. 
95 Amber Williams, principal, KIPP STAR, interview, New York, October 16, 2008. 
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strictly academic teacher.  The pressure involved in prepping for academic classes, she 
explained, grading assignments, helping students by phone at night with their homework, 
and getting students ready for annual state exams in reading and math would have in time 
worn her out.  By contrast, in teaching capoeira, Smith said, she got to help students let 
go and exhale; and in teaching Portuguese, she got to broaden their understanding of 
language and culture without regard to year-end standardized exams.96 
 For its focus as well as its location, KIPP AMP at that time stood out among KIPP 
schools. KIPP AMP was defined by capoeira.  All students had to study capoeira. Both 
Pinheiro, a Brazilian native and capoeira master, and Smith, a native New Yorker who 
learned Portuguese while doing graduate work in Brazil, were accordingly core members 
of the faculty.  And the school used capoeira not only as a form of physical education but 
also as a prism for understanding history, anthropology, and aesthetics. 
 After the 2011-2012 school year, however, capoeira was history.  And Pinheiro 
and Smith were no longer on staff.  The dance studio was converted into an additional 
classroom, and Portuguese was cut from the curriculum.  The purpose of this change was 
to focus on math and reading and at the same time boost results on the state-mandated 
tests in those subjects.  KIPP AMP became another “no excuses” charter school, leaving 
many students, according to several teachers, without an athletic and aesthetic outlet they 
craved.97 
 Anastasia Michals, a math teacher at KIPP AMP from 2009 through 2013, 
                                                
96 Nicole Lavonne Smith, dance instructor, KIPP AMP, interview, New York, July 29, 2011. 
97 Ashley Toussaint, a KIPP AMP social studies teacher since 2009, telephone interview, October 
28, 2014; Anastasia Michals, a KIPP AMP math teacher from 2009 to 2013, telephone interview, 
November 8, 2014; Nicole Lavonne Smith, telephone interview, November 14, 2014. 
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recalled a year after leaving the school that shutting down the capoeira program hurt, in 
particular, students who struggled in the classroom.  “Capoeira was far more than 
physical education,” said Michals, who has a keen appreciation for sports.  She played 
both soccer and lacrosse at Bryn Mawr College, where she majored in economics and 
minored in mathematics before heading into teaching through TFA in 2005.  “Capoeira 
built cultural awareness,” she said, “with trips to dance events across the city, and 
instilled self-confidence, especially in students having troubles academically.  Capoeira 
got these students excited about school.”98 
 Much like capoeira, the neighborhood around KIPP AMP is a rare mix.  KIPP 
AMP is situated on the top floor of a four-story building it shares with two district middle 
schools, M.S. 334 and M.S. 354.  Across Park Place to the north is Albany Houses, a 
project comprising nine identical red-brick high-rise apartment buildings symmetrically 
placed amid two blocks of lawns and trees.  Across Sterling Place to the south stretches a 
neighborhood of Caribbean restaurants, beauty salons, corner markets, brownstones both 
renovated and weathered, and myriad churches, from the stately neo-gothic Bethany 
Methodist Church on St. Johns Place to such humble store-front congregations as the 
Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church, the Open Door Church of God in Christ, and 
Jordan’s Holy Temple Pentecostal Church. Three blocks to the west is a bustling Hasidic 
Jewish community anchored by yeshivas and synagogues. 
 Cultural texture nevertheless did not mean safety. The streets could be dangerous. 
A fourteen-year-old boy was shot dead in front of a bodega around the corner from the 
                                                
98 Michals, telephone interview, November 8, 2014. 
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school early in the evening of June 1, 2011.99 Because the murder was gang related and 
because several students in M.S. 334 and M.S. 354 either belonged to rival gangs or had 
siblings in rival gangs, police stood in the lobby and on every stairwell landing for the 
next week.100 
 
KIPP AMP was the vision of Ky Adderley, the founding principal, who stepped down 
after six years at the helm in June 2011.  His successor, Debon Lewis, who cut the 
capoeira program, would step down three years later amid a swirl of uncertainty.101  
“They call it the KIPP burn,” Adderley said.102  The burn for Adderley did not merely 
concern exhaustion.  The burn was also personal. 
 Adderley, an All-American middle-distance runner at Georgetown University 
with broad shoulders and an infectious smile, had poured himself into his job.  As a 
principal, he continued to radiate the poise and determination of an athlete driven to win.  
That drive was in his family.  His father, Nelson Adderley, played halfback at Ohio State 
and then for the Toronto Argonauts of the Canadian Football League; his uncle Herb 
Adderley played halfback at Michigan State and then became a Hall of Fame cornerback 
for the Green Bay Packers and Dallas Cowboys.  He played youth football himself but 
opted for track as a teenager at Central High School in his native Philadelphia.  He loved 
                                                
99 Matthew Nestel and John Lauinger, “Brooklyn Teen Shot to Death Just Blocks from His Home 
While Walking with His Friends,” New York Daily News, June 3, 2011. 
100 Ky Adderley, principal, KIPP AMP, interview, New York, June 6, 2011. 
101 When asked about Lewis’s departure, Mancini said on August 8, 2014, only that the 
appointment did not work out. Toussaint said in a telephone interview on October 28, 2014, that 
the staff was left in the dark.  Subsequent efforts to reach Lewis by e-mail and telephone for 
comment proved unsuccessful. 
102 Adderley, interview, New York, June 6, 2011. 
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the freedom of running, he said.103 
 After earning a bachelor’s degree in psychology in 1998, Adderley stayed at 
Georgetown to train for the 2000 Olympic trials while working part-time as a research 
assistant for Jens Ludwig, a professor of economics and expert on urban affairs, and 
studying for a master's degree in education and social policy.  A strained Achilles tendon 
kept Adderley from competing in the Olympic trials.  He completed his master's in 2001 
and then went into teaching through TFA, the path taken by Feinberg, Levin, and 
countless KIPP leaders.  Adderley taught eighth grade for three years in Washington, 
D.C., before winning a fellowship funded by the Fisher family to become a KIPP 
principal.  As a Fisher Fellow, Adderley developed the capoeira-based curriculum that 
distinguished KIPP AMP. He bought an apartment three blocks from the school and 
made KIPP AMP his life.104 
 Monday through Friday, Adderley dressed in a suit and tie, circled the 
neighborhood on his orange mountain bike every morning between 7:00 and 7:20 to herd 
students to school on time and every afternoon following dismissal to supervise their 
return home, and worked late afterward in his office.  To ensure the punctuality of his 
students, he negotiated a deal with the proprietors of the corner markets in the 
neighborhood not to sell to them in the morning.  Adderley’s only break came in the 
middle of the day when he returned home briefly to walk his Rhodesian ridgeback, 
named Shango after an African deity.105 
                                                
103 Ky Adderley, interview, New York, October 15, 2008. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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 Adderley had expected everyone on staff to work as hard and obediently follow 
his lead.  Teachers were expected to be in the building from 7:00 a.m., thirty minutes 
before the arrival of students, to 5:00 p.m., and to adhere unquestioned to school 
practice.106 In a revolt that made the pages of The New York Daily News and The New 
York Times, teachers protested in January 2009, in the school’s fourth year, that they 
were overworked, unheard, and ready to unionize.  While KIPP teachers are paid 
approximately 20 percent more than their district counterparts for the extra hours they 
must put in,107 teachers at KIPP AMP alleged the expectations were nevertheless 
unrealistic and their lack of administrative input, unacceptable. “We’re looking to 
promote the kind of teaching environment that people can stay in,” Kashi Nelson, a social 
studies teacher, said in the Daily News.108  Her colleague Luisa Bonifacio, a reading 
teacher, made the same case the same day in the Times: “It’s a matter of sustainability for 
teachers.”109  The breaking point for the teachers came with the dismissal of two 
colleagues without explanation to the staff.110  According to Bonifacio, the Times 
reported, fifteen of the school’s twenty-two teachers had signed cards for unionization.111  
Three months later, in April, the KIPP AMP staff joined the United Federation of 
                                                
106 Yabome Kabia, telephone interview, October 24, 2014. 
107 Adderley, interview, New York, October 15, 2008; and Jennifer Medina, “Charter School’s 
Deadline to Recognize Union Passes,” New York Times, February 13, 2009. 
108 Meredith Kolodner, “Charter School Teachers Push to Join UFT,” New York Daily News, 
January 14, 2009. 
109 Steven Greenhouse and Jennifer Medina, “Teachers at 2 Charter Schools Plan to Join Union, 
Despite Notion of Incompatibility,” New York Times, January 14, 2009. 
110 Smith, interview, New York, July 29, 2011; see also Kolodner, “Charter School Teachers Push 
to Join UFT.” 
111 Greenhouse and Medina, “Teachers at 2 Charter Schools.” 
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Teachers (UFT).112   
 Much of 2008-2009, Adderley was helping run the KIPP regional office while 
two junior colleagues managed day-to-day affairs at KIPP AMP.  In September 2009, 
Adderley returned to KIPP AMP full time. The teachers ultimately voted in April 2010 to 
opt out of the UFT;113 a court-ordered re-vote of this decertification in November 2010 
generated the same result.114  Adderley just the same felt bitter, he recalled in his final 
month at the school, and decided to move on.  He considered offers to start a new KIPP 
school in Philadelphia or Dallas but declined. “Starting a KIPP is consuming,” Adderley 
said.  “It takes one year to plan and three years to get going.”  He instead took a job in 
Rio de Janeiro as an education consultant advising foundations dedicated to helping 
underprivileged Brazilian children.115 
 Among those who left KIPP AMP in 2009 following the turmoil that led to the 
campaign for unionization was Yabome Kabia, a charismatic math teacher who had 
grown up in East Lansing, Michigan, and earned a bachelor’s degree at Boston College 
with majors in economics and sociology.  Through the New York City Teaching Fellows 
program, an alternate route to certification for public school teachers, Kabia taught math 
for three years at the Theater Arts Production Company School, known as Tapco, in the 
Bronx and simultaneously earned a master’s degree in math instruction at City College of 
                                                
112 United Federation of Teachers, press release, April 23, 2009, http://www.uft.org/press-
releases/kipp-s-amp-academy-teachers-are-certified-union-bargaining-unit. 
113 Elizabeth Green, “After Opting In, KIPP Staff Vote Themselves Out of Teachers Union,” 
Chalkbeat, April 23, 2010, http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2010/04/23/after-opting-in-kipp-staff-vote-
themselves-out-of-teachers-union/#.VEfTjovF-8w. 
114 United Federation of Teachers, press release, April 23, 2009. 
115 Ibid. 
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New York.  Kabia then taught for two years at KIPP San Francisco Bay Academy before 
joining the KIPP AMP faculty in September 2008.  Within six weeks at KIPP AMP, 
Kabia expressed concern about burnout.  “I certainly would not be able to do this job 
with a family,” she said after teaching algebra to a class of twenty-six eighth-graders and 
urging students to call her in the evening if they needed any help with their homework.116  
Several months later, Kabia was one of the KIPP AMP teachers to vote for UFT 
affiliation.117 
 The following year, Kabia was teaching at the Berkeley Carroll School, a private 
school with smaller classes and a more manageable schedule in Park Slope, two miles 
and several income brackets away.  Reflecting five years after her departure from KIPP 
AMP during a free period at Berkeley Carroll in October 2014, Kabia, who had since 
married and now had a seventeen-month-old girl, said the difference of teaching at 
Berkeley Carroll was not merely the work load.  Kabia said the environment was far 
more harmonious, but the same was true, she added, of KIPP San Francisco Bay 
Academy.  “KIPP is not one entity,” Kabia said.118  This is true of finances, as previously 
explained.  It is also true of climate as well as academic results. 
 Like separate units in any large organization, some KIPP schools work better than 
others.  And some fold.  Although KIPP’s growth has been impressive, scaling up the 
organization has involved strife and failure as well as success and thus exposed the 
difficulty of expanding such a demanding model of schooling. Of the forty-three KIPP 
                                                
116 Yabome Kabia, interview, New York, October 15, 2008. 
117 Kabia, telephone interview, October 24, 2014. 
118 Ibid. 
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middle schools opened between 2002 and 2006, eight by 2010 had closed and two broke 
away because of philosophical differences.  Those ten schools were located in cities large 
and small across the country: Annapolis, Maryland; Asheville, North Carolina; Atlanta; 
Buffalo; Camden, New Jersey; Chicago; Fresno; Gary, Indiana; and Sacramento.119  
 While KIPP AMP marched on, teacher turnover indicated trouble.  Michals, who 
went on to become the dean of students at an Ascend Learning charter school in the 
Canarsie section of Brooklyn, said the churn undermined the development of curricula as 
well as school culture. “Every year, we felt like we were starting over,” she said.  “We 
couldn’t build momentum.”120 In particular, there were few veteran teachers to provide 
guidance to young faculty. When asked during the summer session of 2011 what kind of 
support he received from senior colleagues in his department, a social studies teacher in 
his second year at KIPP AMP, who was struggling to reach some reluctant students, said 
he had no senior colleagues in his department.121  
 
Some turnover was the necessary price of KIPP’s expansion, as the organization needs 
talented KIPP teachers to take on administrative roles at new schools.  Among those who 
                                                
119 Tuttle et al., KIPP Middle Schools: Impacts on Achievement and Other Outcomes, 
Mathematica Policy Research, February 27, 2013, 7-9, http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/education/KIPP_middle.pdf.  According to a KIPP memo 
entitled Schools Opened by KIPP That Are No Longer Part of the KIPP Network, obtained from 
Mancini by the author on July 5, 2006, the two schools that broke away because of philosophical 
differences were KIPP PATH Academy in Dekalb County, Georgia, which became PATH 
Academy, and KIPP SAC Prep in Sacramento, which became SAC Prep.  In the case of the KIPP 
school in Annapolis, the problem was inadequate resources.  The school had outgrown its space, 
the district had no space available, and the local KIPP board did not have the funds to rent 
sufficient space.  See Jay Mathews, “KIPP’s Mysterious Tale of Three Cities,” Washington Post, 
June 26, 2007. 
120 Michals, telephone interview, November 8, 2014. 
121 Ashley Toussaint, interview, New York, July 28, 2011. 
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joined Adderley in leaving in 2011, in this light, was Emily Carroll, a firm but gentle 
fifth-grade teacher.  Carroll had grown up in Chicago attending the highly regarded 
progressive University of Chicago Laboratory Schools, studied political science at 
Washington University in St. Louis, taught for two years in a public school in the Bronx 
through TFA, taught for two more years at an Achievement First charter school in the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, and then earned a master’s in education policy 
at Harvard before joining the staff of KIPP AMP. It was Carroll’s second year at the 
school.  On the final day of the school year, Carroll explained to her students that she 
would be leaving to train at New York University as a Fisher Fellow, like Adderley 
before her, to become a KIPP principal.  A visibly disappointed girl shot her hand up and 
waited to be acknowledged.  “You said at the beginning of the year you were going to 
stay with us.”  Carroll winced: “Yes, but this opportunity came up.”  Unappeased, 
another student chimed in without waiting to be called upon:  “You’re leaving already, 
after only two years?” While Carroll would be back a year later as the founding principal 
of the KIPP AMP Elementary School, the middle school at a time of transition and 
instability had in the process lost a fine teacher whose competence would be hard to 
match and whose relationships developed over two years with students and colleagues 
could not be matched.122 
 Another teacher leaving in 2011, Antonia Phillip, would be neither returning as a 
teacher nor staying within the organization in a different capacity.  Phillip was a science 
teacher who had grown up in Trinidad attending a Catholic school for girls.  She earned a 
bachelor’s degree in biology from Howard University, taught for one year at the Match 
                                                
122 Emily Carroll, interview, New York, June 16, 2011. 
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Public Charter School in Boston, and joined the staff of KIPP AMP in 2010.  It was 
Phillip’s only year at a KIPP school and, she said, it would be her last.  Phillip said she 
knew by January that the fit was not right.  “You have to have a warrior spirit to teach at 
KIPP,” Phillip said as she packed her belongings in June.  “I don’t have a warrior 
spirit.”123  
 It was not merely the long hours but also the intensity of KIPP’s mission, Phillip 
explained, that required this warrior spirit.124  The ubiquitous posters exhorting good 
behavior at KIPP AMP as well as KIPP Academy, KIPP Infinity, KIPP STAR, and KIPP 
schools visited in Baltimore, Los Angeles, and San Diego provided an obvious but 
superficial indication of this intensity.  The silent single-file lines of students between 
classes, the stern mien of many teachers, the rigid pedagogy in many classrooms, the 
relentless focus on test results, and the strict codes of conduct echoing the ubiquitous 
exhortatory posters gave everyday form to this intensity. 
 In hallways, classrooms, and stairwells, these posters articulate an array of moral 
reminders and morale boosters:  
• DREAM IT! DO IT! 
• All of US WILL LEARN!!! 
• Climb the MOUNTAIN to and through COLLEGE! 
• KIPPsters DO THE RIGHT thing because it’s the RIGHT thing to do! 
• Find a way or make one. 
• KIPPsters leave a place cleaner than they found it. 
                                                
123 Antonia Phillip, interview, New York, June 6, 2011. 
124 Ibid. 
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• Know self. Be proud. 
• KIPP CREDO 
If there is a problem, we look for a solution. 
If there is a better way, we try to find it. 
If we need help, we ask. 
If a teammate needs help, we give. 
• Be Nice. Work Hard. (This inversion of the KIPP motto echoes the original 
formulation conceived by Rafe Esquith, a legendary elementary school teacher in 
Los Angeles who mentored Feinberg and Levin; Levin preferred the original 
sequence, but Feinberg liked the inversion and prevailed in making it the motto 
for the organization as a whole, except in New York, Levin’s domain.)125 
• There are NO SHORTCUTS!! (This was Esquith’s trademark slogan and became 
the title of his memoir.)126 
 
Dovetailing with these posters at KIPP AMP was “The AMP 6,” the school’s core 
principles for behavior: 
1. SSLANT (This is an acronym shared by all KIPP schools as a code of conduct 
for students in class:  Smile, Sit up, Listen, Ask and answer questions, Nod your 
head [if you understand], and Track the speaker [that is, follow the speaker with 
your eyes].) 
2. PETSY (This acronym is widely shared by KIPP schools and covers the basic 
                                                
125 Jay Mathews, Work Hard. Be Nice. (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin, 2009), 179. 
126 Ibid. 
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words for proper dialogue:  Please, Excuse me, Thank you, Sorry, and Yes, not 
yeah or huh [though some at KIPP consider Y to stand for You’re welcome].) 
3. Dress code:  belt; shirt tucked in; no jewelry. 
4. Follow directions the first time. 
5. SHUT UP is a curse word. 
6. Questions require respectful responses: no sucking teeth or heavy sighs; no 
rolling eyes or turning away. 
 Similar posters appear in the hallways, stairwells, and classrooms of schools run 
by Mastery. Mastery’s mission statement and code of conduct are complementary lobby 
fixtures.127 
Our Mission:  
All Students Learn The Academic 
And Personal Skills They Need 
To Succeed In Higher Education, 
Compete In The Global Economy, 
And Pursue Their Dreams. 
Code of Conduct: 
I choose to be here! 
I am here to Learn and Achieve! 
I am responsible for my Actions! 
I contribute to a Safe, Respectful, Cooperative 
Community! 
                                                
127 Based on visits to Mastery Simon Gratz, Shoemaker, and Hardy Williams, May 6, 2014. 
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I come with a clear mind and a healthy body! 
This is OUR school, WE make it Shine! 
 In Achievement First schools, signage affirming the network’s mission is 
pervasive.128 The network’s core values, similar to KIPP’s five pillars, are captured with 
the acronym REACH: Respect, Enthusiasm, Achievement, Citizenship, and Hard Work. 
As in KIPP schools, posters everywhere reinforce the core values with a range of adages, 
prescriptions, and vows: 
• If you want it, you can have it. SUCCESS STARTS HERE AND NOW! 
• WHATEVER IT TAKES 
• TEAM Always Beats Individual 
• Many Minds, One Mission 
• EDUCATION = FREEDOM 
• Sweat the Small Stuff 
• TEAM WORK MAKES THE DREAM WORK 
• FOCUS. DRIVE. SUCCEED. 
• Give Back 
• Envision Success 
• OWN IT. FIX IT. LEARN FROM IT. 
• Read, Baby, Read. – Harriett Ball [a legendary veteran teacher in Houston’s 
Bastian Elementary School who inspired Levin as a novice instructor across the 
hall in 1992 to set high expectations, prepare diligently, and integrate chants as 
                                                
128 Based on visits to the five Achievement First schools in New Haven, March 26, 2015. 
Chapter 6: The Nonprofit Alternative 
 366 
devices for bonding as well as learning]129 
• Education is not received. It is ACHIEVED. 
• The HARDER I work, the luckier I get. – Samuel Goldwyn 
• Excellence is a Habit. 
• I am happy for knowledge to get me to college! 
• If my mind can conceive it, and my heart can believe it, then I can achieve it. – 
Muhammad Ali 
• We are the change we seek. – Barack Obama 
• Until we get equality in education, we won’t have an equal society. – Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor 
• ¡Si Se Puede! – Cesar Chavez 
• Be Nice. Work Hard. [As at KIPP AMP, this sequence echoed Rafe Esquith’s 
formulation.] 
• If There’s A Problem, WE SOLVE IT. 
 If There’s A Wrong, WE RIGHT IT. 
 If There’s A Hurt, WE HEAL IT. 
 If There’s A Mountain, WE CLIMB IT. 
 
On top of the long hours, the task of imposing an exacting code of conduct can be 
exhausting.  Teachers at KIPP, Mastery, and CMOs like it are far more than conventional 
academic instructors.  They are also coaches responsible for relentlessly modeling and 
molding behavior.  More to Phillip’s point, they are soldiers on the front lines of the war 
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on poverty, carrying on the war launched in 1964 by President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 
name of his so-called Great Society.130 But this is a war steered as much by 
philanthropists as government officials and seen primarily through a cultural rather than 
structural or economic prism.  Resources clearly matter to make KIPP and similar CMOs 
work.  The longer day, strong music programs, heavy professional development, and 
three weeks of summer school would not otherwise exist.  But what drives and defines 
these CMOs is a “no excuses” philosophy of hard work and probity.  
 Much as many teachers struggle to enforce these expectations, many students 
chafe under them. In discussing all the rules during a break at Simon Gratz High, a 
notoriously troubled school in North Philadelphia taken over by Mastery in 2011, three 
junior boys in the spring of 2014 gave voice to different perspectives. One complained 
about the strict dress code and the lanyard all students had to wear with an attached card 
to record attendance, homework completion, and any demerits for misconduct or 
tardiness. “I am so tired of all the rules, all the demerits,” he said. Another countered in 
defense of Mastery: “They’re trying to prepare you for life. You can’t be late in real life. 
You can’t show up to work with your shirt untucked in real life. You have to be right, 
look right.” The third, a 6’1” tight end on the school football team who had transferred 
the year before from John Bartram High School in Southwest Philadelphia, found 
common ground with his classmates: “I don’t like the rules either, but I feel safe here. 
You can focus on your learning. At Bartram, you had to worry about your safety.” The 
second student concurred: “True, true. There’s no drama here, no violence.”131  
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 For this philosophy of “no excuses,” KIPP, Mastery, and similar CMOs 
constitute, in essence, a cultural response to the Coleman Report of 1966, which 
famously concluded that the achievement gap was explained more by differences at home 
than school.132  With its longer day and steep behavioral expectations, in particular, these 
CMOs strive, zealously, to compensate at school for what is not taking place at home and 
in the community at large.  LuQuan Graham, a guidance counselor at KIPP Infinity in 
West Harlem, made this purpose plain. “The day has to be long to keep kids off the street 
and away from TV,” he said.  “I saw Family Guy [a satirical animated sitcom on Fox] the 
other night and was horrified.  Our students need to be too busy to watch that stuff.”133 
 Graham’s conviction comports with a signature story in KIPP lore.  In KIPP’s 
second year, Mike Feinberg could not get a fifth-grade student in Houston named Abby 
to do her homework.  Feinberg went to Abby’s home and learned from her mother that 
Abby spent all her time watching TV.  Feinberg urged the mother to keep the TV off until 
Abby completed her homework.  The mother agreed.  When Abby showed up the next 
day without her homework, Feinberg returned to the home and proposed he take the 
family TV and keep it at school until Abby consistently did her homework.  The mother 
protested it was the family’s only TV.  Feinberg replied that if she would not give him the 
TV, Abby was out of KIPP. The mother consented, Abby cried, and Feinberg took the 
TV. Feinberg returned it three weeks later following Abby’s consistent completion of her 
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homework.134 
 Such extreme effort is the exception among KIPP teachers, but it captures the 
mission of the organization and what Phillip identified as the warrior spirit.  The same 
spirit is required of teachers to enforce KIPP’s rules day after day as well as work such 
long hours.  When Auriel Watson, an eighth-grade English teacher at KIPP STAR, ten 
blocks south of KIPP Infinity, heard students talking while walking in single file behind 
her up three flights of stairs from the cafeteria to class following lunch, she marched them 
back to the cafeteria and sternly lectured the group that not a peep should be uttered 
during such transitions.  When someone in line giggled several minutes later just as the 
group was about to exit the stairwell, Watson again marched them back to the cafeteria.  
The process took ten minutes, but Watson later said it was time necessarily spent.135 
 Teachers in class likewise typically make methodical use of the organization’s 
trademark acronym, SSLANT.  They habitually pepper their lessons with behavioral 
reminders, telling students to smile, sit up, listen, nod in acknowledgment of something 
understood, and track the eyes of the speaker all while breaking down a quadratic 
equation, explaining mitosis, or diagramming a sentence. 
 Not all KIPP teachers adhere to this routine. Frank Corcoran, a math teacher at 
KIPP Academy in the Bronx from the beginning, in 1995, and the school’s principal 
since 2011, used none of it in the course of two ninety-minute classes observed in 2008.  
Corcoran did not need it.  He is a master teacher with the presence of a grounded 
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veteran.136  Like Feinberg and Levin, with whom he lived in Houston as a fellow novice 
teacher, Corcoran came into education through TFA.  He grew up in Rhode Island and 
majored in history, with a concentration in peace studies, at the University of Notre 
Dame.  With a passion for social justice, he considered entering the priesthood but chose 
instead to go into public education.137  Yet, while Corcoran could teach without concern 
for behavioral issues because of his magical command of the classroom, the long day 
alone proved challenging.138 
 As KIPP was Adderley’s life, so it has been Corcoran’s.  Single and without 
children, he lived two blocks from KIPP Academy, had an extra bedroom in his 
apartment for former students in need of a place to stay, and arrived at school at 6:30 a.m. 
and stayed till 6:30 p.m.  By 2007, Corcoran said he had concluded the work load was too 
much.  “I’m struggling with sustainability,” he said following the two observed math 
classes. “I pay former students who are now in high school to grade tests.  They stop by 
on Friday afternoon.  I treat them to dinner, pay them $25 or $50 for the grading help.  I 
started doing this last year.  I can’t do the grading anymore.  And I pay some former 
students to tutor, as well.”139 
 Corcoran figured out a way to cope and stayed.  But Corcoran is an outlier among 
outliers, profiled, in fact, as an exceptional teacher in Malcolm Gladwell’s chapter on 
KIPP in his book Outliers.140  For the vast majority of KIPP teachers, especially those 
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with families, the long day and rigorous disciplinary code they must enforce are together 
too much.  Some KIPP principals have devised flexible schedules to give teachers more 
freedom and thus make their jobs more manageable.  As principal, Corcoran stuck to 
tradition, contending that he could not require students to be in school for nine-and-a-half 
hours a day while not demanding the same of teachers.141  However, Joseph Negron, the 
principal of KIPP Infinity, for example, constructed a schedule allowing teachers one late 
start (at 9 a.m., rather than 7 a.m.) and one early departure (at 3 p.m. rather than 5 p.m.) 
per week.142  To accomplish more than that, KIPP would need more money to hire more 
teachers so they could work staggered schedules. 
 The day at Mastery schools is likewise long but not as long. The  school day runs 
from 8 to 3, with office hours and tutorials running until 4, though many teachers arrive 
early and stay late to prepare for classes and meet with colleagues. Furthermore, unlike 
KIPP teachers, Mastery teachers are not expected to be available by cell phone for 
homework help in the evening. In addition, teaching on Saturday mornings has from the 
beginning been optional and comes with extra pay. The same holds for the three-week 
summer session. At KIPP, the summer session is mandatory for all students and teachers. 
At Mastery, it is only for students who failed a course; and, as with classes on Saturday 
mornings, teaching in the summer is optional and comes with extra pay.143 
 “We’ve learned a lot from KIPP,” said Scott Gordon, Mastery’s CEO and 
founder. “But we’re quite different. We’re concentrated in one area and operate like a 
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small school district. And we’ve designed our model with a long-term plan in mind. A 
central question for us is, ‘Can people continue to work here ten years from now with 
families of their own?’”144 
 Mastery does not issue official data on teacher retention.  According to Joe 
Ferguson, Mastery’s COO, the annual retention rate from 2009 through 2014 has been 
approximately 85 percent: about 8 percent of teachers are not invited back; and about 7 
percent decide not to return.145 Nevertheless, of nineteen Mastery teachers who filled out 
anonymous questionnaires in May 2014 regarding the duties, challenges, and rewards of 
their jobs, eleven wrote that they struggled to make time for their personal lives. (The 
question read: “What are your chief challenges at Mastery?”)146 
 “There is NO work-life balance,” wrote a teacher in his or her fifth year of 
teaching and third with Mastery. This teacher explained that he or she taught four fifty-
five-minute literature classes a day with more than thirty students in each class and could 
not keep up with grading papers. “One of the areas students consistently need drastic help 
in,” this teacher wrote, “is with their written expression, and I cannot read all of their 
writing with the turn-around time that is also necessary.” A fellow teacher in his or her 
sixth year of teaching and third with Mastery explained that he or she loved his or her 
work but could not foresee remaining in the position for long: “Ultimately, this [work] is 
not sustainable. For any real and significant change to happen, society needs to 
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change.”147 A third teacher, in his or her tenth year of teaching and eighth with Mastery, 
expressed similar concern about work-life balance and explained, “The fight against 
poverty and its impact on our community is daunting.”148 
 Six teachers cited the strain of enforcing the code of conduct as a chief challenge. 
At Mastery, this task involves not only the conventional regulation of behavior but also 
the marking of the aforementioned merit cards of each student each period to document 
deportment as well as attendance, punctuality, and homework completion. In a 
characteristic exchange at the end of a period, a ninth-grade English teacher at 
Shoemaker named Christopher Hilpl looked a student square in the eye upon returning 
her card with a demerit for chatting in class and said, “I know you know how to be. You 
need to get some grit.”149 
 
In focusing on grit, Hilpl and his Mastery colleagues have adopted the language of KIPP. 
Alongside KIPP’s five pillars of high expectations, choice and commitment, more time, 
power to lead, and focus on results, grit had become an unofficial sixth pillar and perhaps 
its most controversial. 
 Upon seeing year after year that many academically gifted KIPP middle school 
alumni did not fare as well in high school and college as less talented but more diligent 
and socially competent classmates, Dave Levin in 2005 consulted Martin Seligman, a 
professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania and prolific analyst of 
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character, and then immersed himself in studies of mindset and perseverance.  KIPP’s 
goal for all of its students was that they graduate from college.  A student entering fifth 
grade at a middle school in 1999, for instance, was accordingly not considered a member 
of the class of 2003 of that middle school but rather of 2011 of some college to be 
determined. It was already clear to Levin by 2005, however, that many KIPP alumni 
would not graduate from college.150 
 In 2011, KIPP issued a report entitled “The Promise of College Completion: 
KIPP’s Early Successes and Challenges.” The report stated that only 33 percent of 
students who had finished KIPP middle school ten or more years earlier went on to 
graduate from college. Although this surpassed the national average of 31 percent for all 
students across the country who had earned a bachelor’s degree by the age of twenty-nine 
and far exceeded the average of 8 percent for twenty-nine-year-olds coming from the 
same cohort of low-income families as KIPP students, it fell far short of what Levin and 
Feinberg had envisioned.151 
 “Nearly two decades ago, KIPP was built on a promise: helping 47 fifth-graders 
from low-income families climb the mountain to and through college,” the two 
cofounders wrote in the report’s foreword, coauthored with Richard Barth, KIPP’s CEO. 
“Reaching this challenging goal has proved even more difficult than we originally 
thought.” While acknowledging that KIPP students had outperformed students across the 
country and especially students from the same background, Feinberg, Levin, and Barth 
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concluded that KIPP alumni should graduate from college at the same rate as students 
from the top economic quartile. That rate was 75 percent. Anything less, they maintained, 
was unfair to the disadvantaged children KIPP served.152  
 To that end, Levin worked with Seligman’s junior colleague Angela Duckworth 
to develop a “character growth” report card with eight categories, in turn broken down 
into twenty-four subcategories, all graded on a scale of one to five: grit, zest, academic 
self-control, interpersonal self-control, curiosity, optimism, gratitude, and social 
intelligence.153 
 Grit on the initial iteration of this report card,154 for example, was computed as the 
average of scores for three criteria:  
• Finishes whatever he or she begins 
• Tries very hard even after experiencing failure 
• Works independently with focus 
Academic self-control was computed as the average of scores for four criteria: 
• Comes to class prepared 
• Pays attention and resists distractions 
• Remembers and follows directions 
• Gets to work right away rather than procrastinating 
Interpersonal self-control was computed as the average of scores for another four criteria: 
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• Remains calm even when criticized or otherwise provoked 
• Allows others to speak without interruption 
• Is polite to adults and peers 
• Keeps his/her temper in check 
 
With this report card and a conventional report card, students in some KIPP schools 
started in 2012 to earn a character-point average (or CPA) each quarter as well as a 
standard grade-point average (or GPA). Moreover, Levin instructed teachers not only to 
address student conduct in these terms (just as Hilpl did at Mastery’s Shoemaker 
Campus) but also to integrate messages about character into their lesson plans, from word 
problems in math classes to plot analyses in literature classes.155 
 To several observers, Duckworth and Levin had made too much of grit, in 
particular, and of formal character assessment, in general. To researchers at the 
University of Texas and Yale who independently studied the relationship between grit 
and creativity, there was no correlation: grit might help a student win a spelling bee or get 
to and through college, these researchers concluded separately, but it did not lead to 
thoughtfulness or innovation.156 To an education historian writing in The New Republic in 
2014, the mechanical quantification of conduct involved in keeping character report cards 
promoted an instrumentalist or careerist conception of advancement anathema to healthy 
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moral development.157 To discussants on a panel about grit at an education conference 
(called EduCon) in Philadelphia in 2015, Duckworth and Levin were ultimately tilting at 
windmills: disadvantaged students did not fail to make it to and through college because 
of insufficient character, these critics argued, but because of insufficient social and 
financial resources taken for granted by middle- and upper-class students.158  
 These important matters aside, KIPP teachers were now tasked with keeping close 
tabs on each student in eight areas of behavior, on top of working long hours and 
vigilantly imposing a strict code of conduct. KIPP as well as Mastery and similar 
networks may nevertheless be on their way to becoming less stressful places for teachers.  
As previously noted, until 2004, KIPP operated only middle schools; until 2010, the same 
was true for Mastery.  This meant KIPP and Mastery have had to acculturate students 
accustomed to less demanding academic and behavioral expectations. As KIPP by 2014 
had sixty elementary schools feeding eighty middle schools and as Mastery had eight 
elementary schools feeding seven middle schools in Philadelphia (as well as two 
elementary schools that may lead to middle schools in Camden), that task of acculturation 
is naturally less arduous.  As of 2014, only KIPP middle schools in Houston, Newark, 
and New York had fifth-graders who transitioned from KIPP elementary schools.  
Reports from those middle schools so far, according to KIPP officials, indicate that 
starting students in KIPP in elementary school may be far more effective than doing so in 
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middle school.159 
 Levin, in fact, said during an interview in 2008 that he and Feinberg wanted to do 
this from the start, but they were middle-school teachers and could not imagine 
convincing parents to enroll their children in a new school run by people with no 
background in elementary education.  Moreover, Levin said, parents had to experience 
their neighborhood schools first before opting for something different.  “Now that KIPP 
has a reputation,” Levin said, “we can open elementary schools and are eagerly doing 
so.”160 
 
Beyond the challenges of retaining teachers and raising necessary supplementary funding 
from philanthropists, KIPP, Mastery, and similar CMOs face the more fundamental 
problem of suitability for a broad range of students, even if they begin in kindergarten 
rather than fifth grade.  KIPP, in particular, has worked well for a segment of the student 
population, but it has been a small segment and appears necessarily limited in size 
because of the long day, the strict code of conduct, the obligation of parents to abide by 
the organization’s “Commitment to Excellence,” and the relentless emphasis on academic 
results.161  The termination of capoeira at KIPP AMP is one illustration of this emphasis 
on academic results.  
 To many scholars, KIPP’s results accordingly do not mean what they seem to 
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mean.  KIPP, in keeping with charter school law, does employ a lottery for admission if 
oversubscribed. While several scholars have shown that KIPP’s lottery winners post 
better reading and math scores on state exams than KIPP’s lottery losers,162 those students 
ill suited for KIPP’s high demands may not enter KIPP lotteries or may not do so in 
proportionate numbers. In this regard, some scholars have cited higher levels of academic 
achievement of matriculating students at KIPP schools than at neighboring schools; 
disproportionately high enrollment of girls (who on average perform better in middle 
school and cause fewer disciplinary problems); and disproportionately low enrollment of 
English-language learners as well as students with special needs.  Scholars in this same 
camp have also cited much higher levels of grade retention at KIPP schools for students 
in fifth grade. Such retention both affords weaker students additional time in school 
before they are assessed as eighth-graders and conveys to fifth-graders as well as 
potential applicants that KIPP schools are especially demanding.163 
 Of matriculating fifth-graders at KIPP Academy in the Bronx in 2002, for 
example, one group of scholars found that 42 percent had passed the state reading test in 
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fourth grade and not one was an English-language learner. Meanwhile, 28 percent of their 
peers in the thirty-one area elementary schools had passed the same reading test and 17 
percent were English-language learners.164 In a study of KIPP schools across the country 
from 2005 to 2009, another group of scholars found that, on average, over these four 
years 8 percent of KIPP students were English-language learners in comparison to 15 
percent for the host districts while 6 percent of KIPP students were diagnosed with 
learning disabilities in comparison to 12 percent for the host districts.165  
 Moreover, attrition and replacement patterns further distinguish KIPP students. Of 
those students who do gain admission to KIPP but do not prove a good fit, a significant 
number drop out after one or two years, return to their neighborhood district schools, and 
either get replaced by higher-performing transfers or do not get replaced at all, leading to 
smaller, more academic cohorts in seventh and eighth grades. In studying thirty KIPP 
middle schools across the country from 2007 to 2009, this second group of scholars 
found that enrollment from sixth grade to eighth grade dropped 30 percent whereas the 
decline for schools in host districts was 6 percent.166 For this cohort of KIPP schools, 
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attrition was especially pronounced for black boys, amounting to 40 percent in two years. 
The attrition rate for black girls was, by contrast, 28 percent; for Hispanic boys and girls, 
30 and 12 percent, respectively; and for white boys and girls, 25 and 26 percent, 
respectively.167 
 In a subsequent study of nineteen KIPP middle schools across the country from 
2001 to 2009, a third group of scholars concluded that “late entrants” who transfer into 
KIPP in sixth grade or later (though relatively few students transfer into KIPP middle 
schools after sixth grade) to replace exiting students tend to comprise fewer male 
students, fewer students with learning disabilities, and more students with higher baseline 
scores on fourth-grade reading and math exams.168 This third group of scholars, 
researchers at Mathematica commissioned by KIPP, found that the shift in these baseline 
scores was significant: from the 46th percentile on the fourth-grade reading and math 
exams for KIPP students in the fifth grade to the 53rd and 55th percentiles in reading and 
math, respectively, on those same exams for KIPP students in the eighth grade.169   
 Mathematica researchers likewise found significant differences in grade retention 
of students in fifth grade at KIPP schools and host district schools. In a 2010 survey of 
twenty-two KIPP schools across the country, Mathematica found that 11 percent of fifth-
graders at KIPP schools were held back in contrast to 2 percent of their counterparts in 
host district schools. The difference for sixth-graders was 5 percent and 2 percent, 
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respectively.170 In a follow-up study in 2013 of forty-three KIPP schools across the 
country, Mathematica found grade retention rates of 9 percent and 2 percent for fifth-
graders in KIPP and host district schools, respectively, and 4 percent and 2 percent for 
sixth-graders, respectively.171 
 
Rates of improvement of KIPP students must therefore be qualified, as entry and exiting 
cohorts can be far different groups and as the message of high grade retention of fifth-
graders is unmistakable. Even if the rates of improvement are confined to specific 
students who stay from fifth grade through eighth in the case of middle school, the 
advantage conferred such students of being in classes with similarly motivated peers can 
be significant, particularly as the late entrants enrolling in KIPP schools comprise 
students with higher baseline scores in reading and math. Much as runners typically 
benefit from racing against faster runners, students do better in classrooms with better 
students. The researchers at Mathematica made precisely this point.172   
 While the gains for KIPP students who stayed from fifth through eighth grades 
significantly exceeded those of students in the lottery who did not get into KIPP, peer 
group effects may explain a good deal of that superior performance, the Mathematica 
researchers maintained. If so, they conceded, “the scalability of the KIPP model” comes 
                                                
170 Tuttle et al., Student Characteristics and Achievement in 22 KIPP Middle Schools, 17-18. The 
averages were derived by the author from Table II.2. 
171 Tuttle et al., KIPP Middle School Impacts on Achievement and Other Outcomes, 21. For an 
assessment of five additional studies of KIPP, published between 2002 and 2008, see Jeffrey R. 
Henig, “What Do We Know about the Outcomes of KIPP Schools?” Education and the Public 
Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit, November 2008, 
http://epicpolicy.org/publication/outcomes-of-kipp-schools. 
172 Ibid., 2-3. 
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into serious question: “If KIPP’s impacts are produced primarily by an improvement in 
the peer environment that derives from selective replacement of departing students, then 
it might be difficult to replicate KIPP’s success in schools that have a different mix of 
students.”173 Without accounting for unobserved factors (such as parental expectations or 
student conduct) that might attract students to KIPP rather than district schools, 
Mathematica researchers concluded that the gains of KIPP students over four years were 
so significant that peer group effects would at best explain 29 percent of the total KIPP 
impact in reading and 21 percent of the total KIPP impact in math. If such unobserved 
factors, however, were somehow acknowledged, the Mathematica researchers cautioned, 
the peer group effects stood to be greater.174  
 The negative impact of troubled students on classmates can be substantial, as 
noted with reference to research by Scott Carrell and Mark Hoekstra.175 What this means 
for a school with significant control over student enrollment is telling and thus goes a 
long way in differentiating the record of an organization like KIPP from a company like 
Edison or any public school district.  As a school takeover rather than start-up 
organization, Mastery has had less control over enrollment than KIPP.  But once 
established, Mastery, too, has an admission process that discourages students 
uncomfortable with a “no excuses” environment from enrolling. Like KIPP, Mastery can 
also make life uncomfortable for enrolled students who don’t conform.   
                                                
173 Ibid., 2. 
174 Ibid., 22-23.   
175 Scott E. Carell and Mark L. Hoekstra, “Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed 
to Domestic Violence Affect Everyone’s Kids,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
2 (January 2010): 211-228.   
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 Working with the Houston Independent School District, the economist Roland 
Fryer put the KIPP model to test in conventional district schools with no admission 
process in an experiment called Apollo 20.  Beginning with nine high schools in 2010 
and adding eleven elementary schools in 2011, Fryer applied two of KIPP’s pillars 
verbatim, implemented two variations, and substituted a fifth: a culture of high 
expectations; more instructional time (with ten more days in the school year and an extra 
hour of classes Monday through Thursday); more effective principals and teachers 
through more rigorous selection; data-driven instruction based on benchmark assessments 
given three times a year; and supplementary tutoring for an hour a day in math for 
students in fourth, sixth, and ninth grades. The additional cost at the secondary level was 
$1,837 per pupil (no sum was provided for the additional cost at the primary level). As of 
August 2014, Fryer reported significant annual gains in math but little impact in reading. 
“Perhaps the most worrisome hurdle of implementation,” Fryer wrote in a study of this 
experiment, “is the labor supply of talent available to teach in inner-city schools.”176  
 With Apollo 20, Fryer’s team did have the freedom to hire its own teachers. The 
Houston Independent School District had spent $5 million to buy out teacher contracts so 
Apollo 20 could begin anew.177 But that freedom, Fryer concluded, was still not enough 
to get the staff Apollo 20 needed.178 Implementing the KIPP model in twenty schools at 
once clearly proved daunting, especially without the buy-in KIPP obtained from parents 
                                                
176 Roland G. Fryer Jr., “Injecting Charter School Best Practices into Traditional Public Schools: 
Evidence from Field Experiments, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (August 2014): 1355-
1407. 
177 Ibid., 1364. 
178 Ibid., 1404. 
Chapter 6: The Nonprofit Alternative 
 385 
and students alike before students even applied.  While schools in Apollo 20, Fryer 
wrote, were instructed to put into effect “school-parent-student contracts” akin to KIPP’s 
“Commitment to Excellence” contracts, parents and students did not know about these 
contracts prior to the start of the school year.  To derive critical lessons from Apollo 20, 
Fryer was, of course, set on barring any self-selection from taking place.179 Absent this 
buy-in of students as well as parents, peer group effects as well as individual motivation 
stand to be significantly different. 
 At traditional public schools, such contracts have no place at all.  And that 
proscription constitutes the most stubborn of conceptual constraints for KIPP and similar 
CMOs. As with Catholic schools, which have been lauded for their analogous impact on 
student outcomes,180 the very existence of KIPP and other CMOs embracing the 
philosophy of “no excuses” depends on the presence of a fallback system of schooling, 
where students can go if KIPP, Mastery, or Achievement First does not prove a good fit. 
But there is no alternative system of schooling to the traditional system of public 
schooling, except in the rare cases of juvenile offenders. 
 Catholic schools, independent schools, and KIPP as well as similar CMOs thus 
work, in part, because they don’t have to work. Administrators at traditional public 
                                                
179 Ibid., 1357, 1371. Fryer maintained that such contracts were only meant to send a message, not 
be enforced.  Fryer wrote that this was consistent with policy at CMOs like KIPP.  However, this 
conflicts with much of what I observed in visits to KIPP schools in Baltimore, Los Angeles, New 
York, and San Diego.  See also Mathews, Work Hard. Be Nice., 88-91, 100-101, 180-181, 217-
218. Consequences at KIPP may not mean expulsion, but they can mean stern parent-teacher-
student conferences and home visits as well as suspension of everyday privileges.  
180 Anthony Bryk, Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland, Catholic Schools and the Common Good 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab, 
“Finishing High School and Starting College: Do Catholic Schools Make a Difference?,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (November 1995): 941-974; Derek Neal, “The Effect of 
Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Attainment,” Journal of Labor Economics 15 
(January 1997): 98-123. 
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schools cannot, for example, do what Mike Feinberg did in Houston in telling the mother 
of a KIPP student that her daughter will no longer have a place at the school unless she 
stops watching TV and completes her homework.  
 This qualification is critical. As an Achievement First executive conceded, “The 
‘no excuses’ environment does not work for all students, and it doesn’t work for all 
families.”181  For his part, Dave Levin does not view KIPP as a panacea. It is rather one 
response to a system that he and Feinberg found falling far short. When asked at a forum 
on school improvement at Teachers College, Columbia University, in 2010 about what 
should be done to improve education in New York, in particular, Levin did not hesitate: 
“The only way to really improve New York’s schools is if there were a giant lottery, with 
no parents knowing where their kids would go to school. That way everyone would be in 
the same boat, and all schools would get the support they needed.”182   
 This giant lottery—much akin to the process advocated by John Rawls of making 
all societal decisions from behind a “veil of ignorance” as to personal outcomes—is 
clearly not something, however, Levin was waiting for early in his career or later.183 As a 
young, idealistic, indignant educator, Levin along with Feinberg was set on building 
demanding charter schools that worked for some students and stood to bear lessons for 
many more. As such, KIPP and similar CMOs have at once made great strides and 
exhibited significant limits. 
 
                                                
181 Anonymous Achievement First executive, April 30, 2015. 
182 Forum at Teachers College, Columbia University: Taking the First Step, cosponsored by 
EdLab and the Society for Entrepreneurship and Education, April 19, 2010.  
183 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 12, 140. 
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To New York’s Mayor Bill de Blasio and his allies, the necessarily restricted reach of 
KIPP and similar CMOs  amounted to the chief problem with charter schools in general. 
In his ill-fated effort to block the expansion of charter schools in New York City in 2013 
by demanding their operators pay rent for use of public school buildings, de Blasio gave 
clear expression to the case made two decades earlier by the political scientist Jeffrey R. 
Henig that the movement for school choice sidestepped central challenges.184 “We have a 
crisis when it comes to education,” de Blasio said in advance of the aforementioned 
charter school rally in Foley Square. “The answer is not to find an escape route that some 
can follow and others can’t. The answer is to fix the entire system.”185 
 In dissenting against the Supreme Court majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris in 2002 supporting vouchers for a small fraction of students in Cleveland, Justice 
John Paul Stevens had made a similar argument. “The solution to the disastrous 
conditions that prevented over 90 percent of the student body from meeting basic 
proficiency standards,” Stevens wrote, “obviously required massive improvements 
unrelated to the voucher program.”186 
 In defense of charter schools as well as vouchers, Marc Sternberg, director of K-
12 education reform at the Walton Family Foundation and former deputy chancellor for 
new school development in the New York City Department of Education, fired back in a 
2014 interview with The New York Times that it is the critics who are in denial of 
                                                
184 Jeffrey R. Henig, Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 3-12, 101-148. 
185 Elizabeth A. Harris, “Charter School Backers Rally, Hoping to Influence de Blasio’s Policies,” 
New York Times, October 3, 2013. 
186 John Paul Stevens, dissent, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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pressing realities. “What’s the argument there?” Sternberg said. “Don’t help anybody 
until you can help everybody?”187 
 With this interrogative rebuttal, Sternberg captured the defiant spirit of many 
charter school advocates and defined their incrementalist perspective. Sternberg, 
however, dodged a knotty matter when it comes to charter schools in the “no excuses” 
mold, in particular. While such charter schools may help many students, they may hurt 
others by concentrating in default neighborhood public schools those students who can’t 
abide by the “no excuses” agenda.188 Much as unifying docile, diligent students can have 
positive peer group effects, concentrating unfocused, troubled students, as Carrell and 
Hoekstra documented, can have the opposite impact. 
 
 
                                                
187 Motoko Rich, “A Walmart Fortune, Spreading Charter Schools,” New York Times, April 25, 
2014. 
188 For a seminal analysis of the exit of some and its consequences for others, see Albert O. 
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 




Chapter 7: The Swedish Mirror 
 
A majority of Swedish schools will in time be run for profit, as there will be pressure for 
greater efficiency. There’s too much slack in the current system.  
- Peje Emilsson, chairman and founder, Kunskapsskolan Education Sweden AB, 
Stockholm, May 11, 2009 
 
The one part of the world that comes closest to employing the giant lottery imagined by 
Dave Levin for determining school enrollment (or to making educational policy from 
behind a “veil of ignorance” as to personal outcomes, in the language of John Rawls) is 
the Nordic region. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden fund their schools 
fairly, grant parents paid maternity/paternity leaves lasting approximately one year to 
nurture solid starts for all infants, provide excellent health care to everyone, heavily 
subsidize preschool, and levy steeply progressive taxes to make all this possible and at 
the same time contain income inequality.1  
                                                
1 For an overview of Nordic equity, see Mary Hilson, The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 
(London: Reaktion, 2008), 87-115, and Francis Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway 
and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 99-114. 
In addition, regarding equity in funding of schools, see Svein Lie, Pirjo Linnakylä, and Astrid 
Roe, eds., Northern Lights on PISA: Unity and Diversity in the Nordic Countries in PISA 2000 
(Oslo: Department of Teacher Education and School Development, University of Oslo, 2003), 8. 
Regarding paid parental leave and child-care subsidies, see Nabanita Datta Gupta, Nina Smith, 
and Mette Verner, “Child Care and Parental Leave in the Nordic Countries: A Model to Aspire 
to?,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 2014, March 2006, 8-10, 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp2014.pdf. Regarding income distribution, see the OECD Income Distribution 
Database, http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm. Regarding income taxes, 
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 This Nordic conception of equality is deeply ingrained. The idea of the nation as 
family or “people’s home” (folkhem) took hold in Sweden, in particular, with the 
endorsement of Social Democratic leader Per Albin Hansson in the 1920s.2 In a storied 
speech before fellow legislators in the Riksdag in 1928, Hansson invoked folkhem in 
laying the groundwork for the Nordic welfare state: “The foundation of the home is 
community and solidarity. The good home knows no privilege or neglect, no favorites 
and no stepchildren.... Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ home, this would mean 
the breakdown of all social and economic barriers that now divide citizens into privileged 
and deprived, into the rulers and the ruled, into rich and poor, the propertied and the 
destitute, the robbers and the robbed.”3 
 Akin to folkhem is the widespread Nordic belief in humility or, more specifically, 
non-exceptionalism, captured by the Danish-Norwegian novelist Aksel Sandemose, a 
Hansson contemporary, as the Law of Jante. In describing the behavioral strictures of a 
mythical Danish town called Jante in his 1933 novel, A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks, 
Sandemose explained in the form of ten commandments how nobody should think he or 
she is better than anyone else.4 Known as Janteloven in Danish and Norwegian, the 
ubiquitous Law of Jante is called Jantelagen in Swedish and Janten laki in Finnish. 
                                                                                                                                            
the top marginal rate in 2014 in Denmark was 56 percent; in Finland, 52; in Iceland, 46; in 
Norway, 39; and in Sweden, 57. In addition, the sales tax in these countries is about 25 percent. 
See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/personal-income-tax-rate. 
2 Hilson, The Nordic Model, 105-106. 
3 Ibid., 106. 
4 Aksel Sandemose, A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks (En flyktning krysser sitt spor, 1933; 
translated from the Norwegian by Eugene Gay-Tifft, New York: Knopf, 1936), 77-78. 
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 This shared reverence for equality aside, the Nordic countries differ substantially 
in how they run schools.  For its significant privatization of school management, Sweden 
stands out as utterly distinct from its Nordic neighbors. In 1991, Sweden embarked on a 
path reflecting Chilean practice and U.S. ambitions. In the same year that Chris Whittle 
announced his Edison Project and Minnesota passed legislation for charter schools,5 
Sweden approved the first of two bills paving the way to the introduction of vouchers the 
following year to be used at independent schools run by either nonprofit or for-profit 
organizations (friskolor).6  Denmark, Finland, and Norway have all barred for-profit 
operation of schools, though the Norwegian government proposed in its legislative 
agenda in 2013 introducing a variation on Sweden’s model.7 
 
The same laissez-faire triumphalism in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall that 
animated Whittle, Benno Schmidt, and many of their allies in the United States inspired 
legislators and entrepreneurs behind the transformation of Swedish schooling.  This 
embrace of the free market, in fact, swept Sweden’s conservative Moderate Coalition 
Party (Moderaterna) to power in 1991, bringing an end to nearly six decades of rule by 
the Social Democratic Party molded by Per Albin Hansson. Since 1932, Sweden had 
been run by the Social Democrats, but for a break between 1976 and 1982. 
                                                
5 Laws of Minnesota 1991, Chapter 265.9.3, www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/?id=265&year=1991. 
6 Gary Miron, Choice and the Use of Market Forces in Schooling: Swedish Education Reforms 
for the 1900s (Stockholm: Institute of International Education, Stockholm University, 1993), 60. 
7 Political Platform for a Government Formed by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, 
October 7, 2013, 55, 
http://www.hoyre.no/filestore/Filer/Politikkdokumenter/politisk_platform_eng.pdf. While the 
platform stipulated that such schools “will be prohibited from paying dividends to the owners,” 
there was no language restricting schools from being treated as long-term investments that could 
be sold for profit. 
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 While the conservatives did not threaten the free provision of basic services 
defining Sweden as folkhem, they did call for a radical transformation of the delivery of 
those services.  To the conservatives, Sweden under the Social Democrats had become an 
iconically inefficient, stale welfare state.  Privatization, they claimed, would rejuvenate 
Sweden through competition and choice. Soon after becoming prime minister, Carl Bildt, 
leader of the Moderaterna, made this plain: “The time for the Nordic model has passed.... 
It created societies that were too monopolized, too expensive and didn’t give people the 
freedom of choice that they wanted; societies that lacked flexibility and dynamism.”8 
 For Bildt and his party, educational choice was of paramount importance. There 
were few independent schools in Sweden at the time and mounting discontent with 
municipal schools. In the 1991-1992 school year, all but 1 percent of the country’s 1.2 
million students at the primary and secondary levels attended municipal schools.9 Of the 
independent schools, many were small Montessori, Waldorf, or religious schools 
enrolling under 100 students; six were international schools with English, French, or 
German as the primary language of instruction; and three were exclusive boarding 
schools (Gränna, Lundsberg, and Sigtuna) for the children of the country’s thin layer of 
affluent elite. The government covered approximately 50 percent of tuition at the 
                                                
8 Hilson, The Nordic Model, 180-181. 
9 Data on the Web site of Skolverket, the Swedish School Agency, go back only to the academic 
year of 1992-1993. Other sources were accordingly used. The total number of students in Sweden 
at the primary and secondary levels in 1991-1992 was 1,166,833, according to the UNESCO 
database, http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/default.aspx. At the compulsory level (for 
grades one through nine), there were 8,337 students attending independent schools; at the upper-
secondary level (for the equivalent of grades ten through twelve), there were 4,950 students 
attending independent schools. The Swedish numbers come from Gary Miron, ed., Restructuring 
Education in Europe: Country Reports from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
(Stockholm: Institute of International Education, Stockholm University, 1997), 140-141.  
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Waldorf, Montessori, and religious schools and approximately 35 percent of tuition at the 
international schools.10  Tuition at the boarding schools was far beyond average means.11 
 Much of the discontent with municipal schools proceeded from reforms 
implemented in the 1960s. In the name of social integration, Sweden in 1962 did away 
with tracking by level of academic proficiency for students in grades one through six and 
placed all students in the same comprehensive school (grundskola), comprising grades 
one through nine.12 In 1968, Sweden went a step further, nullifying what remained of 
streaming students by level of academic proficiency in the upper grades of these new 
comprehensive schools.13  Yet this transformation never fulfilled what the reformers had 
envisioned, writes the Norwegian social historian Francis Sejersted, because it came 
without the necessary modifications in pedagogy to accommodate the changes in 
classroom composition. “It had been a precondition that teacher education would be 
overhauled,” writes Sejersted, “but this was never done.”14 
 The most obvious indication of this failure, according to Sejersted, was demotion 
of the teacher: “The teacher was no longer the learned knowledge broker but, at best, an 
                                                
10 Miron, Choice and the Use of Market Forces, 46-47, 162-170. 
11 See Anders Böhlmark and Mikael Lindahl, “Does School Privatization Improve Educational 
Achievement? Evidence from Sweden’s Voucher Reform,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 3691, 
September 2008, 5, http://ftp.iza.org/dp3691.pdf. The authors note that once vouchers were 
introduced in 1992, they covered all schools but these three. 
12 Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 267-272. 
13 Susanne Wiborg, “Swedish Free Schools: Do They Work?,” LLAKES Research Paper 18, 
Centre for Learning and Life Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies, London, 2010, 7-
8, http://www.llakes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Wiborg-online.pdf. 
14 Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy 271. 
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organizer. He or she was placed on the sidelines.”15 In protest arose “the knowledge 
movement,”16 much in sync with E.D. Hirsch’s campaign in the United States for “core 
knowledge,” mandating mastery of specific content at each grade level.17 While this 
countermovement was led by conservatives, it had advocates among Social Democrats, 
as well. In recognition of the decline in academic rigor at schools, Bengt Göransson, the 
education minister for the Social Democrats in the 1980s, worked to make intellectual, 
not social, development the chief goal of schools.18 
 Through the educational choice program put forth by Carl Bildt, parents could 
make their own decisions about what kind of curricula they wanted for their children. The 
voucher legislation proposed in 1991 and passed in 1992 entitled parents to vouchers 
worth 85 percent of the per-pupil expenditure in neighboring public schools. When the 
Social Democrats returned to power in 1994, they reduced this allocation to 75 percent. 
But the Social Democrats two years later increased coverage to 100 percent, with the 
stipulation that independent schools could not charge any additional fees.19 This provision 
at once shielded parents from extra costs and ultimately pulled Sweden’s few expensive 
international and boarding schools into participation in the voucher program, with the 
                                                
15 Ibid., 419. 
16 Ibid., 421. 
17 See E.D. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987).  
18 Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 421. 
19 Michael Baggesen Klitgaard, School Vouchers and Political Institutions: A Comparative 
Analysis of the United States and Sweden, December 2007, Working Paper 153, 15, 
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP153.pdf. 
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qualification that boarding costs had to be covered independently (vouchers cover the full 
cost of attendance for day students from the community who live at home).20  
 
The growth in voucher use proved slow but consistent.  Five years after implementation, 
in the 1997-1998 academic year, 2.7 percent of students attending grundskolor used 
vouchers to go to independent schools (or friskolor); and 3.1 percent of students attending 
gymnasieskolor (the equivalent of grades ten through twelve) did the same.  Ten years 
after implementation, the proportions grew to 5.5 percent of students attending 
grundskolor and 8.2 percent of students attending gymnasieskolor. By 2010, the 
proportions grew to 11.9 percent of students attending grundskolor and 23.8 percent of 
students attending gymnasieskolor. Because independent schools in Sweden, as in the 
United States, tend to be smaller than municipal schools, the proportion of independent 
schools exceeded the proportion of students attending them (see Chart 7.1).  By 2010, 
1,230, or 21.8 percent, of the country’s 5,641 grundskolor and gymnasieskolor combined 
were independent schools: 741 of 4,626 grundskolor; and 489 of 1,015 gymnasieskolor.  
Of that combined number, nearly 930—75.6 percent of independent schools and 16.5 
percent of all schools—were run by for-profit operators, or, more specifically, limited 
companies, defined in Swedish by AB, for aktiebolag.21 
                                                
20 Swedish Ministry of Education, “Internationella skolor,” September 2, 2014, and 
“Riksinternatskolor,” March 13, 2014, http://www.regeringen.se. 
21 The numbers of students and schools were obtained from Skolverket, the Swedish School 
Agency, http://www.skolverket.se/statistik-och-utvardering/statistik-i-tabeller. The number of 
schools run by aktiebolag is an estimate derived from the percentages provided for 2013-2014 by 
Friskolornas riksförbund, the Swedish Association of Independent Schools, in a report entitled 
Fakta om friskolor, April 2015, 2, http://www.friskola.se/fakta-om-friskolor.  According to this 
report, aktiebolag ran 69 percent of grundskolor and 86 percent of gymnasieskolor. Using those 
same percentages for 2010-2011, when 741 grundskolor and 489 gymansieskolor were 
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 This growth surpassed what Wall Street analysts like Michael T. Moe of Merrill 
Lynch had predicted in 1999 for for-profit operators of publicly funded primary and 
secondary schools in the United States.  Moe, as described, had forecasted that 10 percent 
of the nation’s approximately 100,000 K-12 public schools would be managed by 
companies like Edison within a decade.22 The reality, again, was under 1 percent.23  
Swedish for-profit school operators, by contrast, benefited from several telling 
advantages. 
 Most critically, in Sweden, from 1996 onward, for-profit school operators 
received the same per-pupil allocation as neighboring municipal schools. In the United 
States, such parity was the rare exception. In Baltimore and Philadelphia, as described, 
Edison earned per-pupil premiums for overhead costs and did not have to pay for space.  
However, Edison and its competitors typically earned marginal if any premiums for 
overhead costs and almost always paid significant amounts for space in managing charter 
schools. Charter schools in New York City without free co-location in 2008-2009, as 
explained by the Independent Budget Office, received 12.8 percent less in funding than 
neighboring public schools.24 According to Peje Emilsson, the founder and chairman of 
Kunskapsskolan AB, one of Sweden’s largest for-profit school operators, parity in 
                                                                                                                                            
independent schools (friskolor), the total number of schools run by aktiebolag comes to 932. See 
also “Making Them Happen,” The Economist, September 26, 2009. 
22 Michael T. Moe, Kathleen Bailey, and Rhoda Lau, The Book of Knowledge: Investing in the 
Growing Education and Training Industry (New York: Merrill Lynch, April 9, 1999), 74-75.   
23 Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education 
Management Organizations: Fourteenth Edition, 2011-2012, November 2013, 9, 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12. 
24 New York City Independent Budget Office, Fiscal Brief: Comparing the Level of Public 
Support: Charter Schools versus Traditional Public Schools, February 2010, 
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/charterschoolsfeb2010.pdf.   
Chapter 7: The Swedish Mirror 
 397 
funding was essential to his involvement in education. Like Whittle, Emilsson was a 
precocious businessman with a strong commitment to privatization. At twenty-four, soon 
after graduating from Stockholm University, where he studied economics and political 
science, Emilsson co-founded a communications consultancy in 1970 called Kreab AB; 
in 2009, Kreab merged with Gavin Anderson of New York to become Kreab Gavin 
Anderson AB, with offices in twenty-five countries across four continents. In 1989, a 
year after completing Harvard Business School’s Owner/President Management (OPM) 
program, a mid-career executive training course spread over three summers, Emilsson 
started Demoskop AB, a marketing firm.  In 1995, he created the Magnora Group AB, a 
holding company comprising Kreab and Demoskop, as well as other interests and 
counting Carl Bildt as a board member. Four years later, Emilsson launched 
Kunskapsskolan as another part of the Magnora portfolio. A decade afterwards, Emilsson 
established Silver Life AB, a company operating elder homes, as yet another part of the 
Magnora portfolio.25 
 Meaning “knowledge schools,” Kunskapsskolan represented a formal 
continuation of “the knowledge movement” in refutation of the education reforms 
introduced by the Social Democrats in 1962.  Basic to the identity of Kunskapsskolan 
was personalized learning, with students spending significant portions of the day working 
on their own and at their own pace. In a 2009 interview, Emilsson faulted, in particular, 
Olof Palme for lowering academic standards and stifling individual development in 
Swedish schools. Palme had served as education minister from 1967 to 1969 and then as 
prime minister from 1969 to 1976 and from 1982 until his stunning death in 1986, 
                                                
25 Peje Emilsson, Chairman, Kunskapsskolan, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2009; Web site of 
Magnora AB, http://www.magnora.com/start.html. 
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wrought by a lone gunman while Palme was strolling home with his wife without any 
security detail after seeing a late movie in central Stockholm. In Emilsson’s opinion, 
Palme had elevated equity over excellence as education minister and preserved that 
emphasis as leader of the Social Democrats. “Palme turned teaching into social work,” 
Emilsson said, “and thereby drove people serious about content away from the 
profession. The focus of school had become fair play, not learning.”26  
 
 
Chart 7.1  Percentage of students at each level using vouchers to attend friskolor (independent 
schools) and percentage of schools at each level that are friskolor. Data source: Swedish School 
Agency, http://www.skolverket.se/. Approximately 75 percent of friskolor are run for profit. 
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 Also like Whittle, Emilsson was immersed in politics and ambitious on an 
international scale. While getting Kreab off the ground, he served from 1970 to 1972 as 
chairman of the Confederation of Swedish Conservative and Liberal Students (Fria 
Moderata Studentförbundet), affiliated with Britain’s Federation of Conservative 
Students and the United States’ College Republicans. Bildt served under Emilsson as vice 
chairman and then succeeded him. In this capacity, Emilsson befriended Karl Rove and 
Jeb Bush and has remained close since. Emilsson subsequently served as chef de cabinet 
of the International Chamber of Commerce from 1973 to 1981.27  In sync with Whittle’s 
celebration of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, Emilsson took particular pride 
in buying the former Czechoslovakian embassy,  a ten-story brutalist composition of 
cement, red brick, and glass in the stately Östermalm section of Stockholm, and making it 
his corporate headquarters in 2000.  Emilsson kept a massive antenna on the roof from 
the Cold War era as a trophy.28 
 As with Kreab, so with Kunskapsskolan, Emilsson had global aspirations. His 
plan was to grow the education company gradually in Sweden and then open schools in 
Britain and the United States. Like many Swedish for-profit school entrepreneurs, 
Emilsson waited until 1996 before entering the education business. The vouchers, he 
said, had to be worth the same as per-pupil allocations in neighboring schools before he 
or his competitors could implement sound business plans. Emilsson nevertheless met in 
1992 with Schmidt and Whittle to discuss strategy and potential opportunities for 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Per Ledin, CEO, Kunskapsskolan, interview, Stockholm, May 4, 2009. 
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collaboration. Nothing came of that meeting, Emilsson said, other than sharpened hopes 
of someday operating charter schools in the United States.29  
 In a telling episode of Swedish-American engagement, however, a Kreab client, 
Investor AB, a publicly traded holding company in Stockholm run by the legendary 
Wallenberg banking family, took a 9 percent stake in Edison for $20 million in 1997 and 
with it a seat on the company’s board. Representing Investor on Edison’s board was Klas 
Hillström.30  In a 2009 interview, Hillström said Investor managed to make a sizable 
profit on its investment in Edison because it reduced its stake to 1 percent in 2001 and 
exited in 2002.  Hillström could not recall the precise return on investment.  But it is easy 
enough to estimate from an average of the daily closing prices of Edison’s stock in 2001 
and 2002:  $21.56 and $5.38, respectively.  Investor indeed made a sizable profit.  With a 
9 percent stake worth roughly 4.5 million shares, Investor got approximately $86.7 
million for the sale of 4 million shares in 2001 and $2.7 million for the sale of 500,000 
shares in 2002, for a total profit of about $69 million on an investment of $20 million, 
amounting to an approximate return of 345 percent in five years.31 
 Hillström, who moved on in 2003 to the Stockholm office of the London-based 
private equity group 3i, explained over coffee in a conference room at 3i’s office on 
Birger Jarlsgatan, a ten-minute walk through Humlegården from Magnora headquarters, 
that Investor got out because the Edison model ultimately did not make sense: charter 
                                                
29 Emilsson, interview, May 11, 2009. 
30 Klas Hillström, Partner, 3i, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2009. See also Investor, Annual 
Reports, 1997- 2002, http://www.investorab.com/investors-media/reports/.  
31 All stock prices come from Wharton Research Data Services, Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRISP), https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/, subscription required. 
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schools required significant capital infusions for building or leasing facilities; district 
schools required similar infusions for site renovations; contracts with charter boards and 
host districts meanwhile lasted only five years; and per-pupil allocations typically ran 15 
percent below those for neighboring district schools.32 
 In Sweden, for-profit school operators benefited from not only funding parity but 
also administrative sovereignty. Kunskapsskolan, like Edison, would have to invest 
considerable sums to build, lease, and renovate facilities. Yet Kunskapsskolan and its 
Swedish counterparts were free-standing entities without contract obligations to charter 
boards or district offices. Swedish school companies would flourish or fade according to 
demand from parents and students. The politics of charter and school boards that dogged 
EMOs in the United States did not exist in Sweden.  
 
Following a period of planning from 1998 to 2000, Emilsson opened five 
Kunskapsskolan sites: four lower-secondary schools (comprising grades six through nine) 
and one upper-secondary school (comprising grades ten through twelve) along with a 
craft center shared by all schools on a rotating basis where students would board in a 
dormitory for two weeks at a time and work on woodshop and art projects. The upper-
secondary school was located in the Stockholm suburb of Nacka; three of the lower-
secondary schools were located in the Stockholm suburbs of  Skärholmen, Täby, and 
Tyresö; the fourth was located in the small city of Norrköping, 100 miles southwest of 
the capital. The craft center was located in the small city of Falun, 140 miles northwest. 
                                                
32 Hillström, interview, May 11, 2009.  
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 The planning committee was chaired by Birgitta Ericson, a career educator from 
Norrköping who had taught history and religion at the upper-secondary level for fifteen 
years before becoming the head of a progressive grundskola in Norrköping called 
Navestadsskolan.  Emilsson had heard of Ericson’s work through Per Unckel, the 
minister of education from 1991 to 1994, and Anders Hultin, Unckel’s assistant 
responsible for drafting Sweden’s voucher plan. Unckel was on Kunskapsskolan’s board, 
and Hultin was the company’s CEO; both came from the Norrköping area.  Much as 
Whittle was close to Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander, Emilsson was close to 
Unckel.33 
 Ericson developed a curriculum with the assistance of a long-time colleague, 
Torbjörn Bindekrans, a veteran teacher of math and science.  Their brand of progressive 
pedagogy at once meshed with the “knowledge movement” embraced by Emilsson and 
with Emilsson’s desire for a return on capital to build, market, and staff schools: the 
curriculum was defined by mastery of content; and the staffing model was labor light, 
with 5.4 teachers per 100 students in contrast to the Swedish national average of 8.3 per 
100.34  Emilsson’s Magnora Group provided initial financing and sold a 30 percent stake 
to Investor in 2002, soon after Investor’s exit from Edison, and allocated a 6 percent 
stake to management.35 
                                                
33 Per Ledin, e-mail correspondence, August 4, 2015. 
34 Birgitta Ericson, interview, Stockholm, May 5, 2009. This number calls for qualification. 
Ericson explained that at the schools, the ratio was 5.4 teachers per 100 students. However, 
Cecilia Carnefeldt subsequently explained in a telephone interview on August 20, 2015, that once 
the teachers at the craft centers were counted, the ratio climbed to 6.2 teachers per 100 students. 
35 Per Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 4, 2009. 
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 The curriculum called for students demonstrating competence through 
achievement of specific goals in each subject on their own and at their own pace.  
Schooling would be broken into two divisions:  lower-secondary and upper-secondary; 
operating a primary division was out of the question, as younger students could not be 
expected to spend so much time working independently. Teachers would serve both as 
classroom instructors leading three forty-five-minute classes a day and as tutors 
monitoring the progress of twenty students under their supervision via a twenty-minute 
one-on-one meeting with each student per week. During those weekly sessions, tutors 
would review company-issued logbooks kept by students to see precisely what they had 
accomplished; parents, as well, would be expected to review these logbooks with their 
children on a regular basis. To facilitate teacher engagement with students, a company 
Web site, called the Knowledge Portal, with lesson plans shared by teachers in all 
subjects, would cut down on prep time.36 
 Students would start the day at 8:30 with a thirty-minute homeroom meeting run 
by their tutor and end the day with a ten-minute homeroom meeting at 2:20.  The 
morning meeting would include watching a portion of Swedish network news on a 
classroom monitor and discussing major stories. In keeping with Ericson’s model of 
learning as an upward journey, homeroom would go by “base camp,” and the “base 
camp” would stay together with the same tutor year after year through each division. 
Students would attend only one class per subject per week and otherwise work on their 
own or with classmates. To promote independent and collaborative work, the school 
buildings, to be designed by the architect Kenneth Gärdestad, would comprise light-filled 
                                                
36 Ibid. All details confirmed by visits in May 2009 to Kunskapsskolan sites in Nacka, Uppsala, 
and the Enskede, Kista, and Liljeholmen districts of Stockholm.  
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common areas anchored by cafés and airy computer labs as well as seminar rooms and 
small lecture halls. No bells would punctuate the day.37  
 Ericson put this curriculum into motion as the inaugural head of 
Kunskapsskolan’s lower-secondary school in Norrköping in 2000. A year later she 
became the company’s full-time director of education and development, splitting her time 
between company headquarters in Stockholm and an office for curriculum and IT in 
Norrköping. In a 2009 interview in the company’s Stockholm office, Ericson said 
Kunskapsskolan was initially derided by critics as “another Summerhill,” referring to the 
child-centered British boarding school founded by A.S. Neill in 1921. “But our students 
have done well on the national exams administered in ninth grade,” Ericson said.  
“Municipalities now follow us in using logbooks, tutorials, and Web portals with shared 
lesson plans.”38 
 Tord Hallberg, the founding principal of the company’s upper-secondary school 
in Uppsala, echoed Ericson. Hallberg had been a teacher for seventeen years and a 
principal for ten in conventional municipal Swedish schools. Frustrated with his inability 
to implement change, Hallberg joined Kunskapsskolan in 2007. “After two years with 
Kunskapsskolan, I think I’ve had a greater impact on conventional schools, as they’re 
taking lessons from us,” he said. “When I see my old boss, he tells me, ‘We’re learning 
from you. We’re now using the Web in innovative ways, getting our students to take 
more responsibility, having our teachers work more one-one-one with students.’”39 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Tord Hallberg, interview, Uppsala, May 8, 2009. 
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 Of students interviewed at six Kunskapsskolan sites, nearly all considered their 
freedom both a gift and a burden. “The good thing about Kunskapsskolan is that you can 
go at your own speed,” said a ninth-grader at a school in Enskede, a district in the south 
of Stockholm. “The bad thing is you can easily fall behind.”40  Several ninth-graders 
echoed this sentiment in a group interview during morning base camp at a 
Kunskapsskolan four miles east in the suburb of Nacka. In the background, a Swedish 
network news story played on the classroom monitor about rioting young men setting 
cars and dumpsters ablaze in the heavily immigrant Rosengård district of the southern 
city of Malmö.  The base camp leader, an English and French teacher named Pernilla 
Brorsson, afterward asked her students what they thought about the turmoil in Malmö. 
One student mentioned feelings of discrimination among immigrant youth as a cause for 
anger. Brorsson nodded and cited three satellite communities northwest of Stockholm 
(Husby, Rinkeby, and Tensta) as smaller versions of Rosengård.41   
 Of teachers interviewed at these same schools, nearly all called the tutorial system 
effective and the Knowledge Portal useful. Several, though, said classes, especially in 
mathematics, should meet more than once a week. Several more voiced concern about the 
stress generated by the company’s method for teacher evaluation and compensation: 
raises were determined, one, by the academic progress of one’s students as both a tutor 
(with twenty students to supervise) and as a subject teacher (with approximately sixty 
students to instruct and assess); and, two, by one’s rankings by students on a five-point 
                                                
40 School visit, Kunskapsskolan, Enskede, May 5, 2009. 
41 School visit, Kunskapsskolan, Nacka, May 7, 2009.  The discussion took place in Swedish. 
Brorsson explained the dialogue over lunch later in the day.   
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scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) regarding helpfulness, organization, and 
content.42 
 According to several Kunskapsskolan administrators, the company used student 
results on national exams administered in grade nine as a check against grade inflation.  
However, this policy was porous.  As at schools across the country, the national exams 
were not graded by external readers or even colleagues within the same building.  Rather, 
teachers graded the national exams of their own students.  In grade three, all students are 
tested in Swedish and math; in grade six, in Swedish, math, and English; in grade nine, in 
those three subjects as well as science; and at the upper-secondary level, in Swedish, 
math, and English.43  
 Suspicions of grade inflation were thus substantial. This was true for 
Kunskapsskolan and all schools in Sweden, whether public or independent. According to 
a 2009 op-ed in Dagens Nyheter, the nation’s most widely read paper, by two Swedish 
economists, Magnus Henrekson and Jonas Vlachos, grades spiked for upper-secondary 
students from 1997 to 2007 while performance on international assessments dropped and 
diagnostic examinations at the college level showed no improvement. Henrekson and 
Vlachos concluded that the pressure placed by the free-market enrollment system on both 
municipal and independent schools to attract students and retain them as satisfied 
customers constituted the only compelling explanation for the grade inflation and urged 
                                                
42 Ledin explained the method for evaluation and compensation; interview, Stockholm, May 4, 
2009. Teacher interviews were done in May 2009 during and after visits to the six 
Kunskapsskolan sites listed earlier. 
43 Deborah Nusche et al., OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Sweden 
(Paris: OECD, 2011), 46.  See also the Swedish National Agency for Education, 
http://www.skolverket.se/bedomning/nationella-prov/alla-nationella-prov-i-
skolan/gymnasieskolan. 
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education authorities to implement both external assessment of national exams and 
something akin to France’s baccalaureate at the end of upper-secondary school.44 
 Annual reports from 2011 through 2014 by Skolinspektionen (the Swedish 
Schools Inspectorate), in fact, found that independent readers grading national exams 
gave much lower marks than teachers grading national exams taken by their own 
students.45 Yet the policy of having teachers grade their own students remained in place.46   
  
By 2009, Kunskapsskolan had thirty-two schools across Sweden, with twenty-two lower-
secondary schools and ten upper-secondary schools. The company also had a second craft 
center, located in Gamleby, a small town 160 miles south of Stockholm, and a science 
center, with an adjoining dormitory, located in a former observatory atop a sylvan hill in 
the seaside Stockholm suburb of Saltsjöbaden to be used, like the craft centers, on a 
rotating basis.  With growth came the profits that eluded Edison.  Losses in the first three 
years were substantial, but Kunskapsskolan broke even its fourth year and went on to 
post a profit its fifth year and steadily increasing profits over the four ensuing years (see 
Table 7.1).47     
                                                
44 Magnus Henrekson and Jonas Vlachos, “Konkurrens om elever ger orättvisa gymnasiebetyg,” 
Dagens Nyheter, August 17, 2009. 
45 Skolinspektionen, “Lika eller olika? Omrättning av nationella prov i grundskolan och 
gymnasieskolan,” May 16, 2011; “Lika för alla? Omrättning av nationella prov i grundskolan och 
gymansieskolan under tre år,” August 31, 2012; “Olikheterna är för stora Omrättning av 
nationella prov i grundskolan och gymnasieskolan,” September 2, 2013; and “Uppenbar risk för 
felaktiga betyg,” 2014, http://www.skolinspektionen.se. 
46 Patrik Levin, Director of Education, Skolinspektionen, telephone interview, August 18, 2015. 
47 Ledin, Introduction to Kunskapsskolan, presentation, Stockholm, May 4, 2009; and 
Kunskapsskolan Education Sweden AB, Årsredovisning och koncernredovisning för 
räkenskapsåret 2014, March 20, 2015, accessed via Bolagsverket at http://www.bolagsverket.se, 








Revenue Earnings Earnings/Revenue 
2001 5 880 48 m. kr (25.8 m. kr) (53.8%) 
2002 12 2,767 159 m. kr (26.7 m. kr) (16.8%) 
2003 20 5,148 266 m. kr (30 m. kr) (11.3%) 
2004 22 6,060 367 m. kr 0 0.0% 
2005 22 6,397 436 m. kr 7.8 m. kr 1.8% 
2006 23 7,020 485 m. kr 11 m. kr 2.3% 
2007 26 8,155 571 m. kr  19.5 m. kr 3.4% 
2008 30 9,161 657 m. kr 25 m. kr 3.8% 
2009 32 9,663 726 m. kr 36 m. kr 5.0% 
Table 7.1 Kunskapsskolan schools, estimated enrollment, and financial data (in millions of 
Swedish kronor; the Swedish krona fluctuated over this time period from 5.9 to 10.9 kronor to the 
U.S. dollar). Data source:  Kunskapsskolan Education Sweden AB, Årsredovisning och 
koncernredovisning för räkenskapsåret 2014, Bolagsverket, http://www.bolagsverket.se. 
 
 To Emilsson, the trend was unmistakable for Kunskapsskolan and for the for-
profit school sector in Sweden as a whole.  “A majority of Swedish schools will in time 
be run for profit, as there will be pressure for greater efficiency,” Emilsson said in a 2009 
discussion of American and Swedish educational policy over dinner with his board and 
guests at his headquarters in Östermalm. “There’s too much slack in the current system.  
Sweden can be the role model for other countries in being egalitarian while using 
corporate management. Interest from abroad certainly leads us to think we have 
                                                                                                                                            
with financial data reset from calendar year to academic year (Jul 1 to June 30) by Fredrik 
Lindgren, CEO, Kunskapsskolan i Sverige AB, August 20, 2015. 
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something special.”  Emilsson predicted that within five years, Kunskapsskolan would be 
running at least ten schools abroad and ten more in Sweden.48 
 Emilsson mentioned Rahul Gandhi as one foreign leader, in particular, 
interested in replicating Kunskapsskolan. After touring several Kunskapsskolan sites 
during a visit to Sweden as head of the Indian Youth Congress in 2008, Gandhi told 
Emilsson that Kunskapsskolan would flourish in India. Emilsson soon after flew to 
Chenai and met with government officials and potential investment partners.49 
Kunskapsskolan opened its inaugural Indian campus in Gurgaon in 2013.50    
 By 2014, Kunskapsskolan was also running four schools in Great Britain, though 
on a nonprofit basis, per British regulations, one charter school in New York, also on a 
nonprofit basis, per New York regulations, and a second school in Gurgaon. Because 
Kunskapsskolan as a trademarked commercial brand could not be used in its nonprofit 
capacity in Great Britain and the United States, the four schools in Great Britain were 
called Learning Schools and the one school in New York, Innovate Manhattan Charter. 
The school in Gurgaon, however, retained the company name and functions as a fee-
based for-profit private school (fees for middle-school students for the 2014 academic 
year amounted to 214,000 rupees, or approximately $3,400).51 Though Kunskapsskolan 
did not have ten schools abroad by 2014, as Emilsson had forecasted, seven nevertheless 
represented a solid accomplishment.  
                                                
48 Emilsson, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2009.  
49 Ibid. 
50 See Web site for Kunskapsskolan Gurgaon: http://kunskapsskolan.edu.in/gurgaon/. 
51 Per Ledin, interview, New York, March 8, 2011. 
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 Among U.S. visitors to Kunskapsskolan sites in Sweden, Jeb Bush toured the 
company’s school in the Kista district of Stockholm in 2008 while in the city for business 
(following his second term as governor of Florida) and concluded Kunskapsskolan would 
have great potential in Florida. John White the following year visited the Kunskapsskolan 
in Nacka as deputy chancellor of the New York City Department of Education. White, 
who went on to become Louisiana’s superintendent of schools in 2012, encouraged 
Emilsson to open a school in New York, helped him establish the school, which would be 
Innovate Manhattan Charter, and saw to it that space would be provided for the school its 
first year, 2011-2012, in Tweed Courthouse, the central office of the Department of 
Education.52  In 2011, Rupert Murdoch toured the Kunskapsskolan in Enskede  together 
with Joel Klein, soon after Klein had stepped down as chancellor of the New York City 
Department of Education to become head of the education division of Murdoch’s News 
Corp.53  To be rebranded Amplify in 2012, the education division of News Corp. grew 
out of Murdoch’s purchase of Brooklyn-based Wireless Generation in 2010 for $360 
million.  Murdoch and Klein’s mission with Amplify was to put curricula on wireless 
computer tablets and thus enable students to work like Kunskapsskolan students: on their 
own and at their own pace with minimal assistance from teachers.54 
 
                                                
52 Cecilia Carnefeldt, CEO, Kunskapsskolan Sweden Education AB, e-mail correspondence, 
August 21, 2015.  
53 Ledin, interview, New York, March 8, 2011. 
54 Ian Quillen, “Ed-Tech Advocates Eye Rupert Murdoch’s Move into K-12 Market,” Education 
Week, December 8, 2010, 16; Benjamin Herold, “Big Hype, Hard Fall for News Corp.’s $1 
Billion Ed Tech Venture,” Education Week, August 26, 2015, 1, 12-13. 
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Because of Ericson’s innovative curriculum and Emilsson’s political and marketing 
savvy, Kunskapsskolan was perhaps the best known of for-profit school operators in 
Sweden. The company garnered praise in six articles in The Economist alone from 2007 
to 2010.55  But it was one company among many and not close to the largest. 
AcadeMedia AB was one major competitor. Founded in 1996 as an adult education 
company, listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange in 2001, and in the business of running 
friskolor by 2007, AcadeMedia would mushroom through mergers and acquisitions. 
Internationella Engelska Skolan AB (IES) was a second major competitor.  Founded in 
1993 by an American science teacher of Swedish origin, IES provided a traditional 
secondary curriculum defined by “tough love” and dedicated to fluency in English.  IES 
operated twenty-two schools with 15,500 students by 2012, when it was taken over by 
TA Associates, a private equity group based in Boston. Pysslingen AB was a fourth 
major commercial school operator, with more than eighty preschools and primary schools 
by 2009, when it was taken over by Polaris, a private equity group based in 
Copenhagen.56 
 John Bauer Gymnasiet AB was a fifth such company, though focused on job 
training.  John Bauer, named after the celebrated turn-of-the-century Swedish painter, 
started out in 2000 as one vocational upper-secondary school in the southern city of 
Jönköping. Through a series of acquisitions of competitors, the company grew to become 
                                                
55 See the following articles in The Economist:  “Free to Choose, and Learn,” May 5, 2007, 65; 
“Our Friends in the North,” June 6, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11477890; “Private 
Education: The Swedish Model,” June 14, 2008, 83; “Making Them Happen,” September 26, 
2009, 69-70; “A Classroom Revolution,” April 24, 2010, 22; and “Britain: Cutting the Knot,” 
May 29, 2010, 34. 
56 Information on these companies comes from the Web sites of EQT, Polaris, and TA Associates. 
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the country’s largest chain of vocational schools, with twenty-nine sites and 10,000 
students by 2008, when it was acquired by Axcel, another private equity group based in 
Copenhagen, and renamed JB Education. Baggium AB was also a chain of vocational 
upper-secondary schools. Started as one school in the southwestern city of Kungsbacka in 
1999, Baggium evolved over a decade into a chain of forty-one schools with 4,700 
students as well as a network of care and treatment centers for immigrant and refugee 
children with psychological problems. In 2010, FSN Capital, a private equity group based 
in Oslo, took a 70 percent stake in Baggium and a year later sold the care and treatment 
division to Humana AB, a Swedish healthcare company.57 
 Bure Equity AB, a Stockholm-based publicly traded holding company similar to 
Investor, took a major stake in AcadeMedia in 2007, purchasing all outstanding shares. 
Bure already owned Anew Learning AB, an education conglomerate comprising five 
separate school companies:  Didaktus AB, a chain of adult education programs and 
upper-secondary vocational schools focused on childcare and health professions; Vittra 
AB, a chain of primary and lower-secondary schools employing the Montessori method; 
IT-Gymnasiet AB, a chain of upper-secondary schools focused on technology; 
Framtidsgymansiet AB, a chain of upper-secondary vocational schools dedicated to 
building and mechanical trades; and Rytmus AB, an upper-secondary music school in 
Stockholm that would soon evolve into a chain.58 
 In 2008, AcadeMedia merged with Anew Learning, retaining only the first 
company’s name. Two years later, EQT Partners AB, a Stockholm-based private equity 
                                                
57 Information on these companies comes from the Web sites of Axcel and FSN. 
58 Information on these companies comes from the Web sites of Bure Equity, EQT, and Polaris. 
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group created by the Wallenberg family in 1994, took AcadeMedia private; Investor, 
already holding a 30 percent stake in Kunskapsskolan, was, in turn, an anchor investor in 
EQT with a 19 percent stake.59 In 2011, EQT purchased Pysslingen from Polaris and 
added it to its AcadeMedia holdings. By 2014, AcadeMedia was managing 285 
preschools and schools across Sweden as well as 130 adult education programs. The 
company’s revenue from the Swedish government for the fiscal year was 5.1 billion 
kronor (or approximately $730 million), making it the nation’s largest school operator 
behind the municipality of Stockholm.60 
 This profusion of commercial school operators and dizzying movement of 
investment organizations in and out of the sector baffled many Swedes.61  Among them, 
Bengt Westerberg, deputy prime minister under Carl Bildt from 1991 to 1994 and leader 
of the Liberal People’s Party from 1983 to 1995, confessed bewilderment. Westerberg, 
who had moved on to become chairman of Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority), said during a 2012 interview at the Finansinspektionen 
headquarters in central Stockholm that he was a supporter of the voucher legislation as 
deputy prime minister but never envisioned schools becoming businesses and could not 
have imagined the contemporary role of private equity in education.62 
 In Westerberg’s opinion, private equity groups, especially, should be barred from 
education because they typically take only a short-term interest, aiming to reshape school 
                                                
59 Investor AB, Annual Report, 2014, http://ir.investorab.com/files/press/investor/201504017999-
1.pdf. 
60 Helen Warrell, “Free Schools: Lessons in Store,” Financial Times, August 27, 2014. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Bengt Westerberg, interview, Stockholm, May 15, 2012. 
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companies and sell them within a few years for significant gains.  Westerberg, in 
addition, disagreed with Emilsson about the future for commercial operation of schooling 
in Sweden, predicting decline rather than growth: “If you have an inefficient public 
sector, then it’s easy for the for-profits to come in and make money. But over time, the 
municipal operators will become more efficient.”63  
 Of equal concern to Westerberg was segregation.  He said he had recently visited 
his high school alma mater in his native Södertälje, a mid-sized city twenty miles 
southwest of Stockholm with a significant immigrant population. It was his first return to 
his alma mater in many years.  To his surprise, he said, nearly all the students were 
immigrants or children of immigrants. Westerberg said he asked the school principal 
about the rest of the children in Södertälje.  Westerberg quoted the principal’s response:  
“They almost all now go to friskolor.”64 
 
Beyond funding parity with municipal schools for independent school operators, 
administrative sovereignty for their leaders, and desire among many Swedes for school 
choice after decades of limited options, an interconnected, vigorous Nordic investment 
community played a substantial role in boosting educational privatization. The 
coordination of Swedish banks and businesses, in particular, has a long history.  Called 
the “Wallenberg system” by Francis Sejersted, ownership groups with controlling 
interests in Swedish companies also hold major stakes in banks, which they, in turn, use 
to facilitate loans. Among the so-called “fifteen families” operating in this manner, the 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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Wallenbergs have stood out, holding, for example, controlling interests through EQT and 
Investor in such companies as Alfa Laval, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Scania-Vabis, and 
SKF as well as AcadeMedia while also maintaining a major stake in Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken (better known as SEB).65  In conformity with the concept of Jantelagen, 
in fact, the Wallenberg motto, chiseled into a black granite wall at SEB headquarters, 
captures this quiet ubiquity: Esse non videri [To be yet not seen].66 
 But for EQT and Investor of the Wallenbergs, along with Bure Equity and 
Magnora, Kunskapsskolan and several of its competitors would never have evolved into 
sprawling enterprises. These school companies benefited, as well, from two additional 
advantages denied Edison and many other EMOs: first, much lower perceptions of 
corruption, or, as Transparency International puts it, “abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”; and second, far less childhood poverty, meaning children come to school 
better prepared to learn as well as much less likely to cause trouble for classmates (or, in 
technical terms, generate negative peer group effects).67 
 According to Transparency International, a think tank based in Berlin dedicated to 
measuring trust in government and corporate officials in countries around the world, 
Sweden, like its Nordic neighbors, has year after year been a model nation. Over the 
course of two decades of annual surveys, from 1995 to 2014, Sweden averaged a ranking 
                                                
65 Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 218-221.  Regarding the Wallenbergs, Sejersted 
referenced Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the family’s private bank, which merged with 
Skandinaviska Banken in 1972 to become SE-Banken and then SEB, which is controlled by 
Investor, the Wallenberg’s publicly traded holding company. 
66 “Seemly Success,” Time, June 7, 1963, 120. 
67 Information about Transparency International and its system for measuring perceptions of 
corruption may be found on its Web site, http://www.transparency.org/.  For data on relative 
childhood poverty, see UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Report Card 10: Measuring Child 
Poverty, May 2012, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc10_eng.pdf. 
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of fourth most transparent (or least corrupt) country, ranging from most transparent to 
sixth most. By contrast, the United States has averaged a ranking of eighteenth, ranging 
from fifteenth to twenty-fourth.68 
 In everyday circumstances, such trust can be seen in parents leaving infants in 
carriages outside cafés while meeting friends inside for coffee or in café proprietors 
leaving woolen blankets on outdoor chairs to keep customers warm. By extension, 
parents, union leaders, and journalists in the 1990s and early aughts accorded for-profit 
school operators ample trust that student interests would be paramount. 
 In fact, both teachers unions—Lärarförbundet (representing preschool and 
elementary teachers) and Lärarnas Riksförbund (representing secondary teachers)—
welcomed the free school movement and continued to support it. According to Anna 
Jändel-Holst, a senior policy adviser at Lärarnas Riksförbund, teachers welcomed the 
opportunity to work at different schools and expected additional competition between 
schools to drive up salaries.  Speaking in 2009 at her office in central Stockholm, Jändel-
Holst, who was previously a lower-secondary social studies teacher for seven years, 
explained that many members of her union taught in commercially operated schools and 
that she had no objection herself to the concept.  Her son, after all, was a ninth-grader at a 
Kunskapsskolan, she said, and was challenged and happy.69 
 Jändel-Holst said the only problem with the voucher legislation was that it did not 
stipulate that teachers in friskolor had to be certified. Some schools consequently hired 
                                                
68 Transparency International, Corruptions Perception Index, 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. The precise average for Sweden was 4.2; the 
United States, 17.9; Denmark, 1.9; Finland, 2.4; and Norway, 8.4. The number of nations 
surveyed in 1995 was 45; in 2014, 174. 
69 Anna Jändel-Holst, interview, Stockholm, May 15, 2009. 
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unqualified teachers, she said, and this exemption moreover put downward pressure on 
teacher salaries.70 Salaries for Swedish teachers did, in fact, sink from 2000 to 2009. In 
2000, teacher pay equaled per capita GDP for primary and lower-secondary teachers and 
amounted to 1.07 as much for upper-secondary teachers. By 2009, primary teachers 
earned 0.93 as much as per capita GDP; lower-secondary teachers, 0.96; and upper-
secondary teachers, 1.01. The trend in Norway was the same whereas the opposite was 
true in Denmark and Finland.71   
 Along with her colleague Olof Lundberg, another senior policy advisor, Jändel-
Holst agreed that both unions had erred in failing to anticipate the consequences of this 
exemption for friskolor.  But both were quick to point out that legislation was passed in 
2006 to mandate that teachers in all schools be certified, though uncertified teachers 
already employed at friskolor were grandfathered in.72 
 Per Ledin, Anders Hultin’s successor as CEO of Kunskapsskolan and leader of 
the company from 2007 to 2012, attributed this trust to Swedish modesty and cited 
Jantelagen as a pervasive, tempering influence. Ledin, who had previously served as 
Kunskapsskolan’s marketing director from 2002 to 2007, knew Emilsson as a fellow 
member of the Confederation of Swedish Conservative and Liberal Students in the early 
1970s.  Ever since, Ledin had worked for Emilsson, first at Kreab and then 
                                                
70 Ibid. 
71 OECD, Education at a Glance 2011 (Paris: OECD, 2011), Table D3.4, 419. For Norway, the 
change at each level was from 1.05 to 1, 1.05 to 1, and 1.05 to 1.06; for Denmark, 1.21 to 1.41, 
1.21 to 1.41, and 1.42 to 1.61; and for Finland, 1.08 to 1.13, 1.23 to 1.21 (representing the only 
decline), and 1.29 to 1.35. 
72 Jändel-Holst, interview, Stockholm, May 15, 2015; Olof Lundberg, telephone interview, May 
13, 2015. 
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Kunskapsskolan. Like Emilsson, Ledin also participated in Harvard Business School’s 
Owner/President Management (OPM) program, completing the three-summer course a 
year after Emilsson. Ledin pointed out that the company’s target for earnings was itself 
modest: 5 to 7 percent a year, not the 20 percent envisioned by leaders of both EAI and 
Edison.73  The culture of Kunskapsskolan moreover exhibited the impress of Jantelagen. 
The company headquarters was located in the nondescript Hammarbyhamnen district of 
Stockholm, four miles and three bridges south of the city center.  Ledin said that 
Emilsson had suggested he relocate to the Magnora headquarters in tony Östermalm, but 
Ledin declined, contending the address would convey the wrong impression to 
legislators, journalists, and parents.  At this headquarters for a company with 800 
employees and thirty-two schools in 2009, Ledin worked without a secretary, answered 
the phone himself, and saved printouts for scrap paper. To get from school to school, 
Ledin did not have a driver or a company car.  He drove his family’s station wagon, a 
1999 silver Audi with a bag of soccer balls in the rear for his daughter’s team, which he 
helped manage. Ledin was driving the same car when I made a return visit three years 
later.74 
 In his station wagon, Ledin regularly crisscrossed the country visiting schools in 
the Kunskapsskolan network and attending headmaster meetings held at a different 
school each month, from Borlänge in the north to Helsingbor, Landskrona, and 
Trelleborg in the south.75 While Kunskapsskolan did not have any schools in the 
                                                
73 Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 4, 2009.  Regarding profit forecasts made by John Golle and 
Chris Whittle, see Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. 
74 Based on visits to Kunskapsskolan headquarters on May 5, 2009, and May 11, 2012.  
75 Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 4, 2009.   
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aforementioned heavily immigrant communities of Husby, Rinkeby, Rosengård, or 
Tensta, the company did have schools nearby enrolling students from these communities, 
especially in the case of Rosengård.76 In addition, Landskrona is one such community as 
is Botkyrka, where the company has run schools since 2001 and 2003, respectively. The 
same is true of Skärholmen and Kista, where the company ran schools from 2000 to 2010 
and from 2002 to 2015, respectively, before a combination of inadequate space and 
intense competition from other friskola companies led Kunskapsskolan to close its 
schools in these communities.77 Moreover, beyond running schools in affluent suburbs 
like Nacka and Täby or university towns like Lund and Uppsala, the company has been 
running schools in a range of working-class cities and towns. Borlänge and Trelleborg 
fall into this category, as do Enköping, Katrineholm, Norrköping, and Örebro.78 
 The hurdles children face in disadvantaged communities in Sweden, however, do 
not compare to the hurdles confronting children in disadvantaged communities in  the 
United States. Disadvantage itself means something quite different in the two countries.  
Of European nations, Sweden ranks second, behind Iceland, for child welfare.79  Of the 
thirty OECD countries ranked in descending order by UNICEF for “relative child 
poverty” (determined as “the percentage of children [aged 0 to 17] who are living ... in a 
household in which disposable income, when adjusted for family size and composition, is 
                                                
76 Fredrik Lindgren, CEO, Kunskapsskolan i Sverige AB, telephone interview, August 18, 2015. 
77 Ibid. 
78 According to Statistics Sweden, in 2007, the latest year for which data are available, Borlänge 
ranked 231st out of 298 municipalities in assets per capita; Enköping, 150th; Katrineholm, 206th; 
Norrköping, 212th; Örebro, 134th; and Trelleborg, 132nd.  Data from http://www.scb.se/en_/. 
79 UNICEF, “Report Card 10: Measuring Child Poverty,” 2. 
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less than 50% of the national median income”), Sweden ranks seventh, with 7.3 percent 
of children in this cohort while the United States ranks last, with 23.1 percent.80 
 Moreover, Stieg Larsson’s depictions aside, there is no comparable degree of 
violence. In 2012, in all of Sweden, with a population of 9.6 million, there were sixty-
eight cases of murder or manslaughter (or 0.7 cases for every 100,000 residents); in 
Stockholm County, with a population of 2.1 million, there were eighteen cases (or 0.9 
cases for every 100,000 residents); in the communities of Husby, Kista, Rinkeby, and 
Tensta, there were none.81  That same year in Baltimore alone, with a population of 
625,000, there were 218 cases of murder or manslaughter (or 35 cases for every 100,000 
residents).  For the United States as a whole, with a population of 314 million, there were 
14,827 cases of murder or manslaughter (or 4.7 cases for every 100,000 residents).82 
 While Husby, Kista, Rinkeby, and Tensta, as examples of marginalized 
communities in Stockholm County, house many immigrants and post high rates of 
unemployment,83 these communities bear no physical resemblance to East Harlem, North 
Philadelphia, West Baltimore, or South Central Los Angeles. The reputation of these 
Swedish communities was certainly tarnished by angry young men torching cars and 
                                                
80 Ibid., 3. 
81 Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, Crime and Statistics, 
http://www.bra.se/bra/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/murder-and-manslaughter.html. 
For county data, see Brottsförebyggande rådet, Konstaterade fall av dödligt våld: Statistik för 
2014, http://www.bra.se/bra/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2015-04-01-konstaterade-fall-av-
dodligt-vald.html. 
82 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting 
Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm. 
83 Niklas Magnusson and Johan Carlstrom, “Sweden Riots Put Faces to Statistics as Stockholm 
Burns,” BloombergBusiness, May 27, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-
26/sweden-riots-put-faces-to-statistics-as-stockholm-burns. 
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public buildings in May 2013 in reaction to the deadly police shooting of a local man 
brandishing a knife in Husby.84 Yet visits four years earlier revealed no dilapidated 
buildings or boarded-up storefronts or overgrown abandoned lots or broken sidewalks 
speckled with discarded crack vials.85 
 Cultural separation in these communities was indeed obvious from attire, 
restaurant fare, and newsstand offerings as well as satellite dishes mounted to every third 
balcony of apartment buildings for TV programs from the residents’ native countries. The 
metro stations, however, were spotless, but for some graffiti excoriating the police or 
celebrating the eponymous artist.  The public squares were litterless and orderly; the 
playgrounds, parks, and soccer fields, well maintained.86 For all parents in these 
communities, as in all of Sweden, there is generous maternity/paternity leave and heavily 
subsidized daycare. Likewise, as for all Swedes, there is first-rate free medical care no 
matter the diagnosis.87 
 Although children from Kista or neighboring Husby do not start school with the 
same benefits as their counterparts in the upscale suburbs of Nacka or Täby, the 
difference pales in comparison to the chasm between children in North Philadelphia and 
nearby Lower Merion or between West Baltimore and nearby Pikesville. The challenge 
for Kunskapsskolan and other friskola companies was accordingly not the challenge 
encountered by Edison and other EMOs. In contrast to EMOs, friskola companies thus 
                                                
84 See Harvey Morris, “Riots Dent Image of Sweden’s Classless Social Model,” New York Times, 
May 24, 2013. 
85 Observations based on visits in May 2009. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Hilson, The Nordic Model, 87-115; and Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 99-114. 
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not only had far more opportunity to open schools because of the virtual absence of 
independent schools in the early 1990s but also far greater reason to expect children to 
come to school ready to learn. 
 
Despite all these advantages friskola companies had over EMOs, they hit a wall in 2011.  
AcadeMedia would continue to grow because of mergers and acquisitions, but other 
companies, including Kunskapsskolan, would slow down or, in one prominent case, shut 
down.  
 While the teachers unions continued to back the friskola movement, many 
legislators, scholars, and journalists turned on it. The trouble began with a change in 
government policy at the beginning of the year regarding enrollment in upper-secondary 
schools, heated up in September with a report from a prestigious centrist think tank 
critiquing the nation’s free-market makeover, and then intensified, first, with a series of 
muckraking articles in the press in October about for-profit mismanagement of nursing 
homes and, second, with a muckraking documentary in December on for-profit 
mismanagement of schools broadcast on national television. 
 Widely referred to as GY11 for Gymnasieskola 2011, the new curriculum for 
upper-secondary schools, as part of the Swedish Education Act of 2011, was tightened, in 
the name of better quality control, to give all schools across the country concrete 
common goals and thus better prepare students for jobs or further study. In particular, 
GY11 specified that the country’s plethora of vocational programs had to be limited to 
twelve carefully defined areas of study (from child care, culinary arts, and business 
administration to auto repair, building construction, and HVAC maintenance). Moreover, 
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GY11 made vocational education a far more direct path to the job market.  With GY11, 
once students began vocational programs following graduation from lower-secondary 
school, they were no longer in much of a position to attend universities, as admission 
requirements to universities were simultaneously tightened to mandate certain academic 
coursework.88  Though the government had made clear the purpose of GY11 as early as 
2009, for-profit vocational school operators struggled to retrofit their schools to meet the 
new standards.89 
 In addition, no amount of retrofitting would compensate for the new limits on 
options for students in vocational schools.  Much as corporations engaged in foreign 
direct investment risk losing contracts because of local ambitions to take control of 
operations and thus increase autonomy and cut costs, they also assume political risk that 
local policies will remain favorable to their business model. For the Danish private equity 
group Axcel, owner since 2008 of JB Education, GY11 meant a collapse in revenue. 
From 2008 to 2011, enrollment in year one (the equivalent of tenth grade) at JB 
Education’s vocational schools plummeted 62 percent. In municipalities where JB 
Education operated vocational schools, applications to vocational schools, in general, 
dropped from 40 percent of students in the final grade of lower-secondary school in 2010 
to 28 percent in 2011.90  
                                                
88 Patrik Levin, interview, Stockholm, May 22, 2012. See also Skolverket, Gymnasieskola 2011 
(Stockholm: Skolverket, 2011), http://www.skolverket.se/om-skolverket/publikationer. 
89 Levin, interview, May 22, 2012. 
90 Axcel, “Berättelsen om JB Education: Om Axcels investering i John Bauer Organization och 
avvecklingen av JB Education,” October 24, 2013, obtained by e-mail from Vilhelm Sundström, 
Partner, Axcel, January 22, 2014. 
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 Affecting all friskola companies was a detailed report published in September on 
the impact of privatization on the provision of education, individual and family welfare 
services, health care, and elder care. The report was published by the highly regarded 
Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle (SNS), known in English as the Center for 
Business and Policy Studies, and presented at a forum at the SNS headquarters in 
Stockholm broadcast by SVT, the Swedish Public Service Television Company.91 At the 
forum and in an op-ed published the same day in Dagens Nyheter, Laura Hartman, the 
SNS research director and editor of the 279-page report, concluded that there was no 
evidence competition had improved delivery of services.92 
 In the chapter on education, in particular, the aforementioned economist Jonas 
Vlachos contended that the process of education is inherently too opaque for competition 
between schools to necessarily benefit parents and students.93 Vlachos, in this regard, 
refined his contention that free-market reforms had generated grade inflation, pointing 
out that students from lower-secondary friskolor recorded lower grades at upper-
secondary municipal schools while those students from lower-secondary municipal 
schools posted grades at the upper-secondary level consistent with their lower-secondary 
grades. Vlachos argued, as well, that the free-market reforms had driven up costs, 
increased student segregation, and created an uneven playing field in allowing leaders of 
                                                
91 Laura Hartman, ed., Konkurrensens konsekvenser: Vad händer med svensk vualfärd? 
(Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 2011). 
92 Laura Hartman, “Privatiskeringar i välfärden har inte ökat effektiviten,” Dagens Nyheter, 
September 7, 2011. 
93 Jonas Vlachos, “Friskolor i förändring,” in Hartman, ed., Konkurrensens konsekvenser, 66-67 
and 70-73. 
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friskolor significant control over enrollment while leaders of municipal schools had to 
take all students.94    
 A ruckus followed Hartman’s introduction at the forum and later in the press. Peje 
Emilsson afterward took the floor and called the report the worst piece of research 
published by SNS in twenty years.  Emilsson took issue with several conclusions, 
especially Vlachos’s claim that leaders of friskolor had significant control over 
enrollment. “It was like nothing I had ever seen,” said Per Ledin, who attended the 
forum. “There was blood on the walls.”95 Hartman maintained her cool but not her job. 
Asked after the forum by the head of SNS to refrain from publicly commenting on the 
report, Hartman decided to step down, a move that, in turn, brought the report more 
attention in the press.96 
 In an interview eight months later at her office at Försäkringskassan, the Swedish 
Social Insurance Agency, in central Stockholm, where she had taken the position of 
director of analysis and forecasting, Hartman stood by every conclusion in the report, 
particularly Vlachos’s claim that leaders of friskolor have considerable control over 
enrollment. “They can develop curricula suitable only for students who are easy to work 
with,” she said. “They can establish admission preferences for siblings.  They can limit 
enrollment when they choose. Municipal schools cannot do any of these things.”97 
                                                
94 Ibid., 66 and 96-99.   
95 Per Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2012. See also Richard Orange, “Doubts Grow over 
the Success of Sweden’s Free Schools Experiment,” The Guardian, September 10, 2011. 
96 Johan Anderberg, “SNS förlorade heder,” Fokus, September 30, 2011, 
http://www.fokus.se/2011/09/sns-forlorade-heder/. 
97 Laura Hartman, interview, Stockholm, May 18, 2012. 
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 Providing a school administrator’s perspective on the report that same week, 
Einar Fransson, the director of education for the municipality of Nacka, where 20 percent 
of students attend friskolor, said the determinations about enrollment, grade inflation, and 
segregation were all correct. Fransson said he liked the variety of options provided by 
friskolor and was particularly fond of Kunskapsskolan, where he had been a principal for 
seven years before assuming his position in Nacka in 2010. Fransson knew the Swedish 
system thoroughly. Before joining Kunskapsskolan, he had been the principal of a 
municipal school for fifteen years and prior to that a secondary teacher of history for four. 
Fransson confirmed Vlachos’s conclusion that leaders of friskolor have ways of 
controlling enrollment and that grade inflation at lower-secondary friskolor is a serious 
matter, noting a clear pattern at Nacka’s two municipal upper-secondary schools of 
students earning lower grades than they had achieved at lower-secondary friskolor.  
Regarding segregation, Fransson said savvy parents search aggressively for the best fit 
for their children, their children and the children of their friends and neighbors exit 
municipal schools together for that best fit, and the children without such parents stay 
behind.98  
 To Fransson, however, the most troubling aspect of the friskola movement was 
that it deflected attention from two fundamental problems that competition between 
schools did not address: inadequate preparation and pay for teachers. Fransson said low 
teacher pay was a longstanding issue and recalled that when he and his wife, also an 
educator, went to a bank for a loan to buy a bigger apartment in the Stockholm area in the 
                                                
98 Einar Fransson, interview, Nacka, May 16, 2012. 
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1980s, the banker was appalled at their combined income: “He said we had three options: 
move north, leave teaching, or go abroad.”99   
 
While the SNS report had a jarring effect, it amounted to a gentle prelude to a media 
storm generated by a series of stories in October in Dagens Nyheter on abuses discovered 
at a chain of for-profit nursing homes called Carema,100 a subsidiary of a Swedish 
healthcare company called Ambea, jointly owned by the private equity groups KKR, 
based in New York, and Triton, based in Frankfurt. KKR (previously described as the 
owner of Channel One from 1994 to 2007) and Triton had bought Ambea from 3i, the 
London-based private equity group, in 2010.101   
 According to Dagens Nyheter, poor care in the name of cutting costs at Carema 
led to significant malnourishment of residents, unnecessary amputations, contusions and 
fractures suffered from falls, and extended use of diapers. Following its initial series in 
October, Dagens Nyheter ran more than 120 stories about Carema over the next twelve 
months.  Soon known as Caremaskandalen, the revelations led to numerous articles in 
competing papers, broadcasts on Swedish television, and parliamentary debate.102  While 
Carema officials and independent commentators would dispute key findings reported in 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
100 For early coverage in Dagens Nyheter, see Josefine Hökerberg, “Carema försökte köpa min 
tystnad,” October 13, 2011; Mia Tottmar, “’Oacceptabla förhållanden’ på äldreboende i 
Välingby,” October 13, 2011; and Tottmar, “Sköterskans larmrapport stoppades,” October, 19, 
2011. 
101 Martin Arnold, “KKR to Partner with Triton in Ambea Acquisition,” Financial Times, March 
26, 2010. 
102 Erik Palm, Caremaskandalen: Tiskkapitalets fantastiska resa i äldrevården (Stockholm: 
Carlsson, 2013). 
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Dagens Nyheter, there was no remedy for the damage done by the relentless coverage.103  
In time, Ambea changed the name of Carema to Vardaga, equivalent, roughly, to 
“Everyday Living.”104  
 To Ledin, the impact of the scandal was profound, igniting distrust of all 
privatized delivery of services, especially education.105 A harsh illustration of this distrust 
came in December in the form of a documentary on UR, the Swedish Educational 
Broadcasting Company, deriding friskola companies as driven by greed. Entitled 
Vinstmaskinerna (meaning “Profit Machines”), the documentary was one episode in a 
four-part series crudely entitled Världens bästa skitskola (loosely, and more politely, 
translating as “The World’s Worst Schools”).106 Much as many Chileans at the same time 
were protesting their nation’s longstanding system of for-profit school management, 
initiated in 1981, Swedish critics started to raise their voices in opposition.107 The Chilean 
adversaries would soon prevail, with President Michelle Bachelet declaring in January 
2015 that her government would phase out for-profit school management.108 
                                                
103 Cecilia Stenshamn, Lögnen om Koppargården: Skandalen bakom Caremaskandalen 
(Stockholm: Timbro, 2013). 
104 Ambea, Carema Is Changing its Name, August 27, 2013, 
http://news.cision.com/ambea/r/carema-is-changing-its-name,c9456926. 
105 Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2012. 
106 Though singular in form, the title in translation into English is better conveyed in the plural. 
The title literally means “The World’s Best Shit School.” 
107 Lili Loofbourow, “No to Profit: Fighting Privatization in Chile,” Boston Review, May/June 16, 
2013, 30-35. 
108 Anthony Esposito, “Chile’s Bachelet Prepares Next Phase of Education Reform,” Reuters, 
January 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/us-chile-education-reform-
idUSKBN0L01W620150127. 
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 Basic to the UR series was a crisis of faith in Swedish education known as “PISA 
shock.” Of all OECD nations, only Sweden had seen scores on the triennial Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) successively drop with each administration of 
the exam since its introduction in 2000, and this decline, moreover, occurred in each 
subject (reading, math, and science).109  Scores dropped again in 2012 in each subject. 
Only in 2015, four years after the UR series,  did Sweden see a reversal in its PISA 
results, perhaps as a result of provisions in the Swedish Education Act of 2011 to sharpen 
curricula (see Chart 7.2).  
                                                
109 For evidence of “PISA shock,” see OECD, Improving Schools in Sweden: An OECD 
Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/improving-schools-in-sweden-
an-oecd-perspective.htm. 
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Chart 7.2 PISA scores for Sweden; the mean score for OECD nations is approximately 
500. Data source: OECD, PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015, 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/. 
 
 Defenders of the Swedish model and skeptics of the much higher PISA results 
posted by Finland have countered that lower scores in Sweden merely reflected the 
greater proportion of immigrant children in Swedish schools.110  While Finland is indeed 
home to fewer immigrant children than Sweden as well as Denmark and Norway, this 
difference explains only a small portion of the difference in PISA scores. Disaggregated 
                                                
110 While doing research in Norway and Sweden, I heard from several authorities that non-
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data make this clear. With the 2006 exam, the OECD began presenting disaggregated 
data for all nations where at least 3 percent of the examinees were immigrants or children 
of immigrants. For subsequent exams, the OECD presented disaggregated data for all 
nations regardless of the percentage of students with immigrant status.111 
 Although each administration of the exam covers reading, math, and science, one 
subject is the focus, rotating sequentially through reading, math, and science. In keeping 
with this focus, the OECD provides disaggregated data for the selected subject alone. In 
2006, non-immigrant students in Denmark scored a 503 in science (in contrast to a 
national average of 496); and in Sweden, a 512 (in contrast to a national average of 
503).112 While neither Finland nor Norway tested enough immigrant students in 2006 to 
be included by the OECD as nations with disaggregated data, their scores may 
nevertheless be compared to the non-immigrant results for Denmark and Sweden, with 
the understanding that results for non-immigrant students would be marginally higher: 
students in sum in Finland scored a 563; and in Norway, a 487.113 
 In 2009, non-immigrant students in Denmark scored a 502 in reading (in contrast 
to a national average of 495); in Finland, a 538 (in contrast to a national average of 536); 
in Norway, a 508 (in contrast to a national average of 503); and in Sweden, a 507 (in 
contrast to a national average of 497).114 In 2012, non-immigrant students in Denmark 
scored a 508 in math (in contrast to a national average of 500); in Finland, a 523 (in 
                                                
111 OECD, PISA 2009 Results: Overcoming Social Background (Paris: OECD, 2010), 70; PISA 
2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity (Paris: OECD, 2013), 73. 
112 OECD, PISA 2006: Science Competencies for Tomorrow’s World (Paris: OECD, 2007), 177. 
113 Ibid., 56. 
114 OECD, PISA 2009 Results: Overcoming Social Background (Paris: OECD, 2010), 70. 
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contrast to a national average of 519); in Norway, a 496 (in contrast to a national average 
of 489); and in Sweden, a 490 (in contrast to a national average of 478).115  
 Skeptics of Finland’s distinction on PISA have also countered that because 
Finnish is phonetic, Finnish students have an easier time becoming readers.116 Finnish 
grammar is nevertheless brutal and the reason for much struggling in the early grades, 
especially for boys.117 As with Latin, the final syllable of a noun in Finnish determines its 
grammatical case.  Yet whereas Latin has six cases (nominative, vocative, accusative, 
genitive, dative, and ablative), Finnish has fifteen.118  
 
Each episode in the UR series was narrated by Nathaneal Derwinger in the manner of 
Michael Moore.119  In Vinstmaskinerna, Derwinger reported that Ola Sälsten, the founder 
                                                
115 OECD, PISA 2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity (Paris: OECD, 2013), 73. 
116  See, for example, The Economist, “Our Friends in the North,” June 6, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/11477890. 
117 Päivi Juntti, Director, Special Education, Friisilän koulu, Raisio, interview, Helsinki, April 27, 
2012. 
118 That Finnish-speaking Finns do better on PISA than Swedish-speaking Finns is another matter. 
Approximately 6.5 percent of Finnish students come from Swedish-speaking homes and attend 
Swedish-speaking schools. The Finnish Education Ministry has disaggregated scores on each 
PISA exam to show results for both Finnish-speaking Finns and Swedish-speaking Finns. While 
the former do better than the latter, the latter do better than their counterparts in Sweden. For 
example, in 2006, Swedish-speaking Finns scored a 531 in science compared to a 512 by their 
Swedish counterparts. The results in 2009 in reading were nearly the same: 511 for the Swedish-
speaking Finns, 507 for their Swedish counterparts. The results in 2012 in math were far apart: 
520 for the Swedish-speaking Finns, 490 for their Swedish counterparts. The difference between 
the Swedish-speaking Finns and Finnish-speaking Finns may boil down to the cultural 
disadvantage of belonging to a linguistic minority. This holds for the teacher education program 
in Vaasa, which can not benefit from the wider collaboration of other teacher education programs 
spread across the country, as well as the everyday experience of students. See Ministry of 
Education, PISA06: Analyses, Reflections, Expectations (2008), 45; PISA09: Ensituloksia (2010), 
13; and PISA12: Ensituloksia (2013), 51. 
119 Sveriges Utbildningsradio AB, Världens bästa skitskola: Vinstmaskinerna, December 11, 
2011, http://www.ur.se/Produkter/165325-Varldens-basta-skitskola-Vinstmaskinerna. 
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and owner of Baggium, the chain of vocational schools launched in Kungsbacka in 1999, 
had personally retained 43 million kronor (approximately $5.5 million) in earnings since 
founding the company and was moreover paying himself a salary of 1 million kronor per 
year (approximately $150,000).120 Derwinger went to Kungsbacka, where Sälsten lived 
and served as a Social Democratic member of the city council, seeking an interview with 
Sälsten to learn how he justified making such money.  After being repeatedly rebuffed in 
the course of roaming about Kungsbacka and simultaneously telling the story of 
Baggium, Derwinger went north to Sundsvall to interview students and teachers at a 
vocational school run by JB Education.  One student reported spending much of the day 
playing video games, several others admitted receiving higher grades than they deserved, 
teachers spoke of being told by administrators to give students higher grades to make the 
school look better, and one former teacher contended he was pressured by administrators 
to mark absent students as present to qualify the company for per-pupil allocations from 
the local government.121 Like defenders of Carema responding to allegations of 
negligence, defenders of JB Education described the coverage as a hatchet job based on 
limited evidence, yet the damage was irreversible for the company, in particular, and the 
for-profit school management sector, in general.122 
 In an interview at his office in May 2012, Ledin confessed anxiety about 
Kunskapsskolan’s fate. He said applications to the company’s upper-secondary schools in 
                                                
120 Dollar approximations are based on exchange rates at the time of transactions. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Vilhelm Sundström, interview, Copenhagen, January 13, 2014; Per Ledin, telephone interview, 
August 12, 2015; and Joachim Sperling, Head of Corporate Affairs, Axcel, telephone interview, 
August 12, 2015. 
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February for the following academic year were down sharply and added that applications 
to upper-secondary friskolor across the country were down 25 percent.  The company 
was not on course to fulfill Emilsson’s prediction in 2009 that it would be running forty-
two schools in Sweden, up from thirty-two, by 2014. The company’s school count in 
2011-2012 was thirty-three, with four schools added since 2009 (in Jönköping, 
Kroskslätt, Örebro, and Uppsala, all at the lower-secondary level) and three lost (one 
lower-secondary school in Skärholmen and two upper-secondary schools, one in Kista 
and the other in Nacka).  In addition, total enrollment from 2008-2009 to 2011-2012 was 
flat, going from 9,663 students to 9,658.  While revenue was up from 726 million kronor 
to 794 million, earnings were down from 36 million kronor to 24 million.123 
 Three weeks later, Cecilia Carnefeldt, Emilsson’s daughter, who had succeeded 
her father as chairman of the Kunskapsskolan board in 2010, asked Ledin to step down as 
CEO and become quality manager for international operations. Ledin declined, and 
Carnefeldt took over as CEO.124 
 For JB Education, the numbers were far grimmer. Axcel, the Danish private 
equity group that took over the company in 2008, fired the CEO in 2012 and replaced 
him with Anders Hultin, the founding CEO of Kunskapsskolan, who had been working in 
London since 2007 working, first for GEMS Education, Sunny Varkey’s school 
management company based in Dubai, and then for Pearson, the education and 
publishing conglomerate. Hultin brought on Ledin as chief of staff.  Within a year, 
however, Vilhelm Sundström, the partner at Axcel overseeing the group’s investment in 
                                                
123 Ledin, interview, Stockholm, May 11, 2012. 
124 Per Ledin, e-mail, June 19, 2012. Ledin reported he was asked to step down on May 28.  
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JB Education, decided it was too late to turn the company around. Applications in 
February 2013 for the upcoming academic year were down 31 percent.125 
 JB Education declared bankruptcy in June.  Eight of the company’s thirty-four 
vocational schools were closed. The remaining twenty-six were taken over by either 
companies or municipalities (AcadeMedia absorbed five; Hultin took over four and 
started a new company, Fria Läroverken, with Ledin as his executive vice president). In 
addition, of the five primary schools the company had acquired since 2008, four were 
taken over by AcadeMedia and one was closed; and of the company’s three adult 
education programs acquired since 2008, two were taken over by AcadeMedia and one 
by a competitor,  ThorenGruppen AB.126 
 Using a marker to jot stakeholders, sums, circles, and arrows on a flipboard in a 
conference room at Axcel’s headquarters in Copenhagen in January 2014, Sundström 
explained during an interview the valuation of John Bauer in 2008, how much money 
Axcel and other stakeholders had invested, and how much was ultimately lost. Most 
impressive about John Bauer, Sundström said at the outset, was the company’s 
enrollment growth rate of 7 percent each year from 2006 through 2008.127 
 Following six months of due diligence, Sundström said, Axcel valued the 
company at 675 million Swedish kronor (approximately $95 million), invested 133 
million kr. of the group’s own money, took over John Bauer’s bank loan of 318 million 
                                                
125 Sundström, interview, Copenhagen, January 13, 2014. 
126 Axcel, “Berättelsen om JB Education”; Axcel, “JB Education avyttrar vuxenutbildningen,” 
June 11, 2013, 
http://www.axcel.se/media/135670/pressmeddelande_jb_education_130611_slutlig_1_.pdf. 
127 Sundström, interview, Copenhagen, January 13, 2014. 
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kr. (initially made by Fortis, a Benelux bank, and then assumed by FIH, a Danish bank), 
secured a vendor loan of 200 million kr. from John Bauer’s founder, Rune Tedfors, 
valued Tedfors’s remaining stake at 14 million kr. (which Axcel bought out in 2011), and 
raised another 10 million kronor from unidentified investors. From 2008 to 2012, Axcel 
invested an additional 240 million kronor in acquisitions and improvements, without 
retaining any earnings. In 2013, Axcel invested another 100 million kronor to keep 
schools open through the end of the academic year. In total, JB Education’s collapse cost 
1.015 billion kronor (approximately $150 million):  Axcel lost 487 million kronor; FIH, 
318 million kronor; Tedfors, 200 million kronor; and unidentified investors, 10 million 
kronor128 There were virtually no assets to offset this loss.129 
 Gracious, understated, frank, and multilingual, Sundström personified Nordic 
high finance. A Swedish-speaking Finn who grew up on the Åland Islands, Sundström 
studied business at the Swedish School of Economics in Helsinki and worked for several 
years for Morgan Stanley in Stockholm and then Merrill Lynch in London before joining 
Axcel in 2006. He split his time between offices in Stockholm and Copenhagen.130 
 Sundström conceded that turning around schools was far more challenging than 
he and his partners had expected. He said one-third of the schools they took over in 2008 
were good, one-third middling, and one-third subpar.  “It was particularly difficult to get 
the school leaders and teachers necessary to get the job done at the subpar schools,” he 
said. Sundström added that Axcel had attempted, as well, to grow too fast in 2010 in 
                                                
128 Axcel, “Berättelsen om JB Education”; Sundström, interview, January 13, 2014.  Dollar 
approximations are based on exchange rates at the time of transactions. 
129 Joachim, Sperling, telephone interview, August 12, 2015. 
130 Sundström, interview, January 13, 2014. 
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moving into management of primary schools. And, most crucially, Sundström explained 
that Axcel failed to respond adequately to the GY11 reforms announced in 2009. Axcel 
had no reason to anticipate those reforms in 2008, he said, but could and should have 
responded more aggressively in 2009.131  
 Kunskapsskolan meanwhile turned around under Carnefeldt, growing to thirty-six 
schools by 2014-2015 and posting earnings of 41 million kronor on revenue of 1.002 
billion kronor, for a profit margin of 4.1 percent. While the school count had grown only 
12.5 percent since 2008-2009, rather than 31 percent, as Emilsson had forecasted, 
enrollment figures told a more promising story.  This boost in enrollment resulted from 
Carnefeldt’s decision to respond to the recalibration of schooling divisions by the 
Swedish Education Act of 2011. With this legislation, elementary education went from 
grades one through five to one through three (students in Sweden start grade one at age 
seven); lower-secondary education went from grades six through nine to seven through 
nine; and a new middle division, comprising grades four through six, was created. 
Carnefeldt decided to add grades four and five to the company’s lower-secondary schools 
and increase the teacher-to-student ratio in these new grades to provide more structure. 
Largely on this account, enrollment had grown from 2008-2009 to 2014-2015 by 17 
percent, from 9,663 to 11,329.132  
 Yet in a telling sidebar, Kunskapsskolan failed in New York.  In the fourth year of 
its five-year charter, the board of Innovate Manhattan Charter School decided in March 
                                                
131 Ibid. 
132 Carnefeldt, telephone interview, August 20, 2015. Enrollment numbers come from 
Kunskapsskolan Education Sweden AB, “Årsredovisning och koncernredovisning för 
räkenskapsåret 2014,” March 20, 2015. 
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2015 to shut the school down in June.  A middle school, with grades six through eight, 
located in private space on the Lower East Side (following its first year in Tweed 
Courthouse), Innovate Manhattan had seats in 2014-2015 for 225 students but enrolled 
only 145, of whom only twenty-nine were sixth-graders.133 Results on New York State 
exams in reading and math were low.  For the 2013-2014 academic year, 15 percent of 
the school’s students were rated proficient in reading, compared to a district average of 
38 percent; and 6 percent were rated proficient in math, compared to a district average of 
37 percent.134 Of its students, 66 percent qualified for free or reduced-price lunch, a proxy 
for economic disadvantage, compared to 65 percent across the district.135 In this one 
instance, Kunskapsskolan struggled much like Edison and other EMOs to boost the 
academic performance of underprivileged children. 
 When asked about Innovate Manhattan Charter two months after the school 
closed, Carnefeldt said she wished she could start the school over again.  “I am certain 
our approach can work for all students,” she said. “But we didn’t adapt appropriately. We 
underestimated how much structure the students needed.  We figured this out by the 
2013-2014 school year and got the right leadership in place by January 2014, but it was 
too late.”136 
                                                
133 Sarah Darville, “Recruitment, Finance Troubles Force Closure of Charter School that Opened 
in Tweed,” Chalkbeat, March 4, 2015, http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2015/03/04/recruitment-finance-
troubles-force-closure-of-charter-school-that-opened-in-tweed/.  
134 New York City Department of Education, Middle School Quality Snapshot 2013-2014, 
http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/01/M524/AboutUs/Statistics/default.htm. 
135 See New York State Department of Education, District Data, 2013-2014, 
http://data.nysed.gov/. For data regarding Innovate Manhattan Charter, see New York School 
Quality Guide 2013-2014, 
http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/01/M524/AboutUs/Statistics/default.htm. 







It’s not the tables. It’s the floor. 
- Franklin Singleton, Senior, Beacon School, October 1999 
 
In my first year as a teacher at the Beacon School, a progressive public high school on 
Manhattan’s West Side, I shared a classroom with a French teacher, a senior colleague 
and inspiring instructor named Nicole Cherry, fluent in Portuguese and Spanish as well as 
French.  It was 1999-2000.  The classroom was 104.  For four periods of the seven-period 
schedule, Cherry taught in 104. For the other three, I did; in addition, I taught a fourth 
class in another classroom. This is how teachers at Beacon and many schools share space. 
 We had eight round tables in 104, with four chairs at six and five at two.  The 
statutory ceiling for class size for New York City public high schools was thirty-four; 
hence the additional two chairs.  Cherry’s desk was at one end of the classroom, mine at 
the other.  The north wall was punctuated with windows behind black steel fencing.  The 
south wall was covered with a whiteboard. 
 The tables with five chairs were tight, but we made do.  The real problem with the 
tables wasn’t their size.  The problem was they wobbled.  Over the first few weeks of the 
school year, students muttered at the beginning of class about the wobbling, folded some 
paper, and jammed it under the short leg or legs, or they moved previous engineering 
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efforts from one leg to another.  As the challenges of prepping for class and learning the 
names of students dominated my attention, I didn’t give much thought to this matter of 
wobbling tables, until one day when a squabble broke out at one table five minutes into 
class in early October about which leg was short. 
 It was a class in economics for seniors.  In exasperation, a student named Franklin 
Singleton stood up, dropped to his hands and knees, and pressed one side of his head to 
the floor for several seconds.  The class went silent.  I stopped outlining my lesson on the 
whiteboard about inflation or unemployment or opportunity costs.  Singleton popped up 
and intoned, “We need to stop all this foolishness.  It’s not the tables. It’s the floor.” 
Everyone nodded. They were accustomed to contrarian but sensible comments from 
Singleton, a gifted math student as well as a sharpshooting forward and powerful 
rebounder on the school’s basketball team. I returned to outlining my lesson.  
 During a break later in the day, I thought about Singleton’s observation.  
Singleton was right.  The building, after all, was previously a warehouse for heavy 
equipment for ABC Television, whose studios were a few blocks north, east, and south of 
the school.  It made sense the floors weren’t level.  But as a metaphor for education 
policy, Singleton’s observation appears profound. Changing modes of school 
management and student assessment do not address fundamental factors, such as 
childhood poverty. 
 We don’t want to acknowledge the role of poverty despite overwhelming 
evidence of its force.1 It’s far more convenient to see the market as the solution to our 
                                                
1 See, in particular, Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, Economic, and 
Educational Reform to Close the Black-White Achievement Gap (Washington, DC: Economic 
Policy Institute, 2004), 13-59; and David C. Berliner, “Our Impoverished View of Educational 
Reform,” Teachers College Record 108 (2006): 949-995. 
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schooling woes.  Ranking last among thirty OECD nations in a 2012 UNICEF study of 
child poverty, as noted, should alone make clear the gravity of this problem, as should the 
cited comparative crime data: in particular, Baltimore as home to forty times the number 
of cases of murder and manslaughter per capita as Stockholm.  In sync with these 
numbers is income inequality.  Of OECD nations, the United States is the second most 
financially polarized, behind only Mexico.2  
 The striking failure of Kunskapsskolan’s transplant, Innovate Manhattan Charter, 
is one illustration of this misguided faith in the market. Across Sweden, an egalitarian 
nation with excellent social services, the Kunskapsskolan model has worked reasonably 
well. In lower Manhattan, where 65 percent of children in public schools come from 
economically disadvantaged homes, the model performed so poorly that the school’s 
board surrendered its charter from the state a year before it was up for renewal. Writ 
small, this story reflected the saga of Edison. Edison’s curricula, school design, 
benchmark assessments, professional development, and advanced data systems were 
beside the point. As the Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Larry Eichel titled his piece in 
2001 on Edison’s projected role in his city, “Edison Isn’t the Issue.”3 A decade later, 
Eichel was proven undoubtedly correct. 
                                                
2 UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Report Card 10: Measuring Child Poverty, May 2012, 
http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc10_eng.pdf, 3; Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention, Crime and Statistics, http://www.bra.se/bra/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-
statistics/murder-and-manslaughter.html. For county data, see Brottsförebyggande rådet, 
Konstaterade fall av dödligt våld: Statistik för 2014, 
http://www.bra.se/bra/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2015-04-01-konstaterade-fall-av-dodligt-
vald.html; and U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm. Regarding income inequality, see 
Drew DeSilver, “Global Inequality: How the U.S. Compares,” Pew Research Center, December 
19, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/19/global-inequality-how-the-u-s-
compares/. 




As the story of Manhattan Innovate Charter conveys, a key problem with applying the 
business model to schooling is the distinct production function of education.  As I 
explained in the Introduction, educators, like doctors, do not have as much control over 
outcomes as businessmen because, in technical terms, the production function in 
education, as in health care, is by nature more complex. The traditional production 
function for industry comprises capital investment, labor, and technological innovation. 
In education, facilities and supplies constitute capital investment; administrators, 
teachers, and support staff equal labor; and pedagogical strategy takes the form of 
technological innovation. However, in education, the students themselves amount to a 
fourth input. 
 Jamie Robert Vollmer made this difference in production functions eminently 
tangible in a 2002 essay in Education Week.  Vollmer explained that as the president of a 
legendary ice cream manufacturer in Iowa, he had stepped into the ring of education 
reform with the goal of getting schools to function more like businesses. Following a 
speech to an assembly of principals and teachers on the merits of running schools like 
businesses, Vollmer recalled that a veteran teacher asked him what he did as an ice cream 
manufacturer if he received “an inferior shipment of blueberries.” Vollmer replied that he 
sent them back, as he used only premium ingredients. Vollmer shared in his essay that he 
then heard the loud snap of the teacher’s trap.  Before he could qualify his response, he 
knew he was done. “That’s right!,” she barked “and we can never send back our 
blueberries. We take them big, small, rich, poor, gifted, exceptional, abused, frightened, 
confident, homeless, rude, and brilliant. We take them with ADHD, junior rheumatoid 
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arthritis, and English as their second language. We take them all! Every one! And that, 
Mr. Vollmer, is why it’s not a business. It’s school.”4 
 Beyond this critical distinction, there are five additional barriers, as I explained in 
Chapter 5, to making education a business, as Chris Whittle had professed in 1992 was 
his ambition in establishing the Edison Project. Territoriality may be the most significant 
barrier to companies taking over public schools. The political pushback against 
Behavioral Research Labs (BRL) in Gary, Indiana, in the early 1970s, against 
Educational Alternatives Inc. (EAI) in Baltimore and Hartford in the 1990s, and against 
Edison in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia in the aughts all testify to the resistance 
of communities to what came to be known as Educational Management Organizations 
(EMOs). In case after case, community protest was defined by opposition to outsourcing 
the management of a central civic institution to a for-profit operator. As noted, the 
success, by contrast, of K12 Inc., Connections Academy, and other for-profit providers of 
virtual (or online) education speaks to a salient difference in the nature of service 
rendered. While BRL, EAI, and Edison engaged in the operation of schools and thus, 
implicitly if not explicitly, planted the company flag on school grounds, K12, 
Connections Academy, and their competitors have provided a barely visible service to 
school districts in the form of online curricula for home-schooled students and online 
courses in subjects for which schools can’t afford to provide instruction, such as some 
foreign languages and advanced topics in math. 
                                                
44 See Jamie Robert Vollmer, “The Blueberry Story,” Education Week, March 6, 2002, 42; and 
Larry Cuban, The Blackboard and the Bottom Line: Why Schools Can’t Be Businesses 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-5. 
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 The difference between managing a school and providing online curricula, 
however, goes beyond optics and points to the second barrier to outsourcing school 
management to a for-profit operator.  School management is a necessarily complex 
service rife with problems associated with information asymmetry and concomitant 
incomplete contracting.  As the direct consumer, the student is not in a good position to 
assess the quality of his or her education.  The parent, taxpayer, and legislator are 
meanwhile at a necessary distance.  The online curricula offered by the likes of K12 and 
Connections Academy, however, differ little from textbooks and software licenses, 
discrete goods and services whose merits can be far more easily assessed. 
 The third barrier to what Whittle and others had envisioned in turning education 
into a business is transaction costs. Precisely because education is a complex service 
inherently rife with problems of information asymmetry, contracts must be written with 
extraordinary specificity and even then fall short of deflecting client distrust. The costs of 
writing and enforcing such detailed contracts, as explained, are nevertheless significant. 
The costs of marketing for EMOs are likewise significant, as are those for managing a 
network of schools spread across several states. As I explained in Chapter 1, conventional 
school districts, located in one region, see significant diseconomies of scale emerge when 
they have more than 15,000 students on account of additional administrative layers 
necessary for larger operations.5  For EMOs running a scattered network of schools, the 
problem of diseconomies of scale clearly becomes that much greater. 
                                                
5 Matthew Andrews, William Duncombe, and John Yinger,  “Revisiting Economies of Size in 
American Education: Are We Any Closer to a Consensus?,” Economics of Education Review 21 
(June 2002): 245-262. See also Henry M. Levin, “Why Is This So Difficult?,” in Educational 
Entrepreneurship: Realities, Challenges, Possibilities, ed. Frederick M. Hess (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Education Press, 2006), 165-182. 
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 The fourth barrier is bargain obsolescence. There are no trade secrets to the 
operations of EMOs. Host districts can and do learn how EMOs operate, adopt their best 
practices, and then exit contracts when the premium for external management is no 
longer justifiable.  Both the superintendent of schools in Wichita, Kansas, and the head of 
a large charter school in Boston, as I explained, exited contracts with Edison after seven 
years for precisely this reason. As Dudley Blodget, the head of the charter school in 
Boston, said: “We’ve now got the internal strength to be more independent. Edison is a 
great start-up model. We could never have gotten off the ground without them.  But now 
we want to run the school ourselves.”6 
 Finally, there is the barrier of mission alignment.  In the language of “identity 
economics,” teachers, like policemen, firemen, and soldiers, are typically driven by their 
desire to maximize not their utility as consumers but rather their utility as servants of a 
cause. This makes for a mismatch with for-profit school management. The veteran 
teacher who set Vollmer straight about the difference between making ice cream and 
running a school by reeling off the kind of children public school students must serve 
communicated precisely this sense of mission.  The failure of EMOs to win the buy-in of 
teachers achieved by their nonprofit CMO counterparts, as I explained, furnishes 
additional evidence of this critical distinction.  
 As the foci of this study, Edison, KIPP, Mastery, and Kunskapsskolan clearly do 
not capture the entire narrative of EMOs and CMOs, but they do represent a good deal of 
these sectors. Edison, after all, was the standard-bearer of a movement hailed by Wall 
Street analysts in the 1990s to outsource the operation of public schools to EMOs. 
                                                
6 D.C. Denison, “School of Hard Knocks in the Bull Market,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2002. 
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Analysts, as I wrote, forecasted that Edison and similar EMOs surfacing in its wake 
would run 10 to 20 percent of the country's public schools by 2010 and reward investors 
handsomely.  By 2010, the portion of public schools run by EMOs was 0.7 percent. 
Moreover, Edison’s financial failure was pronounced, echoing that of BRL and EAI long 
before, and no EMO has since gone public. As the standard-bearer of for-profit school 
management in Sweden, Kunskapsskolan reflects a nationwide initiative of investors and 
school leaders to bring market competition to primary and secondary schooling.  KIPP 
meanwhile constitutes the nonprofit response to Edison. As the country’s largest CMO, it 
now manages 209 schools from Massachusetts to California.  Mastery, in turn, is a 
regional CMO in KIPP’s mold. 
 
The corporate makeover of education is nevertheless not confined to EMOs and CMOs. It 
extends to federal and state policy.  EMOs and CMOs are products of the push for greater 
accountability going back to the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983. In this regard, 
they are part of the shift in “policy regime” identified by Patrick J. McGuinn as well as 
Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir that subordinated the government’s focus on equity to 
its concentration on excellence.7 In turn, EMOs and CMOs have buttressed, if not directly 
influenced, federal and state policy with their unrelenting dedication to results on 
standardized tests.  Edison’s president and COO Chris Cerf, as noted in Chapter 3, went 
on to become commissioner of education of New Jersey; and Jim Shelton, another Edison 
executive, went on to become deputy secretary of education for innovation and 
                                                
7 Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the 
Democratic Ideal (New York: Basic, 1985), 210-213; Patrick J. McGuinn, No Child Left Behind 
and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005 (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 2006), 11-24.  
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improvement in the Obama administration. In the Trump administration, Jason Botel, a 
former KIPP executive, serves as deputy assistant secretary of education for elementary 
and secondary education. 
 Edison, as I wrote in Chapter 3, did not ultimately have to flourish to have an 
impact.  The company played a major role in transforming the discussion of public 
education by emphasizing competition, choice, and results.  Whittle’s contention in 
advertorials in Education Week in 2005 and 2006 that schools should provide parents 
data about their children’s academic progress much as Federal Express supplies 
customers data about their packages is a telling illustration of how the company at the 
very least amplified the focus on results.  As I noted in Chapter 1, Whittle argued that 
that just as Federal Express informs customers exactly when a package shipped and 
where it is in transit, schools should pinpoint for parents their children’s levels of 
proficiency in reading and math throughout the year.8 In testing all students in grades 
three through eight and one year in high school in reading and math and recording data 
for students on regular benchmark assessments in preparation for these annual tests, 
schools on account of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and its successor, the Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA), come close to fulfilling Whittle’s vision.  Typifying the embrace 
of annual testing, the editorial board of The New York Times in December 2015 dismissed 
as absurd a proposal in the Senate concerning reauthorization of NCLB that would have 
permitted states to end annual testing. Such legislation, the editors contended, “would 
leave the country no way of knowing whether students were learning anything or not.”9 
                                                
8 The advertorials ran on page 2 of Education Week in the following issues:  September 28 and 
December 7, 2005; and February 15 and 22 and May 3, 2006. 
9  “Course Correction for School Testing,” New York Times, December 7, 2015. 
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 Yet we don’t need annual testing to know whether students are learning. With 
sophisticated sampling techniques, school administrators can obtain all the information 
they need and simultaneously preserve time for art, music, crafts, and play as well as 
academic subjects other than reading and math.  School administrators can thus also 
reclaim valuable time, energy, and resources expended on constructing, proctoring, and 
grading these tests. With the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), we 
already have in place an excellent form of sampling. Introduced in 1969, NAEP has been 
periodically administered to test small but representative samples of students in reading, 
writing, math, and science in grades four, eight, and twelve in public schools across the 
country. Since 2007 NAEP has been administered every two years. The sample size is, on 
average, 2,500 students in each grade in each state.10 
 A reader might fault me for this conclusion by pointing out how much data 
analysis there is in this study.  But much of that data analysis concerned the perverse 
consequences of heavy testing in Baltimore and Philadelphia:  tampering in the first case; 
disregard in the second for subjects (specifically, writing and science) that had no bearing 
on determining a school’s Adequate Yearly Progress, the metric introduced by NCLB to 
assess schools.11 The remaining data analysis concerned child welfare, crime, per-pupil 
expenditure, teacher pay, and the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 
the exam administered by the OECD every three years since 2000 to a small random 
sample of fifteen-year-olds in each member nation. 
                                                
10 National Center for Education Statistics, NAEP Overview, 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/. 




 The evidence against the usefulness of all our testing is robust and compelling.  
Perhaps most damning was a detailed report published in 2011 by the National Research 
Council drawing on analysis of ten years of test-based accountability systems as well as 
merit pay programs for teachers and pay-for-performance experiments for students. 
Entitled Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education, the report was the work 
of a blue-ribbon commission made up of seventeen leading professors of business, 
economics, education, law, psychology, and sociology.  The authors found little if any 
effect on student progress and, in some instances, counterproductive outcomes.12   
 Paul Reville, the secretary of education for Massachusetts, drew a similar 
conclusion in 2008 upon reflecting on efforts in the state since passage of the 
Massachusetts Education Reform Act in 1993.  Reville, one of the architects of the act, 
said that despite aggressive efforts at measurement and accountability, the state had failed 
to alter the strong relationship of socioeconomic status to educational achievement.13  
 Worse yet, our emphasis on testing has led school officials to invest good money 
after bad in analyzing test results to guard against cheating by principals and teachers 
worried sick about the impact of student performance on their evaluations and pay.  In 
August 2015, New York City Schools chancellor Carmen Fariña announced the creation 
of an Academic Integrity Task Force to investigate irregularities in test scores as well as 
rates of graduation and course credit accumulation.  “Principals and guidance counselors 
                                                
12 Michael Hout and Stuart W. Elliott, eds., Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in 
Education (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011).  See also Sarah D. Sparks, “Panel 
Finds Few Learning Benefits in High-Stakes Exams,” Education Week, June 8, 2011, 1 and 14. 
13 Michael Jonas, “Held Back,” Commonwealth Magazine, June 5, 2008, 
http://commonwealthmagazine.org/education/held-back/. For more detail, see David K. Cohen 
and Susan L. Moffitt, The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix the Schools? 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 211-213.  
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will have to attend additional training sessions to help them maintain high standards,” 
reported the Associated Press, and auditors from the accounting firm Ernst & Young will 
assist the task force in reviewing data. According to The New York Times, the task force 
is expected to cost $5 million a year.14  Fariña and superintendents like her have had little 
choice.  They must comply with federal and state mandates.   
 
The corporate makeover of education, in sum, amounts to what I termed paradigm 
encroachment in the Introduction. The commercial mindset basic to American identity, 
documented half a century ago by Raymond Callahan and Richard Hofstadter,15 and the 
embrace of the market around the globe accelerated by the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
documented by Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin,16 have together pushed the market 
model in education beyond its appropriate boundaries. 
 This conclusion is not reached without acknowledgment of the gradual acceptance 
in the past of seemingly inappropriate economic arrangements. Lending money and 
charging interest, after all, was barred in Europe until the sixteenth century and later by 
usury laws deriving from passages in Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, Psalms, and 
                                                
14 Associated Press, “N.Y.C. Chancellor Forms Anti-Cheating Task Force,” Education Week, 
August 19, 2015, 4; and Elizabeth A. Harris, “New York City Task Force Targets Cheating by 
Teachers and Principals,” New York Times, August 4, 2015. 
15 Raymond Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that 
Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962), 7, 19-25, 67-94; and Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New 
York: Knopf, 1963), 237-252, 299-322. 
16 Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between 





Ezekiel.17 Selling life insurance policies and annuities was also at the outset judged 
unethical for putting a price on longevity but in time became mainstream practice.18 
 Nor, as noted in the Introduction and Chapter 1, is this conclusion reached 
without acknowledgment of the need for many school systems to improve payroll, 
inventory, storage, construction, and auditing protocols as well as streamline hiring and 
purchasing procedures, as documented over several decades by David Rogers.19 Yet 
running schools like businesses and imposing the metrics of the corporate world on 
everyday pedagogical practice have already manifested substantial perverse 
consequences. 
 Milton Friedman’s case for “selling school like groceries,” as he put it in his 1973 
essay for The New York Times,20 perhaps best captures what is wrong with the corporate 
model.  The case rests on a forced analogy.21  The same holds for Secretary of Education 
                                                
17 Jacques Le Goff, Un Autre Moyen Âge (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1999), 1274-1275.  Le Goff 
cites the following biblical passages as basic to  usury laws in medieval Europe: Exodus, 22:24; 
Leviticus, 25: 35-37; Deuteronomy, 23: 20; Psalm 25; and Ezekiel, 18: 13.  Glyn Davies explains 
in A History of Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 2002), 218-223, that a parliamentary act approving interest on loans passed in 1545, was 
repealed in 1552, and then reenacted in 1571.  Simon Schama explains in The Embarrassment of 
Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (New York: Knopf, 1988), 330, 
that bankers and their families were barred from communion in Holland until 1658. 
18 Viviana Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 
19 David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street: Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City School 
System (New York: Random House, 1968); Rogers and Norman H. Chung, 110 Livingston Street 
Revisited: Decentralization in Action (New York: New York University Press, 1983); Can 
Business Management Save the Cities: The Case of New York (New York: Free Press, 1978); 
Mayoral Control of the New York City Schools (New York: Springer, 2009). 
20 Milton Friedman, “Selling School like Groceries: The Voucher Idea,” New York Times, 
September 23, 1973. 
21 For more on forced analogies and their consequences, see Jon Elster, Explaining Social 
Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 167-174. 
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Betsy DeVos’s recent contention that choosing a school should be akin to choosing 
among Lyft, Uber, or a taxi.22 Schools are not like car services or groceries, or 
supermarkets for that matter, because they provide a complex service that eludes 
conventional contract enforcement and, moreover, represent hubs of civic engagement 
and identification fundamental to community life.  Friedman envisioned in that essay 
“highly capitalized chain schools, like supermarkets.” Whittle attempted to build on that 
idea, aiming to bring about the Safeway of schools.23   That did not happen, as I have 
documented in this study, and, for good reason, should not happen. 
                                                
22 Valerie Strauss, “DeVos: Picking a School Should be Like Choosing Among Uber, Lyft or a 
Taxi,” Washington Post, March 29, 2017. 
23 Chris Whittle, Crash Course: Imagining a Better Future for Public Education (New York: 
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